Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi

nell'attesa della diffusione odierna dei risultati dello stress test, una tabella sulle indiscrezioni http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/05/stress-test-table-morgan-stanley-needs.html

nel blog finanziario/etico da me preferito si riportava una notizia indicativa del mercato immobiliare statunitense http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-demolish5-2009may05,0,4930126.story

Prima o poi doveva capitare. Per non perdere altri soldi, una banca ha fatto abbattere sedici sontuose nuove ville di cui si era rimpossessata. Gli acquirenti non erano riusciti a onorare i contratti, e la banca, impossibilitata a trovarne altri, ha deciso di limitare i danni. Mantenere le case in periodo di crisi le sarebbe costato vari milioni di dollari. Con poche centinaia di migliaia di dollari, ha risolto il problema.

RUSPE - Sotto gli occhi di una folla sorpresa e infuriata, le ruspe hanno spianato gli edifici. L’incredibile episodio è avvenuto a Victorville, città di centomila abitanti circa a 150 km circa a nord di Los Angeles, nella provincia di San Bernardino in California. Nel settembre del 2007, quando la Guaranty Bank del Texas aveva dato il via alla costruzione, il prezzo medio di vendita di una villa era di 325 mila dollari. Ma adesso è sceso di più della metà. Ha dichiarato Yvonne Herter, la portavoce della banca: «Non avevamo più scelta. Nessuno compra. Badare alle case, ai giardini, alle strade ci sarebbe costato troppo». La Guaranty Bank ha realizzato qualche soldo vendendo a prezzi stracciati le suppellettili delle ville, dai tavoli di marmo ai vasi di fiori. Un muratore, Curtis Forrester, che le aveva costruite con i compagni, ha trascorso quasi due settimane a trattare coi clienti. «Non ero mai vissuto in tanta agiatezza», ha ammesso. «Distruggerle è un vero peccato». E abbandonarle? «Impossibile», ha spiegato Yvonne Herter, «lo vietano i regolamenti comunali e a poco a poco avrebbero inquinato l’ambiente».

SETTORE FERMO - L’idea di assegnarle pro tempore ai senza tetto non ha sfiorato nessuno. Non è escluso che l’episodio si ripeta. In California, sono stati sospesi i lavori su quasi 10 mila ville e altri edifici adibiti ad abitazione, e altri Stati, l’Arizona, il Nevada, la Florida, si trovano in situazioni analoghe. In America a marzo, le vendite delle case già esistenti sono salite del 3,2 per cento, un salto inaspettato. Ma la crisi dei mutui subprime o ad alto rischio continua e il settore immobiliare è tuttora in panne. Per evitare che il cattivo esempio della Guaranty Bank venga seguito da altre banche bisogna che gli Stati intervengano. Ma come? In America, l’edilizia pubblica è sempre stata molto debole.
 
The Worst Case Scenario (Someone Has to Say It) Seeking Alpha 07 maggio 2009
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Stampa Manda per E-mail
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Testo
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Since the economy began sliding downhill in late 2007, mainstream economic and market experts have consistently erred on the sunny side.

As late as June 2008, mainstream consensus held that the U.S. was heading for a “soft landing” and would avoid recession. Several months later, the slump was acknowledged to have started in January 2008, but we were supposed to see renewed growth by mid-2009, with unemployment peaking in the eight-to-nine percent range. A quick “shovel-ready” stimulus bag was supposed to set us back on the road to prosperity.

In January, recovery projections were pushed forward to late 2009. Today, the consensus is for a mid-2010 recovery, with unemployment peaking at just over 10 percent. Clearly, the mainstream has struggled to catch up to reality for well over one year. What are the chances that they finally have it right this time?

Moreover, the mainstream continues to see what is going on as a plain-vanilla recession that will be quelled with some on-the-fly monetary and fiscal tinkering. Washington, we are told, will pull us out of this slump—as soon as the masses can be enticed back to the shopping malls. Then things will return to how they were before. But what if the experts and politicians are wrong not only on their ever-changing recovery timeline, but also on the nature—nay, the very existence—of a recovery?

