Una lettura per questo fine settimana piovoso, meglio non farsi scoraggiare dal titolo:
Greece: First and Second Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement Under the
Extended Fund Facility, Request for Waiver of Applicability, Modification of
Performance Criteria, and Rephasing of Access—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press
Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director
for Greece.
Il pdf qui:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1320.pdf
Per chi ha di meglio da fare piuttosto che sfogliarsi le 260 pagine, alcuni delle considerazioni salienti sul tema del debito, non manca poi il dettaglio di tutte le condizioni da rispettare e rendicontare affinché il programma abbia il seguito concordato:
50. Greece and its European partners agreed to
a package of upfront debt relief measures and a
maturity extension on existing loans (Box 4). The
measures adopted include an interest rate reduction
on existing GLF loans, and fiscal transfers by member
states (of ECB profits related to Greek bond holdings).
The Greek authorities also completed, on December
18, 2012, a voluntary buyback of bonds from the private sector. Greece’s European partners also
agreed to a 15-year extension of the maturities on official loans. Together, the latter two measures
dramatically reduce rollover requirements post-2020. All told, these measures are projected to
deliver some 16 percent of GDP in debt reduction by 2020.
51. Since this was not enough to restore debt sustainability, Greece’s European partners
gave supplementary assurances of additional conditional debt relief. Through the Eurogroup
statements on November 29 and December 13, and via separate interactions with the Managing
Director, they have made clear that they will: (i) provide 1.4 percent of GDP in debt relief in early
2014 (provided the primary balance target for 2013 is met); and (ii) take measures in 2015 to ensure
that debt drops to 124 percent of GDP by 2020 and substantially below 110 percent of GDP by 2022
(provided Greece’s primary balance swings to a surplus as programmed in 2014). Time will tell what
the full commitment will require, but staff’s assessment at this point is that some combination of
haircuts on outstanding GLF loans, close to zero interest rates on GLF loans and lower rates on EFSF
loans, or long-term transfers will be necessary.
53. Taking into full account the maturity
extension on loans, Greece’s debt in fact now
appears to be considerably more manageable. Compared to the Extended Arrangement, the debt
service path is now significantly more benign. Interest payments in 2013–20 have been reduced by
almost 3 percent of GDP per year in cash terms (falling below the euro area average), and principal
repayments on debt falling due from 2020 to 2030 are reduced by an average of about 4½ percent
of GDP per year. The sharp decline in the debt service burden means that Greece’s headline debt—
peaking at about 180 percent of GDP in 2013—overstates the debt burden. To lend some
perspective to this, the NPV of end-2012 debt evaluated at Greece’s long-run projected nominal
growth rate (around 4 percent) would be significantly lower, at 148 percent of GDP. This is also
lower than the debt NPV at the time of EFF program approval (when it stood about 3 percentage
points higher). Using a higher discount rate—in line with the range of borrowing rates within the
euro area—would produce even lower debt NPVs.
54. Greece also reached understandings with its European partners on additional financing
for the program period (Tables 19 and 20). Greece’s additional balance of payments financing
needs over the period 2012–16 were estimated to be €32 billion. The debt buyback added about
€9.8 billion to needs during 2012–16 (with €10.8 billion upfront) while other debt-related measures
(see ¶50) reduced financing needs by about €10 billion over the same period. As outlined below, a
total of roughly €26 billion in new financing was agreed,
leaving a gap of €5.5–9.5 billion (depending
on how transitory movements in deposits are accounted for), falling entirely in 2015–16:
Greece’s European partners agreed to a deferral and capitalization of EFSF interest payments
falling due for one decade (providing an estimated €11.5 billion in financing through 2016).
The ECB agreed, on a preliminary basis, to a rollover of maturing Greek bonds held by the
national central banks (ANFA) (generating about €5.6 billion in further financing through
2016). To the degree this rollover is not confirmed by March, the euro member states agreed
to provide equivalent relief via other means.
At the request of its euro area partners, Greece agreed to delay the programmed €9 billion
net redemption of Treasury bills now held by banks. With only a small share of the stock of
Treasury bills expected to be eligible for use as collateral for BoG funding beyond Q1 2013,
Greece’s banks will need to make room for this through other adjustments in their balance
sheets (likely involving higher ELA and higher access to ECB instruments which should be
facilitated by the ECB’s decision in mid-December 2012 to expand the list of eligible
collateral).
55. Financing from Greece’s European partners will be re-phased. Amounts have been
brought forward to fill financing gaps in 2013. Disbursements will in
general be tranched within quarters, linked to financing needs and the
completion of objective milestones (defined in the program). Against
this backdrop, following the €34.3 billion disbursed in December 2012,
a further €14.8 billion will be disbursed in early January, early February,
and early March 2013 (as Greece meets milestones related to, e.g.,
passage of the tax reform, and establishment of public sector staff
reduction targets). The funds to be disbursed in the January-March
period would include amounts for bank recap, which were delayed to
provide resources to fund the debt buyback. It is important that these
disbursements be frontloaded to January in a sufficient amount to
minimize delays with bank restructuring and prevent tighter-than programmed liquidity.
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Market access assumptions have also been updated, and the DSA has been extended
to 2030, to evaluate how higher debt ratios may affect Greece’s ability to refinance debt
coming due.
Small but building amounts of market borrowing are assumed to begin in 2018,
culminating in full reliance on the market after 2020. For modeling purposes, it is assumed that the
terms of borrowing are directly linked to the level of Greece’s debt. At a debt level of roughly
115 percent of GDP, Greece is assumed to be able to borrow at a spread of 450–600 bps depending
on the maturity (reflecting current spreads for high-debt European countries plus a premium for
Greece’s recent history of debt restructuring) with spreads rising by 10 bps for every 1 percentage
point increase in debt. These assumptions imply entry into the market at relatively high spreads and
shorter maturities, with improvements over time as debt falls.
Financing assumptions. Interest rate sensitivities arise via the rate charged on official
financing, and via interest on new market borrowing once Greece re-enters markets
(primarily after 2020). If the spread on EFSF borrowing were to be 100 bps higher, then debt
to-GDP would reach 130 percent by 2020. One key improvement to the resilience of Greek
debt regards shocks to market interest rates.
Given the extension of maturities on official
sector debt, reliance on market access is adequately low that even a 400bps shock to Greek
spreads over 2021–30 has a relatively modest impact on debt levels.
