Derivati USA: CME-CBOT-NYMEX-ICE Tbond,Tnote,Bund&CO-giu/lug2006: fuga dai Bonds (vm18) (6 lettori)
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Global Investor: Barton Biggs
Don't Blame the Hedge Funds
July 3-10, 2006 issue - Hedge funds, like Moby Dick, are mysterious and potentially threatening, but are they the principal cause of the speculation and mad volatility in commodity prices we've seen in recent years? A lot of market watchers seem to think so, but I don't. Instead, my guess is that the culprit is more a case of what might be called "institutional envy" or, more precisely, "endowment envy."
During the late 1990s and the three-year bear market that ended in 2003, large, institutional portfolios—which were traditionally invested in stocks and bonds—suffered. They missed the huge gains in venture capital and private equity in the second half of the 1990s, bought into technology and In-ternet stocks just before they crashed, and were criticized for being unimaginative, stodgy and prone to debilitating committee-think.
At the same time, two new tribes of heroes were rising in the investment world—hedge funds and college endowments. In the devastation of the bear market, hedge funds prospered. For the five years that ended March 31, 2003, a hedge fund at the middle of the pack earned 7.8 percent a year, and one in the 75th percentile returned 12.7 percent. By contrast, the S&P 500 had a negative total return (including dividends) of 3.6 percent per year.
The other heroes were the endowments of major colleges such as Yale, Harvard and Stanford. Yale's endowment has grown 17 percent a year for something like 20 years now, and has transformed the economics of the university. Its chief investment officer, David Swensen, has become big money's Warren Buffett. All these schools emphasize absolute return strategies (hedge funds), private equity, venture capital and real assets (timberland, oil and gas, real estate, commodities). These asset classes are much less liquid than good old stocks and bonds, but they are good diversifiers—they don't go up and down with the stock market.
Licking their wounds, owners of big money—whether pension funds, endowments or wealthy families—began asking their investment managers why their performance was so lousy compared with Yale's or Harvard's. Their response was to pour money into the asset classes that the new heroes had exploited: hedge funds, private equity and venture capital. Everyone wanted to be another David Swensen. In the huckster tradition of Wall Street, supply rises quickly to meet the new demand. Of course, inevitably the new supply is of lower quality. The range between the top quartile and the median fund in all three asset classes is very large, and there is no asset class that too much money can't spoil. Expect far less inspiring future returns from all three, particularly private equity.
As for real assets, the supply of oil and gas deals and timberland is very limited. What was readily available was commod-ities, so money poured into that asset class and into commodity-trading funds (CTFs). Traditional hedge funds also began buying commodities because that's where the action was.
At the time, commodities were emerging from a vicious bear market that began in the late 1970s. Throughout the 1990s, the long decline in prices and onerous environmental regulations discouraged companies from opening new mines or adding new capacity. But then demand for oil, steel, coal, nickel, iron ore and aluminum skyrocketed in the developing world. Suddenly commodity users found to their dismay that they had to bid up prices in competition with a new class of buyer—investors. Even worse, some of the investors were outright speculators. Put simply, CTFs buy what is going up and sell what is going down, and devil take the hindmost. The collision between real buyers, the hedge funds and the asset-class investors sent commodity prices halfway to the moon.
In recent weeks investors have begun to worry that central banks are raising interest rates even as growth is slowing in the United States and is still fragile in Europe and Japan. In other words, the banks are making a "policy error" that could result in a slowdown, even a global recession. The result has been panic selling of equities, commodities, gold and silver. The selling has little to do with the fundamentals of these assets, and a lot to do with who owns them. I think it's a cyclical bear market within a bull market in both commodities and emerging markets, but, of course, I could be wrong. If so, the herd will once again have zigged when it should have zagged.
Biggs is a managing partner of the Traxis Partners hedge fund in New York.
Don't Blame the Hedge Funds
July 3-10, 2006 issue - Hedge funds, like Moby Dick, are mysterious and potentially threatening, but are they the principal cause of the speculation and mad volatility in commodity prices we've seen in recent years? A lot of market watchers seem to think so, but I don't. Instead, my guess is that the culprit is more a case of what might be called "institutional envy" or, more precisely, "endowment envy."
