Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
londonwhale
Forumer storico
Non ho capito: c'è il consorzio di garanzia per l'aumento di capitale? In vista dell' IPO non credo che le banche si facciano sfuggire la doppia commissione.... Ci sono diverse LT2 quotate, io sono sulla IT0004781073, ammortizing, scade a dicembre 2018, rendimento 5.3%, min 1k.
la prossima tranche (25%) verrà rimborsata a Dicembre, quindi prima di Aucap e quotazione
negusneg
New Member
MILANO (MF-DJ)--B.P.Vicenza andra' in Borsa attraverso una vera e propria Ipo e sara' il mercato e non piu' il Cda della banca a fissare il prezzo delle azioni gia' a primavera. E' quanto sostiene Francesco Iorio, a.d. della banca, in una intervista rilasciata domenica al Corriere della Sera. Parlando dell'aumento di capitale, il top manager spiega che "e' una operazione indispensabile per garantire il futuro. Puntiamo a un indicatore Vet1 al 12% rispetto all'attuale 6,81% e quindi vogliamo raccogliere fino a 1 mld e mezzo. Non sara' un aumento di capitale come gli ultimi. Il prezzo delle azioni lo decidera' il mercato. Faremo una vera e propria Ipo e stiamo valutando l'opzione di un book building". Per quanto riguarda le tempistiche "sulla carta vorremmo chetutto - l'assemblea per la trasformazione in Spa, la quotazione e l'aumento - si concludesse entro il primo trimestre 2016. Il giorno dopo l'aumento la banca sara' quotata". red/lab (fine) MF-DJ NEWS 31 ago 2015 08:23
no perpetual no party
Forumer storico
ciao Negus!
come la vedi per le due popolari venete e soprattutto per i loro azionisti (con azioni non quotate)?
te lo chiedo come azionista di Veneto Banca....
come la vedi per le due popolari venete e soprattutto per i loro azionisti (con azioni non quotate)?
te lo chiedo come azionista di Veneto Banca....
negusneg
New Member
ciao Negus!
come la vedi per le due popolari venete e soprattutto per i loro azionisti (con azioni non quotate)?
te lo chiedo come azionista di Veneto Banca....
Ahia :sorpresa:
Purtroppo sarà un bagno di sangue. A parte l'entità dell'aumento, che diluirà fortemente gli attuali azionisti, questi devono ancora adeguare i prezzi al mercato. Mi auguro solo che tu ne abbia poche...
londonwhale
Forumer storico
mi pare di capire che la frase "sarà il mercato a decidere" significa che al momento non ci sono underwriter sicuri
Ilmigliore
Osserva e agisci
Carife e la strategia del Fondo per ‘bypassare’ il ‘bail-in’
tratto da Carife e la strategia del Fondo per ?bypassare? il ?bail-in? | estense.com Ferrara
grazie @giunaz dal FOL
Secondo Milano-Finanza sarebbe allo studio un piano per riportare le banche in bonis evitando contestazioni europee su aiuti di Stato
Con l’entrata in vigore da gennaio 2006 del meccanismo del bail-in, l’Europa ha deciso che in futuro le perdite conseguenti a default bancari non saranno più a carico delle sole casse pubbliche, ma saranno sopportate in gran parte dai finanziatori privati e dai depositanti (entro un certo limite). È per questo motivo che il Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi starebbe studiando il modo per gestire i salvataggi bancari, come quello recente della Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (ma non solo), evitando il rischio di incorrere nella contestazione di aiuti di Stato.
Lo stratagemma che consentirebbe in un certo senso di “bypassare” le direttive europee, secondo quanto rivela MFMilano Finanza, sarebbe quello di costituire una società controllata dal Fondo ma con una propria autonomia giuridica, che potrebbe autonomamente gestire le operazioni di salvataggio e rendere così indiretta la partecipazione del Fondo al salvataggio stesso, evitando – è questo uno degli obiettivi – eventuali contestazioni.
