Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 1 (2 lettori)

[paperix66]

cosa abbiamo fatto per evitare tutto ciò noi italiani?

un'aggiunta alla manovra (del caXXo) da 54 mld?

 

[Discepolo]

un'aggiunta alla manovra (del caXXo) da 54 mld?

Parlo da cittadino, e non da analista dei conti pubblici.

Ti sembra che sparare delle cifre, dopo anni che ne sparano di sbagliate, possa risultare credibile ai mercati? alla gente comune?

Secondo me, a prescindere dagli introiti della manovra, lo spettacolo è stato rivoltante, dal punto di vista politico, io non mi esprimo sulle persone, poichè non ho il piacere di conoscerle. E con questo non sto difendendo altre parti politiche. Mi limito, da cittadino qualunque, a dare un giudizio sullo spettacolo ante manovra. E, quando penso che sono italiano, rischio di cadere in depressione. Scusate, so che tanti hanno tenuto duro anche in questa difficile fase, ma per me la misura è colma. Purtroppo so maneggiare solo la forchetta e non il forcone, sinora usato solo per raccogliere il fieno.

:bleah:

 

[ibbius]

Io ho questa obbligazione.
Ggb Mag12 Eur 5,25 - Borsa Italiana
Adesso è a 60 e pensavo di incrementare.
Voi che ne dite ?

 

[bosmeld]

i francesi, visto quello che sta succedendo alle loro banche, hanno tutta intenzione di aiutare la grecia

FRENCH FIN MIN BAROIN SAYS WE ARE CLEARLY NOT PREPARING A PLAN B FOR GREECE

 

[gualberto]

infatti, in questi giorni speravo tanto in un intervento di Sarkò per calmare la situazione...

 

[discipline]

i francesi, visto quello che sta succedendo alle loro banche, hanno tutta intenzione di aiutare la grecia

FRENCH FIN MIN BAROIN SAYS WE ARE CLEARLY NOT PREPARING A PLAN B FOR GREECE

Ovvero dopo averlo preparato si sono accorti che il conto era po' troppo salato.. per cui questo è il momento in cui bisogna essere 'clearly' tutti amici..

 

[ferdo]

è appena uscito un report di Nomura - data 7 settembre
chi lo ha riesce a postarlo? da qui non riesco

 

[discipline]

è appena uscito un report di Nomura - data 7 settembre
chi lo ha riesce a postarlo? da qui non riesco

Scenario 1: Limited default – Greece stays in the eurozone. One possibility is that
Greece may be left to default on only some of its obligations and only for a very
short while. The logical outcome of this would presumably be that European
partners need at some point to make a credible threat to Greece, in light of its
reluctance to push through the agreed structural and fiscal reforms. Given that the
various aid tranches cover not only Greece‟s bond redemptions but also its large
primary deficit, failure to secure any of the aid disbursements would also lead to a
temporary inability to pay for domestic obligations too (e.g. wages and pensions).
This may exert sufficient pressure on the Greek government to speed up the
structural reform and fiscal consolidation process. Under such a scenario, Greece
would presumably be allowed to remain in the monetary union.

Scenario 2: Extensive default – Greece stays in the eurozone. A second scenario
has Greece refusing to meet the demands of its creditors. Seeing that
consolidating within their creditors‟ preferred time horizon is both socially and
politically costly, Greek leaders could opt for a unilateral default with very large
haircuts in an attempt to reduce the country‟s debt burden. While it is conceivable
that Greece could remain in the eurozone even if it defaulted unilaterally on its
obligations, this would become an increasingly difficult compromise. On the
international front, such a move would cement Greece‟s image as an unreliable
partner who fails to live up to political commitments. On the domestic front, there
would likely be political fallout amid rising social tensions and accusations of
political failure. Finally, capital markets would likely react badly in either on the
above scenarios, with contagion to the rest of the periphery the immediate
consequence.

