Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3

Ciao Rott,
per favore mi spieghi perchè per ESFG non interviente la legge
sul Bail -in?

Con lo scioglimento della società ESFG-Credit Agricole, ESFG non consolida più il bilancio di BES. Avevo già fatto notare come fosse strano che lo consolidasse prima; ora, con il 25.1%, proprio non ha più senso.

Se vai a vedere l'elenco delle banche europee soggette ad AQR vi troverai ESFG. Ora quell'elenco va aggiornato con BES al posto di ESFG.

Se poi vai a leggere alcuni articoli linkati nel 3D delle portoghesi, vedrai anche che:

*gli azionisti di ESFG hanno programmato di togliere la società dalle borse dove erano quotati, per farla acquisire da Rio Forte. Da Londra sono già usciti.
*il governo portoghese ha già fatto sapere che gli eventuali problemi finanziari di ESFG non lo riguardano in nessun modo.

La legge sul bail-in riguarda gli "enti" descritti agli articoli 1 e 2 della legge che ho postato qualche giorno fa: ESFG è altra cosa.
 
Con lo scioglimento della società ESFG-Credit Agricole, ESFG non consolida più il bilancio di BES. Avevo già fatto notare come fosse strano che lo consolidasse prima; ora, con il 25.1%, proprio non ha più senso.

Se vai a vedere l'elenco delle banche europee soggette ad AQR vi troverai ESFG. Ora quell'elenco va aggiornato con BES al posto di ESFG.

Se poi vai a leggere alcuni articoli linkati nel 3D delle portoghesi, vedrai anche che:

*gli azionisti di ESFG hanno programmato di togliere la società dalle borse dove erano quotati, per farla acquisire da Rio Forte. Da Londra sono già usciti.
*il governo portoghese ha già fatto sapere che gli eventuali problemi finanziari di ESFG non lo riguardano in nessun modo.

La legge sul bail-in riguarda gli "enti" descritti agli articoli 1 e 2 della legge che ho postato qualche giorno fa: ESFG è altra cosa.

Ricordo tutto quanto da te riportato...
visto gli intrecci crediti/debiti tra i due soggetti, ESFG in caso di bail- in verrebbe trattato come un qualsiasi creditore privato
Il governo portoghese voglio vedere come fa a disinteressarsi delle sorti di ESGF tenuto conto dei debiti che ha verso BES, quest'ultima ha debiti pesanti verso Portugal Telecom . Bes è socio della stessa Portugal Telecom
Catena di S.Antonio...??
 
Ultima modifica:
Ricordo tutto quanto da te riportato...
visto gli intrecci crediti/debiti tra i due soggetti, ESFG in caso di bail- in verrebbe trattato come un qualsiasi creditore privato
Il governo portoghese voglio vedere come fa a disinteressarsi delle sorti di ESGF tenuto conto dei debiti che ha verso BES, quest'ultima ha debiti pesanti verso Portugal Telecom . Bes è socio della stessa Portugal Telecom
Catena di S.Antonio...??

Nel bilancio di BES non ho trovato esposizioni significative verso ESFG. La quota di capitale di ESFG in BES è sì una liability, ma di tipo particolare: si può trasformare in cash ed è finita lì, senza che vi siano ripercussioni sul bilancio di BES.
Tutto questo se si leggono i bilanci ufficiali. Se poi ci sono altri scheletri...:specchio:

Tu che altre esposizioni ("debiti", come dici tu) hai trovato?

Ti faccio un paragone, con tutti i suoi limiti, visto che esco dal campo bancario: se Exor corresse il rischio di saltare, magari con qualche ripercussione su Fiat, e vi fosse bisogno di un aiuto statale, che probabilità ci sarebbero, secondo te, che lo Stato vada in soccorso di Exor?
 