America’s reigning political-economic ideology has demonstrably failed. Given that its government is obviously fumbling along without a clue, its foreign and domestic credit is tapped out, and its 300 million people are discovering that their hopes for continuous material improvement will never be met, could the U.S. be headed the way of the USSR?

Instead of a recovery as the mainstream envisions it, what if America permanently bankrupts, impoverishes, and marginalizes itself? What if its cherished institutions fail across the board? For example, what happens when the police realize that their under-funded pension plans cannot support a decent retirement? Will they stay honest, or will they opt to survive by any means necessary? These are questions that the mainstream does not even begin to contemplate.

In the interests of providing you with an alternate vision—something outside the mainstream—below are ten predictions for America through the year 2012. This is not boilerplate doom-saying. Rather, I am laying out in highly specific terms what will happen over the next three-odd years. Others have thrown around the term “Depression”, but I am going to tell you precisely what it means for you, your investments, and your community.

When these predictions come true, I expect to be rewarded with a seven-figure consulting gig, a book contract, or a high-level position in whatever administration succeeds the doomed Obama team—that is, if anyone succeeds it at all.

Prediction one. The twenty-five-year equities bubble pops in 2009. U.S. and foreign equities markets will stop treading water and realign with economic reality. Stock prices will cease to reflect the “greater fool” mentality and will return to being a function of dividend yields, which have long been miserable. The S&P 500 will sink below 500. In a bid to stem the panic, the government will enforce periodic “stock market holidays”, and will vastly expand the scope of its short-selling prohibitions—eventually banning short-selling altogether.

Prediction two. With public pension systems and tens of millions of 401k holders virtually wiped out—and with the Baby Boomers retiring en masse—there will be tremendous pressure on the government to get into the stock market in order to bid up prices.

Therefore, sometime in 2010, the Federal Reserve will create and loan out hundreds of billions of fresh dollars to the usual well-connected suspects, instructing them to buy up stocks on the public’s behalf. This scheme will have a fancy but meaningless name—something like the “Taxpayer Assurance Equities Facility”. It will have no effect other than to serve as buyer of last resort for capitulating smart-money types who want to get out of stocks entirely.

Prediction three. Millions of new retirees—including white-collar people with high expectations for a Golden Retirement—will be left virtually penniless. Thousands will starve or freeze to death in their own homes. Hundreds of thousands will find themselves evicted and homeless, or will have to move in with their less-than-enthusiastic children. Already strained by the rising tide of the working-age unemployed, state and local welfare services will be overwhelmed, and by 2012 will have largely collapsed and ceased to function in many parts of the country.

Prediction four. “Quantitative easing” will fail to restart previous patterns of lending and consumption. As the government sends out additional “rebate” checks and takes ever-more drastic measures to force banks to lend, hyperinflation could take hold. However, comprehensive debt relief via a devaluation of the dollar is even more likely. This would entail the government issuing one “new” dollar for some greater number of “old” dollars—thus reducing both debts and savings simultaneously. This would make for a clean slate a la Fight Club.

As there are many more debtors than savers in the U.S., the vast majority would support devaluation. The Chinese and other foreign holders of our bonds would be screaming mad, but unable to do anything. Every country that has not found a way out of dollar-denominated reserve assets by 2012 will see its reserves eliminated.

Prediction five. The government will stop pretending that it can finance continuous multi-trillion-dollar deficits on the private market. By late 2010, the sole buyers of new U.S. Treasury and agency bonds will be the Federal Reserve and a few derelict financial institutions under government control. This may or may not lead to hyperinflation. (See prediction four).

