Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1 (4 lettori)

[tommy271]

Greece Appoints Managers For Bond Swap Deal



ATHENS -(Dow Jones)- Greece has appointed BNP-Paribas, Deutsche Bank and HSBC to act as managers in a plan to swap existing Greek bonds held by private investors with longer dated maturities, the Finance Ministry said Wednesday.
The three banks will act as joint dealer-managers for the voluntary bond exchange, a related financing facility, and debt buyback program agreed at last week's European summit, the ministry said in a statement.
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP has been appointed as legal adviser for the bond swap and Lazard Freres as financial adviser, the ministry added.
Greek Deputy Finance Minister Philippos Sachinidis said Tuesday that Greece expects to implement the bond swap deal with private investors next month, offering them four choices for trading in their existing Greek government bonds for 30-year debt.
European Union leaders have agreed to a new EUR109 billion assistance program for Greece to cover its financing needs for the next several years. Central to the Greek plan is a distressed-debt exchange whereby the country's private sector creditors agree to accept new bonds worth less than their original holdings.

 

[tommy271]

German Econ Minister: Bureaucracy Major Hurdle To Investing In Greece



BERLIN (Dow Jones)--German Economics Minister Philipp Roesler said Wednesday that German companies are eager to invest in Greece's renewable energy and infrastructure sectors, but that bureaucracy remains a major hurdle to their engagement there.
"It was clear that there's clearly an intent to invest in renewable energy...but bureaucracy is a hindrance," Roesler told reporters after meeting with officials from influential German trade associations.
He added that infrastructure projects, such as new airports, and opportunities to expand tourism operations are also attractive to German companies.
Roesler also said German officials could advise Greece on reforming its monopoly and cartel regulations.
"We can offer some of our know-how on this," he said.
Asked whether Greece needed a new "Marshall Plan" to overcome its debt crisis, Roesler said strengthening Greece's real economy is the only way for Greece to leave the crisis behind completely, but that "no additional money" for the private sector is necessary in addition to aid programs for the Greek government.

 

[tommy271]

Greek Stocks Attempt Rebound



Greek stocks attempt a rebound on Wednesday after posting losses for two consecutive sessions.

Banks snap intraday losses of as much as 2.46%, total turnover remains modest while shares of Alpha Bank, ATEBank and Mitilineos top FTSE20’s gains.

We would expect the market to stabilize although the sentiment remains quite weak, Piraeus Securities comments today.

“We consider that yesterday’s sell-off is not fully supported by news content, as analyst estimates on the exact haircut percentage imposed on GGBs and market perception as to whether the Greek side will eventually achieve the required 90% participation rate do not constitute rock-solid reasons that can effectively cancel previous week’s very positive Summit resolutions” says Pegasus Securities.

“In this context, we regard yesterday’s late-in-the-session significant pressure asserted on large-cap banking equities as a hyperbole that should be corrected during today’s session, in order for the market to retain the short-term ascending momentum provided during the recent rally”, Pegasus says.

Athens General Index is up 0.22% at 1.235.93 while turnover stands at 44.5 million euro.

In the FTSE20 Index Alpha Bank gains 3.85% at 3.24 euro followed by ATEBank, Mitilineos, Eurobank and Ellaktor, all up by more than 2%. National Bank of Greece trades at 4.94 euro posting 1.23% gains.

In negative territory PPC is down 4.13% at 9.06 euro followed by Viohalco (-2.08%), MIG (-1.92%), Hellenic Petroleum (-1.54%), Jumbo (-1.39%) and Titan (-1.28%).


(capital.gr)

 

[tommy271]

I TITOLI DEI GIORNALI:

Disagreement in the ruling PASOK parliamentary group on the issue of deregulation of the taxi profession and the deadlines for the Medium-Term fiscal programme were the main front-page items in Athens' dailies on Wednesday.


ADESMEFTOS TYPOS: "Ragoussis (transport minister) should resign!"
AVGHI: "He (prime minister) is celebrating by himself on the results of the recent eurozone summit".
AVRIANI: "Take back the shameful law".
DIMOKRATIA: "The truth they're concealing about the debt".
ELEFTHEROS: "The burning 'arrangement' for the unlicensed buildings".
ELEFTHEROS TYPOS: "Half-price 'arrangement' (legalisation) for unlicensed buildings, for 40 years".
ELEFTHEROTYPIA: "Transfer (of proprietorship of unlicensed building) with double statement".
ESTIA: "The 'umbilical cord' with the state".
ETHNOS: "What you must pay to...save your unlicensed building".
IMERISSIA: "The plan for the Ellinikon (former Athens international airport) tract of land".
KATHIMERINI: "The taxis dividing PASOK".
LOGOS: "aTAXIa in the government".
NAFTEMPORIKI: "The final arrangements for 'saving' unlicensed buildings".
NIKI: "Big Business and blue and white (colors of Greek flag) background".
RIZOSPASTIS: "Back the KKE for safeguarding and expansion of list of 'heavy and hazardous' occupations".
TA NEA: "What you will pay to save it (unlicensed structure)".
VRADYNI: "Arrangement of unlicensed building for up to 40 years"


(ana.gr)

 

[tommy271]

La Borsa di Atene chiude oggi con volumi molto scarsi a 64 MLN.
Indice ASE a 1226 punti - 0,51%.

