stockuccio
Guest
come dare una sistematina ad un bilancio 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...d-of-trickery-in-12.3bn-toxic-asset-sale.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...d-of-trickery-in-12.3bn-toxic-asset-sale.html
Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione METHOS
- Data di Inizio
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Allegati
paologorgo
Chapter 11
troppidebiti
Forumer storico
commercio estero: Istat, nel primo semestre export -24,2%
stockuccio
Guest
è uscita la puntata numero 37 ... ecco la sintesi pubblica gratuita http://www.leap2020.eu/GEAB-N-37-is...pursuit-of-the-impossible-recovery_a3797.html
GEAB N°37 is available! Global systemic crisis: In pursuit of the impossible recovery
- Public announcement GEAB N°37 (Septembre 16, 2009) -
Before this summer, LEAP/E2020's team announced that there would be no recovery in sight in September 2009, and not until summer 2010 in any event. Well indeed, contrary to the claims of the media, and financial and political circles, we confirm our anticipation.
The slowdown in the speed of collapse of the global economy, at the origin of all the « good news » (1), is only due to the world's enormous public financial effort of the last twelve months (2). But the « time saved » using taxpayers' money around the world should have been dedicated to redesigning the international monetary system at the heart of the current systemic crisis (3). Yet, besides a few cosmetic considerations (4) and huge gifts to US and European banks, nothing serious has been undertaken, and, when it comes to the future, the « every man for himself » rule prevails (5).
Now, as summer 2009 comes to a close, and as the three rogue waves start impacting the global economy hard (unemployment (6), bankruptcies (7) and monetary shocks (8)), the time to mend the system, or to prepare for a soft transition towards a new global system, is over (9). The first signs of a major decoupling (10) are beginning to appear: the rest of the world is rapidly moving away from the Dollar zone. As shown by the chart below, there is a 95 percent chance that 1,000 billion new USDs will be printed in a very near future... not very attractive for the Dollar zone.
Inconsistent statistics reflect a chaotic world economy
We are heading straight to the phase of geopolitical dislocation expected to begin in the fourth quarter of 2009 (11). In this issue of the GEAB, our team analyses the trends at work (real estate market, srategic issues…) within the current chaos resulting from a flood of unchecked public expenditure and a persistently uncontrolled financial system in a context of growingly inconsistent statistics. Paradoxically, dislocation has become, according to our researchers, the only way to economic recovery (a recovery that will take place around a global architecture and interaction between economic, social and financial spheres profoundly different from anything we knew in past decades. Our team believes that the first features of the “post-crisis world” should begin to appear by summer 2010 and, in the coming months, they will dedicate themselves to their identification.
Meanwhile, as anticipated in the previous editions of the GEAB, no one can now construct a true picture of today’s global economic situation as macroeconomic figures are more and more contradictory or simply absurd (12). Measurement data and instruments have been so manipulated (13) and limited to a volatile US Dollar as sole benchmark (14), that no government, international organisation or bank (15) can now tell in which direction the global system is heading. The media reflect this chaos and contribute to their readers’/auditors’/viewers’ bewilderment: depending on the day, or even the hour, that they give contradictory news on finance, economy or currency. Policy makers, entrepreneurs, employees,… economists or analysts… are reduced to Pascal’s wager (16) to assess what will happen in future months.
Global output, trade and consumer prices (2000 – 2009) – Source: BRI, 2009
According to LEAP/E2020, the chart above tells about facts that cannot be ignored: the global economic, financial and monetary system is drifting at an increasing rate, its weakness is reaching unequalled lows in modern history, and the slightest shock (financial, geopolitical or even natural) can now break it apart (17). The States’ breathtaking plunge into bottomless public debt (18) (governments feel that, without the support of public money, world economies would soon resume their collapse) is creating a literally explosive situation, conveying massive tax increase in Japan, Europe, the US… If there is any recovery in sight, it is that of tax. As a matter of fact, confronted to historic unemployment rates and a free-falling economy, Japanese voters decided to dismiss their decade-old leaders: they have probably inaugurated the great political upheaval of the next phase of the crisis (19). This summer, the Obama administration was also surprised to discover the importance of the popular anger which focused on his health system reform programme (though a much needed one).
Charter rates for container ships (in USD/day) – Showing the decline between the two first quarters of 2008 and 2009 - Source: Spiegel / ISL Port Monitor
Here is a very illustrative analogy of the crisis today that imposed itself on our researchers: a rubber ball in a staircase. It seems to rebound on every step (then giving the impression that the fall has stopped) but it falls even lower on the next step, “resuming” its collapse.
“Disoriented” economic players and policy-makers
Of course, all this doesn’t create a favourable investment climate for business. Production capacity is under-used everywhere in historic proportions. Stocks are only renewed at a drip-feed rate (eliminating any hope of a recovery based on their replacement). Consumers have become realistic economically: no money, no purchase. Their salaries fall when they haven’t simply been lost through job losses, the banks don’t lend any more because they know that they themselves are still insolvent (despite the “golden” powder thrown in the eyes of public opinion these last months) (21). The state itself, on its own, cannot substitute itself for the frenetic consumerism of the past. In the US, a return to the previous state would require about USD 2,500 billion pumped into the economy each year. Barak Obama’s stimulus package, less than USD 400 billion a year over two years is far from the amount needed if he has to replace the non-spending of households and businesses. The problem is that this is exactly the present situation of the US economy.
US retail sales during recent recessions (Rebased to 100 at recession inception, duration in months) - Source: Financial Sense, 2009
But the US are not alone in this regard. Asia and Europe are also confronted with a drastic unemployment surge that statistical manipulation (22) cannot hide beyond this summer: jobless no longer entitled to unemployment benefits, youngsters placed in waiting internships or jobless recruited for short-term public construction projects, lay-offs postponed by means of short-time allowance measures, plants artificially maintained in activity thanks to public funds,… from Beijing to Paris, in Washington, Berlin, London or Tokyo, every trick is being used to hide the situation as long as possible… until the recovery arrives. Unfortunately, the recovery will not arrive in time. It’s Blücher instead of Grouchy (23). Instead of a recovery in September, the world is suffering the impact of this summer’s three rogue waves:
. massive unemployment, for people soon to be excluded from further benefits in particular, and its disastrous consequences for nations’ political and social stability, are beginning to appear
. the number of bankruptcies (companies, municipalities,…) and deficits of all sorts, are exploding
. and, of course, the impact of all this on the US Dollar, Treasuries (and the UK, suffering collateral damage) .
The first wave already reached the shore at the end of summer 2009. The second one is coming up. And the third is beginning to appear on the horizon.