Il tutto da portare a termine entro fine anno e pare che la nuova ricetta sarà sul tavolo del Cda già a settembre, così da riportare in bonis le banche commissariate prima che entri in vigore la normativa sul bail-in. Il salvataggio Carife potrebbe essere una sorta di esperimento per poi adottare la stessa misura anche per tutti gli altri salvataggi da qui in avanti. Secondo MF “la costituzione di un veicolo risponde a un’esigenza tecnica e di ordine”: da una parte gestire le partecipazioni in banche in maniera più agile e dall’altro dotare il nuovo soggetto controllato godrebbe di autonomia giuridica, rendendo così la partecipazione nella banca commissariata di tipo indiretto e la sua gestione autonoma. In questo modo il Fondo si salverebbe dalle contestazioni di concedere aiuti di Stato: per l’ultimo salvataggio, infatti, quello della Tercas, la Commissione Europea ha aperto un’indagine.
tratto da Carife e la strategia del Fondo per ?bypassare? il ?bail-in? | estense.com Ferrara
grazie @giunaz dal FOL
Secondo Milano-Finanza sarebbe allo studio un piano per riportare le banche in bonis evitando contestazioni europee su aiuti di Stato
Con l’entrata in vigore da gennaio 2006 del meccanismo del bail-in, l’Europa ha deciso che in futuro le perdite conseguenti a default bancari non saranno più a carico delle sole casse pubbliche, ma saranno sopportate in gran parte dai finanziatori privati e dai depositanti (entro un certo limite). È per questo motivo che il Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi starebbe studiando il modo per gestire i salvataggi bancari, come quello recente della Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (ma non solo), evitando il rischio di incorrere nella contestazione di aiuti di Stato.
Lo stratagemma che consentirebbe in un certo senso di “bypassare” le direttive europee, secondo quanto rivela MFMilano Finanza, sarebbe quello di costituire una società controllata dal Fondo ma con una propria autonomia giuridica, che potrebbe autonomamente gestire le operazioni di salvataggio e rendere così indiretta la partecipazione del Fondo al salvataggio stesso, evitando – è questo uno degli obiettivi – eventuali contestazioni.
Il tutto da portare a termine entro fine anno e pare che la nuova ricetta sarà sul tavolo del Cda già a settembre, così da riportare in bonis le banche commissariate prima che entri in vigore la normativa sul bail-in. Il salvataggio Carife potrebbe essere una sorta di esperimento per poi adottare la stessa misura anche per tutti gli altri salvataggi da qui in avanti. Secondo MF “la costituzione di un veicolo risponde a un’esigenza tecnica e di ordine”: da una parte gestire le partecipazioni in banche in maniera più agile e dall’altro dotare il nuovo soggetto controllato godrebbe di autonomia giuridica, rendendo così la partecipazione nella banca commissariata di tipo indiretto e la sua gestione autonoma. In questo modo il Fondo si salverebbe dalle contestazioni di concedere aiuti di Stato: per l’ultimo salvataggio, infatti, quello della Tercas, la Commissione Europea ha aperto un’indagine.
vbrm
Forumer attivo
Crunch time for insurers on capital rules
Il FT sull'impatto per gli assicuratori europei (in particolare NL e UK) di Solvency II, in vigore da gennaio 2016.
Mi viene in mente che questo possa avere una relazione con la debolezza di alcuni perpetuals assicurativi notata da qualcuno qui.
In particolare, coinsiderati i riferimenti a possibili adc e tagli di dividendo, bisognerà guardare con attenzione ai titoli non cumulativi.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/883cff52-44fe-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.html
It is crunch time for Europe’s insurers. A long-awaited overhaul of financial safety standards is within sight, with far-reaching implications for the €8.4tn industry.
Investors would be forgiven for assuming that only minor details need to be finalised before the new regime takes effect in four months. After all, regulators have spent more than a decade planning it.
No such luck. Shares in Delta Lloyd have plunged 43 per cent after the Amsterdam-listed insurer said this month that its financial headroom under the new rules would be tighter than previously disclosed.
Its larger rival Aegon, which owns the US insurer Transamerica, also said that its capital surplus would be lower than expected. Aegon’s shares have lost 23 per cent this month.
The warnings have investors in other European insurance companies wondering whether they too are in for nasty surprises before the reforms, known as Solvency II, kick in at the start of January.
Igotz Aubin, head of prudential regulation at the trade body Insurance Europe, says many executives “are extremely concerned about the pressure which insurers face due to additional last minute requirements”.
Allianz, Axa and Aviva are among hundreds of companies that need to comply with the shake-up.
Executives at several big insurers have said that the new rules, designed in the wake of the financial crisis to ensure companies have strong financial buffers so they can meet claims, should be manageable. Yet behind the scenes, the industry is on tenterhooks. “They’re all absolutely petrified,” says a Solvency II consultant at a big four firm.
Brussels policymakers agreed the basis of the regulations months ago. But they set a tight implementation timetable. National supervisors still need to specify the capital requirements for each big insurer by taking into account the particular risks they run.