Prediction six. As the need for financial industry paper-pushers declines and people have less money to spend on lawyers and Starbucks (SBUX), unemployment will rise until the private sector has eliminated all of its excess capacity and superfluous or socially needless jobs. The government’s narrow unemployment figure (U3) will rise into the high teens by late 2010. The government’s broader unemployment figure (U6) will cease to be reported when it reaches 25 percent—it will simply be too embarrassing. Ultimately, one in three work-eligible Americans will be unemployed, underemployed, or never-employed (e.g. college grads permanently unable to find suitable work).

Prediction seven. With their pension dreams squashed, and their salaries frozen or cut, police and other local government workers will turn to wholesale corruption in order to survive. America’s ideal of honest, courteous, and impartial cops, teachers, and small-time local functionaries will have come to an end.

Prediction eight. Commercial overcapacity will strike with a vengeance. By 2012, thousands of enclosed malls, strip malls, unfinished residential developments, motels, truck stops, distribution centers, middle-of-nowhere resorts and casinos, and small-city airports across America will turn into dilapidated, unwanted, and dangerous ghost towns. With no economic incentive for their maintenance or repair, they will crumble into overgrown, plywood-and-sheet-rock ruins.

Prediction nine. By the end of 2010, tens of millions of households will have fallen behind on their mortgages or stopped paying altogether. Many banks will be unable to process the massive volume of foreclosure paperwork, much less actually seize and resell the homes.

Devaluation (as mentioned in prediction four) could ease the situation for those mortgage holders still afloat, but it would also eliminate any incentive for most banks to stay in the mortgage business. In any case, the housing market in many parts of the country will lock up completely—nothing bought or sold.

With virtually no loans being made, even the government will finally acknowledge that most banks are fundamentally insolvent. A general bank run will only be averted through a roughly one trillion-dollar recapitalization of the FDIC, courtesy of new money from the Federal Reserve.

Prediction ten. As an economy is never independent of the society within which it functions, the next few paragraphs will focus on social and political factors. These factors will have as much of an impact on market and consumer confidence as any developments in the financial sector.

Whether rightly or not, President Obama, having come to power at the dawn of this crisis, will be blamed for it by over 50 percent of the population. He will be a one-term president. In response to his perceived socialization of America, there will be a swarm of secessionist and extremist activity, much of it violent. Militias and armed sects will be more prominent than in the early 1990s. Stand-off dramas, violent score-settlings, and going-out-with-a-bang attacks by laid-off workers and bankrupted investors—already a national plague—will become an everyday occurrence.

For both economic and social reasons, millions of immigrants and guest workers will return to their home countries, taking their assets and skills with them. The flow of skilled immigrants will slow to a trickle. Birth rates will plummet as families struggle with uncertainty and reduced (or no) income.

Property crime will explode as citizens bitter over their own shattered dreams attempt to comfort themselves by taking what is not theirs. Mutinies and desertions will proliferate in an increasingly demoralized, over-stretched military, especially when states can no longer provide the educational and other benefits promised to their National Guard troops.

There will be widespread tax collection issues, and a huge backlash against Federal and state bureaucrats who demand three-percent annual pay raises while private sector wages remain frozen or worse. In short, the “Tea Parties” of tomorrow will likely not be so restrained.

Finally, between now and 2012, we are likely to see another earth-shaking national embarrassment on the scale of the 9/11 attacks or Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. This will demonstrate conclusively to all Americans that their government, even under a savior-figure like Obama, cannot, in fact, save them.

By 2012, there will be a general feeling that the nation is in immediate danger of blowing up or coming apart at the seams. This fear will be justified, given that the U.S. has always been held together by the promise of a continuously rising material standard of living—the famous “pursuit of happiness”—rather than any ethnic or religious ties. If that goes, so could everything else. We were lucky in the 1930s—we may not be so lucky again.
 
nell'attesa della diffusione odierna dei risultati dello stress test, una tabella sulle indiscrezioni http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/05/stress-test-table-morgan-stanley-needs.html

nel blog finanziario/etico da me preferito si riportava una notizia indicativa del mercato immobiliare statunitense http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-demolish5-2009may05,0,4930126.story

Prima o poi doveva capitare. Per non perdere altri soldi, una banca ha fatto abbattere sedici sontuose nuove ville di cui si era rimpossessata. Gli acquirenti non erano riusciti a onorare i contratti, e la banca, impossibilitata a trovarne altri, ha deciso di limitare i danni. Mantenere le case in periodo di crisi le sarebbe costato vari milioni di dollari. Con poche centinaia di migliaia di dollari, ha risolto il problema.