In any event, if the Eurozone and Asia are in a better situation to face up to the impact of these waves (as already analyzed in GEAB N°28 of last October), their situation is not so good that they can expect a recovery yet. It is however on the US, the Dollar and US Treasuries on the one hand, and on the UK and the Pound on the other , that the consequences of the three waves will be harder. Mid-summer night dreams also have an end!
But for those who still have enough money to travel, the holidays can go on as hotels, airline companies, holiday resorts… are giving discounts at prices never seen before. Another sign that the recovery is here!
----------
Notes:
(1) For example, the fact of talking in percentage points is part of this summer's « euphoria » operation. Indeed, many banks, whose stock price was close to zero could claim « rebounds » of +200 percent, +300 percent or +500 percent. Taking a look at Natixis, Citi or Royal Bank of Scotland stock prices helps to understand the trap: regaining 500 percent when the stock fell down to 1, that makes 5... which would leave you holding a loss of 40 if you bought 2 years ago (or if you borrowed money in exchange of this security).
(2) This is illustrated by France's recent announcement that the state wishes to continue to support the banking system until the end of 2010. Source: Reuters, 09/13/2009
(3) See LEAP open letter to the G20 published last April in the Financial Times on the eve of London's G20 summit.
(4) The great « traders' bonus hunt » is morally praiseworthy. However it should not make us forget that traders are nothing but the « privateers » of the banks hiring them and of the financial centres hosting the latter. These employers and their hosts give them their « letters of marque » (or should we say « of bonus »?) authorizing them to buccaneer the seas of global finance. Limiting their bonuses to their total salary would compel banks to hire them as master mariners instead of filibusters.
(5) Source: Times, 09/02/2009
(6) In the United States, the real rate of unemployment growth remains between 600,000 and 1 million new jobless every month, if we include those who decide to stop searching for a job (source: CNBC/New York Times, 09/07/2009). To get an idea of the socially explosive wave currently hitting the US economy, in California, since September 1st, 143,000 new jobless are no longer entitled to insurance benefits (including their families, that makes an extra 1 million people in distress... just for this month) – source : MyBudget360, 09/02/2009. In Europe, Asia, … everywhere, unemployment rates are almost the highest in modern history (at 5.7 percent, Japan already reached its historic high in July – source : Japan Times, 09/08/2009) ... despite all sorts of manipulation to reduce the figures.
(7) As an anecdote, there have been more bankruptcies in the US between GEAB N°36 (June 16, 2009) and GEAB N°37 (September 16, 2009) than during the whole of 2008, including two of the most important bankruptcies of the year. But, of course, the media cannot make their headlines on both swine fever and bankruptcies. The same goes for the rate of US corporate bankruptcies which has reached a 12.2 percent all-time high (source: Yahoo, 09/09/2009). In Spain, the number of bankruptcies in the first semester of 2009 is three times the number in 2008 (source: Spanish News, 08/06/2009). In France, employers expect 70,000 corporate bankruptcies by the end of this year (source: Capital, 09/02/2009).
(8) The accelerating pace of the weakening of the US Dollar is creating new monetary stress worldwide and the upcoming request, by the Obama administration, to increase the authorized US federal debt ceiling by USD 1,500-billion is not likely to slow down the selling of the US currency. Indeed the USD 12,000-billion debt ceiling is about to be reached. Sources: Wall Street Journal, 09/12/09; Bloomberg, 09/08/2009; Wall Street Journal, 09/12/09
(9) As we said, such a « window of opportunity » existed between spring and summer 2009. This window is now closed.
(10) See GEAB N°22, 02/2008
(11) See GEAB N°32, 02/2009.
(12) For example, US and French unemployment rate reductions at the beginning of this summer, or the growth in Chinese output. Sources: New York Times, 08/10/2009; Expansion, 07/27/2009; Wall Street Journal, 05/25/2009
(13) It is worth reading Marion Selz’s paper entitled « Statistics, a public service twisted » introducing a recently published book written anonymously by a group of French statisticians with the evocative title « [ame="http://www.amazon.fr/grand-truquage-gouvernement-manipule-statistiques/dp/2707157937"]The great fiddle: How the government manipulates statistics[/ame]». Obviously, in these times of global crisis, the information revealed in this book applies to almost all governments. Source: [ame="http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Les-statistiques-un-service-public.html"]La vie des idées[/ame], 09/02/2009
(14) When, in February 2008 in GEAB N°22, we anticipated that the world was heading to a « Dollar carry-trade », not many people believed us. However this is now exactly what is happening on currency markets. Source: Le Monde, 09/12/2009
(15) Banks which, in April 2009, were eager to get the right to return to the « fair value » system (I estimate my asset is worth 100) (source: Bloomberg, 04/02/2009) instead of valuing their assets at “market value” (on the market, your asset is worth 10). Thus they persist in keeping assets in their balance sheets which they cannot realistically value; precisely because they suspect these assets to be worth 10 or 20 percent of their ‘fair value. The countryside and cities of the US, UK, Spain, Latvia, Japan, China, and other countries are full of houses, flats and buildings that no one buys because their prices are artificially maintained high above the market price so that banks’ balances sheets do not show that they are in fact insolvent because almost all their assets are “rotten”. Bankers too are trying to save time, in the hope of a return to yesterday’s world. Are they old children nostalgic of their golden age or big offenders endangering society? The future will soon tell us as the next phase of global geopolitical dislocation will develop.
(16) Refering to Blaise Pascal’s argument to convince miscreants to believe in God: wager as though God exists because if it is so, paradise is the reward, and otherwise, it simply doesn’t matter; while the contrary wager might take you to hell.
(17) In the next GEAB, the October issue N°38, we shall update our country- and big region-based anticipations, including of course an assessment of the situation regarding US and UK defaults.
(18) With a record-high debt issuance in Europe (EUR 1,100-billion in 2009, and more than EUR 250-billion for the UK only), and with USD 9,000-billion federal deficit over the next ten years, there is no doubt on the fact that the situation is uncontrollable. Source: Yahoo/Reuters, 09/04/2009; CBS, 08/25/2009
(19) In the US, in Europe and in China too. Sources: Reuters, 09/08/2009; Financial Times, 09/06/2009; BBC, 07/26/2009.
(20) On the subject of banks, our team strongly recommends reading the excellent article by Matt Taibbi, “Inside the great American bubble machine” which appeared in Rollingstones on 07/02/2009. It sets out the history of Goldman Sachs and throws essential light on its financial practices and central role in the current financial crisis. In the way of deceased India companies, or the knights templars, it is likely that in five to a maximum of ten years from now, American political power, in the face of a socio-economic collapse and under public pressure, will be obliged to tear apart this institution which interferes in all levels of government activity.
