Thread Ufficiale Unificato delle Discussioni Politiche Generali

[big_boom]

Come spendono i vostri soldi:

DA ASTA 4G "Nella relazione tecnica al provvedimento si precisa che "le maggiori entrate ammontano a circa 1.545 milioni di euro, in quanto le frequenze sono state aggiudicate per complessivi 3.945 milioni di euro, a fronte di un incasso stimato nella legge 220 del 2010, di 2.400 milioni di euro". "


Gli oltre 700 milioni verranno quindi distribuiti per le seguenti finalita': 200 milioni al ministero della Difesa per il potenziamento e il finanziamento di oneri indifferibili; 220 milioni al ministero dell'Interno per il potenziamento e il finanziamento di oneri indifferibili della polizia di stato, dell'Arma dei carabinieri e dei vigili del fuoco; 30 milioni alla guardia di finanza per il potenziamento e il finanziamento di oneri indifferibili; 100 milioni al ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'universita' e della ricerca per la messa in sicurezza degli edifici scolastici; 100 milioni al ministero dell'Ambiente per interventi in materia di difesa del suolo e altri interventi urgenti; 100 milioni al ministero dello Sviluppo economico per il finanziamento del fondo di garanzia.


fatemi capire 100 milioni per la ricerca la scuola e la messa in sicurezza degli edifici scolastici

e gran parte del malloppo dato a forze militari

forze militari 220 + 200 + 30 = 450

scuola, sviluppo e ambiente 100 + 100 +100 = 300

ci stiamo preparando alla guerra civile?


e si chiama pure decreto di stabilita'

http://www.agi.it/economia/notizie/...asta_4g_100_mln_a_ambiente_220_a_forze_ordine

 

[big_boom]

cosa pensa dei manifestanti una persona intelligente:

La cancelliera tedesca, Angela Merkel sta prendendo seriamente in considerazione le recenti proteste dei giovani 'indignados'. Lo fa sapere il suo portavoce, Steffen Seibert. "Il governo - dice il portavoce - sta prendendo molto seriamente le proteste. Esse esprimono la richiesta di una maggiore giustizia da parte di molta gente". "Finora non sono state accolte, ma vanno accolte per dare ai mercati finanziari quelle regole che per noi sono socialmente accettabili in Germania". .

AGI Energia

 

[alingtonsky]

10/17/11 - 01:38 PM EDT

.....

They should change the name to Occupy Congress and get 2 million people to go down to the D.C. area, where unemployment is low and deficits high and where Congress hardly does any real work and lets the lobbyists decide. Real estate values in and around the Beltway have held up pretty well. So have wages. I wonder why all the states and cities should be cutting wages and the federal government and Congress are not cutting their own pay.

Wall Street is just a first or second derivative of Congress. Even after the mortgage debacle the federal bank regulators didn't catch the robo-signing problem. The states' attorneys general and private attorneys were the first to find the problem.
It will take time for the housing market to heal because Congress is not going to do anything about it. ....

Maybe Congress and the rest of the D.C. crowd sent the Occupy Wall Street people to Wall Street to divert attention from what they're doing.
....

Forget Wall Street, Occupy Congress - TheStreet

 

[lorenzo63]

Italy’s debt a better bet than ‘triple A’ UK FT 20 ottobre 2011

Italy’s debt a better bet than ‘triple A’ UK

By Erik Nielsen

You would be forgiven for thinking that something has suddenly gone awfully wrong in Italy. Last week it was downgraded by both Moody’s and Fitch. Moody’s cut, by a hefty three notches to A plus, was its first downgrade of Italy in 18 years.

The move came just a couple of weeks after the approval of the biggest fiscal adjustment of any leading country in decades. Then again, markets had already taken absence from fundamentals, driving Italian sovereign funding costs above 5 per cent – so the rating agencies, following tradition, adjusted their rating regardless of economic fundamentals.

But sometimes the market gets it all wrong, as is the case now. Consider the following: while Italy funds itself at 5.1 per cent, the UK government funds itself at 1.6 per cent (and is therefore rated triple A).

Italy and the UK are two countries broadly of the same size, wealth and income. Italy is more geared towards manufacturing, with many corporates plugged into the German export machine. The UK is more geared towards services.

