Obbligazioni societarie La saga della famiglia Espírito Santo: cosa succederà alle obbligazioni BES ed ESFG? (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Rottweiler
- Data di Inizio
Topgun1976
Guest
LONDON:There was some surprise in the market when holders of senior bonds escaped a bail-in in the rescue of bail-in Banco Espirito Santo, but perhaps there shouldn't have been given that the European Central Bank was a major creditor of the Portuguese bank.
Forcing a contribution from seniors in addition to subordinated bondholders would have posed a dilemma about what to do with the ECB's claims, which amounted to a net 7.4bn at the end of June.
Imposing losses on ECB claims would in effect have meant eurozone taxpayers helping to pay for the recapitalisation, something that bank regulators and politicians have pledged to avoid under new bank resolution legislation shortly to take effect across Europe.
The ECB's claims stem from assets parked at the central bank. These include senior unsecured floating-rate notes issued by BES, and guaranteed by the Portuguese state, paying Libor plus 12 per centage points. These were pledged as collateral to the ECB in return for funding.
These senior notes are some of the largest outstandings of BES senior bonds. For instance, three such notes cumulatively with a face value of 3.5bn come due this December, January and February. All were issued at the height of the eurozone crisis in late 2011 or early 2012, in effect to extract liquidity from the ECB.
EMERGENCY
BES has been relying on such emergency funding for some time. At its peak in 2009 the bank's loan to deposit ratio stood at 192%. That has since reduced to 126% but wholesale funding remains a key element of the bank's liabilities. ECB funding to BES increased 37% in the first half of this year.
Portugal was able to act quickly to rescue the majority of BES's loans, as well as its deposits and senior claims, by creating a bridge institution, Novo Banco, backed by a 4.9bn government loan because Europe's new bank recovery and resolution directive is not yet in place.
"Portugal like many other countries hasn't yet put the legislation in place, so that gave authorities the freedom to choose whether or not these creditors would be bailed in," said one senior banker at a European bank. "Two years from now, there would have been no choice but to bail in senior bondholders."
BRAVE NEW WORLD
The new pan-European rules must be applied from the end of 2015. That will create a strict hierarchy of creditor seniority that must be followed to decide which claims should be bailed in to recapitalise financial institutions in trouble.
That situation may place the ECB in peril, since it is a major creditor of many eurozone banks. It could also leave it wide open to accusations that it has a conflict of interest when it takes direct control of bank supervision across Europe from this November.
"There is potential for a conflict of interest in that the ECB is going to be both regulator and creditor to many banks," said the banker.
Under the new rules, senior bondholders will rank alongside uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors. If there is insufficient equity or subordinated debt then these instruments will also have to take a haircut to recapitalise a bank sufficiently.
"This shows how carefully the ECB must tread if it doesn't want to test the collateral of these government bonds parked with it," said a lawyer. "You could imagine that when the ECB becomes the main regulator that it will not risk ECB exposures at all costs. It would not choose to hit senior bondholders if that meant hitting itself."
Another lawyer specialising in bank resolutions confirmed that under the new rules the ECB's claims would "almost certainly" rank with other senior bondholders, making it likely that it would be "seriously conflicted" if such a situation had arisen after 2015.
The lawyer added that under the new regime a full asset valuation would have had to have been carried out before a bridge institution would have been set up, making it less likely that seniors would have escaped.
ECB EXPOSURES
Overall as of August 1, the ECB had 533.5bn outstanding with eurozone credit institutions, principally through its LTRO schemes. An additional 74.2bn of "other claims" to such bodies were also outstanding. These are understood to include these emergency liquidity arrangements.
The ECB declined to comment specifically on BES's rescue. However, a spokesperson said risk control measures, such as applying appropriate haircuts to instruments pledged as collateral, were in place to confront these situations.
This "ensures that the Eurosystem is protected against the risk of financial loss in case the underlying assets have to be realised owing to the default of a counterparty," said the ECB spokesperson.
IFR reported in June that Greece's four major banks still had 40bn of such funding outstanding. In May Alpha Bank, for instance, issued to itself a 2.82bn state-guaranteed FRN at three-month Euribor plus 12 per centage points explicitly for use as collateral at the ECB.
