T-Bronx5Y-10Y-Bund .. la notte dei morti viventi (vm18)

f4f ha scritto:
grasssie caro
torno adess appostappost :P
uè avete sostenuto i mercati in mia assenza? ebbravi :cool:

per Gipa
ma chi t'ha ditto ke sono neutral ecc ecc ....? trend-follower semmai, in qst mondo di contrarian ecco
anzi, ''occasionista'' diciamo :help:
ricordiamo qui la vecchia 'lame weasel' del ciube :lol:

Ok ok telo appoggio :cool: sei trendy :P :P ma guarda che neutral player non era male :D
 
gipa69 ha scritto:
Sotto i 1400 di cash ti vengo a far compagnia :rolleyes:

Il mercato è sceso sotto i 1400 in mia assenza per cui l'operazione al ribasso lo aperta meglio del previsto sebbene al momento sia pressochè in pari.
Diciamo che almeno fino a domani sono impegnato :rolleyes:
 
Investment Strategy
by Jeffrey Saut
A Kid’s Market?!”


“’My solution to the current market,’ the Great Winfield said. ‘Kids. This is a kids’ market. This is Billy the Kid, Johnny the Kid, and Sheldon the Kid.’

‘Aren’t they cute?’ the Great Winfield asked. ‘Aren’t they fuzzy? Look at them, like teddy bears. It’s their market. I have taken them on for the duration.’

‘I give them a little stake, they find the stocks, and we split the profits,’ he said. ‘Billy the Kid here started with five thousand dollars and has run it up over half a million in the last six months.’ ‘Wow!’ I said. I asked Billy the Kid how he did it.

‘Computer leasing stocks, sir!’ he said, like a cadet being quizzed by an upper classman. ‘The need for computers is practically infinite,’ said Billy the Kid. ‘Leasing has proved the only way to sell them, and computer companies themselves do not have the capital. Therefore, earnings will be up a hundred percent this year, will double next year, and will double again the year after. The surface has barely been scratched. The rise has scarcely begun.’

‘Look at the skepticism on the face of this dirty old man,’ said the Great Winfield, pointing at me. ‘Look at him, framing questions about depreciation, about how fast these computers are written off. I know what he’s going to ask. He’s going to ask what makes a finance company worth fifty times earnings. Right?’ ‘Right,’ I admitted.

Billy the Kid smiled tolerantly, well aware that the older generation has trouble figuring out the New Math, the New Economics, and the New Market. ‘You can’t make any money with questions like that,’ said the Great Winfield. ‘They show you’re middle-age, they show your generation. Show me a portfolio, I’ll tell you the generation.’

‘See? See?’ said the Great Winfield. ‘The flow of the seasons! Life begins again! It’s marvelous! It’s like having a son! My boys! My kids!’”

. . . “The Money Game” by Adam Smith

The Great Winfield goes on to say, in Adam Smith’s classic 1967 book, “The strength of my kids is that they’re too young to remember anything bad, and they are making so much money they feel invincible.” He rented kids with the idea that one day the music will stop (it partially did in 1969-1970 and completely did in 1973-1974) and all of them will be broke but one. That one will be the Arthur Rock (legendary venture capitalist) of the new generation; Winfield will keep him.

Obviously, folks, we are back from our sojourn where it became abundantly clear that the “kids” are currently outperforming the stock market’s “greybeards” as the Warren Buffetts and John Templetons of the world worry about such silly things as optimistic valuations, waning earnings’ momentum, a slowing economy, a housing debacle, etc.

Speaking first to valuations, we have often stated that the best representative index for the average stock is not the S&P 500, but the ValueLine Index. At its peak the median P/E ratio of the ValueLine Index was 20.9x (see chart 1). Currently its P/E ratio is 18.3x, and while not as expensive as it was at its zenith, it is certainly not “cheap” by historic standards. Second, as for earnings momentum, if you deduct share repurchases, and seasonally adjust earnings, one finds that earnings momentum has been slowing since 4Q05 and is currently tracking toward mid-single digits. Third, recent reports leave little doubt that the economy is slowing. Indeed, GDP, capex shipments, ISM, private payrolls, Industrial Production, Existing Home sales, retail sales, et all, have been contracting. The lone stand-out arguing for economic strength remains governmental tax receipts, which continue to record low double-digit growth readings. Plainly that just does not “foot” with the recent 1.6% GDP report.