BES' share price is down ~11.7% in the past 5 days, which we believe
reflects management/corporate governance changes as well as investor
concerns around the asset quality in Angola. However, in our view nothing
has financially changed since we published our "Banco Espirito Santo:
Earnings recovery potential and a macro play on Portugal - upgrade to
Neutral" note in May. In our view the management changes are positive and
we believe the risks in Angola are manageable. Trading at 0.5x PNAV and
9.0x P/E for a 6% RoNAV in 2016e plus ~102% EPS upside risk in our blue
sky scenario, we believe this could provide an opportunity to pick up BES
shares). However, whilst we view BES as a good macro play on the
Portuguese macro recovery combined with emerging markets growth, we
recognize uncertainty around the asset quality of the Angolan loan book
(€6.1bn) and reputational risk arising from the financial irregularities at
Espirito Santo International (indirectly owns ~12% of BES), who share some
of the same board of directors. On the back of this we reiterate our
Neutral rating.
A brief summary of recent events:
* New ownership structure - post the €1bn capital increase ESFG holds
25% (~27% pre-rights) and Credit Agricole ~15% (~20% pre-rights) in
BES. Both companies are subject to a 6 month lock-up period post the
rights issue. In our view the reduced holding by ESFG/Espirito Santo
family is positive.
* New management - given the change in ownership ESFG proposed 20
June 2014 that BES CFO Amílcar Morais Pires replace Ricardo Salgado as
Group CEO. Additionally 5 board members (all part of the Espirito Santo
family) have resigned from the Board and ESFG proposed to appoint Paulo
da Mota Pinto, as Chairman of the Board replacing Alberto de Oliveira
Pinto. A General Meeting will be held on 31 July 2014 after which Bank of
Portugal has said it will evaluate the new Board members that are elected.
In our view increased independence from the Espirito Santo family is again
positive.
* Not new - reputational risk from ESI - material irregularities were found
in the accounts of ESI (disclosed in the rights issue prospectus), which
indirectly owns ~12% in BES and is a private company (ie no public
financials available). Whilst BES has no direct credit exposure to ESI and
is not responsible for the Holding Co's accounts, it could affect BES'
reputation. ESI has €823mm of bonds outstanding (as of 27 May 2014),
which are unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by ESFG (with
~€700mm of provisions against it) and have been subscribed by BES'
clients. Given the accounting irregularities at the ultimate Holding Co, we
view reduced influence from the Espirito Santo family as positive.
* Angola - question marks around the asset quality. With ~€4.2bn of
loans (total credit of ~€6.1bn in Angola) covered by an 18mths sovereign
guarantee, there are some question marks around asset quality, especially
once the guarantee expires. BES doesn't recognize any NPLs on the
guaranteed part of the loan book, while has ~€33mm of NPLs
corresponding to a ~2% NPL ratio against €246mm of provisions (745%
coverage) in the non-guaranteed part of the book. This compares to a
~6.2% NPL ratio (>90d overdue) and ~63% coverage of the entire Angolan
loan book in 2012. Assuming the Angolan NPL ratio has remained
unchanged yoy, would imply NPLs of ~€342mm on the non-gteed book
and ~72% coverage on the entire book, which in our view is manageable.
With a ~20% market share in Angola, BES is arguing that the guarantee
reflects its systemic importance in the country.
* Espirito Santo de Investimento, a subsidiary 100% owned by BES and
run by Ricciardi, who is member of the Espirito Santo family and who
resigned from the Board on 24 Jun 2014. Mr Ricciardi's stated ambition is
to develop the investment banking business further and dilute the
ownership. Whilst he has been quoted in the press saying the investment
bank "plans significant capital increase" (Bloomberg 20 Jun 2014) we
would note that this reflects his growth ambitions for the subsidiary and
not any capital shortfall. Hence, in our view this is manageable.
 