The immediate need to recapitalise BES came on August 1 after the ECB indicated it might not be able to continue to provide further liquidity facilities, a decision that would have sparked a run on the bank's deposits.
The Novo Banco solution also suits another official sector creditor, the China Development Bank, which lent BES 300m for three years in September 2011. That facility is due to be repaid next month.
Forcing a contribution from seniors in addition to subordinated bondholders would have posed a dilemma about what to do with the ECB's claims, which amounted to a net 7.4bn at the end of June.
Imposing losses on ECB claims would in effect have meant eurozone taxpayers helping to pay for the recapitalisation, something that bank regulators and politicians have pledged to avoid under new bank resolution legislation shortly to take effect across Europe.
The ECB's claims stem from assets parked at the central bank. These include senior unsecured floating-rate notes issued by BES, and guaranteed by the Portuguese state, paying Libor plus 12 per centage points. These were pledged as collateral to the ECB in return for funding.
These senior notes are some of the largest outstandings of BES senior bonds. For instance, three such notes cumulatively with a face value of 3.5bn come due this December, January and February. All were issued at the height of the eurozone crisis in late 2011 or early 2012, in effect to extract liquidity from the ECB.
EMERGENCY
BES has been relying on such emergency funding for some time. At its peak in 2009 the bank's loan to deposit ratio stood at 192%. That has since reduced to 126% but wholesale funding remains a key element of the bank's liabilities. ECB funding to BES increased 37% in the first half of this year.
Portugal was able to act quickly to rescue the majority of BES's loans, as well as its deposits and senior claims, by creating a bridge institution, Novo Banco, backed by a 4.9bn government loan because Europe's new bank recovery and resolution directive is not yet in place.
"Portugal like many other countries hasn't yet put the legislation in place, so that gave authorities the freedom to choose whether or not these creditors would be bailed in," said one senior banker at a European bank. "Two years from now, there would have been no choice but to bail in senior bondholders."
BRAVE NEW WORLD
The new pan-European rules must be applied from the end of 2015. That will create a strict hierarchy of creditor seniority that must be followed to decide which claims should be bailed in to recapitalise financial institutions in trouble.
That situation may place the ECB in peril, since it is a major creditor of many eurozone banks. It could also leave it wide open to accusations that it has a conflict of interest when it takes direct control of bank supervision across Europe from this November.
"There is potential for a conflict of interest in that the ECB is going to be both regulator and creditor to many banks," said the banker.
Under the new rules, senior bondholders will rank alongside uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors. If there is insufficient equity or subordinated debt then these instruments will also have to take a haircut to recapitalise a bank sufficiently.
"This shows how carefully the ECB must tread if it doesn't want to test the collateral of these government bonds parked with it," said a lawyer. "You could imagine that when the ECB becomes the main regulator that it will not risk ECB exposures at all costs. It would not choose to hit senior bondholders if that meant hitting itself."
Another lawyer specialising in bank resolutions confirmed that under the new rules the ECB's claims would "almost certainly" rank with other senior bondholders, making it likely that it would be "seriously conflicted" if such a situation had arisen after 2015.
The lawyer added that under the new regime a full asset valuation would have had to have been carried out before a bridge institution would have been set up, making it less likely that seniors would have escaped.
ECB EXPOSURES
Overall as of August 1, the ECB had 533.5bn outstanding with eurozone credit institutions, principally through its LTRO schemes. An additional 74.2bn of "other claims" to such bodies were also outstanding. These are understood to include these emergency liquidity arrangements.
The ECB declined to comment specifically on BES's rescue. However, a spokesperson said risk control measures, such as applying appropriate haircuts to instruments pledged as collateral, were in place to confront these situations.
This "ensures that the Eurosystem is protected against the risk of financial loss in case the underlying assets have to be realised owing to the default of a counterparty," said the ECB spokesperson.
IFR reported in June that Greece's four major banks still had 40bn of such funding outstanding. In May Alpha Bank, for instance, issued to itself a 2.82bn state-guaranteed FRN at three-month Euribor plus 12 per centage points explicitly for use as collateral at the ECB.