Spread sul decennale sempre in oscillazione entro un trading-range stabile a 1242 pb.

Spread Italia a 312 pb.

 

[tommy271]

IFR-COMMENT: Next leg of the peripheral contagion trade








Wed Jul 27, 2011 10:16am EDT

by Divyang Shah


LONDON, July 27 (IFR) - Once again Italy and Spain are leading the bailout trio when it comes to spread widening. This has been a noticeable feature of the price action since the EU summit last week. The rationale driving the price action is simple: investors are either outright reducing exposure or looking to hedge via CDS. Take the results from DB yesterday for example that were reported to show that the bank had 1) reduced net exposure to Italy by 88% largely via CDS and 2) reduced exposure to Spain by 53%*. Investors in general are questioning the notion that sovereign exposure is safe and the Eurozone debt market continues to fragment.
We have moved beyond the stage where strengthening the crisis resolution mechanism (EFSF/ESM) will help, to one where only a true move toward a transfer union will keep the crisis in check. For now the price action is dominated by a reduction of exposure and/or hedging, but this is only one step closer toward the slippery slope of outright shunning the sovereign debts of Italy and Spain.
When we have the combination of 1) continued supply 2) reduction of exposure and 3) lower buying, the supply/demand balance is disturbed and this is what the price action is showing. German FinMin Schaeuble's rejection of a "carte blanche" for EFSF purchases in the secondary market only raises doubts over policy makers ability to deal effectively with any supply/demand imbalance.
The EU may have succeeded in kicking the can down the road for Greece, Ireland and Portugal but this has only seen pressure shift to Italy and Spain.
In the past we have focused on Italy and Spain as proxy plays for the bailout trio and now it is time to move further up the credit curve toward France and other core countries.
We would consider taking a look at playing for a widening of 10-year France/Germany from the current level of around 60bps to over 100bps over the coming weeks with a stop at 45bps. Alternatively consider looking at playing for a widening of 10-year Belgium/France which we look to widen out to 175bps from the current spread of around 100bps.

 

[Cat XL]

Answers to client questions on the Greek exchange offering

Se qualcuno e' interessato alle tecnicalita' del deal

Question 1/ We understand that for options 1 & 2, the NPV (calculated at 9% discount rate for both existing/maturing and new bond) difference will be 21% (implicit haircut taken by the banks). We understand that the new step-up coupons and the longer maturity should allow to recover but we don’t understand how options 1 & 2 contribute to a nominal debt reduction for Greece.
Answer 1. Basically there is no material relief in terms of nominal debt reduction from options 1 and 2. That said, the average weighted coupon for Greek bonds outstanding is 4.8%, so the average 4.5% coupon on the 30yr bond does offer something of a coupon discount. However, there will be a buyback facility, which if executed at a moderate premium to market prices would have a direct nominal debt reduction effect (the IIF document mentions 13.5bn, which is not that big...)

Question 2/ Technically spoken, is it right that the only variables to obtain this 21% NPV difference with 9% discount rate are the maturity & coupons for the new bonds?
Answer 2. The 21% NPV difference is achieved mostly through the low coupon size on options 1 and 2 and mostly through the principal cut in options 3 and 4, and then a discount rate of 9% is applied in all cases. Once the coupon flows have been set, the only variable is the discount rate. In all four options there is a 21% NPV difference. The 9% discount rate is used in all cases, and the coupons are then chosen in order to achieve a 21% NPV hit.

Question 3/ We don’t understand how option 3 & 4 (discount exchange) function…
Answer 3. In option 3 the investor exchanges an existing bond for a 30yr bond that matures at 80% of par. The coupons on this bond average 6.42%, and this would be calculated as 6.42% of the 80 amount at redemption, which really translates into an average coupon of 5.14% (vs par). The principal is guaranteed by investment in zero coupon bonds to redeem at 80 in 30 years time. In option 4 the same methodology applies, expect the maturity and principal guarantee are halved.