Granted, the Italian government’s debt is larger than that of the UK (some 119 per cent of gross domestic product compared with 80 per cent of GDP). But the Italian private sector has stronger balance sheets than the UK private sector, so the two countries’ net international investment positions (net debt of anyone in the country to foreign creditors) are both very comfortable at minus 24 per cent of GDP in Italy, against minus 13 per cent of GDP in the UK.

This means that the Italian sovereign transfers more resources (as interest payments) to foreign creditors than the UK sovereign, while the Italian private sector transfers fewer resources to foreign creditors than the UK private sector. Hence, the Italian government has stronger private wealth for potential future taxation than the UK.

Coming through the crisis, both governments knew that they had to address their fiscal imbalances, and so they did. In the UK, the government passed legislation last year that will tighten the fiscal stance by 2.6 per cent of GDP by the end of parliament in 2014-15, and by another 1.1 per cent of GDP for the first year thereafter, for a total of 3.7 per cent of GDP through to 2016.

This comes on top of fiscal measures implemented by the previous government. All in all, the UK primary balance is set to improve from a worrisome deficit of 5.0 per cent of GDP this year to a modest surplus of 1.3 per cent of GDP in four years.

In Italy, the government passed legislation two weeks ago that will tighten their fiscal stance by 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2014, which comes on top of last year’s tightening of 1.5 per cent of GDP, for a total of a sizeable 5 per cent of GDP. These measures are set to improve the fiscal primary balance from a surplus this year of 0.9 per cent of GDP to a surplus of 5.7 per cent of GDP in four years. Yes, there are implementation risks, but Italy starts with a primary surplus; the UK starts with a sizeable deficit.

In spite of Italy’s better fiscal position and more comprehensive measures, it now pays more than 5.1 per cent (in euros) for its debt while the UK pays just 1.6 per cent in sterling. Could the difference be due to investors’ expectations of future sterling appreciation? Hardly.

Indeed, the argument seems to go the other way. Curiously, investors seem to like the UK precisely because of the country’s ability to weaken its currency (apparently disregarding the loss imposed by such depreciation) because – the argument goes – this will boost future growth and hence tax revenues. The only problem is that this theory has not really worked that well in practice.

Since the end of 2007, UK GDP has contracted cumulatively by 3.4 per cent in spite of the great sterling depreciation as exports failed to recover. Italy’s GDP contracted by 4.4 per cent during the same period. Meanwhile, weaker sterling has lowered imports as the UK became poorer in real terms through higher inflation. In 2007, the average Brit was 30 per cent richer than the average Italian; now they are just 5 per cent richer, according to Eurostat.

Another curious argument relates to central bank underwriting of the sovereign. Yes, the Bank of England may be more comfortable printing money than the European Central Bank but such printing presumably involves some risk of weakening the exchange rate. And make no mistake about it, the ECB is Italy’s central bank and, as already demonstrated, it stands behind the Italian sovereign like any central bank would do in any civilised society. But while the ECB buys Italian sovereign debt, it does so against policy conditionality.

So what would you rather own? The bond on a government being pushed by its central bank to adjust its underlying fundamentals (while backstopping the most extreme market sentiment) or the bond of a government with less ambitious fiscal plans with a central bank behind it which prints without conditionality attached? Oh, and you’ll be paid 3.5 percentage points more for the former

 

[lorenzo63]

Italy's Absent Opposition 19 ottobre 2011 Wsj

Italy's Absent Opposition
The Democratic Party is right to criticize Silvio Berlusconi's economic polices. Too bad it has nothing better to offer.

As the results of last Friday's confidence vote were announced in the Italian parliament, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi covered his face with his hands and appeared almost to sob with relief when his victory became clear.

The vote was a test of Mr. Berlusconi's capacity to lead Italy in the face of mounting economic crisis. On paper, he should have lost. In struggling to deal with a massive public debt of almost 120% of GDP, he has run into serious challenges. Since Moody's downgraded Italy's debt rating to A2 from Aa2 on Oct. 4, market confidence in Italian government bonds has plummeted, and Mr. Berlusconi's government has come under increasing pressure to cut public spending. Nevertheless, the parliament last week rejected his 2010 budget report, which he had intended to pave the way toward further austerity measures.

Mr. Berlusconi's parliamentary coalition has also begun to fracture. Some members of his own center-right People of Freedom (PdL) party opposed the budget report and came out against the prime minister in the confidence vote. Announcing his intention to quit the party last month, former PdL representative Santo Versace indicated that Italy needs a new premier.