The immediate need to recapitalise BES came on August 1 after the ECB indicated it might not be able to continue to provide further liquidity facilities, a decision that would have sparked a run on the bank's deposits.
The Novo Banco solution also suits another official sector creditor, the China Development Bank, which lent BES 300m for three years in September 2011. That facility is due to be repaid next month.
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
Moody's sul senior debt di Novo Banco...
Approccio molto prudente di Moody's:
Rating Action: Moody's assigns B3 senior debt and B2 deposit ratings to Novo Banco; ratings on review for downgrade
Global Credit Research - 12 Aug 2014
Madrid, August 12, 2014 -- Moody's Investors Service has today assigned debt, deposit ratings and a standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to the newly established Portuguese entity Novo Banco, S.A., in response to the transfer of the majority of assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items from Banco Espirito Santo, S.A. (BES), together with the banking activities of this bank. The following ratings have been assigned: (1) long- and short-term deposit ratings of B2/Not-Prime; (2) a standalone BFSR of E (equivalent to a ca baseline credit assessment [BCA]).
Additionally, Moody's rates the debt issues which have been transferred from BES and assumed by Novo Banco as follows: (1) the long-term and short-term senior unsecured debt at B3/Not-Prime, and (2) the government guaranteed debt at Ba1. The bank's long-term senior debt and deposit ratings are on review for downgrade, while the BFSR is on review for upgrade. The outlook on the government guaranteed debt is stable.
At the same time, Moody's has taken the following rating actions on BES: (i) the B2/Not-Prime deposit ratings were withdrawn, and (ii) the E BFSR (equivalent to a ca BCA) and the C subordinated debt ratings were affirmed.
Please refer to the end of this press release for a list of affected ratings.
RATINGS RATIONALE
ASSIGNMENT OF RATINGS TO NOVO BANCO
The E standalone BFSR(equivalent to a ca BCA) assigned to Novo Banco reflects the fact that this bank is the successor to BES which -- as a result of significant losses and governance issues -- had failed to meet regulatory capital requirements and consequently got intervened by the Portuguese regulator. Such a scenario is consistent with the BFSR/BCA of E/ca, a positioning which also reflects a higher than normal degree of uncertainty associated with our assessment of the financial strength of this new bank. Nevertheless, Moody's acknowledges that upward rating pressure exists on Novo Banco's BFSR, given that it has new shareholders and new management, and that the most problematic assets which caused the resolution of BES have not been transferred to Novo Banco. Further, Novo Banco received a capital injection from the Portuguese Resolution Fund -- which results in a CET 1 ratio of 8.5% - and will have a high level of loan loss reserves following large provisions constituted by BES in H1 2014. Moody's expects to conclude the review for upgrade of Novo Banco's BFSR in the coming weeks, as we anticipate greater visibility around the bank's credit and business profile, including more detail and clarity on key financial metrics.
The B3/Not-Prime senior debt and B2/Not-Prime deposit ratings assigned to Novo Banco, which are four and five notches, respectively, above the BCA, reflect the fact that the holders of these instruments have been protected by the Portuguese authorities from the resolution of BES. The review for downgrade of the senior debt and deposit ratings will focus on (1) the standalone credit profile of Novo Banco, given the review for upgrade of the bank's BFSR, and (2) an assessment of the likelihood of systemic support going forward, and particularly whether the potential for support would be lower in the future if there were a subsequent event requiring government intervention. The one notch differential between Novo Banco's deposit and debt ratings reflects the rating agency's assessment of higher risk for senior debt holders versus the bank's depositors.
BES' RATINGS
Moody's has affirmed BES's standalone E BFSR (equivalent to a ca BCA), which indicates that this bank has needed external support in order to avoid default, and it also reflects that all the performing assets and senior liabilities have been transferred to Novo Banco. Likewise, Moody's has affirmed the senior subordinated debt rating at C and the junior subordinated debt at (P)C(hyb). These junior debt instruments, which have not been transferred to Novo Banco, are backed by the problematic assets of uncertain value which remain at BES. The risk associated with these junior debt instruments is reflected in the C rating, which is consistent with a loss severity above 65%.
