Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1

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Russia and Greece talk to Libya about a ceasefire

Sat Apr 23, 2011 4:40pm GMT






* Libyan PM talks with Russia foreign minister and Greek PM
* Libyan agency: Lavrov offers ceasefire observers

(Adds Greek government source, no comment from Moscow)


RABAT, April 23 (Reuters) - Russia and Greece held talks with the Libyan government about the enforcement of a ceasefire, the official JANA news agency said, after government troops appeared to withdraw from front lines in rebel-held Misrata.
JANA said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi on Saturday Moscow could send observers to monitor a ceasefire and pave the way for a peaceful solution.
The official JANA news agency said Lavrov made the proposal during phone talks with Mahmoudi.
"Russia stands by the Libyan people," JANA quoted him as saying.
Lavrov and Mahmoudi "emphasised during the exchange the implementation of a ceasefire announced by Libya", it said.
"Russia's position focuses on a peaceful solution and its readiness to send observers to monitor a ceasefire. He (Lavrov) emphasised that Russia has notified the United Nations about this."
There was no immediate comment on the report from Moscow. Russia has criticised the Western campaign of air strikes against Muammar Gaddafi's forces as exceeding the mandate of a U.N. resolution which authorises the use of force to protect civilians.
JANA said Mahmoudi also talked with his Greek counterpart George Papandreou and "reiterated Libya's commitment to United Nations resolutions" and said Libya is committed to the African Union's peace initiative.
A Greek government source confirmed the contact. "The exchange indeed took place, on the initiative of the Libyan side," the source said.
"The Greek prime minister reiterated to his Libyan counterpart that Libya must comply with UN resolutions."
The Libyan government has repeatedly made calls for ceasefires, rejected by rebels who say they are not matched by its actions.
The Kremlin on Friday said Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Papandreou were working to help resolve the Libyan conflict and were ready "to provide any necessary mediation help in order to settle the situation in Libya", Russia's Interfax agency reported.


***
Politica estera.
Papandreou, anche in questi momenti, riesce a ritagliarsi un ruolo da giocare sullo scacchiere internazionale.
 
GRECIA: STARK, RISTRUTTURAZIONE DEBITO PORTEREBBE SVANTAGGI
***
In Italiano.
Riassunto sintetico della posizione di Stark (e della BCE), chiaro ed essenziale.

Direi che la traduzione italiana è moderata, le dichiarazioni originali sono molto più pesanti...

ECB's Stark: risks of second Lehman if state restructures

BERLIN, April 23 (Reuters) - A sovereign debt restructuring in a euro zone state could trigger a banking crisis worse than that unleashed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, ECB Executive Board member Juergen Stark said. In comments released on the Web site of German broadcaster ZDF on Saturday, Stark raised the spectre of the U.S. investment bank's famous collapse to underline the European Central Bank's opposition to Greece restructuring its mountain of debt.
"A restructuring would be short sighted and bring considerable drawbacks," he said. "In the worst case, the restructuring of a member state could overshadow the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy."
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 virtually froze credit markets and pushed governments into huge bailouts of their banking sectors.
Rising expectations that Greece will have to restructure a debt load that is one-and-a-half times its annual output has raised doubts about whether leaders can restore confidence in the 12-year-old euro currency experiment.
In the interview, Stark criticised the debate over Greece, which he said was being monitored closely but is not insolvent, and would be able to pay its debts after an international bailout agreed last May.
"The discussion about restructuring in the euro zone is based on false assumptions that one state or another is insolvent," he said.
"The EU and IMF adjustment programmes were based on analyses of the ability to repay debt," he said. "Aid would not have been disbursed if the ability to repay debt after the completion of the reform programmes could not be ensured."
 
Rimango sempre dell'avviso che l'ipotesi di riscadenziamento di 5 anni mantenendo il nominale a 100 sia quella più gettonata: lieve ed indolore.
Poi nel 2013 si vedrà ...

Non ho capito: quando ipotizzi il riscadenziamento? Questa estate? Quindi tutti i titoli diverrebbero post 2013.....
Comunque l'ipotesi Uruguay è sempre statta la mia favorita, anche se a questo punto ha perso molto probabilità.
Ma tu tecnicamente come la vedi?Perchè comunque è un default....