Popular opposition is also rising against Mr. Berlusconi. The worsening economic situation has eroded his popularity, already fragile after a seemingly endless series of scandals. Earlier this month, his approval rating plummeted to an all-time low of 24%. The violent protests in Rome on Saturday are a testimony to the anger that his austerity measures have provoked.

Yet against all odds, Mr. Berlusconi coasted to victory last week, winning the necessary 316 votes without too much difficulty. His triumph seems almost to defy common sense. How did he do it? The answer is simple. However resentful voters and parliamentarians may be of his austerity measures, il Cavaliere—as the flamboyant Mr. Berlusconi is known—is offering the only realistic solution to Italy's economic woes.

It is not that Mr. Berlusconi's economic policy represents Italy's best hope of climbing out of the quagmire of debt. A combination of spending cuts, job cuts and tax hikes, the government's austerity package has rightly been criticized for constricting rather than encouraging economic growth. Confindustria, the Italian employers' federation, announced in September that it was "greatly concerned" by Mr. Berlusconi's response to the crisis, and Jean-Claude Trichet, head of the European Central Bank, has repeatedly indicated his anxiety about the direction of Italian economic policy. Mr. Berlusconi's measures have also been opposed by labor unions on the grounds that they disproportionately hit blue-collar workers.
Even if it does not represent the best of all possible strategies though, Mr. Berlusconi's agenda is nevertheless the only serious package of reforms on offer. Despite crowing for Mr. Berlusconi's resignation for months, Italy's main opposition, the Democratic Party, has failed to advance any realistic alternative to his budgetary proposals. No matter how valid its criticisms of Mr. Berlusconi's austerity measures, the Democratic Party has nothing better to offer.

This is the product of a long-running crisis at the party's heart. Formed out of an unlikely coalition of left-wing parties in 2007, the Democratic Party is composed of former Christian Democrats, Communists, Social Democrats and Liberals, all of which retain a distinct factional identity within the party and pull in different directions. As party leaders have discovered, it is virtually impossible to find consensus. In the name of preserving unity, the party has increasingly offered bland centrist policies that voters have struggled to differentiate from those of the PdL.

At present, the Democratic Party's economic prescriptions remain focused on job creation and progressive taxation, issues that Mr. Berlusconi himself has also embraced. But continuing factional divisions have prevented the Democratic Party from explaining how it will achieve these objectives. Following the party's disappointing showing in Italy's May administrative elections, voters are mistrustful of this vagueness and are worried that the party might fracture if allowed to form a government. The same concerns have prevented Italy's traditionally left-wing labor unions from giving their wholehearted support to the Democratic Party, and have kept independent-minded parliamentarians on the prime minister's side when the chips are down.

Seen in this light, Mr. Berlusconi's victory in Friday's confidence vote seems less surprising. His success is a product of his opposition's failure.

But while the Democratic Party's weakness on economic policy may be good news for Mr. Berlusconi, it is almost certainly bad news for Italy. Given the likelihood of default and stagnation, it is clear that the country urgently needs a strong alternative to Mr. Berlusconi.

Even at the risk of splitting the party and incurring future electoral losses, the Democratic Party's leadership must recognize that it has a responsibility to elaborate a clear and effective economic policy focused on encouraging growth and stabilizing public spending. It will be tough, but Mr. Berlusconi's victory demonstrates that the Democratic Party needs to rethink its economic strategy from scratch if Italy is to recover.

 

[lorenzo63]

Che stranezza .... Penati e quindi di riflesso politicamente Bersani (nn poteva nn sapere: se è valido x Silviuccio..) adesso D' Alema ... quindi sti due articoli ...

Renzi ... è il nuovo cavallo su cui hanno deciso di puntare; gli stanno facendo piazza pulita attorno ...

 

[f4f]

Italy’s debt a better bet than ‘triple A’ UK

By Erik Nielsen

You would be forgiven for thinking that something has suddenly gone awfully wrong in Italy. Last week it was downgraded by both Moody’s and Fitch. Moody’s cut, by a hefty three notches to A plus, was its first downgrade of Italy in 18 years.

The move came just a couple of weeks after the approval of the biggest fiscal adjustment of any leading country in decades. Then again, markets had already taken absence from fundamentals, driving Italian sovereign funding costs above 5 per cent – so the rating agencies, following tradition, adjusted their rating regardless of economic fundamentals.