(21) In the end, all these indicators depend on the US Dollar as a measure of value. But if Dollar volatility were to be transferred to a compass, we would see the needle swing between North, South, East and West every month. No wonder then that political, economic and financial leaders are so « disoriented »!
(22) Napoleon too, during the battle of Waterloo, firmly believed th at luck was still on his side and that reinforcements (Grouchy) would materialize at the decisive moment of the battle. Alas, the long awaited troops, whose dust showed their rapid progress, happened to be the enemy’s reinforcements (Blücher). We know what happened next… and we cannot bet that the G20 leaders are strategists as experienced as Napoleon was.
(23) The crisis has somewhat « British humour » and proves that we are far from having seen all its consequences. Indeed, London is now expecting to have to pay a heavy bill in order to rescue its little network of tax havens. The Cayman Islands, for instance, can no longer pay their civil servants. No doubt British taxpayers will be very happy with this perspective! Otherwise, these islands could also resort to a simple idea: create taxes. Source: Guardian, 09/13/2009
Mercredi 16 Septembre 2009
GEAB N°37 is available! Global systemic crisis: In pursuit of the impossible recovery
- Public announcement GEAB N°37 (Septembre 16, 2009) -
Before this summer, LEAP/E2020's team announced that there would be no recovery in sight in September 2009, and not until summer 2010 in any event. Well indeed, contrary to the claims of the media, and financial and political circles, we confirm our anticipation.
The slowdown in the speed of collapse of the global economy, at the origin of all the « good news » (1), is only due to the world's enormous public financial effort of the last twelve months (2). But the « time saved » using taxpayers' money around the world should have been dedicated to redesigning the international monetary system at the heart of the current systemic crisis (3). Yet, besides a few cosmetic considerations (4) and huge gifts to US and European banks, nothing serious has been undertaken, and, when it comes to the future, the « every man for himself » rule prevails (5).
Now, as summer 2009 comes to a close, and as the three rogue waves start impacting the global economy hard (unemployment (6), bankruptcies (7) and monetary shocks (8)), the time to mend the system, or to prepare for a soft transition towards a new global system, is over (9). The first signs of a major decoupling (10) are beginning to appear: the rest of the world is rapidly moving away from the Dollar zone. As shown by the chart below, there is a 95 percent chance that 1,000 billion new USDs will be printed in a very near future... not very attractive for the Dollar zone.
Inconsistent statistics reflect a chaotic world economy
We are heading straight to the phase of geopolitical dislocation expected to begin in the fourth quarter of 2009 (11). In this issue of the GEAB, our team analyses the trends at work (real estate market, srategic issues…) within the current chaos resulting from a flood of unchecked public expenditure and a persistently uncontrolled financial system in a context of growingly inconsistent statistics. Paradoxically, dislocation has become, according to our researchers, the only way to economic recovery (a recovery that will take place around a global architecture and interaction between economic, social and financial spheres profoundly different from anything we knew in past decades. Our team believes that the first features of the “post-crisis world” should begin to appear by summer 2010 and, in the coming months, they will dedicate themselves to their identification.
Meanwhile, as anticipated in the previous editions of the GEAB, no one can now construct a true picture of today’s global economic situation as macroeconomic figures are more and more contradictory or simply absurd (12). Measurement data and instruments have been so manipulated (13) and limited to a volatile US Dollar as sole benchmark (14), that no government, international organisation or bank (15) can now tell in which direction the global system is heading. The media reflect this chaos and contribute to their readers’/auditors’/viewers’ bewilderment: depending on the day, or even the hour, that they give contradictory news on finance, economy or currency. Policy makers, entrepreneurs, employees,… economists or analysts… are reduced to Pascal’s wager (16) to assess what will happen in future months.
Global output, trade and consumer prices (2000 – 2009) – Source: BRI, 2009 According to LEAP/E2020, the chart above tells about facts that cannot be ignored: the global economic, financial and monetary system is drifting at an increasing rate, its weakness is reaching unequalled lows in modern history, and the slightest shock (financial, geopolitical or even natural) can now break it apart (17). The States’ breathtaking plunge into bottomless public debt (18) (governments feel that, without the support of public money, world economies would soon resume their collapse) is creating a literally explosive situation, conveying massive tax increase in Japan, Europe, the US… If there is any recovery in sight, it is that of tax. As a matter of fact, confronted to historic unemployment rates and a free-falling economy, Japanese voters decided to dismiss their decade-old leaders: they have probably inaugurated the great political upheaval of the next phase of the crisis (19). This summer, the Obama administration was also surprised to discover the importance of the popular anger which focused on his health system reform programme (though a much needed one).
Charter rates for container ships (in USD/day) – Showing the decline between the two first quarters of 2008 and 2009 - Source: Spiegel / ISL Port Monitor Here is a very illustrative analogy of the crisis today that imposed itself on our researchers: a rubber ball in a staircase. It seems to rebound on every step (then giving the impression that the fall has stopped) but it falls even lower on the next step, “resuming” its collapse.
“Disoriented” economic players and policy-makers
Of course, all this doesn’t create a favourable investment climate for business. Production capacity is under-used everywhere in historic proportions. Stocks are only renewed at a drip-feed rate (eliminating any hope of a recovery based on their replacement). Consumers have become realistic economically: no money, no purchase. Their salaries fall when they haven’t simply been lost through job losses, the banks don’t lend any more because they know that they themselves are still insolvent (despite the “golden” powder thrown in the eyes of public opinion these last months) (21). The state itself, on its own, cannot substitute itself for the frenetic consumerism of the past. In the US, a return to the previous state would require about USD 2,500 billion pumped into the economy each year. Barak Obama’s stimulus package, less than USD 400 billion a year over two years is far from the amount needed if he has to replace the non-spending of households and businesses. The problem is that this is exactly the present situation of the US economy.
US retail sales during recent recessions (Rebased to 100 at recession inception, duration in months) - Source: Financial Sense, 2009 But the US are not alone in this regard. Asia and Europe are also confronted with a drastic unemployment surge that statistical manipulation (22) cannot hide beyond this summer: jobless no longer entitled to unemployment benefits, youngsters placed in waiting internships or jobless recruited for short-term public construction projects, lay-offs postponed by means of short-time allowance measures, plants artificially maintained in activity thanks to public funds,… from Beijing to Paris, in Washington, Berlin, London or Tokyo, every trick is being used to hide the situation as long as possible… until the recovery arrives. Unfortunately, the recovery will not arrive in time. It’s Blücher instead of Grouchy (23). Instead of a recovery in September, the world is suffering the impact of this summer’s three rogue waves:
. massive unemployment, for people soon to be excluded from further benefits in particular, and its disastrous consequences for nations’ political and social stability, are beginning to appear
. the number of bankruptcies (companies, municipalities,…) and deficits of all sorts, are exploding
. and, of course, the impact of all this on the US Dollar, Treasuries (and the UK, suffering collateral damage) .
