è appena uscito un report di Nomura - data 7 settembre
chi lo ha riesce a postarlo? da qui non riesco
Scenario 1: Limited default – Greece stays in the eurozone. One possibility is that
Greece may be left to default on only some of its obligations and only for a very
short while. The logical outcome of this would presumably be that European
partners need at some point to make a credible threat to Greece, in light of its
reluctance to push through the agreed structural and fiscal reforms. Given that the
various aid tranches cover not only Greece‟s bond redemptions but also its large
primary deficit, failure to secure any of the aid disbursements would also lead to a
temporary inability to pay for domestic obligations too (e.g. wages and pensions).
This may exert sufficient pressure on the Greek government to speed up the
structural reform and fiscal consolidation process. Under such a scenario, Greece
would presumably be allowed to remain in the monetary union.
Scenario 2: Extensive default – Greece stays in the eurozone. A second scenario
has Greece refusing to meet the demands of its creditors. Seeing that
consolidating within their creditors‟ preferred time horizon is both socially and
politically costly, Greek leaders could opt for a unilateral default with very large
haircuts in an attempt to reduce the country‟s debt burden. While it is conceivable
that Greece could remain in the eurozone even if it defaulted unilaterally on its
obligations, this would become an increasingly difficult compromise. On the
international front, such a move would cement Greece‟s image as an unreliable
partner who fails to live up to political commitments. On the domestic front, there
would likely be political fallout amid rising social tensions and accusations of
political failure. Finally, capital markets would likely react badly in either on the
above scenarios, with contagion to the rest of the periphery the immediate
consequence.
Scenario 3: Extensive default – Greece exits the eurozone. The third scenario
consists in Greece‟s exit from the euro area. This would likely be the natural
consequence of a unilateral default, as it would show that Greece lacks both the
institutional and political maturity required to function within the context of a
monetary union.
Greece itself has little to gain by exiting the eurozone and a lot to lose. Replacing the euro with a significantly undervalued new currency would mean that both the public and the private sector would default on most, if not all, their euro-denominated obligations. A run on the banks would very likely follow such a decision, while the interruption of credit lines with Greek businesses by (presumably) both foreign and domestic counterparts would bring economic activity to a halt. Greece‟s current account and primary deficits would close violently, implying shortages of essential imported products (fuel, energy, and food), a sharp rise in unemployment, and serious social and political instability. With capital markets closed for years for both public and private entities, it is highly doubtful that Greece‟s growth potential could be realized within a reasonable time-span. In fact, even the alleged benefits in competitiveness due to currency devaluation seem to be based on a naïve “all-other-things-being-equal” type of argument that is inapplicable here. Tourism, Greece‟s main exporting industry would hardly stand to gain from the likely breakout of social tensions. An instructive example is Egypt, where tourist arrivals fell by as much as 80% y-o-y in February 2011, after violence broke out in the country, and remain 30% down y-o-y as of June 2011 (the last available data point). Furthermore, transactions in shipping, the country‟s second largest exporting industry, are done in US dollars; therefore, no benefits from leaving the eurozone are to be expected there. Finally, the devalued new currency would hardly offer any protection against imported inflation that would work as yet another drag on growth. For these reasons we doubt Greece would leave the eurozone voluntarily. Importantly, this stance is shared by nearly all parliamentary political parties in Greece (the Communist party being the possible exception), which significantly reduces the chance of a voluntary exit from the eurozone.
But can Greece be forced out of the eurozone? To answer this question we need to analyze what its European partners have to gain and what to lose from such an outcome. On the benefits side, European countries would avoid financing Greece‟s deficit and rollover needs for the foreseeable future. However, this would come at significant cost: (a) Greece would default on most of the bilateral loans it has already received (€46.7bn to-date); (b) as explained above, the ECB would be in need of recapitalization due to the Greek banks‟ inability to return the funds tapped through the ECB‟s liquidity operations; (c) the event would most likely be a systemic global risk-event that would further destabilize European government bond markets and weigh negatively on an already anemic recovery; and (d) should political differences lead to the end of the euro-project itself (something we can hardly rule out a priori in the event of a Greek exit), Greece‟s European partners will have the added task of tackling the logistical and economic problems of reverting to the old national currencies.
We conclude that Greece‟s exit from the eurozone would harm rather than benefit both Greece itself and the rest of the eurozone countries. We think this is an important consideration that increases our conviction that Greece will avoid a disorderly outcome and stay in the euro area.