Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2

Bondholders lobby US government to soften Venezuela sanctions

Creditor group says restrictions on trading could be forcing bonds into ‘rogue’ hands


Subscribe to read | Financial Times

Bondholders lobby US to soften Venezuela sanctions

US sanctions on the trading of Venezuelan debt could be forcing bonds into "rogue" foreign hands, according to a group of bondholders that is urging the government to soften its stance.

Several investors in Venezuela’s creditor committee — which holds roughly $8bn of the country’s debts — are lobbying the Treasury department to address what some call an "ill-advised" trading ban, in light of JPMorgan’s decision this month to all but remove Venezuelan debt from its widely followed emerging market bond benchmarks.

The move is likely to precipitate forced selling — especially by passive US funds that simply try to track an index — at a time when the sanctions bar US institutions from doing business in Venezuelan securities with other US entities.Should investors want or need to wind down their positions, they can only sell to non-US buyers — often at a steep discount.

The sanctions are "having the exact opposite effect as . . . intended," said Mike Conelius, a portfolio manager at T Rowe Price — one of the country’s largest bondholders alongside Fidelity, BlackRock, Pimco and Goldman Sachs Asset Management.

"The policy is hurting American investors and unknown, potentially rogue foreign investors are profiteering from the extremely distressed prices caused by forced selling," he argued.

The trading ban was imposed during the US government shutdown in January, but concerns among bondholders have intensified in recent weeks. Since the end of June, the once-frozen market for Venezuelan debt has come back to life after buyers snapped up an estimated $300m to $400m worth of bonds at knockdown prices.

The trades, which some money managers speculate originated in Spain and the Middle East, were reported to a price-dissemination system run by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the industry’s self-regulatory body,triggering markdowns and large paper losses for holders. Certain maturities of Venezuela’s sovereign bonds now fetch below 20 cents on the dollar, and some instruments issued by PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, are trading even lower.

"This was a sophisticated non-US purchaser seeking to create additional selling pressure right around the same time that many investors would have to sell because of the JPMorgan decision," said Hans Humes, chief executive officer of New York-based Greylock Capital, a bondholder. "That type of buyer can really mess up a restructuring process."

Source: Financial Times
 
Bondholders lobby US to soften Venezuela sanctions

US sanctions on the trading of Venezuelan debt could be forcing bonds into "rogue" foreign hands, according to a group of bondholders that is urging the government to soften its stance.

Several investors in Venezuela’s creditor committee — which holds roughly $8bn of the country’s debts — are lobbying the Treasury department to address what some call an "ill-advised" trading ban, in light of JPMorgan’s decision this month to all but remove Venezuelan debt from its widely followed emerging market bond benchmarks.

The move is likely to precipitate forced selling — especially by passive US funds that simply try to track an index — at a time when the sanctions bar US institutions from doing business in Venezuelan securities with other US entities.Should investors want or need to wind down their positions, they can only sell to non-US buyers — often at a steep discount.

The sanctions are "having the exact opposite effect as . . . intended," said Mike Conelius, a portfolio manager at T Rowe Price — one of the country’s largest bondholders alongside Fidelity, BlackRock, Pimco and Goldman Sachs Asset Management.

"The policy is hurting American investors and unknown, potentially rogue foreign investors are profiteering from the extremely distressed prices caused by forced selling," he argued.

The trading ban was imposed during the US government shutdown in January, but concerns among bondholders have intensified in recent weeks. Since the end of June, the once-frozen market for Venezuelan debt has come back to life after buyers snapped up an estimated $300m to $400m worth of bonds at knockdown prices.

The trades, which some money managers speculate originated in Spain and the Middle East, were reported to a price-dissemination system run by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the industry’s self-regulatory body,triggering markdowns and large paper losses for holders. Certain maturities of Venezuela’s sovereign bonds now fetch below 20 cents on the dollar, and some instruments issued by PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, are trading even lower.

"This was a sophisticated non-US purchaser seeking to create additional selling pressure right around the same time that many investors would have to sell because of the JPMorgan decision," said Hans Humes, chief executive officer of New York-based Greylock Capital, a bondholder. "That type of buyer can really mess up a restructuring process."

Source: Financial Times

Mi dicono 14/15 per PDVSA e 15/16 per i TdS.
 