The first wave already reached the shore at the end of summer 2009. The second one is coming up. And the third is beginning to appear on the horizon.
In any event, if the Eurozone and Asia are in a better situation to face up to the impact of these waves (as already analyzed in GEAB N°28 of last October), their situation is not so good that they can expect a recovery yet. It is however on the US, the Dollar and US Treasuries on the one hand, and on the UK and the Pound on the other , that the consequences of the three waves will be harder. Mid-summer night dreams also have an end!
But for those who still have enough money to travel, the holidays can go on as hotels, airline companies, holiday resorts… are giving discounts at prices never seen before. Another sign that the recovery is here!
----------
Notes:
(1) For example, the fact of talking in percentage points is part of this summer's « euphoria » operation. Indeed, many banks, whose stock price was close to zero could claim « rebounds » of +200 percent, +300 percent or +500 percent. Taking a look at Natixis, Citi or Royal Bank of Scotland stock prices helps to understand the trap: regaining 500 percent when the stock fell down to 1, that makes 5... which would leave you holding a loss of 40 if you bought 2 years ago (or if you borrowed money in exchange of this security).
(2) This is illustrated by France's recent announcement that the state wishes to continue to support the banking system until the end of 2010. Source: Reuters, 09/13/2009
(3) See LEAP open letter to the G20 published last April in the Financial Times on the eve of London's G20 summit.
(4) The great « traders' bonus hunt » is morally praiseworthy. However it should not make us forget that traders are nothing but the « privateers » of the banks hiring them and of the financial centres hosting the latter. These employers and their hosts give them their « letters of marque » (or should we say « of bonus »?) authorizing them to buccaneer the seas of global finance. Limiting their bonuses to their total salary would compel banks to hire them as master mariners instead of filibusters.
(5) Source: Times, 09/02/2009
(6) In the United States, the real rate of unemployment growth remains between 600,000 and 1 million new jobless every month, if we include those who decide to stop searching for a job (source: CNBC/New York Times, 09/07/2009). To get an idea of the socially explosive wave currently hitting the US economy, in California, since September 1st, 143,000 new jobless are no longer entitled to insurance benefits (including their families, that makes an extra 1 million people in distress... just for this month) – source : MyBudget360, 09/02/2009. In Europe, Asia, … everywhere, unemployment rates are almost the highest in modern history (at 5.7 percent, Japan already reached its historic high in July – source : Japan Times, 09/08/2009) ... despite all sorts of manipulation to reduce the figures.
(7) As an anecdote, there have been more bankruptcies in the US between GEAB N°36 (June 16, 2009) and GEAB N°37 (September 16, 2009) than during the whole of 2008, including two of the most important bankruptcies of the year. But, of course, the media cannot make their headlines on both swine fever and bankruptcies. The same goes for the rate of US corporate bankruptcies which has reached a 12.2 percent all-time high (source: Yahoo, 09/09/2009). In Spain, the number of bankruptcies in the first semester of 2009 is three times the number in 2008 (source: Spanish News, 08/06/2009). In France, employers expect 70,000 corporate bankruptcies by the end of this year (source: Capital, 09/02/2009).
(8) The accelerating pace of the weakening of the US Dollar is creating new monetary stress worldwide and the upcoming request, by the Obama administration, to increase the authorized US federal debt ceiling by USD 1,500-billion is not likely to slow down the selling of the US currency. Indeed the USD 12,000-billion debt ceiling is about to be reached. Sources: Wall Street Journal, 09/12/09; Bloomberg, 09/08/2009; Wall Street Journal, 09/12/09
(9) As we said, such a « window of opportunity » existed between spring and summer 2009. This window is now closed.
(10) See GEAB N°22, 02/2008
(11) See GEAB N°32, 02/2009.
(12) For example, US and French unemployment rate reductions at the beginning of this summer, or the growth in Chinese output. Sources: New York Times, 08/10/2009; Expansion, 07/27/2009; Wall Street Journal, 05/25/2009
(13) It is worth reading Marion Selz’s paper entitled « Statistics, a public service twisted » introducing a recently published book written anonymously by a group of French statisticians with the evocative title « [ame="http://www.amazon.fr/grand-truquage-gouvernement-manipule-statistiques/dp/2707157937"]The great fiddle: How the government manipulates statistics[/ame]». Obviously, in these times of global crisis, the information revealed in this book applies to almost all governments. Source: [ame="http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Les-statistiques-un-service-public.html"]La vie des idées[/ame], 09/02/2009
(14) When, in February 2008 in GEAB N°22, we anticipated that the world was heading to a « Dollar carry-trade », not many people believed us. However this is now exactly what is happening on currency markets. Source: Le Monde, 09/12/2009
(15) Banks which, in April 2009, were eager to get the right to return to the « fair value » system (I estimate my asset is worth 100) (source: Bloomberg, 04/02/2009) instead of valuing their assets at “market value” (on the market, your asset is worth 10). Thus they persist in keeping assets in their balance sheets which they cannot realistically value; precisely because they suspect these assets to be worth 10 or 20 percent of their ‘fair value. The countryside and cities of the US, UK, Spain, Latvia, Japan, China, and other countries are full of houses, flats and buildings that no one buys because their prices are artificially maintained high above the market price so that banks’ balances sheets do not show that they are in fact insolvent because almost all their assets are “rotten”. Bankers too are trying to save time, in the hope of a return to yesterday’s world. Are they old children nostalgic of their golden age or big offenders endangering society? The future will soon tell us as the next phase of global geopolitical dislocation will develop.
(16) Refering to Blaise Pascal’s argument to convince miscreants to believe in God: wager as though God exists because if it is so, paradise is the reward, and otherwise, it simply doesn’t matter; while the contrary wager might take you to hell.
(17) In the next GEAB, the October issue N°38, we shall update our country- and big region-based anticipations, including of course an assessment of the situation regarding US and UK defaults.
(18) With a record-high debt issuance in Europe (EUR 1,100-billion in 2009, and more than EUR 250-billion for the UK only), and with USD 9,000-billion federal deficit over the next ten years, there is no doubt on the fact that the situation is uncontrollable. Source: Yahoo/Reuters, 09/04/2009; CBS, 08/25/2009
(19) In the US, in Europe and in China too. Sources: Reuters, 09/08/2009; Financial Times, 09/06/2009; BBC, 07/26/2009.