Other “non-footers” include: 1) a personal U.S. savings rate that appears to have bottomed, implying that Americans are saving more. This is not an unimportant observation, for it can be argued that for every 1% increase in the nation’s savings rate the business sector loses roughly $100 billion in profits; 2) reinforcing point one is a rare event that saw consumer credit actually get paid down in September with a concurrent reduction in bank lending to households during the month of October; 3) that begs the question, “following the Goldman Sachs-induced crash in gasoline prices, which have subsequently rebounded now that the gasoline weighting has been cut from 7.3% to 2.5% in Goldman’s much indexed commodity index, why have the retail stocks held up so well?!;” 4) evidently Amazon (AMZN/$42.55) and Wal-Mart (WMT/$47.50) don’t believe the retail rebound is sustainable since they are cutting their respective capex spending budgets; 5) and why, pray tell, does the U.S. Dollar Index remain amazingly resilient in light of low interest rates and given the fact that China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, New Zealand, etc. all telegraphed that they are reducing their weightings of U.S. Dollar reserves?; 6) why did the SEC, in mid-October, reduce margin requirements for select investments by hedge funds?; 7) how in the world can “guest workers” sue U.S. companies for under-paying them ( USA Today 11/15/06)?; 8) we could go on, but you get the idea . . .there are a lot of disconnects currently.

Meanwhile, participants have continued to increase their “risk profile,” as seen in the nearby chart from Merrill Lynch (chart 2), with an attendant parabolic rise in the D-J Industrial Average (DJIA). We have seen such parabolic rises before, most recently in gold’s upside blow-off between March and May of this year (we were sellers of gold back then), and historically such moves have tended to end badly. Verily, since the July “lows” the DJIA has truly gone parabolic. Interestingly, of the Dow’s 1500-point gain over those 87 sessions, roughly 1300 points have come during only 12 sessions where the often mentioned “mysterious buyers” showed up in the futures markets. This unnatural sequence has left the DJIA residing at nearly an unprecedented 1000 points above its 200-day moving average (@ 11341 DMA) and well over-bought relative to its MACD and Relative Strength Indicators (RSI).

What does this mean to us? Well, except for our token long trading positions in the Volatility Index (VIX/10.05), which has so far been a losing trade, we remain “flat” in the trading account. Not so, however, in our investment account, where we are 60% long stocks, 10% long fixed income, and 30% in cash. Fortunately, many of our investment positions “came to life” during our absence with positions like Strong Buy-rated Sprint Nextel (S/$20.26) traveling above $20.00 per share. Likewise, Chesapeake Energy’s (CHK/$32.51/Strong Buy) 5%-yielding convertible preferred has rallied from $91.00 to $100.00, Chicago Bridge & Iron ( CBI /$27.74/Rated Outperform by research correspondent Credit Suisse) lifted from the low $20s, Strong Buy-rated RFID player Intermec (IN/$25.01) rallied, homeland security participant L-1 Identity Solutions ( ID /$16.59/Strong Buy) “popped” . . . all of which have kept us outperforming the various indices. One name that has stalled, however, has been Convanta ( CVA /$20.45/Strong Buy), which we have recommended since the mid-teens. Given the fact that CVA plays to EVERYTHING needed in the environment we envision going forward, we suggest familiarizing yourselves with the CVA story. As well, we suggest you re-consider our long-standing recommendation on electric-grid participant ITC Holdings (ITC/$36.55), which also remains rated Outperform by our research correspondent Credit Suisse.

In conclusion, by far the preponderance of our recent emails have centered on the Canadian Royalty Trusts. Many of those questions were addressed while we were away by our Canadian analysts in a communiqué. For copies please contact the retail liaison desk (x72520) or Julie Lachman (x75559). While we have little value-add in this regard, we believe the proposed tax changes for said trusts will not go through in its present form.

