Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1 (12 lettori)

Stato
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frmaoro

il Fankazzista
Sono d'accordo FRMoro.
Le vicende argentine sono completamente diverse, anche se la suggestione si indirizza verso quei lidi.
Se devo trovare qualche similitudine la vedrei meglio tra Irlanda e Islanda.
ne avevo troppe sono rimasto spiazzato in una settimana hanno rimescolato tutte le carte pultroppo :wall:
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Grisù

Forumer attivo
Sul successivo resoconto Reuters, la sua posizione è più chiara.
Comunque se ne discute, abbastanza tenacemente.

No, Reuters quota solo una parte, neanche fosse la gazzetta dello sport. L'intervento di Bini è coerente con i precedenti e naturalmente le parti più interessanti vengono omesse più o meno liberamente.

Third, the best way to avoid triggering speculative attacks against the member states is to link the financial support provided to countries to the latter’s ability to repay, in particular to debt sustainability. There should be no automatic mechanism linking financial support to debt restructuring, because it would attract speculative pressure and precipitate a crisis, even for countries that are solvent.
This raises the issue of how to deal with countries that are not in a position to repay all their debt. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. Again, the experience of the IMF shows that there have been cases of debt restructuring associated with Fund programmes, even though debt restructuring is not considered in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Out of 113 IMF support programmes over the last 20 years, only 19 countries defaulted or restructured their debts. The countries which went through such action – Algeria, Argentina, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Grenada, Indonesia, Kenya, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Russia, Seychelles, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe – have characteristics which are not very similar to euro area members.
In all these cases restructuring was done on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific circumstances. It is suggested by some that precise rules and conditions for debt restructuring should be attached to the creation of the new European mechanism, with a view to achieve an orderly restructuring. In my view this is “unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely”, to quote a recent Staff paper by the IMF.
It is unnecessary because experience shows that restructuring can take place even without international norms and without the IMF being given specific powers in this field. It is undesirable because there is a risk that norms designed at addressing problems of the past are not any more valid for complex financial systems and may even aggravate the situation. Most crises of the past had to deal mainly with foreign creditors of developing countries. In advanced economies the restructuring of the public debt would have to involve a much larger number of financial assets and liabilities, including those of the domestic banking system vis-à-vis residents and non residents. It can be easily seen that there can hardly be anything “orderly” in such a process.
Attempts to work on this issue should certainly not be discouraged. The IMF experience in this field is again telling. There studies and discussions on the design of a mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring took much effort and lasted several years. The result was intellectually interesting but ultimately not agreed, neither by the sovereign states neither by financial market participants. This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try again. But we should be aware that calling for an orderly debt restructuring mechanism sounds nice and is costless. Designing and implementing it is somewhat different, and has not been done yet, like many other nice catchwords which have attracted our intellectual interest in the past.
Some work can be done, and has been done, in developing mechanisms which make it easier for creditors and debtors to agree on revising the contractual terms. Substantial work has been done for instance on collective action clauses, which set minimum thresholds for debtor representation needed to agree on a restructuring. These mechanisms exist currently in many national laws. It might be more promising and pragmatic to further explore this avenue.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Greece Will Stick to EU Deal on Debt Reduction, Official Says

November 01, 2010, 1:04 PM EDT

By Paul Tugwell


Nov. 1 (Bloomberg) -- Greece will stick to its agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in May in return for a 110 billion-euro ($153 billion) emergency loan package, government spokesman George Petalotis said.
“The government’s position is the strict adherence to, and implementation of, the objectives of the programme to lead the country out of the crisis,” Petalotis said, according to an e- mailed transcript of a press briefing in Athens today.
His comments follow remarks by Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Panagalos in an interview with To Vima newspaper that Greece may consider restructuring its debt at some point.
“Before we reach a restructuring of debt, we have to finish with the deficit, but the demonization of debt restructuring is wrong,” Panagalos said, according to the Athens-based newspaper. “Debts exist to be restructured. We may pursue it or it may be suggested to us.”
Petalotis said in an interview with Athens-based radio station Real FM that the discussion “concerns the extension of repayment times and we’re only talking about repayment.”
“It’s still a theoretical discussion and no one knows if it will become more formal,” he said, according to a transcript from the government Press Ministry. “What concerns us is to strictly adhere to our goals.”
 

Noloss

Forumer attivo
Riguardo all'idea italiana di comprendere il risparmio privato direi che sia una necessità per il nostro rating su un debito così elevato.

Ma tale principio viene a legarsi col fatto che è molto presumibile un risparmio privato a contenimento del debito in caso di necessità.

Quindi non sarei così entusiasta, è probabile che a fronte di tale riconoscimento la Germania possa pretendere un primo passo dai privati di tale Stato e poi le opportune misure europee.

Allora, qualsiasi investimento farete, avremo sempre il rischio (fiscale) Italia per tutti noi!

Inoltre continuo a pensare che indirettamente tale principio italiano non aiuti a definire urgente e necessario tutte le misure strutturali (che già lo sono). Purtroppo il suo riconoscimento potrebbe dare ulteriore de-responsabilità alla classe dirigente e politica.

Che tristezza!
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
No, Reuters quota solo una parte, neanche fosse la gazzetta dello sport. L'intervento di Bini è coerente con i precedenti e naturalmente le parti più interessanti vengono omesse più o meno liberamente.

