GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Da un'intervista a Carlos Mendoza Pottella (economist and oil expert at Venezuela’s Central Bank)
The Past, Present and Future of Venezuela’s Oil Industry
[..]
It is correct that we are the owners of 15 to 20% of the oil on the planet, but the truth is that a lot of that oil cannot be exploited today. When we think about the extra heavy oil in the Orinoco Oil Belt, it is indeed an enormous reserve that can last for many hundreds of years (some say it will last 500 years), but these projections are absurd. They have absolutely no economic meaning today! [..]
So Venezuela cannot say that it has 600 billion barrels in its reserve, for it is impossible to exploit that in the foreseeable future. There may be an enormous accumulation in the Orinoco Belt, but only a small part is actually exploitable, and exploiting it is very expensive. In truth, Venezuela has a 15.000 to 20.000 million barrel reserve. That is what can be tapped in the foreseeable future.
Some analysts are coming to the conclusion that the decision‐makers of the oil industry in Venezuela are pushing towards privatization. Do you believe that to be the case?
When you have a plan that requires USD$60 billion, in investment and your income is USD$5 billion per year, what are you implying? That you are looking for someone to come and invest. That is the logic of privatization and anyone can read it between the lines.
So the conditions for privatization are here. The Venezuelan state seems incapable of managing oil production now. On the other hand, I would not say that the tendency toward privatization is planned. I think it is involuntary. I think it is the result of a perfect storm. The collapse of production opens the door to “outside saviors” who will take on operations.
With regard to this, we must understand that if private companies run the operations piecemeal [exploration, servicing, exploitation, distribution], and this is likely to happen, then PDVSA as such is not literally privatized, which would be unconstitutional. What is likely to happen then is that subsidiaries [de facto private undertakings] run the operations.
Through the subsidiaries [“filiales” in Spanish] there would be an indirect privatization, which is permitted by a loophole in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Article 303 states that PDVSA and the wells are non-transferable and are the property of the Republic, but that subsidiaries can assume operations.
The Past, Present and Future of Venezuela’s Oil Industry
[..]
It is correct that we are the owners of 15 to 20% of the oil on the planet, but the truth is that a lot of that oil cannot be exploited today. When we think about the extra heavy oil in the Orinoco Oil Belt, it is indeed an enormous reserve that can last for many hundreds of years (some say it will last 500 years), but these projections are absurd. They have absolutely no economic meaning today! [..]
So Venezuela cannot say that it has 600 billion barrels in its reserve, for it is impossible to exploit that in the foreseeable future. There may be an enormous accumulation in the Orinoco Belt, but only a small part is actually exploitable, and exploiting it is very expensive. In truth, Venezuela has a 15.000 to 20.000 million barrel reserve. That is what can be tapped in the foreseeable future.
Some analysts are coming to the conclusion that the decision‐makers of the oil industry in Venezuela are pushing towards privatization. Do you believe that to be the case?
When you have a plan that requires USD$60 billion, in investment and your income is USD$5 billion per year, what are you implying? That you are looking for someone to come and invest. That is the logic of privatization and anyone can read it between the lines.
So the conditions for privatization are here. The Venezuelan state seems incapable of managing oil production now. On the other hand, I would not say that the tendency toward privatization is planned. I think it is involuntary. I think it is the result of a perfect storm. The collapse of production opens the door to “outside saviors” who will take on operations.
With regard to this, we must understand that if private companies run the operations piecemeal [exploration, servicing, exploitation, distribution], and this is likely to happen, then PDVSA as such is not literally privatized, which would be unconstitutional. What is likely to happen then is that subsidiaries [de facto private undertakings] run the operations.
Through the subsidiaries [“filiales” in Spanish] there would be an indirect privatization, which is permitted by a loophole in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Article 303 states that PDVSA and the wells are non-transferable and are the property of the Republic, but that subsidiaries can assume operations.