Regulators need to approve each company’s “internal model”, which amounts to sifting through gigabytes of arcane detail about their risk exposures. Without being able to use the bespoke version, companies must fall back on the cruder “standard formula” laid down by regulators, which may oblige them to hold more capital.
Watchdogs also need to grant insurers permission to use other crucial mechanisms that give them further relief from the most onerous regulatory demands.
Executives are holding crunch talks with their regulators to get the green light. But so far, only Germany’s Hannover Re, has secured model approval.
The disclosures by Delta Lloyd and Aegon underline the risks.
In particular, the warning from Delta Lloyd, which wrote almost €4bn of policies last year, has sparked concerns that the insurer may need to tap shareholders for more cash even though it raised €340m in an equity issue in March.
Soon after the fundraising, the company said it held at least 70 per cent more capital than the minimum required under Solvency II. But this month it warned the ratio had dropped to less than 40 per cent.
Investors get nervous about low ratios, and most companies target surpluses of at least 60 per cent. Reduced headroom means regulators are more likely to question insurer business models — potentially constraining expansion and dividend payouts.
Delta Lloyd blamed a more cautious stance by the Dutch regulator of its “operational risks”. The watchdog is requiring it to use the “standard formula” to cover such risks.
Aegon, which had previously estimated its capital surplus under Solvency II to be 50-100 per cent above the minimum, cautioned that this had deteriorated to 40-70 per cent.
Analysts say this is because regulators have made more conservative assumptions about Aegon’s operations in the US, the UK and the Netherlands.
Aegon’s difficulties are not as acute as Delta Lloyd’s. Still, says Ashik Musaddi, analyst at JPMorgan Cazenove, the group’s ability to return capital to shareholders could be undermined.
There are reasons to suspect the Netherlands is a special case. Although Solvency II is supposed to harmonise rules across the EU, the framework also gives considerable power to national authorities.
Executives regard the Dutch regulator as particularly tough — partly a legacy of the financial crisis. As recently as 2013, the Dutch government had to nationalise SNS Reaal to safeguard the financial system.
“The Netherlands are a tough insurance market — supervised by a tough regulator,” says Claudia Gaspari, analyst at Barclays.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of Solvency II, analysts do not expect many insurers to have to raise additional capital solely because of the new regime. Even so, not all are convinced the risks are confined to the Netherlands. “Be prepared for volatility,” warns Niccolò Dalla Palma at Exane BNP Paribas of the next few weeks.
Share prices across the sector are vulnerable, says Gordon Aitken, analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “We see risk skewed to the downside from Solvency II,” he says. “Even in the best-case scenario of a benign result, we do not expect share prices to react positively.”
The secret nature of the talks between insurers and regulators — supervisors have forbidden executives from discussing the approval process publicly — has made it difficult for investors to determine which companies are at particular risk.
Yet there remain concerns about the UK, even though Sam Woods, the Prudential Regulation Authority’s director of insurance supervision, said in a speech last month that the watchdog had no plans to use the new rules to force the industry to raise capital.
Mr Aitken says that annuity writers in the UK are most at risk from unfavourable regulatory rulings. Last week, advisers at PwC, the professional services firm, cautioned that prices of “bulk annuities” were set to jump because of Solvency II.
The PRA, which is scrutinising the models of about 20 insurers, does not plan to say which have been approved until December — shortly before the regime begins to take effect.
“This is a very important time for the companies,” says Hugh Savill, director of regulation at the trade body the Association of British Insurers. “It’s heads-down time to get the approvals through.”
Jim Bichard, partner at PwC, says: “Whatever happens, Solvency II has been and continues to be a huge distraction.
“Regardless of the outcome, people have expended a huge amount of resources, effort and time on this.”
Getting to grips with Solvency II
The EU’s Solvency II reforms aim to improve protection for policyholders by bolstering insurers’ resilience against shocks — the kind of catastrophe or financial market crisis forecast to happen once every 200 years. The changes standardise a piecemeal approach to insurance regulation in different European countries.
Similar in some respects to the Basel III rules for banks, the regime introduces a more sophisticated way of determining capital requirements for insurers. Under Solvency II, regulators consider the risks of all parts of insurance balance sheets. The highly-complex exercise involves estimating each company’s potential liabilities — how much they could be on the hook for policyholder claims — and the value of their financial assets in times of stress.
The regime also shakes-up corporate governance and disclosure standards.