Fitch: Completion of Debt Exchange Marks Uruguay Default.

NEW YORK & LONDON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--May 16, 2003

Fitch Ratings today downgraded the ratings on Uruguay's long-term foreign currency debt to 'DDD' from 'C' in anticipation of the completion of a comprehensive exchange of foreign currency debt which Fitch deems to be an event of default under its criteria for distressed debt exchanges. The short-term foreign currency rating is downgraded to 'D' from 'C'. Ratings on the securities to emerge from the exchange will be formally rated when they are issued on May 29 and are likely to be rated around the 'B-' level. Meanwhile, as local currency securities were excluded from the debt exchange, Fitch upgraded the long-term local currency (Uruguayan peso) ratings to 'B' from 'CCC-'. The Outlook on the ratings is Stable.

The government announced today that the exchange offer had achieved the required minimum participation level and that the exchange would therefore be completed; in aggregate, about 90% of eligible bonds' face value was tendered. The offer was extended through May 22, but May 29 issue date for new securities remains unchanged.

In Fitch's opinion, although the exchange was deemed 'voluntary' by the authorities and a payment default has not occurred, a default has occurred in substance because the exchange imposes unambiguous losses in economic terms and because bondholders electing not to participate will become subordinated to the new issues. Under the terms of the exchange, maturities will be extended by at least five years without sufficient compensation in cash or additional interest coupons to offset the loss in the present value of principal. Furthermore, exit amendments approved by a majority of bondholders will eliminate cross-default clauses on the old bonds, and result in their delisting from the Montevideo and Luxembourg Stock Exchanges, dramatically reducing credit protection and liquidity.

In accordance with Fitch's practice in distressed debt exchanges, exchange-eligible bonds will retain a default rating for at least 30 days, to the extent that they are not fully extinguished. After 30 days, if the government is committed to continuing to pay principal and interest on any outstanding defaulted bonds according to their original terms, the ratings on these securities will be raised out of the default category. Because these bonds will be subordinate to new issues, and because Fitch believes that the government's willingness to service these bonds is uncertain, they will carry ratings below the new issues.

New securities issued as part of the exchange will be assigned ratings based on Fitch's assessment of the likelihood of timely and complete payment, potentially at the 'B-' level. In developing its opinion of the appropriate ratings for the new bonds, Fitch will evaluate the new debt service burden, the appropriateness of the fiscal program, and the state of the financial system. A final determination of the ratings for the new bonds will be made when they are issued on May 29.

The local currency rating is upgraded on the substantial improvement in Uruguay's liquidity position as a result of the exchange. Scheduled 2004 and 2005 amortizations are now due almost entirely to official creditors. These obligations would likely be refinanced, assuming IMF performance criteria are met, providing authorities with breathing room to make improvements to public finances and the country's competitiveness. An updated debt service schedule based on the results of the exchange is not yet available, but the reported aggregate participation rate through today is sufficient to make an analytically meaningful estimate of revised financing needs. Excluding payments to the IMF, non-financial public sector amortizations for the remainder of the year are estimated at up to US$200 million, which should be financed by multilateral disbursements of US$380 million. Similarly, 2004 total amortizations of up to US$306 million should be covered multilateral disbursements of US$316 million. Apart from holdouts, market amortizations through 2008 were eliminated by the exchange for all foreign currency bonds. Although refinancing risk has been reduced substantially by extending maturities, interest obligations are not significantly reduced as a result of the exchange and remain high in comparison with some other 'B' sovereigns. Interest obligations are estimated at $480 million or 14.7% of revenue in 2003 and at 13.6% of revenue in 2004. COPYRIGHT 2003 Business Wire
 
come ho sempre detto, io metterei subito la firma per una soluzione stile Uruguay....

Per gli appassionati e chi si vuole fare un po' di cultura...
 

Allegati

Direi che la traduzione italiana è moderata, le dichiarazioni originali sono molto più pesanti...

