dottluca
pesca un numero..isin
Alla rinegoziazione volontaria.
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2 (4 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
Alla rinegoziazione volontaria.
Trans77
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Ipotesi di un cambio ISIN su un bond NY Law? Reputi fattibile una cosa simile? Seriamente??
Che ci fai con 20k Walter, tu sei uomo da 100k in sù come minimo
scatter
Nuovo forumer
da qui:
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Venezuelan bondholders face showdown in Caracas
President Maduro may be seeking to drive down price of country’s debt and buy it back
Lee C Buchheit and Mitu Gulati
Last Friday Venezuelan bondholders received a perfectly resistible invitation. They were asked to present themselves on November 13 2017 in Caracas to meet an individual identified by US authorities as a narco-trafficker (vice-president Tareck El Aissami) to discuss a debt restructuring that may well expose any participating US holders to criminal penalties.
The market’s predictable reaction to the invitation was “¿qué pasa?”
Explanations vary. One school of thought holds that this announcement was intended for domestic consumption; a get-tough-on-bondholders demonstration by the regime of Nicolás Maduro in preparation for next year’s presidential elections. Mr Maduro has, after all, been paying bonds in full by savagely restricting imports of food and medicine; not a policy likely to appeal to a hungry electorate.
Others argue that threatening a bond default unless a consensual debt restructuring can be agreed will force holders to lobby the US government to relax the sanctions it imposed on Venezuela last August. Our own suspicions, however, tend more towards a more brutal endgame.
By announcing a debt restructuring and threatening a payment default, Mr Maduro drove the secondary market prices of the bonds off a cliff. Prices may fall further next week if Venezuelan officials say something alarming during the meeting in Caracas (how could they not?).
Once the secondary market price of a sovereign bond drops below about 35 cents on the dollar, the issuer may be tempted to buy the bond back rather than slog through a debt restructuring exercise in which impertinent investors can raise questions about economic policy and corruption.
Naturally, even a heavily discounted debt buyback requires some money. China and Russia are possible candidates for fundraising; they have both ponied up in the past. Venezuelan insiders are already alleged to hold significant positions in some of the bonds.
Perhaps they could be tempted to increase their exposure if the price is right. For sufficient remuneration, even some private sector (non-US) lenders may be prepared to provide funding for a debt buyback secured by a pledge of the repurchased bonds.
The technique is not novel. In 2008, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa strategically defaulted on two series of the country’s international bonds at a time when the debt-to-GDP level was a comfortable 25 per cent. When the secondary market price of the bonds dropped to the low twenties, the Ecuadorean government was rumoured to have commissioned two companies to buy the bonds in the market at the discounted price. Six months after the default, the government launched a formal tender for the remaining bonds at 35 cents on the dollar.
Most proposals for a restructuring of Venezuela’s external debt have assumed that the exercise would be preceded by a regime change. That, the theory goes, would permit a new administration to seek International Monetary Fund help in reforming the shattered economy and oil sector, allow the US authorities to relax their sanctions, and elicit co-operation and support from a relieved creditor community.
An attempt to restructure the debt with the current administration (and sanctions) in place is far more challenging, perhaps unattainable. The best the administration could hope to achieve is an Ecuadorean-style manipulation of the secondary market price of the bonds as a prelude to a quiet buyback of the instruments.
Attempting a partial debt restructuring today could significantly complicate things if and when a new administration takes over. A credible threat to cease payments on Venezuela’s existing debt might be enough to induce some non-US holders of Republic of Venezuela or PDVSA bonds to swap their positions for new debt instruments as part of an exchange offer. The legal status of those new instruments under Venezuelan law would be problematic.
The National Assembly, controlled by the opposition, has already publicly announced that any Republic of Venezuela debt instruments issued without its approval would be regarded as invalid and may be disavowed following a change of regime. Nothing that the Maduro administration or the supreme court can say at this point will entirely dispel that legal shadow.
It is hard to know what message bondholders will hear at the meeting in Caracas next week. Our prediction? It will not be a carefully crafted debt restructuring proposal designed to provide essential debt relief in the context of a rigorous and thorough reformation of the Venezuelan economy.
Subscribe to read
Venezuelan bondholders face showdown in Caracas
President Maduro may be seeking to drive down price of country’s debt and buy it back
Lee C Buchheit and Mitu Gulati
Last Friday Venezuelan bondholders received a perfectly resistible invitation. They were asked to present themselves on November 13 2017 in Caracas to meet an individual identified by US authorities as a narco-trafficker (vice-president Tareck El Aissami) to discuss a debt restructuring that may well expose any participating US holders to criminal penalties.
The market’s predictable reaction to the invitation was “¿qué pasa?”
Explanations vary. One school of thought holds that this announcement was intended for domestic consumption; a get-tough-on-bondholders demonstration by the regime of Nicolás Maduro in preparation for next year’s presidential elections. Mr Maduro has, after all, been paying bonds in full by savagely restricting imports of food and medicine; not a policy likely to appeal to a hungry electorate.