(20) On the subject of banks, our team strongly recommends reading the excellent article by Matt Taibbi, “Inside the great American bubble machine” which appeared in Rollingstones on 07/02/2009. It sets out the history of Goldman Sachs and throws essential light on its financial practices and central role in the current financial crisis. In the way of deceased India companies, or the knights templars, it is likely that in five to a maximum of ten years from now, American political power, in the face of a socio-economic collapse and under public pressure, will be obliged to tear apart this institution which interferes in all levels of government activity.
(21) In the end, all these indicators depend on the US Dollar as a measure of value. But if Dollar volatility were to be transferred to a compass, we would see the needle swing between North, South, East and West every month. No wonder then that political, economic and financial leaders are so « disoriented »!
(22) Napoleon too, during the battle of Waterloo, firmly believed th at luck was still on his side and that reinforcements (Grouchy) would materialize at the decisive moment of the battle. Alas, the long awaited troops, whose dust showed their rapid progress, happened to be the enemy’s reinforcements (Blücher). We know what happened next… and we cannot bet that the G20 leaders are strategists as experienced as Napoleon was.
(23) The crisis has somewhat « British humour » and proves that we are far from having seen all its consequences. Indeed, London is now expecting to have to pay a heavy bill in order to rescue its little network of tax havens. The Cayman Islands, for instance, can no longer pay their civil servants. No doubt British taxpayers will be very happy with this perspective! Otherwise, these islands could also resort to a simple idea: create taxes. Source: Guardian, 09/13/2009
Mercredi 16 Septembre 2009
stockuccio
Guest
dopo lo scandalo la SEC si sveglia ... le banche avranno (forse) un sistema in meno per fregare la gente http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aq22pEr9qZIA
un pò di terrorismo
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/sp...total-us-government-obligations-1186-trillion
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...-prompting-fears-of-double-dip-recession.html
... le banche avranno (forse) un sistema in meno per fregare la gente http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aq22pEr9qZIAun pò di terrorismo
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/sp...total-us-government-obligations-1186-trillion
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...-prompting-fears-of-double-dip-recession.html
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:
stockuccio
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Exclusive – Wells Fargo’s Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb
September 17, 2009 – 11:12 am Wells Fargo’s Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb
By Teri Buhl
In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo’s commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books… and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank’s outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank,
Wachovia, which Wells purchased last fall as it teetered on the brink of collapse, was so desperate to increase revenue in the last few years of its existence that it underwrote loans with shoddy standards and paid off traders to take them off their books.
According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo and confirmed by Dan Alpert of Westwood Capital, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer’s risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds. Should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.
Alpert says in reference to how he saw CMBS trades get done, “The Wachovia guys would say ‘We’ll just take back that silly credit risk you’re worried about.’ Of course that was a nice increase to earnings when they got the security sold. The bank made money at the time.”
When asked if Wells Fargo was prepared to pay out those credit default swaps if these securities default, a spokeswoman told Bank-Impode.com,” In keeping with our strong risk discipline, we continually monitor all of our outstanding derivative positions. We have provided extensive transparent disclosures on our derivatives in our 2008 annual report beginning on page 132.” The real question is, however, was enough disclosed to investors about this practice when Wells purchased Wachovia?
One top hedge fund manager who has experience in outing accounting fraud told Bank-Implode “They needed to estimate that CDS liability upon the purchase of Wachovia. If they didn’t, they’ve committed fraud.”
Since there is no way to track the amount of contracts Wachovia wrote due to the lack of a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps , the next best option for analysts is to examine how the loans that backed the mortgage securities are performing. An in-depth review by Bank-Implode shows significant weakness regardless of Wells Fargo’s recent claim to the Wall Street Journal that the merger integration is on track. [ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125304082083513011.html ]
According to the New York Post, Harry Markopolos, the whistleblower on Bernie Madoff, gave a speech this summer at the Greek Orthodox Church in Southampton predicting more major scandals will soon be revealed about the unregulated, $600 trillion, credit default swap market. Ouch!
One senior member of Wells Fargo’s commercial loan group who deals directly with the quandary, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says, “One third of this commercial portfolio we took on from Wachovia is impaired and needs to be completely rewritten. I’ve just hired five more guys and we can’t keep up with the volume of defaults. Southeast Florida and Tampa are serious trouble spots.”
Wachovia’s third quarter 2008 filings, which reflect their assets three days before Wells Fargo agreed to the acquisition, shows the bank held a whopping $230 billion in its commercial loan portfolio. Current figures show Wells’ 90-day defaults on its commercial portfolio are rapidly growing. According to data from WLMlab.com which tracks financial numbers that Wells files with its regulators, the bank’s Construction and Development portfolio, with $38.2 billion in loans, is defaulting at a level eight times greater than the rest of the nation’s banks, as of June 30th. [Link: http://www.wlmlab.com/bkLP.asp?inst=HC1120754&loan=lnrecons&met=loan]. Alarming right?
Wachovia commercial loan officers who spoke to Bank Implode say that the bank specialized in underwriting short-term loans up to five years during the credit boom of 2005-2007. The standard terms for such loans included interest-only payments on a floating rate with a huge balloon payment in the final year of the loan. If these loans cannot be refinanced, more waves of defaults are inevitable.
According to Susan Smith, author of a recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers investor survey about the state of the CMBS market, more trouble is brewing. “It’s going to be very difficult for these loans to get refinancing when the market value is going down and fundamentals are deteriorating,” says Smith. According to data from her report, problems in the South Florida region, to which Wachovia had large exposure, are amplified by an increasing overall cap rate, up 80 basis points from last year, and declining rent prices. The OCR is the perception of risk investors see. The overall cap rate goes up when the overall risk in the market is up.
Given the warning signs on the horizon, it’s plausible that Wells Fargo would try to unload some of these troubled loans on the secondary market. But according to multiple private investment shops set up to invest in distressed debt, Wells isn’t selling them. If Wells were to sell the loans, not only would the bank have to book a loss, but would also have to pay out those pesky credit default swaps.
Instead of selling the loans, sources inside Wells commercial group told Bank Implode that they have been instructed to modify loans for customers in default by adjusting the interest rate, but not change the maturity date. Why? According to Meredith Whitney, founder and CEO of Meredith Whiney Advisory Group, Wells is working an accounting game of “extend and pretend.”
“If the bank doesn’t change a maturity date, then it does not have to take an impairment charge on its books, which would affect earnings,” says Whitney. If the loans don’t look like they are impaired, the rating agencies then do not have to downgrade the billions of CMBS that Wachovia sold to other banks and investors. Moody’s backed out of such a downgrade last month, after it previously warned downgrades were coming on $4.1 billion of Wachovia Bank commercial mortgage securities because it now expects principal and interest payments to continue [link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125172997776872671.html ].