BES' share price is down ~11.7% in the past 5 days, which we believe
reflects management/corporate governance changes as well as investor
concerns around the asset quality in Angola. However, in our view nothing
has financially changed since we published our "Banco Espirito Santo:
Earnings recovery potential and a macro play on Portugal - upgrade to
Neutral" note in May. In our view the management changes are positive and
we believe the risks in Angola are manageable. Trading at 0.5x PNAV and
9.0x P/E for a 6% RoNAV in 2016e plus ~102% EPS upside risk in our blue
sky scenario, we believe this could provide an opportunity to pick up BES
shares). However, whilst we view BES as a good macro play on the
Portuguese macro recovery combined with emerging markets growth, we
recognize uncertainty around the asset quality of the Angolan loan book
(€6.1bn) and reputational risk arising from the financial irregularities at
Espirito Santo International (indirectly owns ~12% of BES), who share some
of the same board of directors. On the back of this we reiterate our
Neutral rating.
A brief summary of recent events:
* New ownership structure - post the €1bn capital increase ESFG holds
25% (~27% pre-rights) and Credit Agricole ~15% (~20% pre-rights) in
BES. Both companies are subject to a 6 month lock-up period post the
rights issue. In our view the reduced holding by ESFG/Espirito Santo
family is positive.
* New management - given the change in ownership ESFG proposed 20
June 2014 that BES CFO Amílcar Morais Pires replace Ricardo Salgado as
Group CEO. Additionally 5 board members (all part of the Espirito Santo
family) have resigned from the Board and ESFG proposed to appoint Paulo
da Mota Pinto, as Chairman of the Board replacing Alberto de Oliveira
Pinto. A General Meeting will be held on 31 July 2014 after which Bank of
Portugal has said it will evaluate the new Board members that are elected.
In our view increased independence from the Espirito Santo family is again
positive.
* Not new - reputational risk from ESI - material irregularities were found
in the accounts of ESI (disclosed in the rights issue prospectus), which
indirectly owns ~12% in BES and is a private company (ie no public
financials available). Whilst BES has no direct credit exposure to ESI and
is not responsible for the Holding Co's accounts, it could affect BES'
reputation. ESI has €823mm of bonds outstanding (as of 27 May 2014),
which are unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by ESFG (with
~€700mm of provisions against it) and have been subscribed by BES'
clients. Given the accounting irregularities at the ultimate Holding Co, we
view reduced influence from the Espirito Santo family as positive.
* Angola - question marks around the asset quality. With ~€4.2bn of
loans (total credit of ~€6.1bn in Angola) covered by an 18mths sovereign
guarantee, there are some question marks around asset quality, especially
once the guarantee expires. BES doesn't recognize any NPLs on the
guaranteed part of the loan book, while has ~€33mm of NPLs
corresponding to a ~2% NPL ratio against €246mm of provisions (745%
coverage) in the non-guaranteed part of the book. This compares to a
~6.2% NPL ratio (>90d overdue) and ~63% coverage of the entire Angolan
loan book in 2012. Assuming the Angolan NPL ratio has remained
unchanged yoy, would imply NPLs of ~€342mm on the non-gteed book
and ~72% coverage on the entire book, which in our view is manageable.
With a ~20% market share in Angola, BES is arguing that the guarantee
reflects its systemic importance in the country.
* Espirito Santo de Investimento, a subsidiary 100% owned by BES and
run by Ricciardi, who is member of the Espirito Santo family and who
resigned from the Board on 24 Jun 2014. Mr Ricciardi's stated ambition is
to develop the investment banking business further and dilute the
ownership. Whilst he has been quoted in the press saying the investment
bank "plans significant capital increase" (Bloomberg 20 Jun 2014) we
would note that this reflects his growth ambitions for the subsidiary and
not any capital shortfall. Hence, in our view this is manageable.
Jpm
Che ne pensi sva, ho il t1
Ora anche la lt2 è sotto 80
 
Io ho preso sul finale il lt2 di bes 7,125% a 101callable 2018 bullet 2023 . Adesso c è volatilià totale, ma io mi baso almeno sul adc che bes ha appena concluso, da 1 bn. Poi chi vivrà vedrà , nel we penso usciranno comunicati. Onestamente mi sembra tutto gonfiato.
 

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