Il mio debole parere è che se rimane Maduro (o chi per lui) non pagheranno, semplicemente perchè non riceveranno finanziamenti, viceversa se viene qualcuno messo su dal governo Usa, la vedo duretta mettere su cause presso un tribunale USA
 
Francisco Rodriguez:



1. For those who want to understand the discussion between @ricardo_hausman and myself on sanctions, here’s a brief summary. Our main differences are not in our diagnosis of what has happened in Venezuela, but rather in the risks that certain strategies carry for Venezuelans.

2. Ricardo and I agree that the main cause of Venezuela’s economic problems lies in the economic policies of Chávez and Maduro. We made this argument jointly back in 2012, in the introduction to this book that we co-authored.

3. We also agree that the crisis started long before the adoption of economic sanctions, which began to be applied in 2017. At that moment, the Venezuelan economy had already lived through several years of contraction and deterioration in living standards.

4. We share the view that any debate on the effects of sanctions should not be used to excuse Chávez and Maduro’s governments, whose incompetence and corruption gave rise to the Venezuelan tragedy.

5. Where we differ is in the effect of economic sanctions on the country. Ricardo believes that all the recent deterioration in the economy can be attributed to bad policies. I believe that sanctions have also partly contributed to that deterioration.

6. Social phenomena often have several causes. My thesis is that in this case a crisis generated by poor policies was exacerbated by economic sanctions.

7. A great part of this discussion has to do with the use of econometric techniques to identify the effect of interventions. For those interested in delving into the technical discussion, I suggest you look at this longer piece I published last month. https://torinocap.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Sanctions-and-Vzlan-Economy-June-2019.pdf …

8. Neither of us advocates for a lifting of sanctions. I have advocated the creation of an oil-for-food program, inspired on but correcting the flaws of the Iraqi program, in order to protect the most vulnerable sectors from the impact of sanctions.

9. Thus, this is not a discussion about removing sanctions. It is about the mechanisms that can be used to mitigate the negative effects that these sanctions have on the Venezuelan people.

10.Ricardo also thinks that economic sanctions will serve to drive Maduro from power. I share the view of many other specialists who believe the emphasis should be on individual sanctions.

11. As with many discussions among economists, our differences are not in our objectives. We both want Maduro to leave and will celebrate when it happens. We differ on the ways to achieve that goal, and on how to deal with the collateral effects of that struggle.

12. I hope that this is the start of a rigorous and objective policy debate that puts the well-being of Venezuelans at center stage. Venezuelans deserve no less from us.
 
¿Están funcionando las sanciones? Economistas advierten que agudizan la crisis social


Banca y Negocios @bancaynegocios




Si bien existe un claro consenso entre los economistas en que la crisis económica y social fue causada por el gobierno chavista, a través de su modelo de estatización radical y su gestión monetaria imprudente, aparte de una grave incapacidad para restablecer la capacidad productiva destruida por una deliberada estrategia de «transición al socialismo», está creciendo la preocupación por el impacto social de las sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, en menor grado, sobre las actividades económicas medulares del país.

El abanderado de este cuestionamiento a la estrategia de sanciones, por ahora, es el economista Francisco Rodríguez, economista-jefe de Torino Economics y ex director de informes en el área de Desarrollo Humano en la ONU.

En un artículo reciente, publicado en The New York Times, Rodríguez cuestiona la efectividad de la presión sobre el gobierno de Maduro, a través de sanciones y establece un potencial «riesgo de hambruna» para una porción mayoritaria de la población, si no se establecen limitaciones para suprimir las fuentes regulares de ingresos del país.

Según Rodríguez, «mi investigación muestra que, tras la primera ronda de sanciones económicas, la producción de petróleo venezolano sufrió el peor colapso que haya padecido una economía productora de petróleo sin estar en guerra ni en una huelga petrolera. Como consecuencia, la economía perdió aproximadamente 17.000 millones de dólares al año. Las operaciones que no fueron afectadas —como las alianzas comerciales con China o Rusia— tuvieron un crecimiento en la producción o se estabilizaron mientras el resto de la industria petrolera colapsaba».

Y más adelante, señala: «las cosas solo empeorarán con el embargo petrolero de este año. Si tomamos la experiencia histórica de otros países que han enfrentado situaciones similares en el pasado (como Irak, Irán y Libia), la nueva ronda de sanciones petroleras podría ocasionar a la ya diezmada industria petrolera una pérdida adicional de 10.000 millones de dólares al año, lo que equivale a más de dos terceras partes de las importaciones del país en 2018″.