The call for this week: We were aggressively bullish at the mid-June trading lows, and currently we are aggressively cautious. While that stance has cost us relative performance points recently, we continue to believe that you should not put in your “Rent-a-Kid” application right here because we think we are well past the hiring stage in this bull phase. Indeed, some of the “kids” are well on their way to going broke, like Armand Amaranth, Roger Real Estate, Larry Leverage, Jimmy Junk bond, and the over-leveraged dance continues. Our ideal trading pattern calls for a trading “top” during this holiday week, leading to a correction into the second week of December, which would set up the fabled year-end rally. Whether this plays or not only time will tell, but we have learned the hard way it is difficult to break the markets “down” during the latter half of December. However, when the markets do break down in December it can be significant . . . hello 2002, which saw the DJIA fall from its December high of 9000 into its March 2003 low of 7400. Consequently, we find ourselves left with a George Soros quote from the year 2000 – “Maybe I don’t understand the market, but I prefer not to have the same kind of continued exposure I’ve had up until now. In some ways I think the music has stopped only most people are still dancing.”

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FX Trading - Should this worry us?
We haven't been worry warts to date on the growing level of derivatives in the system - probably for these reasons:
1)We don't quite understand the rocket science behind them.
2)We think the debt revolution that has allowed the consumer to manage his balance sheet in a way business has done for years is a good thing.
3)If it weren't for credit being doled out, our little business might never have seen the light of day.

But, we can't help but find the explosion of growth in the derivatives market eye-opening at the very least. This comes to us via Serhan Cevik, a Morgan Stanley economist, from his recent piece, The Curse of Alpha (our emphasis):

The explosive growth in leveraged financial transactions is a potential threat to stability. Driven by the global liquidity cycle and investors' growing risk appetite, the notional amount of exchange-traded derivative instruments increased from US$2.3 trillion in 1990 to US$14.3 trillion in 2000 and then soared to US$84 trillion in the first half of this year. According to the Bank for International Settlements, annual turnover recorded an astounding surge from 510 million contracts to almost 7 billion contracts over the same period. However, this is still just a small part of the pool of synthetically created financial products, most of which are actually traded over the counter. Indeed, the data compiled by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association show that the outstanding volume of over-the-counter credit derivatives increased from US$3.5 trillion in 1990 to US$63 trillion in 2000 and over US$283 trillion this year. Put differently, the total amount of exchange-traded and over-the-counter structured financial instruments ballooned from 27.3% of global GDP in 1990 to 772.8% this year.

Highly leveraged positions have started turning into a futile game of musical chairs. In today's global network of financial markets, almost everything becomes interdependent and correlated, diminishing the advantage of portfolio diversification. Take, for example, the breathtaking rise of the hedge fund industry. In 1990, there were only 300 hedge funds in business, increasing to 3,000 by the end of the decade. On the latest count, however, the number of hedge funds reached over 10,000, with approximately US$1.5 trillion worth of assets under management. Although that may still look small relative to the rest of the investment community, hedge funds employing risky derivatives strategies to enhance returns already account for 45% of emerging-market bond trading volume and 55% of all credit derivatives trading in the world. In other words, the rise of hedge funds, driven by cheap financing, is behind the explosive growth in structured products and massive flows to emerging markets. However, as the number of players searching for arbitrage opportunities has kept increasing, seeking alpha via highly leveraged positions has started turning into a futile game of musical chairs. Indeed, as competition has squeezed returns, the number of failed hedge funds increased from 4.7% of the funds in operation in 2004 to 11.4% last year.
Yikes! The thought of thousands of hedge funds running for the exits at any one time is a bit disconcerting. And as we found out recently from the demise of hedge fund operator Amaranth, internal risk controls at these places isn't always what it's cracked up to be.