RUSPE - Sotto gli occhi di una folla sorpresa e infuriata, le ruspe hanno spianato gli edifici. L’incredibile episodio è avvenuto a Victorville, città di centomila abitanti circa a 150 km circa a nord di Los Angeles, nella provincia di San Bernardino in California. Nel settembre del 2007, quando la Guaranty Bank del Texas aveva dato il via alla costruzione, il prezzo medio di vendita di una villa era di 325 mila dollari. Ma adesso è sceso di più della metà. Ha dichiarato Yvonne Herter, la portavoce della banca: «Non avevamo più scelta. Nessuno compra. Badare alle case, ai giardini, alle strade ci sarebbe costato troppo». La Guaranty Bank ha realizzato qualche soldo vendendo a prezzi stracciati le suppellettili delle ville, dai tavoli di marmo ai vasi di fiori. Un muratore, Curtis Forrester, che le aveva costruite con i compagni, ha trascorso quasi due settimane a trattare coi clienti. «Non ero mai vissuto in tanta agiatezza», ha ammesso. «Distruggerle è un vero peccato». E abbandonarle? «Impossibile», ha spiegato Yvonne Herter, «lo vietano i regolamenti comunali e a poco a poco avrebbero inquinato l’ambiente».

SETTORE FERMO - L’idea di assegnarle pro tempore ai senza tetto non ha sfiorato nessuno. Non è escluso che l’episodio si ripeta. In California, sono stati sospesi i lavori su quasi 10 mila ville e altri edifici adibiti ad abitazione, e altri Stati, l’Arizona, il Nevada, la Florida, si trovano in situazioni analoghe. In America a marzo, le vendite delle case già esistenti sono salite del 3,2 per cento, un salto inaspettato. Ma la crisi dei mutui subprime o ad alto rischio continua e il settore immobiliare è tuttora in panne. Per evitare che il cattivo esempio della Guaranty Bank venga seguito da altre banche bisogna che gli Stati intervengano. Ma come? In America, l’edilizia pubblica è sempre stata molto debole.

direbbe mariuccio monti e il suo amichetto draghi: tutto sotto controllo e nella norma!:lol::lol::lol:
 
Covered Bond e compagnia bella

Diciamo per i nuovi covered bond.

Molti titoli abs , cartolarizzazioni etc hanno beneficiato delle nuove regole contabili inaugurate in estate del 2008. già allora note banche che tradavano in strumenti del genere hanno avuto la possibilità di immobilizzarli usufruendo di un "aiutino" enorme.

difati, prima, i titoli destinati a trading andavano valutati ai prezzi di mercato (o fair value in altri casi) , poi ci hanno pensato con i l'IFRS7
un pasticciaccio contabile messo in piedi proprio per il bilancio delle banche.

per cui, ad esempio, una Banca come Imi ha potuto immobilizzare a costo storico abs altrimenti illiquidi o quotati al 10-20% di meno sul mercato proprio sul finire del 2008. Con impatti incredibilmente devastanti per la determinazione del patrimonio (nonchè dell'utile sul quale calcolare le stock option del sig Miccichè & Co.).

trovata la regoletta contabile, salvi i patrimoni.

pj
 
anche Trichet leggo vede segnali positivi in Europa ... mi sa che devo andare dall'oculista

giochini su giochini su giochini ... tanto non gliela fanno

credo proprio che per il frequentatore tipo di questa sezione il pezzo seguente risulterà indigesto :-o