During the late 1990s and the three-year bear market that ended in 2003, large, institutional portfolios—which were traditionally invested in stocks and bonds—suffered. They missed the huge gains in venture capital and private equity in the second half of the 1990s, bought into technology and In-ternet stocks just before they crashed, and were criticized for being unimaginative, stodgy and prone to debilitating committee-think.
At the same time, two new tribes of heroes were rising in the investment world—hedge funds and college endowments. In the devastation of the bear market, hedge funds prospered. For the five years that ended March 31, 2003, a hedge fund at the middle of the pack earned 7.8 percent a year, and one in the 75th percentile returned 12.7 percent. By contrast, the S&P 500 had a negative total return (including dividends) of 3.6 percent per year.
The other heroes were the endowments of major colleges such as Yale, Harvard and Stanford. Yale's endowment has grown 17 percent a year for something like 20 years now, and has transformed the economics of the university. Its chief investment officer, David Swensen, has become big money's Warren Buffett. All these schools emphasize absolute return strategies (hedge funds), private equity, venture capital and real assets (timberland, oil and gas, real estate, commodities). These asset classes are much less liquid than good old stocks and bonds, but they are good diversifiers—they don't go up and down with the stock market.
Licking their wounds, owners of big money—whether pension funds, endowments or wealthy families—began asking their investment managers why their performance was so lousy compared with Yale's or Harvard's. Their response was to pour money into the asset classes that the new heroes had exploited: hedge funds, private equity and venture capital. Everyone wanted to be another David Swensen. In the huckster tradition of Wall Street, supply rises quickly to meet the new demand. Of course, inevitably the new supply is of lower quality. The range between the top quartile and the median fund in all three asset classes is very large, and there is no asset class that too much money can't spoil. Expect far less inspiring future returns from all three, particularly private equity.
As for real assets, the supply of oil and gas deals and timberland is very limited. What was readily available was commod-ities, so money poured into that asset class and into commodity-trading funds (CTFs). Traditional hedge funds also began buying commodities because that's where the action was.
At the time, commodities were emerging from a vicious bear market that began in the late 1970s. Throughout the 1990s, the long decline in prices and onerous environmental regulations discouraged companies from opening new mines or adding new capacity. But then demand for oil, steel, coal, nickel, iron ore and aluminum skyrocketed in the developing world. Suddenly commodity users found to their dismay that they had to bid up prices in competition with a new class of buyer—investors. Even worse, some of the investors were outright speculators. Put simply, CTFs buy what is going up and sell what is going down, and devil take the hindmost. The collision between real buyers, the hedge funds and the asset-class investors sent commodity prices halfway to the moon.
In recent weeks investors have begun to worry that central banks are raising interest rates even as growth is slowing in the United States and is still fragile in Europe and Japan. In other words, the banks are making a "policy error" that could result in a slowdown, even a global recession. The result has been panic selling of equities, commodities, gold and silver. The selling has little to do with the fundamentals of these assets, and a lot to do with who owns them. I think it's a cyclical bear market within a bull market in both commodities and emerging markets, but, of course, I could be wrong. If so, the herd will once again have zigged when it should have zagged.
Biggs is a managing partner of the Traxis Partners hedge fund in New York.
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
Derivative traders see June US payrolls at 205,400
Thu Jul 6, 2006
NEW YORK, July 5 (Reuters) - Traders are betting that U.S. employers added about 205,400 jobs in June in a derivatives auction on Thursday, a 33 percent jump from the first auction on Wednesday, according to data from the firms holding the auction.
The latest auction result reflected that traders increased expectations of strong job growth last month, a day after the ADP National Employment Report showed a 368,000 job gain in the private sector in June.
The report caused a stir in the financial markets by sending both stocks and bonds lower. It also led many forecasters to upwardly revise their estimates on the June government non-farm payroll figures.