RATINGS OF BACKED SUBSIDIARIES
The ratings of the debt issued by Banco Espirito Santo N.A. capital LLC, BES Finance Ltd. and Espirito Santo Investment plc, which benefit from the guarantee of BES, are not affected by today's rating action. Moody's will assess the ratings of these subsidiaries once it attains greater visibility on how these entities are affected by the resolution of BES, primarily on whether Novo Banco subrogates in the guarantee extended by BES, or whether these subsidiaries remain under the scope of BES.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The BFSR of Novo Banco could be upgraded if Moody's determines that the bank has been fully and effectively protected from problematic exposures and contingent liabilities related to BES' failure. Moody's nevertheless acknowledges that certain factors limit the potential for upgrade of the BFSR, namely (1) any evidence that Novo Banco's franchise is adversely affected as a consequence of the failure of BES; (2) the changes that Novo Banco needs to implement in BES's business model, which was underpinned by strong links to the Espirito Santo family; (3) further risks that materialise following Bank of Portugal's forthcoming special audit of the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items transferred to Novo Banco; and (4) litigation risk arising from, for example, the sale of affiliate debt to BES retail and institutional customers.
Novo Banco's long-term senior debt and deposit ratings of Novo Banco could be downgraded if Moody's were to assess a lower probability of systemic support in the case that a new government intervention is needed, and this downside risk is not fully offset by the potential improvement in Novo Banco's BFSR.
Moody's could upgrade the rating of BES's junior debt instruments as a consequence of a recovery from the assets remaining with BES which warrants a loss severity for these instruments below 65%.
Approccio molto prudente di Moody's:
Rating Action: Moody's assigns B3 senior debt and B2 deposit ratings to Novo Banco; ratings on review for downgrade
Global Credit Research - 12 Aug 2014
Madrid, August 12, 2014 -- Moody's Investors Service has today assigned debt, deposit ratings and a standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to the newly established Portuguese entity Novo Banco, S.A., in response to the transfer of the majority of assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items from Banco Espirito Santo, S.A. (BES), together with the banking activities of this bank. The following ratings have been assigned: (1) long- and short-term deposit ratings of B2/Not-Prime; (2) a standalone BFSR of E (equivalent to a ca baseline credit assessment [BCA]).
Additionally, Moody's rates the debt issues which have been transferred from BES and assumed by Novo Banco as follows: (1) the long-term and short-term senior unsecured debt at B3/Not-Prime, and (2) the government guaranteed debt at Ba1. The bank's long-term senior debt and deposit ratings are on review for downgrade, while the BFSR is on review for upgrade. The outlook on the government guaranteed debt is stable.
At the same time, Moody's has taken the following rating actions on BES: (i) the B2/Not-Prime deposit ratings were withdrawn, and (ii) the E BFSR (equivalent to a ca BCA) and the C subordinated debt ratings were affirmed.
Please refer to the end of this press release for a list of affected ratings.
RATINGS RATIONALE
ASSIGNMENT OF RATINGS TO NOVO BANCO
The E standalone BFSR(equivalent to a ca BCA) assigned to Novo Banco reflects the fact that this bank is the successor to BES which -- as a result of significant losses and governance issues -- had failed to meet regulatory capital requirements and consequently got intervened by the Portuguese regulator. Such a scenario is consistent with the BFSR/BCA of E/ca, a positioning which also reflects a higher than normal degree of uncertainty associated with our assessment of the financial strength of this new bank. Nevertheless, Moody's acknowledges that upward rating pressure exists on Novo Banco's BFSR, given that it has new shareholders and new management, and that the most problematic assets which caused the resolution of BES have not been transferred to Novo Banco. Further, Novo Banco received a capital injection from the Portuguese Resolution Fund -- which results in a CET 1 ratio of 8.5% - and will have a high level of loan loss reserves following large provisions constituted by BES in H1 2014. Moody's expects to conclude the review for upgrade of Novo Banco's BFSR in the coming weeks, as we anticipate greater visibility around the bank's credit and business profile, including more detail and clarity on key financial metrics.