"... hedge funds employing risky derivatives strategies to enhance returns already account for 45% of emerging-market bond trading volume." This stat adds some weight to our ongoing view that the US dollar could see some major money flow on the risk-reduction trade - despite the warts within the US economy. This game of "musical chairs" stretching for yield into emerging market bonds, and other places emerging, might have something to do with the yen carry trade.

Is it an accident waiting to happen or are derivatives a lot more solid than the average mind can comprehend? Maybe if falling global liquidity begins to bite and a semblance of volatility returns, we might gain some further insight.
 
Ned Davis Research recently noted that 21 blow offs at the end of a bull market in the U.S. have occurred since 1901. Blow offs tend to last 3-4 months from their low to their high. Average (median) time is 64 trading days. Range is a low of 32 days to a high of 94 days. Average (median) gain by the Dow Jones Industrial Average is 14.1%. Range is a low of 9.2% to a high of 29.9%.


Blow offs at the end of bull market in the U.S. are characterized by a swift upside move by the Dow Jones Industrial Average or S&P 500 Index followed by a swift downside move. Identifying the peak of the blow off is virtually impossible. Indeed, Ned Davis Research has not suggested or implied that the current move by U.S. equity markets is a blow off.

We believes that a blow off phase for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 Index started on July 14th 2006 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average touched an inter-day low of 10,701.34 and the S&P 500 Index touched an inter-day low of 1228.45. Since then, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has gained 15.3% and the S&P 500 Index has improved 14.1%. Number of trading days since July 14th is 90. No signs of an end to the current blow off phase have been noted to date.

Other technical evidence of a blow off phase exists. Historically, Tech Talk’s up/down ratio for S&P 500 stocks has moved in a range between 0.25 and 4.00. On three occasions during the past 10 years, the up/down ratio has moved above 4.00: July 1998, January 2000 and March 2002. The ratio exceeded 9.00 in January 2000.Each of those occasions has been identified by Ned Davis Research as the end of a blow off phase. The current up/down ratio for S&P 500 stocks is 4.58
 
When Value Mavens Lag

John P. Hussman, Ph.D.
All rights reserved and actively enforced.




If you've read Warren Buffett's letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, you might recall that they start with a table of long-term performance. But notice what's in the table. He doesn't present the year-to-year returns of Berkshire Hathaway stock. Rather, he presents the growth in Berkshire Hathaway's book value – essentially the fundamental accounting value of its holdings. A relatively small portion is in stocks and cash, while most represents privately held businesses that Berkshire owns.

You'll also notice that though Berkshire 's stock price has historically been much more volatile than its book value, they have soared together over the long run. That's not to say that they've grown every year – they haven't. But over time, price has followed value.

That says something. It says that the attention of a good investor should be on the worth of the underlying businesses. If those are solid and growing, market prices will come to reflect that over time. In my view, a good fund manager spends a lot of time thinking about the underlying value of the businesses that are owned on behalf of shareholders, and doesn't gamble a great deal of shareholder capital when the only merit is speculative momentum. The responsibility is to own assets and claims on probable future cash flows, not just hot air. If the underlying values in the portfolio have a solid foundation (and particularly if investor sponsorship supports that assessment, as evidenced by price-volume behavior), market prices generally come to reflect the underlying values over time.

Looking closely at Buffett's performance, a fascinating pattern emerges. From 1965-2002, we can identify 13 calendar years where, over the following 3-year period, the S&P 500 underperformed Treasury bills. If we examine Buffett's investment performance during those 13 calendar years, it turns out that he beat the S&P 500 by just 1.68%, on average. In contrast, Buffett's investment performance in other years beat the S&P 500 by an average of 15.96%.

Repeatedly, Buffett's investment performance was least impressive when the market was approaching a long period of dull and often negative returns.

There's more to the story. Last week, the Financial Times ran the following news comment: “Aronson+Johnson+Ortiz, a Philadelphia fund manager, has for years tracked a simple strategy: buy the cheapest 10 percent (as measured by the multiple of price over earnings) of the 2000 largest stocks in the market, and sell short the most expensive 10 percent. Over time this strategy does well. Since the exercise started in 1962, it gained about 1200 percent (8.4 percent annually).