Scenario 3: Extensive default – Greece exits the eurozone. The third scenario
consists in Greece‟s exit from the euro area. This would likely be the natural
consequence of a unilateral default, as it would show that Greece lacks both the
institutional and political maturity required to function within the context of a
monetary union.

Greece itself has little to gain by exiting the eurozone and a lot to lose. Replacing the euro with a significantly undervalued new currency would mean that both the public and the private sector would default on most, if not all, their euro-denominated obligations. A run on the banks would very likely follow such a decision, while the interruption of credit lines with Greek businesses by (presumably) both foreign and domestic counterparts would bring economic activity to a halt. Greece‟s current account and primary deficits would close violently, implying shortages of essential imported products (fuel, energy, and food), a sharp rise in unemployment, and serious social and political instability. With capital markets closed for years for both public and private entities, it is highly doubtful that Greece‟s growth potential could be realized within a reasonable time-span. In fact, even the alleged benefits in competitiveness due to currency devaluation seem to be based on a naïve “all-other-things-being-equal” type of argument that is inapplicable here. Tourism, Greece‟s main exporting industry would hardly stand to gain from the likely breakout of social tensions. An instructive example is Egypt, where tourist arrivals fell by as much as 80% y-o-y in February 2011, after violence broke out in the country, and remain 30% down y-o-y as of June 2011 (the last available data point). Furthermore, transactions in shipping, the country‟s second largest exporting industry, are done in US dollars; therefore, no benefits from leaving the eurozone are to be expected there. Finally, the devalued new currency would hardly offer any protection against imported inflation that would work as yet another drag on growth. For these reasons we doubt Greece would leave the eurozone voluntarily. Importantly, this stance is shared by nearly all parliamentary political parties in Greece (the Communist party being the possible exception), which significantly reduces the chance of a voluntary exit from the eurozone.
But can Greece be forced out of the eurozone? To answer this question we need to analyze what its European partners have to gain and what to lose from such an outcome. On the benefits side, European countries would avoid financing Greece‟s deficit and rollover needs for the foreseeable future. However, this would come at significant cost: (a) Greece would default on most of the bilateral loans it has already received (€46.7bn to-date); (b) as explained above, the ECB would be in need of recapitalization due to the Greek banks‟ inability to return the funds tapped through the ECB‟s liquidity operations; (c) the event would most likely be a systemic global risk-event that would further destabilize European government bond markets and weigh negatively on an already anemic recovery; and (d) should political differences lead to the end of the euro-project itself (something we can hardly rule out a priori in the event of a Greek exit), Greece‟s European partners will have the added task of tackling the logistical and economic problems of reverting to the old national currencies.
We conclude that Greece‟s exit from the eurozone would harm rather than benefit both Greece itself and the rest of the eurozone countries. We think this is an important consideration that increases our conviction that Greece will avoid a disorderly outcome and stay in the euro area.

 

[ferdo]