Rodríguez ha entrado en un debate con el también economista, Ricardo Hausmann, designado por el presidente de la Asamblea Nacional y mandatario interino reconocido por 51 países, entre los que destacan Estados Unidos y la mayoría de la Unión Europea, Juan Guaidó, como gobernador ante el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID).

Para Haussmann, la estrategia de sanciones financieras no tiene un impacto real en la calidad de vida de los venezolanos, ya que el problema real está en sostener políticas económicas equivocadas a las que se suman decisiones erróneas para enfrentar sus consecuencias.

Ante los argumentos sobre la inocuidad de las sanciones en términos sociales, Rodríguez responde con una metáfora: «eso es que como decir que no se puede matar a un enfermo terminal». El economista propone aplicar un programa de petróleo por alimentos, similar al ensayo iraquí, que proteja a los ciudadanos de «las acciones de su gobierno»

Pero, el economista de Torino Economics no está solo. También el socio-director de Datanálisis, Luis Vicente León, hace cuestionamientos públicos a la estrategia de sanciones. «Entiendo que el objetivo teórico de las sanciones generales es provocar el debilitamiento del gobierno y la fractura militar para provocar su salida. Pero el resultado de esa estrategia es decepcionante en su historia en el mundo y la experiencia venezolana sólo ratifica lo que sabíamos«.

«Es obvio que las sanciones no son la causa de la crisis. Es absurdo ese planteamiento a la luz de un modelo de control, intervencionismo y hostilidad que tiene una larga experiencia de fracasos en la historia. Pero decir que las sanciones no empeoran la crisis es aún más absurdo», sostiene León en su cuenta de Twitter.

León, incluso, asume una postura más beligerante en otro comentario: «una sanción es efectiva cuando es capaz de provocar un cambio de gobierno o un cambio en el gobierno en un tiempo lo suficientemente corto como para no destruir el país que pretende ayudar. Si el tiempo es largo y la destrucción enorme, el remedio resulta peor que la enfermedad«.

El socio director de Datanálisis señala impactos concretos, como las dificultades que se agudizan para hacer mantenimientos en las infraestructuras de servicios públicos, como agua y electricidad, cuyo funcionamiento es cada vez más precario y destruyen la poca calidad de vida que queda para los sectores más vulnerables, e incluso estratos socio-económicos con ingresos más elevados.

El también economista Luis Oliveros, especialista en el área petrolera, también entró en esta polémica desde su tribuna en Twitter: «Hay que ser responsables a la hora de hablar de las sanciones. 1- Las sanciones NO iniciaron (ni de cerca) la crisis económica (culpables CH y Maduro). 2- Las sanciones SI generan problemas a los venezolanos. 3- Es mentira que las sanciones impactan solamente al régimen».

Más adelante, puntualiza: «Recordemos: una cosa son sanciones individuales (directas a personajes del régimen para generarles incentivos para un quiebre) otra muy distinta son sanciones al país (que impactan a todos los venezolanos y muy poco al régimen, que con reprimir y usarlas como excusa tiene)».

«A los cubanos (+50 años), Zimbabuenses (+30 años) y un largo etc., también les dijeron (compatriotas en el exterior) que las sanciones generarían la caída del régimen. Estamos en el peor de los mundos. Unas sanciones por muchos años, serían trágicas para los venezolanos», concluye Oliveros.

León y Oliveros enfrentan críticas, las cuales se centran básicamente en un argumento: una flexibilización de las sanciones tampoco beneficiaría directamente a los venezolanos, porque nadie garantiza que los recursos vayan a satisfacer las necesidades del país.


El debate está abierto.
 
Mi confermano quello che scrissi qualche giorno fa, ma la cosa sarebbe in qualche modo pubblica, che Cuba è disposta ad abbandonare Maduro. Chiede solo soldi, petrolio e benefits che riceve da Caracas, ma sarebbe in vendita a chiunque li offra.
 
U.S. President Donald Trump's administration plans to divert more than $40 million in humanitarian aid for Central America to support the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela, the Los Angeles Times reported on Tuesday, citing sources and an internal memorandum. Reuters
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Alto