Massimum
Forumer storico
Il secondo articolo e' dell'anno scorso: 14 marzo 2014
Ultima modifica:
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (14 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
Il secondo articolo e' dell'anno scorso: 14 marzo 2014
Extension of Greece’s Rescue Programme Provides Banks Some Breathing Room Amid
Worsening Liquidity
Last Tuesday, euro area finance ministers (the Eurogroup) approved Greece’s reform plan, paving the way
for a four-month extension of the country’s financial rescue programme (known as the master financial
assistance agreement). The original version of the rescue program expired at the end of February. These
developments provide Greek banks some limited breathing room given that an extension of the support
package to Greece would also extend the availability to the banks of eurosystem funding. However, liquidity
risks at Greek banks will remain high.
The affected banks include National Bank of Greece S.A. (Caa2 review for downgrade, E/caa2 stable1
),
Piraeus Bank S.A. (Caa2 review for downgrade, E/caa2 stable), Alpha Bank AE (Caa2 review for downgrade,
E/caa2 stable), Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (Caa3 review for downgrade, E/caa3 stable) and Attica Bank S.A.
(Caa3 review for downgrade, E/caa3 stable).
The approval of the reforms follows an agreement on 20 February between Greece and the Eurogroup that
envisaged extending the current support programme through the end of June, provided its official lenders –
the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund – agree by the
end of April on the details of the reforms that Greece must undertake. A new deal must be in place by the
end of June in order for Greece to meet its financing needs. The four-month extension means that the ECB
is likely to continue providing eurosystem funding to Greek banks either directly or through the approval of
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) via the Bank of Greece, the country’s central bank.
The ELA is crucial to keeping Greek banks afloat because they have continued to experience significant
deposit outflows over the past three months. To this end, the ECB on 18 February approved an increase of
the ELA limit for Greek banks to €68.3 billion from €65 billion. Private-sector deposits in the system are at
their lowest point in 10 years, as depositor confidence has been significantly impaired since early December
2014 because of the perceived risk of Greece’s possible exit from the euro area. We expect that the reform
plan approval will somewhat mollify restive depositors concerned about a possible imposition of
capital controls.
The direct funding provided to Greek banks from the ECB is contingent on Greece remaining within a
support programme. As such, last Tuesday’s decision could prompt the ECB to reconsider its 4 February
decision to stop accepting as collateral Greek government bonds and guarantees from Greek banks. This will
allow around €50 billion to switch back to lower-cost ECB funding from the ELA, which costs approximately
150 basis points more, reducing Greek banks’ funding costs.
However, the funding and liquidity risks for Greek banks will remain acute, while the return of deposits lost
over the past three months will be very difficult to restore over the next 12-18 months, even if there is a
new support programme in place for Greece by June. As a result, Greek banks will continue to rely heavily
on eurosystem funding for a longer period of time than they had previously expected, which is a negative
credit and rating driver. We also expect that Greek banks will have to revise their 2015 projections, since
their performance will be negatively affected by the disruption in the local economy and the significant
decline in investment activity since last December.
Worsening Liquidity
Last Tuesday, euro area finance ministers (the Eurogroup) approved Greece’s reform plan, paving the way
for a four-month extension of the country’s financial rescue programme (known as the master financial
assistance agreement). The original version of the rescue program expired at the end of February. These
developments provide Greek banks some limited breathing room given that an extension of the support
package to Greece would also extend the availability to the banks of eurosystem funding. However, liquidity
risks at Greek banks will remain high.
The affected banks include National Bank of Greece S.A. (Caa2 review for downgrade, E/caa2 stable1
),
Piraeus Bank S.A. (Caa2 review for downgrade, E/caa2 stable), Alpha Bank AE (Caa2 review for downgrade,
E/caa2 stable), Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (Caa3 review for downgrade, E/caa3 stable) and Attica Bank S.A.
(Caa3 review for downgrade, E/caa3 stable).
