Commento di Morgan Stanley
[FONT="]As the negotiations with the official lenders struggle to gather momentum, and the Greek situation deteriorates, our latest collaborative economics & strategy report looks at whether Greece really is systemic, and what are the implications of Grexit for Europe[/FONT][FONT="].
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[FONT="] We ask: i) how a euro exit could happen; ii) what’s the probability; iii) what’s changed since the 2011-12 crisis; iv) what’s the exposure to Greece and the possible channels of contagion (sovereign, banking system, political situation); v) what does it all mean for Greek and European assets. We conclude that, even though the preferred route for markets would be to find a credible compromise between Greece and the official lenders, Grexit is now less likely to result in broad contagion.[/FONT]
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[FONT="]What’s the situation in Greece: [/FONT][FONT="]With a funding gap, no backstop and no market access, paying the IMF loan over the next several months and, crucially, the Greek bonds held by the ECB in July and August, may become challenging. An intensifying recession and below-target tax revenues may mean that the primary surplus is no longer there. Piling up arrears and using the reserves of state-owned enterprises (and other public funds) are only temporary solutions and have negative implications for the economy, thus risking to raise the probability of Grexit.[/FONT]
[FONT="]Exit mechanics:[/FONT][FONT="] While our baseline scenario is that Greece ultimately stays in the eurozone, its chance has diminished. A policy mistake that could potentially lead to an exit would probably unfold as follows:[/FONT]
[FONT="]1. Capital controls:[/FONT][FONT="] In a situation of financial stress, the government may have to issue IOUs to cover its expenses – a sort of ‘dual currency’ circulating domestically – and introduce capital controls to prevent an intensification of deposit outflows; [/FONT]
[FONT="]2. Currency changeover:[/FONT][FONT="] The Greek government would redenominate domestic assets and liabilities in drachma at a given exchange rate (or on a one-to-one basis with euros, though the drachma exchange rate would likely depreciate rapidly).[/FONT]
[FONT="]3. Printing (lots of) drachmas:[/FONT][FONT="] Thus, the Greek central bank would no longer be part of the Eurosystem. Rather, it would conduct its monetary policy in drachma, via operations with a banking system whose balance-sheet is now redenominated in drachma too.[/FONT]
[FONT="]4. Default on foreign debt:[/FONT][FONT="] The domestic debt could be converted in drachma, but foreign debt would still remain in euros. So the debt burden, given the devaluation of the drachma based economy, would rise – most likely triggering a default.[/FONT]
[FONT="]5. EU membership called into question:[/FONT][FONT="] Even though there’s no precedent, it’s possible that Greece would have to leave the EU as well, which would mean an exclusion from the Single Market.[/FONT]
[FONT="]Firewalls:[/FONT][FONT="] Should negative spillovers emerge, stronger firewalls, e.g., ECB and ESM, less direct exposure and better EU fundamentals should provide a cushion. This is not to say that a euro exit would be uneventful. It’s likely to create near-term uncertainty regardless of the policy response. Therefore, feedback loops are harder to predict as they are inherently behavioural in nature. Yet, assuming a strong monetary and fiscal response, possibly also including further steps to ringfence the remaining countries, we believe that the fallout could be cushioned, and the long-term eurozone outlook may even strengthen as a result.[/FONT]
[FONT="]Scenarios and probabilities:[/FONT][FONT="] Contrary to many commentators, we don’t think that the probability of a euro exit has diminished. While we’d still put it at 25% over the next six months, it feels as if we’re at the high end the range, and its probability may increase further. What seems now more likely than before in the near term is the probability of a misstep big enough to require capital controls (‘staycation’). We think its chances have risen from 20% to 35%.[/FONT]