“This strategy is highly unlikely to lose money. It has only done so when the market is truly out of whack, with the most expensive stocks carried forward by their own momentum.

“A fall in the AJO strategy indicates a major sell-off is in the making. Ahead of the bursting of the internet bubble in early 2000, it dropped 53 percent – an early warning of the juddering halt that lay ahead. Since February 2000, it has gained 380 percent, while the S&P 500 has been flat.

“So it should cause concern that the AJO strategy is now falling, for the first time since 2000. It fell ahead of May's correction, and rose thereafter as the rally gained strength, before falling again. By the end of October, it was more than 10 percent below its peak set early last year. The dearest stocks are once more strongly outperforming the cheapest.

“This is unhealthy. It suggests a correction may be coming sooner rather than later.”

Similarly, the Wall Street Journal had this item last week:

“Another problem for stock pickers, points out ING Investment Management analyst Jeanette Louh, is that fewer individual stocks in the S&P 500 than usual are outperforming the overall index this year. When that's happened in the past, it's usually meant that fewer fund managers were able to best the index.” That's clearly evident in the performance of many good managers this year, including Bill Miller over at Legg Mason. Personally, that's small consolation, but it's worth noting because it may be part of a broader pattern that has historically proved unfavorable for the general market.

Here in our office, Bill Hester makes a hobby of reading through 13-F filings. In recent weeks, he's noted an increase in the number of hedge funds holding the SPDRs (S&P 500 depository receipts – essentially exchange traded index funds). In effect, Bill says, “it looks like they're so eager to get into the market that they've bypassed stock selection altogether.” It's difficult for good stocks to get much traction on the basis of their investment merit if investors don't even stop to discriminate.

Paying Twice

At present, I don't see much value in this market. As I've frequently noted, investors are currently paying rich P/E multiples on peak earnings, and those peak earnings are based on record profit margins. In effect, they are paying a premium - twice - for every dollar of normalized earnings. While profit margins have historically been both cyclical and mean-reverting (so high margins tend to normalize over the full economic cycle), the recent upswing has been unusually strong, but I suspect just as temporary.

If profit margins were anywhere near historical norms (even in the healthy range that we saw during the 1990's), the P/E ratio on the S&P 500 would currently be about 23, still on record earnings. Bill Hester has an outstanding research piece on profit margins this week: Profit Margins, Earnings Growth, and Stock Returns. (I'll add another link to his article at the end of this comment).

That said, there's still a good amount of relative value (i.e. many stocks appear priced to deliver better long-term returns than the major indices – and are perfectly reasonable investments, provided we have an offsetting hedge in those market indices). The difficulty, as I've noted lately, is that our normally strong stock selection approach has lagged the major indices by about 3% over the past 6 months. Short periods like that are nothing unusual, but at present, it makes for flat and unimpressive returns at the exact time that the indices are enjoying a speculative blowoff.

The more-than-doubling of the NYMEX initial public offering on Friday was also interesting. The equities of securities exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ, among others, have soared lately. Among offbeat indicators of sentiment used to be the price of seats on the NYSE (which are now no longer traded). Soaring seat prices were generally a good sign of the exuberance of market tops. Friday's NYMEX “shooter” brought that element together with a bubbling IPO market, and is an indication of the increasingly speculative tone of the stock market here.

All of that said, it's exactly that speculative tone, evident in the ease of market advances and the lack of “heavy” price-volume action, which prevents any good forecast of when the market will turn down or complete its cycle. Still, as long-term investors, we don't really need to know. Once stocks become richly valued, further market gains are typically not retained over the full cycle. In richly valued markets, the primary source of sustainable returns is good stock selection that is hedged against general market fluctuations, plus the implied interest earned on those hedges.

Should we chase this advance?

In the Strategic Growth Fund, the decision to accept or not accept market exposure is based on the prevailing combination of valuation and market action at any given time. Various combinations of these conditions have historically produced very different profiles of return and risk. The idea is to accept large market exposures when the expected return/risk profile is favorable, and avoid much exposure when it is not.