Insurers have said they broadly support the principles but are concerned about how the system will work in practice.
After intense industry lobbying, policymakers in Brussels made several concessions to address insurers’ biggest fears.
Parts of the industry have been given 16 years to fully comply. This is particularly important for life insurers in Germany, some of which would become insolvent if they had to comply with all of the new rules immediately because of the nature of the policies they provide.
Yet the industry has many gripes. These include red tape: the disclosure requirements mean insurers need to provide regulators with dozens times more information than at present.
European insurers are also concerned that it will put their businesses in overseas markets, such as the US, at a disadvantage to local rivals.
Il FT sull'impatto per gli assicuratori europei (in particolare NL e UK) di Solvency II, in vigore da gennaio 2016.
Mi viene in mente che questo possa avere una relazione con la debolezza di alcuni perpetuals assicurativi notata da qualcuno qui.
In particolare, coinsiderati i riferimenti a possibili adc e tagli di dividendo, bisognerà guardare con attenzione ai titoli non cumulativi.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/883cff52-44fe-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.html
It is crunch time for Europe’s insurers. A long-awaited overhaul of financial safety standards is within sight, with far-reaching implications for the €8.4tn industry.
Investors would be forgiven for assuming that only minor details need to be finalised before the new regime takes effect in four months. After all, regulators have spent more than a decade planning it.
No such luck. Shares in Delta Lloyd have plunged 43 per cent after the Amsterdam-listed insurer said this month that its financial headroom under the new rules would be tighter than previously disclosed.
Its larger rival Aegon, which owns the US insurer Transamerica, also said that its capital surplus would be lower than expected. Aegon’s shares have lost 23 per cent this month.
The warnings have investors in other European insurance companies wondering whether they too are in for nasty surprises before the reforms, known as Solvency II, kick in at the start of January.
Igotz Aubin, head of prudential regulation at the trade body Insurance Europe, says many executives “are extremely concerned about the pressure which insurers face due to additional last minute requirements”.
Allianz, Axa and Aviva are among hundreds of companies that need to comply with the shake-up.
Executives at several big insurers have said that the new rules, designed in the wake of the financial crisis to ensure companies have strong financial buffers so they can meet claims, should be manageable. Yet behind the scenes, the industry is on tenterhooks. “They’re all absolutely petrified,” says a Solvency II consultant at a big four firm.
Brussels policymakers agreed the basis of the regulations months ago. But they set a tight implementation timetable. National supervisors still need to specify the capital requirements for each big insurer by taking into account the particular risks they run.
Regulators need to approve each company’s “internal model”, which amounts to sifting through gigabytes of arcane detail about their risk exposures. Without being able to use the bespoke version, companies must fall back on the cruder “standard formula” laid down by regulators, which may oblige them to hold more capital.
Watchdogs also need to grant insurers permission to use other crucial mechanisms that give them further relief from the most onerous regulatory demands.
Executives are holding crunch talks with their regulators to get the green light. But so far, only Germany’s Hannover Re, has secured model approval.
The disclosures by Delta Lloyd and Aegon underline the risks.
In particular, the warning from Delta Lloyd, which wrote almost €4bn of policies last year, has sparked concerns that the insurer may need to tap shareholders for more cash even though it raised €340m in an equity issue in March.
Soon after the fundraising, the company said it held at least 70 per cent more capital than the minimum required under Solvency II. But this month it warned the ratio had dropped to less than 40 per cent.
Investors get nervous about low ratios, and most companies target surpluses of at least 60 per cent. Reduced headroom means regulators are more likely to question insurer business models — potentially constraining expansion and dividend payouts.
Delta Lloyd blamed a more cautious stance by the Dutch regulator of its “operational risks”. The watchdog is requiring it to use the “standard formula” to cover such risks.
Aegon, which had previously estimated its capital surplus under Solvency II to be 50-100 per cent above the minimum, cautioned that this had deteriorated to 40-70 per cent.
Analysts say this is because regulators have made more conservative assumptions about Aegon’s operations in the US, the UK and the Netherlands.
Aegon’s difficulties are not as acute as Delta Lloyd’s. Still, says Ashik Musaddi, analyst at JPMorgan Cazenove, the group’s ability to return capital to shareholders could be undermined.
There are reasons to suspect the Netherlands is a special case. Although Solvency II is supposed to harmonise rules across the EU, the framework also gives considerable power to national authorities.