But sometimes the market gets it all wrong, as is the case now. Consider the following: while Italy funds itself at 5.1 per cent, the UK government funds itself at 1.6 per cent (and is therefore rated triple A).

Italy and the UK are two countries broadly of the same size, wealth and income. Italy is more geared towards manufacturing, with many corporates plugged into the German export machine. The UK is more geared towards services.

Granted, the Italian government’s debt is larger than that of the UK (some 119 per cent of gross domestic product compared with 80 per cent of GDP). But the Italian private sector has stronger balance sheets than the UK private sector, so the two countries’ net international investment positions (net debt of anyone in the country to foreign creditors) are both very comfortable at minus 24 per cent of GDP in Italy, against minus 13 per cent of GDP in the UK.

This means that the Italian sovereign transfers more resources (as interest payments) to foreign creditors than the UK sovereign, while the Italian private sector transfers fewer resources to foreign creditors than the UK private sector. Hence, the Italian government has stronger private wealth for potential future taxation than the UK.

Coming through the crisis, both governments knew that they had to address their fiscal imbalances, and so they did. In the UK, the government passed legislation last year that will tighten the fiscal stance by 2.6 per cent of GDP by the end of parliament in 2014-15, and by another 1.1 per cent of GDP for the first year thereafter, for a total of 3.7 per cent of GDP through to 2016.

This comes on top of fiscal measures implemented by the previous government. All in all, the UK primary balance is set to improve from a worrisome deficit of 5.0 per cent of GDP this year to a modest surplus of 1.3 per cent of GDP in four years.

In Italy, the government passed legislation two weeks ago that will tighten their fiscal stance by 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2014, which comes on top of last year’s tightening of 1.5 per cent of GDP, for a total of a sizeable 5 per cent of GDP. These measures are set to improve the fiscal primary balance from a surplus this year of 0.9 per cent of GDP to a surplus of 5.7 per cent of GDP in four years. Yes, there are implementation risks, but Italy starts with a primary surplus; the UK starts with a sizeable deficit.

In spite of Italy’s better fiscal position and more comprehensive measures, it now pays more than 5.1 per cent (in euros) for its debt while the UK pays just 1.6 per cent in sterling. Could the difference be due to investors’ expectations of future sterling appreciation? Hardly.

Indeed, the argument seems to go the other way. Curiously, investors seem to like the UK precisely because of the country’s ability to weaken its currency (apparently disregarding the loss imposed by such depreciation) because – the argument goes – this will boost future growth and hence tax revenues. The only problem is that this theory has not really worked that well in practice.

Since the end of 2007, UK GDP has contracted cumulatively by 3.4 per cent in spite of the great sterling depreciation as exports failed to recover. Italy’s GDP contracted by 4.4 per cent during the same period. Meanwhile, weaker sterling has lowered imports as the UK became poorer in real terms through higher inflation. In 2007, the average Brit was 30 per cent richer than the average Italian; now they are just 5 per cent richer, according to Eurostat.

Another curious argument relates to central bank underwriting of the sovereign. Yes, the Bank of England may be more comfortable printing money than the European Central Bank but such printing presumably involves some risk of weakening the exchange rate. And make no mistake about it, the ECB is Italy’s central bank and, as already demonstrated, it stands behind the Italian sovereign like any central bank would do in any civilised society. But while the ECB buys Italian sovereign debt, it does so against policy conditionality.

So what would you rather own? The bond on a government being pushed by its central bank to adjust its underlying fundamentals (while backstopping the most extreme market sentiment) or the bond of a government with less ambitious fiscal plans with a central bank behind it which prints without conditionality attached? Oh, and you’ll be paid 3.5 percentage points more for the former

molto corretto
naturalmente, i mercati sanno fare le somme
un perchè, c'è

 

[lorenzo63]

molto corretto
naturalmente, i mercati sanno fare le somme
un perchè, c'è

Esatto.

Eccome se c'è un perchè...

 

[f4f]

Esatto.

Eccome se c'è un perchè...

anche più di uno
perchè il mio perchè, scommetto che non è il tuo perchè

ci metto su 1000 sticobaudi

 

[lorenzo63]

anche più di uno
perchè il mio perchè, scommetto che non è il tuo perchè

ci metto su 1000 sticobaudi

Li hai vinti ... Stavolta ...

Diciamo che ciò che x te è la radice della motivazione, per me sono solo attori intermediari -loro malgrado-