We welcome exposure to market risk when we observe some combination of favorable valuations and market action. The best combination in recent years emerged in 2003, though valuations were still well above historical norms so we removed 70%, rather than 100% of our hedges. Conversely, as of last week, we are essentially back to a full hedge because stocks are overvalued, market action is strenuously overbought, and investors are overbullish (the latest Investors Intelligence figures show only 22.3% bears among investment advisors).

But the trend is up! Shouldn't we just ignore the prevailing overvalued, overbought and overbullish conditions, assume the trend is our friend, and chase this market anyway? Well, let's try a thought experiment. At these levels, even if we bit the bullet (against our best evidence) and lifted our hedges, there's little chance we could justify even a 40% exposure. Suppose we did. Then what? Is there a reasonable expectation that the market will plow another 10-15% higher before correcting? If so, would we be able to close down our exposure prior to the market giving that gain back, given that a correction is already so long overdue? Without a perfect exit, how much of the gain would the market give back before we reestablished our hedges? On a 40% exposure, how much impact would our risk-taking have on overall performance?

Once you go through this sort of thought process, it becomes clear that establishing a exposure to market fluctuations here and now, even provided a further advance and a good exit, would still be most probably be associated with a low single-digit impact on Fund performance. In my view, the downside risk is at least as great. In any event, our investment positions are a function of prevailing conditions, and are not based on scenarios about future short-term market direction. Given the overvalued, overbought, and overbullish character of the market, the evidence weighs against taking a significant speculative investment position here.

That isn't to say that nothing would justify some amount of speculative exposure in the near future. If we were to establish a moderate amount of exposure after a reasonable correction in the market, provided internal market action remains relatively favorable, the expected return to that speculative position would at least be positive and perhaps in the mid-to-high single digits. In any event, until we see better valuations, I expect that our primary source of returns will continue to be stock selection and the implied interest on our hedges.

Market Climate

As of last week, the Market Climate for stocks was characterized by unfavorable valuations and favorable market action. On last week's market strength, I took profits on our call option position, so the Strategic Growth Fund is again about fully-hedged. The prevailing overvalued, overbought, overbullish combination has generally been associated negative returns, on average, even when overall market action has been favorable. Still, even a correction of a few percent will again warrant at least some constructive exposure to market fluctuations. Until we actually observe a shift back to unfavorable market action, it would be premature to place much expectation on a near-term market top or an extended decline. We can't rule them out, but as always, our focus is on prevailing, observable conditions, not scenarios or “market calls.”

Meanwhile, in stock selection, we continue to stick to our knitting. I continue to expect disciplined stock selection to be the primary driver of returns in the Fund over time. Market exposure will play a far greater role in our investment returns once valuations move down from the extremes of historical experience.

In bonds, the Market Climate remains characterized by unfavorable valuations and moderately favorable market action. Inflation news has been surprisingly tame in recent reports. While our investment positions don't rely on any particular expectation for inflation, the data are uncharacteristic. It's possible that U.S. government liabilities (currency and Treasury securities) are still enjoying good demand from China and other foreign holders, which we would observe as even deeper current account deficits, but that's still unclear. In any event, without evidence from widening credit spreads, yield levels are currently not sufficient to warrant much duration risk here.

Yes, it would be possible for bonds to achieve reasonable total returns if yield levels move even lower, but as in stocks, the prospect of bonds actually sustaining those returns appears low. The Strategic Growth Fund presently holds a portfolio duration of about 2 years, mostly in TIPS, with about 20% of assets in precious metals shares.
 
Bennet Sedacca
Nov 20, 2006 8:29 am
We must constantly recall that as Keynes once said that "markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent."







Over the past few months we have witnessed a relentless run in virtually every major stock market average. The reasons are vast as I listen to TV, read the paper and talk to fellow professional money managers. The most often mentioned is that the Fed will engineer a ‘soft landing,’ where we experience a slowdown in economic growth but not a hard landing with negative economic growth, otherwise known as a recession in these parts. Another is ‘performance anxiety’ for under-invested managers (they chase).