Executives regard the Dutch regulator as particularly tough — partly a legacy of the financial crisis. As recently as 2013, the Dutch government had to nationalise SNS Reaal to safeguard the financial system.
“The Netherlands are a tough insurance market — supervised by a tough regulator,” says Claudia Gaspari, analyst at Barclays.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of Solvency II, analysts do not expect many insurers to have to raise additional capital solely because of the new regime. Even so, not all are convinced the risks are confined to the Netherlands. “Be prepared for volatility,” warns Niccolò Dalla Palma at Exane BNP Paribas of the next few weeks.
Share prices across the sector are vulnerable, says Gordon Aitken, analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “We see risk skewed to the downside from Solvency II,” he says. “Even in the best-case scenario of a benign result, we do not expect share prices to react positively.”
The secret nature of the talks between insurers and regulators — supervisors have forbidden executives from discussing the approval process publicly — has made it difficult for investors to determine which companies are at particular risk.
Yet there remain concerns about the UK, even though Sam Woods, the Prudential Regulation Authority’s director of insurance supervision, said in a speech last month that the watchdog had no plans to use the new rules to force the industry to raise capital.
Mr Aitken says that annuity writers in the UK are most at risk from unfavourable regulatory rulings. Last week, advisers at PwC, the professional services firm, cautioned that prices of “bulk annuities” were set to jump because of Solvency II.
The PRA, which is scrutinising the models of about 20 insurers, does not plan to say which have been approved until December — shortly before the regime begins to take effect.
“This is a very important time for the companies,” says Hugh Savill, director of regulation at the trade body the Association of British Insurers. “It’s heads-down time to get the approvals through.”
Jim Bichard, partner at PwC, says: “Whatever happens, Solvency II has been and continues to be a huge distraction.
“Regardless of the outcome, people have expended a huge amount of resources, effort and time on this.”
Getting to grips with Solvency II
The EU’s Solvency II reforms aim to improve protection for policyholders by bolstering insurers’ resilience against shocks — the kind of catastrophe or financial market crisis forecast to happen once every 200 years. The changes standardise a piecemeal approach to insurance regulation in different European countries.
Similar in some respects to the Basel III rules for banks, the regime introduces a more sophisticated way of determining capital requirements for insurers. Under Solvency II, regulators consider the risks of all parts of insurance balance sheets. The highly-complex exercise involves estimating each company’s potential liabilities — how much they could be on the hook for policyholder claims — and the value of their financial assets in times of stress.
The regime also shakes-up corporate governance and disclosure standards.
Insurers have said they broadly support the principles but are concerned about how the system will work in practice.
After intense industry lobbying, policymakers in Brussels made several concessions to address insurers’ biggest fears.
Parts of the industry have been given 16 years to fully comply. This is particularly important for life insurers in Germany, some of which would become insolvent if they had to comply with all of the new rules immediately because of the nature of the policies they provide.
Yet the industry has many gripes. These include red tape: the disclosure requirements mean insurers need to provide regulators with dozens times more information than at present.
European insurers are also concerned that it will put their businesses in overseas markets, such as the US, at a disadvantage to local rivals.
Ultima modifica:
France Adopts European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, a Credit Negative
On 21 August, President François Hollande of France (Aa1 negative) enacted the European Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) into French law. This law is credit negative for bank investors because it
allows resolution authorities (national or European) to impose a bail-in on senior creditors of French banks
after 1 January 2016.
France was among 11 countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Malta, Poland, Romania and Sweden) that were late in transposing BRRD into national law (due on 1 January
2015). The European Commission requested on 28 May 2015 that those countries should fully implement
BRRD within two months.
France adopted the BRRD by way of ordinance, a mechanism that requires neither prior discussion of the
text nor its approval by the Parliament. Rather, it empowers the executive branch to enact legislation within
strict limits. As a result, the ordinance was written in accordance with a specific mandate whereby the
government had to transpose BRRD’s provisions without deviating from them.
The transposition of BRRD into French law is in line with the European directive, but there is a risk of
deviation whenever EU countries transpose European legislation into national law. Such differences can
conflict with the objective of harmonization and the creation of a single market across the region.
For example, the so-called German proposal, which is meant to be enacted into the German Banking Act,
materially differs from BRRD on how a bail-in would be implemented. Although BRRD has established a
partial depositor preference, whereby household and SME deposits are ranked above the deposits of more
sophisticated large corporate and institutional investors and bondholders, the German amendment goes
one step further. Under the German proposal, tradable senior unsecured debt obligations (i.e., bonds) would
rank below other senior unsecured liabilities (e.g., corporate deposits, private placements and derivatives)
and would therefore bear initial losses once capital and subordinated debt instruments are depleted. This
proposal, which has not yet been adopted, seeks to simplify the bail-in procedure during the resolution of a
distressed bank by establishing a clearer separation between a bank’s senior unsecured bonds and other
debt instruments.