Third, the best way to avoid triggering speculative attacks against the member states is to link the financial support provided to countries to the latter’s ability to repay, in particular to debt sustainability. There should be no automatic mechanism linking financial support to debt restructuring, because it would attract speculative pressure and precipitate a crisis, even for countries that are solvent.
This raises the issue of how to deal with countries that are not in a position to repay all their debt. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. Again, the experience of the IMF shows that there have been cases of debt restructuring associated with Fund programmes, even though debt restructuring is not considered in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Out of 113 IMF support programmes over the last 20 years, only 19 countries defaulted or restructured their debts. The countries which went through such action – Algeria, Argentina, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Grenada, Indonesia, Kenya, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Russia, Seychelles, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe – have characteristics which are not very similar to euro area members.
In all these cases restructuring was done on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific circumstances. It is suggested by some that precise rules and conditions for debt restructuring should be attached to the creation of the new European mechanism, with a view to achieve an orderly restructuring. In my view this is “unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely”, to quote a recent Staff paper by the IMF.
It is unnecessary because experience shows that restructuring can take place even without international norms and without the IMF being given specific powers in this field. It is undesirable because there is a risk that norms designed at addressing problems of the past are not any more valid for complex financial systems and may even aggravate the situation. Most crises of the past had to deal mainly with foreign creditors of developing countries. In advanced economies the restructuring of the public debt would have to involve a much larger number of financial assets and liabilities, including those of the domestic banking system vis-à-vis residents and non residents. It can be easily seen that there can hardly be anything “orderly” in such a process.
Attempts to work on this issue should certainly not be discouraged. The IMF experience in this field is again telling. There studies and discussions on the design of a mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring took much effort and lasted several years. The result was intellectually interesting but ultimately not agreed, neither by the sovereign states neither by financial market participants. This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try again. But we should be aware that calling for an orderly debt restructuring mechanism sounds nice and is costless. Designing and implementing it is somewhat different, and has not been done yet, like many other nice catchwords which have attracted our intellectual interest in the past.
Some work can be done, and has been done, in developing mechanisms which make it easier for creditors and debtors to agree on revising the contractual terms. Substantial work has been done for instance on collective action clauses, which set minimum thresholds for debtor representation needed to agree on a restructuring. These mechanisms exist currently in many national laws. It might be more promising and pragmatic to further explore this avenue.

Qui si legge meglio.
Tuttavia, il problema non è Bini-Smaghi, nè Trichet ... ma Frau Merkel, la mina vagante. Bisogna vedere sin dove vorrà spingersi.
Oggi nonostante le buone notizie il Portogallo ha allargato ulteriormente e l'Irlanda ha toccato i massimi storici sul Bund.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Greek Value-Added Tax Revenue Rose for Third Month in October

November 01, 2010, 1:38 PM EDT

By Maria Petrakis


Nov. 1 (Bloomberg) -- The Greek government’s revenue from value-added taxes increased for a third month in October, a finance ministry official said.

Sales-tax revenue, which accounts for about a third of all revenue, rose 15 percent in October from a year earlier, said the official, who declined to be named. That produced a 4.4 percent increase in the 10 months to the end of October, compared with a 2.9 percent gain up to the end of September.

Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou has said that tax revenue for the country will pick up towards the end of the year, reversing a shortfall so far, as increases in value-added tax rates kick in. Greece said on Oct. 20 its state budget deficit shrank 30.9 percent to 16.3 billion euros ($23 billion) in the first nine months of the year from a year earlier.
Net ordinary budget revenue rose 3.6 percent compared with a revised annual target of 8.7 percent.


Greece’s government increased value-added rates by 10 percent from July 1, part of a package of measures agreed with the European Union and International Monetary Fund in return for 110 billion euros in emergency loans.


***
Una notizia buona in una brutta giornata.
Meglio ancora perchè si tratta di IVA ...
 

IlPorcospino

Forumer storico
Riguardo all'idea italiana di comprendere il risparmio privato direi che sia una necessità per il nostro rating su un debito così elevato.

Ma tale principio viene a legarsi col fatto che è molto presumibile un risparmio privato a contenimento del debito in caso di necessità.

Quindi non sarei così entusiasta, è probabile che a fronte di tale riconoscimento la Germania possa pretendere un primo passo dai privati di tale Stato e poi le opportune misure europee.

Allora, qualsiasi investimento farete, avremo sempre il rischio (fiscale) Italia per tutti noi!

Inoltre continuo a pensare che indirettamente tale principio italiano non aiuti a definire urgente e necessario tutte le misure strutturali (che già lo sono). Purtroppo il suo riconoscimento potrebbe dare ulteriore de-responsabilità alla classe dirigente e politica.

Che tristezza!

Sì, sono d'accordo. Non possiamo fare il tifo per le nuove regole "italiane" solo perchè salvano i TdS della ns. patria da una discesa, se lo faranno. Dobbiamo renderci conto che potrebbero esserci effetti indesiderati peggiori della discesa stessa. Non mi sembra ci sia scampo alla riduzione del debito; non al prezzo di uccidere la già asfittica ripresa, ma a scapito degli evasori e delle caste, in primis la casta dei politici. Ma chi ha la forza di affrontare il problema? Nessuno, per ora. Bisognerà che la forza delle cose costringano alle misure necessarie. Nel frattempo, facciamo trading.
 

g.ln

Triplo Panico: comprare
Nonostante la Merkel

C'è tempo ...
Oggi è stata una giornataccia alla Borsa di Atene mentre i nostri Bond GGB hanno tenuto le posizioni.
Il legame tra andamento dei Bond e indice ASE è molto forte.

E' strano che nonostante le dichiarazioni bomba della Merkel (possibile ristrutturazione del debito dei Paesi europei in difficoltà) le quotazioni dei titoli della Patria dei greci non abbiano raggiunto i prezzi della fine della prima settimana di maggio. O i prezzi scontavano già questa notizia, o la sconteranno nei prossimi giorni! Ma di solito il panic selling scatta subito!
Stiamo a vedere.
Ciao, Giuseppe
 
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