We all know that the Fed’s stated objective is to have a growing economy with limited and controllable inflation. Inflation is important as it inhibits growth of the ‘real’ return of financial assets over time. My case over the past 10 years or so, ever since I believe Greenspan began targeting asset prices in addition to economic growth and inflation is that we are walking a fine line between inflation and deflation. We know from current Fed Chairman Bernanke that he would ‘drop money from helicopters’ in order to stave off deflation. Deflation is the worst economic scenario—just ask folks from the 30’s in the US or Japan. It is particularly dangerous when debt is piled up so high in every area that we need ever rising asset prices to support the debt and debt payments that go along with them. Currently, inflationary pressures are turning deflationary in my view.

Consider this. If one took the Net Present Value of out budget deficit looking out 75 years (thanks to our friends at Ned Davis Research for the data), including future costs of Social Security, Medicare, etc., it would total $50 trillion. Yes, trillion. That is in addition to the fact that total credit market debt resides around 320% of GDP and the typical household has debt up to its eyeballs. So far, we have seen a bubble in stocks, a bubble in commodities and a bubble (now busted) in real estate. So you see, we need inflation to be sure that the right side of the balance sheet (assets) doesn’t overtake the left side (liabilities). It is why I believe the Fed talks hawkish (tough on inflation) and acts dovish (stoking asset inflation). They do this because they must. It maintains their global credibility, and hence keeps the dollar from collapsing (an inevitable outcome I am afraid).Why do they say that they are acting dovish? It is simple—the money supply continues to grow at an absurd 10% annualized rate—hardly tight monetary policy. All in a desire to grow asset prices. We need them.

Now, to Miss Goldilocks. The Goldilocks economy is one that is judged to be ‘not too cool, not too hot, and just right’—like a bowl of porridge. Market participants have embraced this theory like they did in 1999-2000 and stocks seem to rise every day in the face of awful economic statistics, inflation that is turning to deflation, no fear, the lowest volatility on record (options are the cheapest in my career), a severely inverted yield curve - usually a precursor to recession - and the hedging ‘smart money’ crowd short the S&P 500 in record size. Keep in mind that the S&P data is released on Fridays at 3:30 PM with data as of the previous data and combines the open outcry contracts and electronic e-mini contract (we net them out to give a proper representation.)

So here are the Three Bears: Curve inversion, hedgers, and record low volatility (VXO). I hope you find the charts as interesting and thought provoking as I did.

Yield Curve Inversion (10 Year Note – Fed Funds Rate) vs. S&P 500

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Hedgers (Total Position) vs. S&P 500

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VXO (Market Estimate of Future Volatility) vs. S&P 500

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In conclusion, most indicators I use have been and get further into cautious territory. My firm has been admittedly underweight equities for a little while and have not reaped as much of the gain as others. Keep in mind we are not short stocks and are not fighting the tape, simply following indicators that have worked for me for my entire career. My firm continues to buy high quality preferred stocks in the 6.5-6.6% area as well as short to intermediate term government agencies. We must constantly recall that as Keynes once said that "markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent." While I am not saying the market is irrational, I am simply stating that Goldilocks and the Three Bears are at odds at present. We are entering a very strong seasonal time of year, particularly this week, but I would note that we did very well in the worst seasonal time of the year (mid August-mid October). So, people are positioned for the positive seasonality and could be disappointed this year, but I really don’t know (that would be guessing).

What I do know is that my firm is a protector of other people’s wealth and the risk/reward seems tilted to risk. This by no means suggests that the market cannot continue higher, as that would be a foolish prediction. I just know risk when I see it.

Wishing you and yours a happy, safe and healthy Thanksgiving Holiday.
 
"Donami mille baci, poi altri cento
poi altri mille, poi ancora altri cento,
poi di seguito mille, poi di nuovo altri cento.

Quando poi ne avremo dati migliaia,
confonderemo le somme, per non sapere,
e perché nessun malvagio ci invidi,
sapendo che esiste un dono così grande di baci. "


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