The approval of the reforms follows an agreement on 20 February between Greece and the Eurogroup that
envisaged extending the current support programme through the end of June, provided its official lenders –
the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund – agree by the
end of April on the details of the reforms that Greece must undertake. A new deal must be in place by the
end of June in order for Greece to meet its financing needs. The four-month extension means that the ECB
is likely to continue providing eurosystem funding to Greek banks either directly or through the approval of
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) via the Bank of Greece, the country’s central bank.
The ELA is crucial to keeping Greek banks afloat because they have continued to experience significant
deposit outflows over the past three months. To this end, the ECB on 18 February approved an increase of
the ELA limit for Greek banks to €68.3 billion from €65 billion. Private-sector deposits in the system are at
their lowest point in 10 years, as depositor confidence has been significantly impaired since early December
2014 because of the perceived risk of Greece’s possible exit from the euro area. We expect that the reform
plan approval will somewhat mollify restive depositors concerned about a possible imposition of
capital controls.
The direct funding provided to Greek banks from the ECB is contingent on Greece remaining within a
support programme. As such, last Tuesday’s decision could prompt the ECB to reconsider its 4 February
decision to stop accepting as collateral Greek government bonds and guarantees from Greek banks. This will
allow around €50 billion to switch back to lower-cost ECB funding from the ELA, which costs approximately
150 basis points more, reducing Greek banks’ funding costs.
However, the funding and liquidity risks for Greek banks will remain acute, while the return of deposits lost
over the past three months will be very difficult to restore over the next 12-18 months, even if there is a
new support programme in place for Greece by June. As a result, Greek banks will continue to rely heavily
on eurosystem funding for a longer period of time than they had previously expected, which is a negative
credit and rating driver. We also expect that Greek banks will have to revise their 2015 projections, since
their performance will be negatively affected by the disruption in the local economy and the significant
decline in investment activity since last December.
Austria Proposal to Introduce Systemic Risk Capital Buffers Is Credit Positive
for Banks
Last Wednesday, the Austrian Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) announced that it will propose the
introduction of systemic risk buffers and systemically important institution buffers for certain banks. These
buffers would be credit positive for Austrian banks because they would raise required common equity Tier 1
(CET1) capital levels, which are weak relative to the banks’ risk profiles and European peers, and additional
earnings retention to ensure compliance with these higher capital requirements.
The FMSB has not yet disclosed details of the capital buffers. But based on other European countries, we
expect that the additional buffers initially will not exceed 3% of CET1. Therefore, CET1 minimum
requirements for the large Austrian banks could gradually rise to 10% in 2019 from 4.5% now and 8.125%
by 2016. The three largest Austrian banks, Erste Group Bank AG (Baa2 negative, D+/ba1 negative2
),
Unicredit Bank Austria AG (UBA, Baa2 review for downgrade, D+/ba1 review for downgrade) and Raiffeisen
Bank International AG (RBI, Baa2 review for downgrade, D-/ba3 negative) reported CET1 ratios of 10%-11%
as of December 2014 (see Exhibit 1). As such, we expect that the additional buffer requirements will be
manageable for the banks, even though the higher bar sets a clear incentive for banks to further improve
their CET1 ratios to maintain a safety margin to minimum required levels.
According to the FMSB, the systemic risk buffers will account for the importance of the financial sector to
the Austrian economy, a bank’s exposure to emerging European economies, particularly Central and Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, banks’ relatively low current capitalisation levels
compared with international peers, and specific, mostly private, or mutualist ownership structures that may
hinder quick emergency recapitalisations. We expect the FMSB to introduce the systemic risk buffers in
2016, adding to the 4.5% minimum CET1 ratio that will be applicable at that time and the capital
conservation buffer, which increases to 2.5% by 2019 (see Exhibit 2).