Adds Whitney “We’ve seen Wells Fargo play modification games with its own loans. Why wouldn’t they do it with the loans they took on from Wachovia?” On Tuesday on CNBC, Whitney said again “I don’t know if those commercial modifications are going to work.” [link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1254430805&play=1 ]
In response to analyst expressing doubts that the near $40 billion structured into the purchase of Wachovia for losses in its total portfolio will be enough CEO John Stumpf spoke out. Stumpf told investors at the Barclays conference this week, Wells Fargo has used $2.2 billion in credits for losses from Wachoiva’s commercial mortgages, or one-fifth of the $10.4 billion in total losses it expects from those loans. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125312018580716543.html)
Unfortunately for investors, banks hold CDS liabilities off balance sheet and do not recognize them as a loss until they actually have to pay it. Wachovia at least disclosed in its third quarter 2008 10-K on note 15, that credit derivatives are a regular part of how they finance commercial activities, and add that such instruments ‘don’t meet the criteria for designation as an accounting hedge’.
Given that a specific number for CDS exposure is not yet tenable, it’s hard to say how many billions are at risk. Yet most market players who follow this bank said when those CMBS de-lever and the derivatives come due, it will be a problem for which Wells is absolutely not adequately capitalized.
To give Wells Fargo credit, it might not even know the size of the problem. Bank Implode could not find an analyst who covers the stock to say Wells actually has enough loss reserves built in for it, but regardless the analysts are very concerned about the bank’s health based on the data that they do see. Both Whitney and Paul Miller of FBR Capital Markets both have gone on-air and written in notes [http://bankimplode.com/blog/2009/08/07/is-it-time-to-short-well/] to clients that Wells’ loan loss reserves are not enough to handle coming impairments to residential loans. Miller has a recommended stock price of $15 while WFC is currently trading around $29.
So how can Wells really have enough capital to handle the liability of credit derivatives that will likely come due within the year? As we watch more and more of the junior tranches of commercial mortgage back securities Wachovia sold become worthless how will Wells Fargo afford to pay for the risk premiums Wachovia promised they’d take care of if the loans blew up? From all indications, the bank cannot meet these obligations unless it raises more capital, sells good assets for a loss, or put more of that TARP money to use that CEO John Stumpf says is coming back to the taxpayer. So much for “earning our way out” of the financial crisis.
[Additional reporting by Chris Gillick]
Editors Note: This report holds no relevant stock positions
By Teri Buhl for BankImplode.com
In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo’s (quote: WFC) commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books… and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank’s outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank.
Wachovia, which Wells purchased last fall as it teetered on the brink of collapse, was so desperate to increase revenue in the last few years of its existence that it underwrote loans with extremely shoddy standards and paid traders to take them off their books.
According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer’s risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds. Dan Alpert of Westwood Capital says these were practices that he saw going on in the market at large.
Keep in mind, should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.
Alpert says in reference to how he saw CMBS trades get done, “These guys would say ‘We’ll just take back that silly credit risk you’re worried about.’ Of course that was a nice increase to earnings when they got the security sold. The bank made money at the time.”
When asked if Wells Fargo was prepared to pay out those credit default swaps if these securities default, a spokeswoman told Bank-Impode.com,” In keeping with our strong risk discipline, we continually monitor all of our outstanding derivative positions. We have provided extensive transparent disclosures on our derivatives in our 2008 annual report beginning on page 132.” The real question is, however, was enough disclosed to investors about this practice when Wells purchased Wachovia?
One top hedge fund manager who has experience in outing accounting fraud told Bank-Implode “They needed to estimate that CDS liability upon the purchase of Wachovia. If they didn’t, they’ve committed fraud.”
Since there is no way to track the amount of contracts Wachovia wrote due to the lack of a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps , the next best option for analysts is to examine how the loans that backed the mortgage securities are performing. An in-depth review by Bank-Implode shows significant weakness regardless of Wells Fargo’s recent claim to the Wall Street Journal that the merger integration is on track.
According to the New York Post, Harry Markopolos, the most prominent whistleblower on Bernie Madoff, gave a speech this summer at the Greek Orthodox Church in Southampton predicting more major scandals will soon be revealed about the unregulated, $600 trillion, credit default swap market that Wachovia/Wells is playing in.
One senior member of Wells Fargo’s commercial loan group who deals directly with the quandary, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said, “One third of this commercial portfolio we took on from Wachovia is impaired and needs to be completely rewritten. I’ve just hired five more guys and we can’t keep up with the volume of defaults. Southeast Florida and Tampa are serious trouble spots.”
Wachovia’s third quarter 2008 filings, which reflect their assets three days before Wells Fargo agreed to the acquisition, shows the bank held a whopping $230 billion in its commercial loan portfolio. Current figures show Wells’ 90-day defaults on its commercial portfolio are rapidly growing. According to data from WLMlab.com which tracks financial numbers that Wells files with its regulators, the bank’s Construction and Development portfolio, with $38.2 billion in loans, is defaulting at a level eight times greater than the rest of the nation’s banks, as of June 30th. Alarming, right?
Wachovia commercial loan officers who spoke to BankImplode say that the bank specialized in underwriting short-term loans up to five years during the credit boom of 2005-2007. The standard terms for such loans included interest-only payments on a floating rate with a huge balloon payment in the final year of the loan. If these loans cannot be refinanced, more waves of defaults are inevitable.
According to Susan Smith, author of a recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers investor survey about the state of the CMBS market, more trouble is brewing. “It’s going to be very difficult for these loans to get refinancing when the market value is going down and fundamentals are deteriorating,” says Smith. According to data from her report, problems in the South Florida region, to which Wachovia had large exposure, are amplified by an increasing overall cap rate (OCR), up 80 basis points from last year, and declining rent prices. (The OCR is the perception of risk investors see. The overall cap rate goes up when the overall risk in the market is up.)
Given the warning signs on the horizon, it’s plausible that Wells Fargo would try to unload some of these troubled loans on the secondary market. But according to multiple private investment shops set up to invest in distressed debt, Wells isn’t selling them. If Wells were to sell the loans, not only would the bank have to book a loss, but would also have to pay out on those pesky credit default swaps.
Instead of selling the loans, sources inside Wells commercial group told BankImplode that they have been instructed to modify loans for customers in default by adjusting the interest rate, but not change the maturity date. Why? According to Meredith Whitney, founder and CEO of Meredith Whiney Advisory Group, Wells is working an accounting game of “extend and pretend.”