The U.S. Labor Department will issue the June payroll report on Friday at 8:30 a.m. (1230 GMT).
The latest median forecast of economists polled by Reuters predicted a 185,000 job increase in nonfarm payrolls following a 75,000 gain in May. Prior to the ADP report, the median forecast for the Reuters poll was a 155,000 increase.
Among possible outcomes in this derivatives auction, a payroll gain between 175,000 and 250,000 drew about 33.2 percent of traders betting on those outcomes. This compared with 26.2 percent of bets placed on these outcomes in the first auction.
Investors use the auctions to hedge against unwanted surprises in the report. Traders also use the auctions to speculate on the outcome.
Economic derivatives are offered by Goldman Sachs, interdealer broker ICAP and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Thu Jul 6, 2006
NEW YORK, July 5 (Reuters) - Traders are betting that U.S. employers added about 205,400 jobs in June in a derivatives auction on Thursday, a 33 percent jump from the first auction on Wednesday, according to data from the firms holding the auction.
The latest auction result reflected that traders increased expectations of strong job growth last month, a day after the ADP National Employment Report showed a 368,000 job gain in the private sector in June.
The report caused a stir in the financial markets by sending both stocks and bonds lower. It also led many forecasters to upwardly revise their estimates on the June government non-farm payroll figures.
The U.S. Labor Department will issue the June payroll report on Friday at 8:30 a.m. (1230 GMT).
The latest median forecast of economists polled by Reuters predicted a 185,000 job increase in nonfarm payrolls following a 75,000 gain in May. Prior to the ADP report, the median forecast for the Reuters poll was a 155,000 increase.
Among possible outcomes in this derivatives auction, a payroll gain between 175,000 and 250,000 drew about 33.2 percent of traders betting on those outcomes. This compared with 26.2 percent of bets placed on these outcomes in the first auction.
Investors use the auctions to hedge against unwanted surprises in the report. Traders also use the auctions to speculate on the outcome.
Economic derivatives are offered by Goldman Sachs, interdealer broker ICAP and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
ennessimo movimento a V del maldido T-bronx stoppato sulla r1 odierna
lo spoor sta facendo base a 1284 , quasi quasi mi metto in bid
lo spread S&Pmib/eu50xx ha rotto il traderange ed è andato in negativo, quindi siccome ESSI sanno e ci prendono quasi sempre , pare un buon segno per una continuazione di rialzo, let's see, intanto un tentativo con stop ravvicinato e obb minimo 1290 c' sta c' sta
lo spoor sta facendo base a 1284 , quasi quasi mi metto in bid
lo spread S&Pmib/eu50xx ha rotto il traderange ed è andato in negativo, quindi siccome ESSI sanno e ci prendono quasi sempre , pare un buon segno per una continuazione di rialzo, let's see, intanto un tentativo con stop ravvicinato e obb minimo 1290 c' sta c' sta
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
ormai son entrato, lo stop l'ho messo a 1282 breve come detto sopra, se risale al massimo te lo faccio tornare indietro da 1290 
smile
Forumer storico
Fleursdumal ha scritto:ormai son entrato, lo stop l'ho messo a 1282 breve come detto sopra, se risale al massimo te lo faccio tornare indietro da 1290
mi sa che stoppi prima
anzi hai gia stoppato 
non mi piace deridere i trade in perdita
ps x l'esattezza 1277.5 anche se ovviamente mi attendo un return ben piu' corposo
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
nada da fà, a guardare il 15' pare diretto sullo smile target o quanto meno sul pivot centrale a 1279
Fleursdumal
फूल की बुराई
embè un tentativo me lo sentivo di farlo, l'importante è minimizzare le perdite
smile
Forumer storico
Fleursdumal ha scritto:embè un tentativo me lo sentivo di farlo, l'importante è minimizzare le perdite
guarda che non mi fa piacere se il trade non va a buon fine anzi
cmq stop cosi stretti sonno manna solo x i broker
ma oramai visti gli anni di militanza
non credo tu ti abbisogni dei miei consigli