We expect the initial systemic risk buffer to be 1% for smaller domestic systemically important institutions3
and 3% for Erste, UBA and RBI. Although in theory national systemic risk buffers can be as high as 5%, none
of the eight European Union and European economic area countries that has so far announced systemic risk
buffers has chosen maximum levels greater than 3% (see Exhibit 3). National regulators can introduce
systemic risk buffers of up to 3% by notifying the European Commission, European Banking Authority,
European Systemic Risk Board and competent authorities of other relevant European Union member states,
thereby avoiding the more complex procedures and international consent requirements associated with
higher systemic risk buffer levels.
for Banks
Last Wednesday, the Austrian Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) announced that it will propose the
introduction of systemic risk buffers and systemically important institution buffers for certain banks. These
buffers would be credit positive for Austrian banks because they would raise required common equity Tier 1
(CET1) capital levels, which are weak relative to the banks’ risk profiles and European peers, and additional
earnings retention to ensure compliance with these higher capital requirements.
The FMSB has not yet disclosed details of the capital buffers. But based on other European countries, we
expect that the additional buffers initially will not exceed 3% of CET1. Therefore, CET1 minimum
requirements for the large Austrian banks could gradually rise to 10% in 2019 from 4.5% now and 8.125%
by 2016. The three largest Austrian banks, Erste Group Bank AG (Baa2 negative, D+/ba1 negative2
),
Unicredit Bank Austria AG (UBA, Baa2 review for downgrade, D+/ba1 review for downgrade) and Raiffeisen
Bank International AG (RBI, Baa2 review for downgrade, D-/ba3 negative) reported CET1 ratios of 10%-11%
as of December 2014 (see Exhibit 1). As such, we expect that the additional buffer requirements will be
manageable for the banks, even though the higher bar sets a clear incentive for banks to further improve
their CET1 ratios to maintain a safety margin to minimum required levels.
According to the FMSB, the systemic risk buffers will account for the importance of the financial sector to
the Austrian economy, a bank’s exposure to emerging European economies, particularly Central and Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, banks’ relatively low current capitalisation levels
compared with international peers, and specific, mostly private, or mutualist ownership structures that may
hinder quick emergency recapitalisations. We expect the FMSB to introduce the systemic risk buffers in
2016, adding to the 4.5% minimum CET1 ratio that will be applicable at that time and the capital
conservation buffer, which increases to 2.5% by 2019 (see Exhibit 2).
We expect the initial systemic risk buffer to be 1% for smaller domestic systemically important institutions3
and 3% for Erste, UBA and RBI. Although in theory national systemic risk buffers can be as high as 5%, none
of the eight European Union and European economic area countries that has so far announced systemic risk
buffers has chosen maximum levels greater than 3% (see Exhibit 3). National regulators can introduce
systemic risk buffers of up to 3% by notifying the European Commission, European Banking Authority,
European Systemic Risk Board and competent authorities of other relevant European Union member states,
thereby avoiding the more complex procedures and international consent requirements associated with
higher systemic risk buffer levels.
warren baffo
Forumer storico
la vecchia BOI scampata al massacro è viva e paga regolarmente...euribor 3m + 326
non o idea se abbia mercato e a che prezzi
fabrifede
Forumer storico
Ma è perpetua? Dalle quotazioni si, ma sia Berlino, che frankfurt che lux danno maturity 2018...
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Siete arrivati in ritardo 
http://www.bourse.lu/download/dl?v=...v/lqAuT+JU2Ryx6+LnuSn5I8NUQIvODClYaHm9AzPTQ==
http://www.bourse.lu/download/dl?v=...v/lqAuT+JU2Ryx6+LnuSn5I8NUQIvODClYaHm9AzPTQ==
fabrifede
Forumer storico
Siete arrivati in ritardo
http://www.bourse.lu/download/dl?v=...v/lqAuT+JU2Ryx6+LnuSn5I8NUQIvODClYaHm9AzPTQ==
Ah ecco, guardavo il grafico e non capivo....