“If the bank doesn’t change a maturity date, then it does not have to take an impairment charge on its books, which would affect earnings,” says Whitney. If the loans don’t look like they are impaired, the rating agencies then do not have to downgrade the billions of CMBS that Wachovia sold to other banks and investors. Moody’s backed out of such a downgrade last month, after it previously warned downgrades were coming on $4.1 billion of Wachovia Bank commercial mortgage securities because it now expects principal and interest payments to continue.
Adds Whitney “We’ve seen Wells Fargo play modification games with its own loans. Why wouldn’t they do it with the loans they took on from Wachovia?” On Tuesday on CNBC, Whitney said again “I don’t know if those commercial modifications are going to work.”
In response to analyst expressing doubts that the near $40 billion structured into the purchase of Wachovia for losses in its total portfolio will be enough, CEO John Stumpf spoke out. Stumpf told investors at the Barclays conference this week, Wells Fargo has used $2.2 billion in credits for losses from Wachoiva’s commercial mortgages, or one-fifth of the $10.4 billion in total losses it expects from those loans.
Unfortunately for investors, banks hold CDS liabilities off balance sheet and do not recognize them as a loss until they actually have to pay it. Wachovia at least disclosed in its third quarter 2008 10-K (on note 15) that credit derivatives are a regular part of how they finance commercial activities, and add that such instruments ‘don’t meet the criteria for designation as an accounting hedge’.
Given that a specific number for CDS exposure is not yet tenable, it’s hard to say how many billions are at risk. Yet most market players who follow this bank said when those CMBS de-lever and the derivatives come due, it will be a problem for which Wells is absolutely not adequately capitalized.
To give Wells Fargo credit, it might not even know the size of the problem. BankImplode could not find an analyst who covers the stock to say Wells actually has enough loss reserves built in for it, but regardless the analysts are very concerned about the bank’s health based on the data that they do see. Both Whitney and Paul Miller of FBR Capital Markets both have gone on-air and written in notes to clients that Wells’ loan loss reserves are not enough to handle coming impairments to residential loans. Miller has a recommended stock price of $15 while WFC is currently trading around $29.
So could Wells really have enough capital to handle the liability of credit derivatives that will likely come due within the year? As we watch more and more of the junior tranches of commercial mortgage back securities Wachovia sold become worthless, how will Wells Fargo afford to pay for the risk premiums Wachovia promised they’d cover of if the loans blew up? From all indications, the bank cannot meet these obligations unless it raises more capital, sells good assets for a loss, or puts more of that TARP money to use instead of sending it back to taxpayers, as CEO John Stumpf has promised. So much for “earning our way out” of the financial crisis.
[Additional reporting by Chris Gillick]
Editors Note: This reporter holds no relevant stock positions. Teri Buhl is an investigative journalist who has written for Trader Monthly, New York Post, Housingwire, and Dealbreaker.
Exclusive – Wells Fargo’s Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb
September 17, 2009 – 11:12 am Wells Fargo’s Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb
By Teri Buhl
In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo’s commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books… and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank’s outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank,
Wachovia, which Wells purchased last fall as it teetered on the brink of collapse, was so desperate to increase revenue in the last few years of its existence that it underwrote loans with shoddy standards and paid off traders to take them off their books.
According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo and confirmed by Dan Alpert of Westwood Capital, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer’s risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds. Should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.
Alpert says in reference to how he saw CMBS trades get done, “The Wachovia guys would say ‘We’ll just take back that silly credit risk you’re worried about.’ Of course that was a nice increase to earnings when they got the security sold. The bank made money at the time.”
When asked if Wells Fargo was prepared to pay out those credit default swaps if these securities default, a spokeswoman told Bank-Impode.com,” In keeping with our strong risk discipline, we continually monitor all of our outstanding derivative positions. We have provided extensive transparent disclosures on our derivatives in our 2008 annual report beginning on page 132.” The real question is, however, was enough disclosed to investors about this practice when Wells purchased Wachovia?
One top hedge fund manager who has experience in outing accounting fraud told Bank-Implode “They needed to estimate that CDS liability upon the purchase of Wachovia. If they didn’t, they’ve committed fraud.”
Since there is no way to track the amount of contracts Wachovia wrote due to the lack of a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps , the next best option for analysts is to examine how the loans that backed the mortgage securities are performing. An in-depth review by Bank-Implode shows significant weakness regardless of Wells Fargo’s recent claim to the Wall Street Journal that the merger integration is on track. [ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125304082083513011.html ]
According to the New York Post, Harry Markopolos, the whistleblower on Bernie Madoff, gave a speech this summer at the Greek Orthodox Church in Southampton predicting more major scandals will soon be revealed about the unregulated, $600 trillion, credit default swap market. Ouch!
One senior member of Wells Fargo’s commercial loan group who deals directly with the quandary, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says, “One third of this commercial portfolio we took on from Wachovia is impaired and needs to be completely rewritten. I’ve just hired five more guys and we can’t keep up with the volume of defaults. Southeast Florida and Tampa are serious trouble spots.”
Wachovia’s third quarter 2008 filings, which reflect their assets three days before Wells Fargo agreed to the acquisition, shows the bank held a whopping $230 billion in its commercial loan portfolio. Current figures show Wells’ 90-day defaults on its commercial portfolio are rapidly growing. According to data from WLMlab.com which tracks financial numbers that Wells files with its regulators, the bank’s Construction and Development portfolio, with $38.2 billion in loans, is defaulting at a level eight times greater than the rest of the nation’s banks, as of June 30th. [Link: http://www.wlmlab.com/bkLP.asp?inst=HC1120754&loan=lnrecons&met=loan]. Alarming right?
Wachovia commercial loan officers who spoke to Bank Implode say that the bank specialized in underwriting short-term loans up to five years during the credit boom of 2005-2007. The standard terms for such loans included interest-only payments on a floating rate with a huge balloon payment in the final year of the loan. If these loans cannot be refinanced, more waves of defaults are inevitable.
According to Susan Smith, author of a recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers investor survey about the state of the CMBS market, more trouble is brewing. “It’s going to be very difficult for these loans to get refinancing when the market value is going down and fundamentals are deteriorating,” says Smith. According to data from her report, problems in the South Florida region, to which Wachovia had large exposure, are amplified by an increasing overall cap rate, up 80 basis points from last year, and declining rent prices. The OCR is the perception of risk investors see. The overall cap rate goes up when the overall risk in the market is up.
Given the warning signs on the horizon, it’s plausible that Wells Fargo would try to unload some of these troubled loans on the secondary market. But according to multiple private investment shops set up to invest in distressed debt, Wells isn’t selling them. If Wells were to sell the loans, not only would the bank have to book a loss, but would also have to pay out those pesky credit default swaps.