ECB's Stark: risks of second Lehman if state restructures


l'originale l'avevo postato:
http://www.investireoggi.it/forum/operativo-titoli-di-stato-greci-vt37706-2945.html#post2139496

Condivido....troppa faciloneria...
Gli effetti di panico e contagio vanno ben oltre i grafichetti e le tabelle...
Se non erro il defaut russo del 98 scombussolò l'intero mondo, portando il contagio fino ad Argentina ed Uruguay...
 
come ho sempre detto, io metterei subito la firma per una soluzione stile Uruguay....

Per gli appassionati e chi si vuole fare un po' di cultura...

prima di farmi leggere tutto il documento ...
cosa fecero (allungamente maturity, haircut ?), e più specificatamente:
cosa successe a chi non aderì allo scambio? diventarono junior, ma poi furono pagati?
O lo scambio fu esteso a tutti incondizionatamente?
 
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prima di farmi leggere tutto il documento ...
cosa fecero (allungamente maturity, haircut ?), e più specificatamente:
cosa successe a chi non aderì allo scambio? diventarono junior, ma poi furono pagati?
O lo scambio fu esteso a tutti incondizionatamente?

aumento mauturity di 5 anni circa. Nessun haircut.
Chi non aderì allo scambio i relativi titoli divennero subordinati rispetto alle nuove emissioni. Ma poi che io sappia furono pagati. (potrei sbagliarmi ma non ho notizie di default giuridici Uruguay)
 
cmq leggendo la seconda parte del report UBS riporta anche gli effetti su Portogallo ed Irlanda, alzamento degli spread su Spagna e Italia, insomma impatto che coivolgerebbe tutta l'Europa; pur dicendo che le 20 banche europee che hanno il debito greco sarebbero in grado di sostenere l'haircut, fa anche riferimento ai rischi a catena (esempio banche portoghesi già sotto pressione sollecitate maggiormente)
ed aggiunge che il guadagnare tempo è cmq una strategia per un minore impatto

PS per completare il quadro sarebbe utile avere il report originale di Deutsche Bank che dà la ristrutturazione come evento non inevitabile

PS2 Deutsche Bank è fortemente interessata perchè la sua esposizione è zero, ma quella della controllata DPB è molto elevata
 
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Non ho capito: quando ipotizzi il riscadenziamento? Questa estate? Quindi tutti i titoli diverrebbero post 2013.....
Comunque l'ipotesi Uruguay è sempre statta la mia favorita, anche se a questo punto ha perso molto probabilità.
Ma tu tecnicamente come la vedi?Perchè comunque è un default....

Come già detto, la mia ipotesi attuale è che non succederà niente.
Papandreou avrà modo di dimostrare la bontà dei suoi provvedimenti nei prossimi mesi, credo intorno a luglio potremmo avere un quadro più chiaro.
Nel frattempo la troika rilascerà la tranche da 12 MLD con le avvertenze riguardanti le privatizzazioni ed un'ulteriore rigore nei conti pubblici.
Ovviamente mi auguro che i segnali positivi possano iniziare ad intravedersi concretamente con la stagione estiva.
Se verso settembre/ottobre la recessione sarà ancora profonda e il PIL non darà segni di ripresa questo potrà indurre la Grecia a prendere provvedimenti in favore di un riscadenziamento dei titoli a partire dai primi mesi del 2012 mantenendo il nominale a 100 e spostando le scadenze più in là di cinque anni.
La necessità di intervento potrà riguardare le scadenze sino al 2015. Il valore cedolare non verrà toccato.
Nel frattempo per le necessità di cassa si potrà fare ricorso ad emissioni sottoscritte dall'EFSF, qualora l'accesso ai mercati finanziari sarà proibitivo.
La soluzione migliore, per noi e per la Grecia, rimane un concambio con titoli EFSF al nominale ma con taglio cedolare, questa soluzione può essere elaborata attraverso una proposta di libera adesione insieme ad un buy back con i titoli in pancia a BCE.

Queste sono le mie ipotesi, discutibili, ma ragionevoli.
Come i discorsi degli ultimi giorni ... molto accademica :-o.
 
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