The B3/Not-Prime senior debt and B2/Not-Prime deposit ratings assigned to Novo Banco, which are four and five notches, respectively, above the BCA, reflect the fact that the holders of these instruments have been protected by the Portuguese authorities from the resolution of BES. The review for downgrade of the senior debt and deposit ratings will focus on (1) the standalone credit profile of Novo Banco, given the review for upgrade of the bank's BFSR, and (2) an assessment of the likelihood of systemic support going forward, and particularly whether the potential for support would be lower in the future if there were a subsequent event requiring government intervention. The one notch differential between Novo Banco's deposit and debt ratings reflects the rating agency's assessment of higher risk for senior debt holders versus the bank's depositors.
BES' RATINGS
Moody's has affirmed BES's standalone E BFSR (equivalent to a ca BCA), which indicates that this bank has needed external support in order to avoid default, and it also reflects that all the performing assets and senior liabilities have been transferred to Novo Banco. Likewise, Moody's has affirmed the senior subordinated debt rating at C and the junior subordinated debt at (P)C(hyb). These junior debt instruments, which have not been transferred to Novo Banco, are backed by the problematic assets of uncertain value which remain at BES. The risk associated with these junior debt instruments is reflected in the C rating, which is consistent with a loss severity above 65%.
RATINGS OF BACKED SUBSIDIARIES
The ratings of the debt issued by Banco Espirito Santo N.A. capital LLC, BES Finance Ltd. and Espirito Santo Investment plc, which benefit from the guarantee of BES, are not affected by today's rating action. Moody's will assess the ratings of these subsidiaries once it attains greater visibility on how these entities are affected by the resolution of BES, primarily on whether Novo Banco subrogates in the guarantee extended by BES, or whether these subsidiaries remain under the scope of BES.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The BFSR of Novo Banco could be upgraded if Moody's determines that the bank has been fully and effectively protected from problematic exposures and contingent liabilities related to BES' failure. Moody's nevertheless acknowledges that certain factors limit the potential for upgrade of the BFSR, namely (1) any evidence that Novo Banco's franchise is adversely affected as a consequence of the failure of BES; (2) the changes that Novo Banco needs to implement in BES's business model, which was underpinned by strong links to the Espirito Santo family; (3) further risks that materialise following Bank of Portugal's forthcoming special audit of the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items transferred to Novo Banco; and (4) litigation risk arising from, for example, the sale of affiliate debt to BES retail and institutional customers.
Novo Banco's long-term senior debt and deposit ratings of Novo Banco could be downgraded if Moody's were to assess a lower probability of systemic support in the case that a new government intervention is needed, and this downside risk is not fully offset by the potential improvement in Novo Banco's BFSR.
Moody's could upgrade the rating of BES's junior debt instruments as a consequence of a recovery from the assets remaining with BES which warrants a loss severity for these instruments below 65%.
Topgun1976
Guest
Mi pare che le tre sorelle siano molto pesanti con la Novo Banco,infondo è ripulita,ha linee di credito svalutate ma che possono dare svariati milioni,ecc
Sarà mica perchè Gs e altri Hedge ci hanno smenato ?
Sarà mica perchè Gs e altri Hedge ci hanno smenato ?
drbs315
Forumer storico
Topgun1976
Guest
Ora Moody's assegna rating B3,che è lo stesso che aveva Bes prima dell'ultimo naufragio..a me pare che da allora le cose siano un tantino cambiate,in meglio..
capt.harlock
MENA IL CAMMELLO FAN CLUB
e' abbastanza un "classico"
prima delllo scoppio del bubbone nessuna nuvola all' orizzonte, non c' era alcuna casa d' affari che mettesse in guardia su bes, tutt'altro, ci si aspettava la call sulla 854 (che si vendeva tranquillamente a 95) dopo l' adc da 1 billion
adesso che la banca sostanzialmente e' piu' sana di prima , dopo aver svalutato , ricapitalizzato e schiantato sub e azioni, sorgono mille dubbi
downgrade meritato...
Topgun1976
Guest
Io non ho ancora capito a che servono ste case di Rating,emettono giudizi a giochi fatti,quando invece dovrebbero mettere in guardia prima dei giochi...