Question 4/ The IFF considers that 90% of the banks will participate voluntarily with 25% participation in each option. Will each entity apply 25% of its effort to each option or will some choose only one option? Are insurers part of the IFF effort?
Answer 4. The participating investors can choose whatever option they like best. The 25% is just an estimate by IIF, but is not binding. Note that choosing option 3 and 4 would mean a reduction in the size of nominal debt, which would look optically best for Greece. By the way the 90% refers to ALL investor, and not just the banks, and hence includes not just insurers but also asset managers of all guises. I find this difficult to fathom (90% of banks I get, 90% of all investors I don't get).

Question 5/ What’s the difference between the period before mid-2014 and after? The fact that all refinancing till mid-2014 is already provided for in the different programs?
Answer 5. The only difference is that the official financing program for Greece is a 3 year one that take us through to 2014 (not in print, but that was the intention). Hence for the exchange / buyback operation a distinction was made, but basically the mid-2011 to mid-2014 classification refers to maturity rather than timing. The full maturity spectrum applicable for exchange is mid-2011 to mid-2020, with the buyback likely used for maturities that are longer than that out to the 2040 bond.

 

[tommy271]

Se qualcuno e' interessato alle tecnicalita' del deal

Question 1/ We understand that for options 1 & 2, the NPV (calculated at 9% discount rate for both existing/maturing and new bond) difference will be 21% (implicit haircut taken by the banks). We understand that the new step-up coupons and the longer maturity should allow to recover but we don’t understand how options 1 & 2 contribute to a nominal debt reduction for Greece.
Answer 1. Basically there is no material relief in terms of nominal debt reduction from options 1 and 2. That said, the average weighted coupon for Greek bonds outstanding is 4.8%, so the average 4.5% coupon on the 30yr bond does offer something of a coupon discount. However, there will be a buyback facility, which if executed at a moderate premium to market prices would have a direct nominal debt reduction effect (the IIF document mentions 13.5bn, which is not that big...)

Question 2/ Technically spoken, is it right that the only variables to obtain this 21% NPV difference with 9% discount rate are the maturity & coupons for the new bonds?
Answer 2. The 21% NPV difference is achieved mostly through the low coupon size on options 1 and 2 and mostly through the principal cut in options 3 and 4, and then a discount rate of 9% is applied in all cases. Once the coupon flows have been set, the only variable is the discount rate. In all four options there is a 21% NPV difference. The 9% discount rate is used in all cases, and the coupons are then chosen in order to achieve a 21% NPV hit.

Question 3/ We don’t understand how option 3 & 4 (discount exchange) function…
Answer 3. In option 3 the investor exchanges an existing bond for a 30yr bond that matures at 80% of par. The coupons on this bond average 6.42%, and this would be calculated as 6.42% of the 80 amount at redemption, which really translates into an average coupon of 5.14% (vs par). The principal is guaranteed by investment in zero coupon bonds to redeem at 80 in 30 years time. In option 4 the same methodology applies, expect the maturity and principal guarantee are halved.

Question 4/ The IFF considers that 90% of the banks will participate voluntarily with 25% participation in each option. Will each entity apply 25% of its effort to each option or will some choose only one option? Are insurers part of the IFF effort?
Answer 4. The participating investors can choose whatever option they like best. The 25% is just an estimate by IIF, but is not binding. Note that choosing option 3 and 4 would mean a reduction in the size of nominal debt, which would look optically best for Greece. By the way the 90% refers to ALL investor, and not just the banks, and hence includes not just insurers but also asset managers of all guises. I find this difficult to fathom (90% of banks I get, 90% of all investors I don't get).

Question 5/ What’s the difference between the period before mid-2014 and after? The fact that all refinancing till mid-2014 is already provided for in the different programs?
Answer 5. The only difference is that the official financing program for Greece is a 3 year one that take us through to 2014 (not in print, but that was the intention). Hence for the exchange / buyback operation a distinction was made, but basically the mid-2011 to mid-2014 classification refers to maturity rather than timing. The full maturity spectrum applicable for exchange is mid-2011 to mid-2020, with the buyback likely used for maturities that are longer than that out to the 2040 bond.

Molte grazie.
Allora, la questione con Andre Sant che discutevamo questa mattina sulla volontarietà della scelta di opzione (tra le quattro) qui mi pare ribadita.
Cioè ogni istituzionale può scegliersi l'opzione che preferisce oppure aderire a tutte e quattro a seconda della convenienza rispetto al suo prezzo di carico.

 

[Andre_Sant]

Oggi 17:23 EFSF, BUYBACK TITOLI GRECI SI FOCALIZZERA' SU BOND SCAMBIATI A MENO DI 65% VALORE FACCIALE -FUNZIONARI ZONA EURO

 

[steff]

Efsf, buyback non saranno limitati a 20 mld euro indicati da summit

leader zona euro -funzionari zona euro