MARSEILLE, 9 septembre (Reuters) - Voici les "termes de référence" publiés à l'issue de la réunion des ministres des Finances et banquiers centraux du G7, à Marseille: "Nous nous sommes réunis dans un contexte de nouveaux défis pour la reprise économique mondiale, marqué par des défis importants à relever concernant la croissance, les déficits budgétaires et la dette souveraine, qui résultent des déséquilibres accumulés dans le passé. Cela se reflète dans les tensions renforcées observées sur les marchés financiers. Il y a désormais des signes clairs de ralentissement de la croissance mondiale. Nous sommes décidés à apporter une réponse internationale forte et coordonnée pour relever ces défis. Nous sommes en train de prendre des mesures fortes pour préserver la stabilité financière, retrouver la confiance et soutenir la croissance. Aux Etats-Unis, le Président Obama a annoncé un plan substantiel pour renforcer la croissance et l'emploi à travers des investissements publics, des incitations fiscales et des mesures ciblées pour l'emploi, combiné avec des mesures budgétaires visant à restaurer la soutenabilité budgétaire à moyen terme. Les pays de la zone euro mettent en oeuvre les décisions adoptées le 21 juillet pour faire face aux tensions financières, à travers notamment la flexibilisation de l'EFSF, réaffirmant leur détermination inflexible pour honorer pleinement leurs signatures souveraines individuelles et leurs engagements en faveur de finances publiques soutenables et de réformes structurelles. Le Japon met en oeuvre des mesures budgétaires substantielles pour reconstruire le pays après le tremblement de terre, tout en assurant l'engagement de consolidation budgétaire à moyen terme. Les inquiétudes entourant le rythme et l'avenir de la reprise soulignent le besoin d'un effort concerté au niveau international pour soutenir une croissance forte, durable et équilibrée. Nous devons tous adopter et mettre en oeuvre des plans de consolidation budgétaires ambitieux et favorables à la croissance, ancrés dans des cadres budgétaires crédibles. Les politiques budgétaires sont confrontées à un équilibre délicat à trouver. Etant donnée la nature fragile de la reprise, nous avons la difficile tâche de devoir à la fois mettre en oeuvre pleinement nos plans d'ajustement budgétaires et soutenir l'activité économique, en tenant compte de circonstances nationales différentes. Les politiques monétaires maintiendront la stabilité des prix et continueront à soutenir la reprise économique. Les banques centrales sont prêtes à fournir des liquidités aux banques en tant que de besoin. Nous prendrons toutes les actions nécessaires pour assurer la résilience des systèmes bancaires et des marchés financiers. Dans ce contexte, nous réaffirmons notre engagement à mettre complètement en oeuvre Bâle 3. Nous réaffirmons notre intérêt commun pour un système monétaire international fort et stable et notre soutien à des taux de change déterminés par les marchés. La volatilité excessive et les mouvements désordonnés des changes ont des répercussions négatives pour la stabilité économique et financière. Nous nous consulterons étroitement s'agissant de possibles actions sur les marchés des changes et coopérerons de façon appropriée. Nous allons travailler dans les prochaines semaines avec nos collègues du G20 et du FMI au rééquilibrage de la demande et au renforcement de la croissance mondiale. Conformément à ce sur quoi nous nous sommes mis d'accord, les réformes structurelles représenteront une contribution importante à cet égard." (Jean-Baptiste Vey) ((Service Informations générales. Tel 01 49 49 53 68. [email protected]. Reuters Messaging : [email protected]))

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MARSEILLE, France, Sept 9 (Reuters) - Group of Seven finance ministers agreed on Friday to respond in concert to a slowdown in the global economy but produced no concrete action to calm markets spooked by signs of faltering growth and Europe's debt crisis. "We met at a time of new challenges to ... growth, fiscal deficits and sovereign debt ... There are now clear signs of a slowdown in global growth. We are committed to a strong and coordinated response to these challenges," a communique said after hours of talks between G7 finance ministers and central bankers. "We reaffirmed our share interest in a strong and stable international financial system and our support for market determined exchange rates," it said. "We will consult closely in regard to actions in exchange markets and would cooperate as appropriate." A German government source said talks dragged on late into the evening because France wanted a joint communiqué but others in the meeting felt there was not enough common ground to merit one. Ministers and central bankers were under pressure to calm the biggest confidence crisis in financial markets since the 2007-8 global credit crunch. But with different countries facing different problems there was no one-size-fits-all solution. "We have to get away from the idea there is only one solution for all... It's not rigour versus growth," French finance minister Francois Baroin told a news conference. A senior U.S. official said the meeting was dominated by Europe's sovereign debt crisis. (Writing by Mike Peacock) Keywords: G7/STATEMENT

 

[ferdo]

SHIRAKAWA SAYS G7 AGREED ON NEED FOR EUROPE TO CARRY OUT ITS JULY AGREEMENT, TACKLE FINANCIAL STABILITY


Ecb's trichet says, regarding greece, it's clear countries are responsible for themselves

ecb's trichet says we are all convinced all euro zone countries must meet commitments, be "ahead of the curve"

Da capire che vuol dire ...