Although the French authorities recognize the merits of the German proposal, they have (thus far) refrained
from following suit, and seem more inclined to amend the BRRD itself rather than deviating from it. In fact,
the German initiative has triggered a discussion at the European Union (EU) level because Germany as well
as other EU members have doubts about the feasibility of a bail-in under current BRRD rules. Even if EU
members seem to have no intention to amend BRRD at this point in time, many of them recognize that the
German proposal is worth further discussion, and more work on this issue will be completed under the
European Commission’s auspices in the months ahead.
Last, France is keen to have the results of the upcoming discussion at the Financial Sector Board and G-20
on total loss-absorbing capital before considering amendments to BRRD given that both the EU framework
and the total loss-absorbing capital future framework are intended to address the same issue (i.e., bank
resolution), even though the framework targets only global systemically important banks.
On 21 August, President François Hollande of France (Aa1 negative) enacted the European Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) into French law. This law is credit negative for bank investors because it
allows resolution authorities (national or European) to impose a bail-in on senior creditors of French banks
after 1 January 2016.
France was among 11 countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Malta, Poland, Romania and Sweden) that were late in transposing BRRD into national law (due on 1 January
2015). The European Commission requested on 28 May 2015 that those countries should fully implement
BRRD within two months.
France adopted the BRRD by way of ordinance, a mechanism that requires neither prior discussion of the
text nor its approval by the Parliament. Rather, it empowers the executive branch to enact legislation within
strict limits. As a result, the ordinance was written in accordance with a specific mandate whereby the
government had to transpose BRRD’s provisions without deviating from them.
The transposition of BRRD into French law is in line with the European directive, but there is a risk of
deviation whenever EU countries transpose European legislation into national law. Such differences can
conflict with the objective of harmonization and the creation of a single market across the region.
For example, the so-called German proposal, which is meant to be enacted into the German Banking Act,
materially differs from BRRD on how a bail-in would be implemented. Although BRRD has established a
partial depositor preference, whereby household and SME deposits are ranked above the deposits of more
sophisticated large corporate and institutional investors and bondholders, the German amendment goes
one step further. Under the German proposal, tradable senior unsecured debt obligations (i.e., bonds) would
rank below other senior unsecured liabilities (e.g., corporate deposits, private placements and derivatives)
and would therefore bear initial losses once capital and subordinated debt instruments are depleted. This
proposal, which has not yet been adopted, seeks to simplify the bail-in procedure during the resolution of a
distressed bank by establishing a clearer separation between a bank’s senior unsecured bonds and other
debt instruments.
Although the French authorities recognize the merits of the German proposal, they have (thus far) refrained
from following suit, and seem more inclined to amend the BRRD itself rather than deviating from it. In fact,
the German initiative has triggered a discussion at the European Union (EU) level because Germany as well
as other EU members have doubts about the feasibility of a bail-in under current BRRD rules. Even if EU
members seem to have no intention to amend BRRD at this point in time, many of them recognize that the
German proposal is worth further discussion, and more work on this issue will be completed under the
European Commission’s auspices in the months ahead.
Last, France is keen to have the results of the upcoming discussion at the Financial Sector Board and G-20
on total loss-absorbing capital before considering amendments to BRRD given that both the EU framework
and the total loss-absorbing capital future framework are intended to address the same issue (i.e., bank
resolution), even though the framework targets only global systemically important banks.
TheLondoner
Forumer storico
buona idea postare quest'articolo del FT. Come avevo notato c'è una certa debolezza implicita in alcuni subordinati/ibridi assicurativi che monitoro dovuta oltre alle attuali turbolenze di mercato anche alla implementazione della nuova normativa dal 2016. In ogni caso quel che mi sento di consigliare
è scegliere emittenti con un buon track record su utili e dividendi, oppure in ogni caso - comprare o detenere bond con cedole cumulative (L)T2.
Questi ultimi secondo me beneficeranno degli aumenti di capitale o di ibridi di nuova emissione magari anche di grado junior sub.
Ultima modifica:
Similar threads
- Bloccata
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate
Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 2
- Bloccata
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate
Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1