Insolvent banks should feel market discipline

Matthew Richardson and Nouriel Roubini | May 6, 2009

From the Financial Times:

Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that the essence of capitalism was creative destruction, by which new economic structures are born from the rubble of older ones. The government stress tests on the 19 largest US banks, the results of which are due be announced on Thursday, could have facilitated this process. The opportunity looks likely to be missed.The tests, which measure how viable banks are under adverse economic conditions, have no “failed” category, even if as many as 10 are reported to need additional capital. But, given that the economic environment already reflects the tests’ worst-case scenario and that recent estimates by the International Monetary Fund of financial sector losses have doubled in six months, the stress test results will not be credibly interpreted as a sign of bank health.
Instead, market participants will conclude that banks requiring extra capital have, in fact, failed. As a result, these institutions will not be able to raise outside capital and will immediately require government help.
Once again, the question will be how the near-insolvent banks can be kept afloat, to avoid systemic risk. But the question we really should be asking is: why keep insolvent banks afloat? We believe there is no convincing answer; we should instead find ways to manage the systemic risk of bank failures.
Schumpeter’s biggest fear was that creative destruction would lead capitalism to collapse from within, because society would not be able to handle the chaos. He was right to be afraid. The response of governments worldwide to the financial crisis has been to give the structure of private profit-taking an ever-growing scaffolding of socialised risk. Trillions of dollars have been thrown at the system, just so that we can avoid the natural process of creative destruction that would take down these institutions’ creditors. Why shouldn’t the creditors bear the losses?
One possible reason is the “Lehman factor” – the bank runs that would occur as a result of a big failure. But we have learnt from the Lehman collapse and know not to leave the sector high and dry when a systemic institution fails. Just being transparent about which banks clearly passed the stress tests would alleviate many of the fears.
Another reason is counterparty risk, the fear of being on the other side of a transaction with a failed bank. But unlike with Lehman, the government can stand behind any counterparty transaction. This will become easier if a new insolvency regime for systemically important financial institutions is passed on a fast-track basis by Congress. Problem nearly solved.
That leaves the creditors – depositors, short- and long-term debt-holders and preferred shareholders. For the large complex banks, about half are depositors. To avoid runs on these deposits, the government has to provide a backstop. But it is not clear it needs to cover other creditors of a bank, as the failures of IndyMac and Washington Mutual attest.
Even if systemic risk were still present, the government should protect the debt (up to some level) only of the solvent banks, not the insolvent ones. That way, the risk of the insolvent institutions would be transferred back from the public to the private sector, from the taxpayer to the creditors.
The government may be able to avoid the mess by persuading long-term creditors to swap their debt for equity, at a loss. The recent failed effort with Chrysler suggests this will not be easy. But a credible threat of bankruptcy could scare creditors into negotiation, to avoid bigger losses.
Suppose the systemic risk problem is solved. The other argument against allowing banks to fail is that after a big loss by creditors, no one would be willing to lend to banks – which would devastate credit markets. However, the creative-destructive, Schumpeterian, nature of capitalism would solve this problem. Once unsecured debtholders of insolvent banks lose, market discipline would return to the whole sector.
This discipline would force the remaining banks to change their behaviour, probably leading to their breaking themselves up. The reform of systemic risk in the financial system would be mostly organic, not requiring the heavy hand of government.
Why did creditors not prevent the banks taking excessive risks before the crisis hit? For the very same reason creditors are getting a free pass now: they expected to be bailed out. For capitalism to move forward, it is time for a little orderly creative destruction.
The authors are professors who contributed to the recently published Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System
 
dopo USA for AFRICA, USA for SALE (mi sa che piacerà a Stockuccio... :D)

A group of 400 executives from state-owned and private Chinese firms will arrive in the U.S. and Canada next month, to hunt for cheap distressed assets. The group is expected to look at the auto, petrochemical, energy, metal, media, furniture and consumer goods sectors.
 

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