Others argue that threatening a bond default unless a consensual debt restructuring can be agreed will force holders to lobby the US government to relax the sanctions it imposed on Venezuela last August. Our own suspicions, however, tend more towards a more brutal endgame.
By announcing a debt restructuring and threatening a payment default, Mr Maduro drove the secondary market prices of the bonds off a cliff. Prices may fall further next week if Venezuelan officials say something alarming during the meeting in Caracas (how could they not?).
Once the secondary market price of a sovereign bond drops below about 35 cents on the dollar, the issuer may be tempted to buy the bond back rather than slog through a debt restructuring exercise in which impertinent investors can raise questions about economic policy and corruption.
Naturally, even a heavily discounted debt buyback requires some money. China and Russia are possible candidates for fundraising; they have both ponied up in the past. Venezuelan insiders are already alleged to hold significant positions in some of the bonds.
Perhaps they could be tempted to increase their exposure if the price is right. For sufficient remuneration, even some private sector (non-US) lenders may be prepared to provide funding for a debt buyback secured by a pledge of the repurchased bonds.
The technique is not novel. In 2008, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa strategically defaulted on two series of the country’s international bonds at a time when the debt-to-GDP level was a comfortable 25 per cent. When the secondary market price of the bonds dropped to the low twenties, the Ecuadorean government was rumoured to have commissioned two companies to buy the bonds in the market at the discounted price. Six months after the default, the government launched a formal tender for the remaining bonds at 35 cents on the dollar.
Most proposals for a restructuring of Venezuela’s external debt have assumed that the exercise would be preceded by a regime change. That, the theory goes, would permit a new administration to seek International Monetary Fund help in reforming the shattered economy and oil sector, allow the US authorities to relax their sanctions, and elicit co-operation and support from a relieved creditor community.
An attempt to restructure the debt with the current administration (and sanctions) in place is far more challenging, perhaps unattainable. The best the administration could hope to achieve is an Ecuadorean-style manipulation of the secondary market price of the bonds as a prelude to a quiet buyback of the instruments.
Attempting a partial debt restructuring today could significantly complicate things if and when a new administration takes over. A credible threat to cease payments on Venezuela’s existing debt might be enough to induce some non-US holders of Republic of Venezuela or PDVSA bonds to swap their positions for new debt instruments as part of an exchange offer. The legal status of those new instruments under Venezuelan law would be problematic.
The National Assembly, controlled by the opposition, has already publicly announced that any Republic of Venezuela debt instruments issued without its approval would be regarded as invalid and may be disavowed following a change of regime. Nothing that the Maduro administration or the supreme court can say at this point will entirely dispel that legal shadow.
It is hard to know what message bondholders will hear at the meeting in Caracas next week. Our prediction? It will not be a carefully crafted debt restructuring proposal designed to provide essential debt relief in the context of a rigorous and thorough reformation of the Venezuelan economy.
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
dipende dalle tue attese in termini di recovery.
Chi immagina che il default sara' evitato.. e' fesso a vendere a 23, perché' ricevera' 100+ cedole.
Chi immagina che ci sara' una ristrutturazione ragionevole.. e' fesso a vendere a 23, perché si immagina di recuperare almeno il doppio.
Chi immagine che ci sara' un default seguito da "somalizzazione" del Venezuela.. avrebbe dovuto astenersi dal comprare.
Chi e' un trader geniale.. compra sempre basso e rivende poco dopo alto. Ma deve essere geniale.
schei
Dum differtur, vita transcurrit
Il problema è come ristrutturare aggirando le sanzioni Usa. Per questo i titoli sono crollati.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Ovviamente sarebbe default.
Ma tecnicamente potrebbero lanciare un'operazione di adesione titoli e rimborso (o concambio) per chi vuole o per far ottenere una corsia preferenziale.
Il tutto gestito a Caracas, poichè l'operazione sarebbe fuori da ogni legalità internazionale.
Ottoecinquanta
Forumer attivo
La rinegoziazione è un grande bluff. Mi sono registrato al sito del ministero e ho provato ad aprire la pagina riservata; non funziona ovviamente
MARCO82
Forumer attivo
Tommy una cortesia tu che sei più esperto. Tecnicamente detenendo un bond senza CAC se facessi holdout fino alla fine, poniamo pure anche tra 15 anni, non dovrebbe essere più o meno certo il mio rimborso a 100stile argentina? Poi chiedo se qualcuno era dentro all ecuador nel 2008 come si è comportato grazie. Ha accettato i 35 offerti da Correa per forza o avrebbe potuto resistere e tentare le vie legali?
070162
Bond..... solo BOND
comprate 50'000 poco sotto 25.... mi pare 24,6
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. DL-Notes 2007(07/27) | A0NRHT | XS0294364954 | Overview | boerse-stuttgart.de
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. DL-Notes 2007(07/27) | A0NRHT | XS0294364954 | Overview | boerse-stuttgart.de