O meglio capisco che le corporazione Usa devono comandare,ma almeno si sforzassero di farlo almeno con un senso..
Topgun1976
Guest
O jogador francês vendido pelo FC Porto ao Manchester City estava dado como garantia a um empréstimo de 30 milhões de euros do BES à SAD portista, que tinha de ser liquidado até Julho. Venda rendeu 30,5 milhões.
A sociedade anónima desportiva (SAD) do Futebol Clube do Porto (FCP) comunicou esta segunda-feira, 11 de Agosto, que recebeu 30,5 milhões de euros pela venda de 56,67% dos direitos económicos que detinha do jogador Mangala, defesa central internacional francês.
Mas nas contas do terceiro trimestre do exercício 2013/2014 - entre Janeiro e Março -, a SAD portista divulgou que os "passes" dos jogadores Mangala e Jackson Martinez estavam dados como garantia/colateral a um empréstimo de 30 milhões de euros do Banco Espírito Santo, cujo reembolso estava dividido em duas tranches: 23 milhões de euros em Julho deste ano e os restantes sete milhões em Outubro próximo.
No mesmo documento, sobre esta garantia/colateral, a SAD portista esclarece que "caso a empresa aliene, ceda ou transfira a propriedade dos direitos económicos dos passes dos jogadores Mangala e Jackson Martinez que detinha à data de abertura do financiamento antes do término da maturidade do mesmo, está obrigada a liquidá-lo imediata e antecipadamente".
Isto significa que se a SAD do FCP não tiver encontrado um parceiro para substituir o crédito do BES e, com esse financiamento, liquidado o empréstimo de 30 milhões até ao momento em que assegurou a venda de Mangala (segunda-feira, 11 de Agosto), o proveito da venda foi usado para pagar ao Novo Banco, que assumiu todos os créditos que o BES detinha com os seus clientes, antes da intervenção do Banco de Portugal no último dia 3 de Agosto.
Fonte oficial da SAD portista, questionado sobre se o destino do encaixe realizado com a venda do central francês foi o reembolso do empréstimo do BES, não respondeu em tempo útil.
Refira-se que a imprensa desportiva britânica tem assumido que o custo total de Mangala para o Manchester City terá sido de 40 milhões de euros.
A sociedade anónima desportiva (SAD) do Futebol Clube do Porto (FCP) comunicou esta segunda-feira, 11 de Agosto, que recebeu 30,5 milhões de euros pela venda de 56,67% dos direitos económicos que detinha do jogador Mangala, defesa central internacional francês.
Mas nas contas do terceiro trimestre do exercício 2013/2014 - entre Janeiro e Março -, a SAD portista divulgou que os "passes" dos jogadores Mangala e Jackson Martinez estavam dados como garantia/colateral a um empréstimo de 30 milhões de euros do Banco Espírito Santo, cujo reembolso estava dividido em duas tranches: 23 milhões de euros em Julho deste ano e os restantes sete milhões em Outubro próximo.
No mesmo documento, sobre esta garantia/colateral, a SAD portista esclarece que "caso a empresa aliene, ceda ou transfira a propriedade dos direitos económicos dos passes dos jogadores Mangala e Jackson Martinez que detinha à data de abertura do financiamento antes do término da maturidade do mesmo, está obrigada a liquidá-lo imediata e antecipadamente".
Isto significa que se a SAD do FCP não tiver encontrado um parceiro para substituir o crédito do BES e, com esse financiamento, liquidado o empréstimo de 30 milhões até ao momento em que assegurou a venda de Mangala (segunda-feira, 11 de Agosto), o proveito da venda foi usado para pagar ao Novo Banco, que assumiu todos os créditos que o BES detinha com os seus clientes, antes da intervenção do Banco de Portugal no último dia 3 de Agosto.
Fonte oficial da SAD portista, questionado sobre se o destino do encaixe realizado com a venda do central francês foi o reembolso do empréstimo do BES, não respondeu em tempo útil.
Refira-se que a imprensa desportiva britânica tem assumido que o custo total de Mangala para o Manchester City terá sido de 40 milhões de euros.