Instead of selling the loans, sources inside Wells commercial group told Bank Implode that they have been instructed to modify loans for customers in default by adjusting the interest rate, but not change the maturity date. Why? According to Meredith Whitney, founder and CEO of Meredith Whiney Advisory Group, Wells is working an accounting game of “extend and pretend.”
“If the bank doesn’t change a maturity date, then it does not have to take an impairment charge on its books, which would affect earnings,” says Whitney. If the loans don’t look like they are impaired, the rating agencies then do not have to downgrade the billions of CMBS that Wachovia sold to other banks and investors. Moody’s backed out of such a downgrade last month, after it previously warned downgrades were coming on $4.1 billion of Wachovia Bank commercial mortgage securities because it now expects principal and interest payments to continue [link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125172997776872671.html ].
Adds Whitney “We’ve seen Wells Fargo play modification games with its own loans. Why wouldn’t they do it with the loans they took on from Wachovia?” On Tuesday on CNBC, Whitney said again “I don’t know if those commercial modifications are going to work.” [link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1254430805&play=1 ]
In response to analyst expressing doubts that the near $40 billion structured into the purchase of Wachovia for losses in its total portfolio will be enough CEO John Stumpf spoke out. Stumpf told investors at the Barclays conference this week, Wells Fargo has used $2.2 billion in credits for losses from Wachoiva’s commercial mortgages, or one-fifth of the $10.4 billion in total losses it expects from those loans. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125312018580716543.html)
Unfortunately for investors, banks hold CDS liabilities off balance sheet and do not recognize them as a loss until they actually have to pay it. Wachovia at least disclosed in its third quarter 2008 10-K on note 15, that credit derivatives are a regular part of how they finance commercial activities, and add that such instruments ‘don’t meet the criteria for designation as an accounting hedge’.
Given that a specific number for CDS exposure is not yet tenable, it’s hard to say how many billions are at risk. Yet most market players who follow this bank said when those CMBS de-lever and the derivatives come due, it will be a problem for which Wells is absolutely not adequately capitalized.
To give Wells Fargo credit, it might not even know the size of the problem. Bank Implode could not find an analyst who covers the stock to say Wells actually has enough loss reserves built in for it, but regardless the analysts are very concerned about the bank’s health based on the data that they do see. Both Whitney and Paul Miller of FBR Capital Markets both have gone on-air and written in notes [http://bankimplode.com/blog/2009/08/07/is-it-time-to-short-well/] to clients that Wells’ loan loss reserves are not enough to handle coming impairments to residential loans. Miller has a recommended stock price of $15 while WFC is currently trading around $29.
So how can Wells really have enough capital to handle the liability of credit derivatives that will likely come due within the year? As we watch more and more of the junior tranches of commercial mortgage back securities Wachovia sold become worthless how will Wells Fargo afford to pay for the risk premiums Wachovia promised they’d take care of if the loans blew up? From all indications, the bank cannot meet these obligations unless it raises more capital, sells good assets for a loss, or put more of that TARP money to use that CEO John Stumpf says is coming back to the taxpayer. So much for “earning our way out” of the financial crisis.
[Additional reporting by Chris Gillick]
Editors Note: This report holds no relevant stock positions
By Teri Buhl for BankImplode.com
In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo’s (quote: WFC) commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books… and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank’s outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank.
Wachovia, which Wells purchased last fall as it teetered on the brink of collapse, was so desperate to increase revenue in the last few years of its existence that it underwrote loans with extremely shoddy standards and paid traders to take them off their books.
According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer’s risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds. Dan Alpert of Westwood Capital says these were practices that he saw going on in the market at large.
Keep in mind, should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.
Alpert says in reference to how he saw CMBS trades get done, “These guys would say ‘We’ll just take back that silly credit risk you’re worried about.’ Of course that was a nice increase to earnings when they got the security sold. The bank made money at the time.”
When asked if Wells Fargo was prepared to pay out those credit default swaps if these securities default, a spokeswoman told Bank-Impode.com,” In keeping with our strong risk discipline, we continually monitor all of our outstanding derivative positions. We have provided extensive transparent disclosures on our derivatives in our 2008 annual report beginning on page 132.” The real question is, however, was enough disclosed to investors about this practice when Wells purchased Wachovia?
One top hedge fund manager who has experience in outing accounting fraud told Bank-Implode “They needed to estimate that CDS liability upon the purchase of Wachovia. If they didn’t, they’ve committed fraud.”
Since there is no way to track the amount of contracts Wachovia wrote due to the lack of a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps , the next best option for analysts is to examine how the loans that backed the mortgage securities are performing. An in-depth review by Bank-Implode shows significant weakness regardless of Wells Fargo’s recent claim to the Wall Street Journal that the merger integration is on track.
According to the New York Post, Harry Markopolos, the most prominent whistleblower on Bernie Madoff, gave a speech this summer at the Greek Orthodox Church in Southampton predicting more major scandals will soon be revealed about the unregulated, $600 trillion, credit default swap market that Wachovia/Wells is playing in.
One senior member of Wells Fargo’s commercial loan group who deals directly with the quandary, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said, “One third of this commercial portfolio we took on from Wachovia is impaired and needs to be completely rewritten. I’ve just hired five more guys and we can’t keep up with the volume of defaults. Southeast Florida and Tampa are serious trouble spots.”
Wachovia’s third quarter 2008 filings, which reflect their assets three days before Wells Fargo agreed to the acquisition, shows the bank held a whopping $230 billion in its commercial loan portfolio. Current figures show Wells’ 90-day defaults on its commercial portfolio are rapidly growing. According to data from WLMlab.com which tracks financial numbers that Wells files with its regulators, the bank’s Construction and Development portfolio, with $38.2 billion in loans, is defaulting at a level eight times greater than the rest of the nation’s banks, as of June 30th. Alarming, right?
Wachovia commercial loan officers who spoke to BankImplode say that the bank specialized in underwriting short-term loans up to five years during the credit boom of 2005-2007. The standard terms for such loans included interest-only payments on a floating rate with a huge balloon payment in the final year of the loan. If these loans cannot be refinanced, more waves of defaults are inevitable.
According to Susan Smith, author of a recent PriceWaterhouseCoopers investor survey about the state of the CMBS market, more trouble is brewing. “It’s going to be very difficult for these loans to get refinancing when the market value is going down and fundamentals are deteriorating,” says Smith. According to data from her report, problems in the South Florida region, to which Wachovia had large exposure, are amplified by an increasing overall cap rate (OCR), up 80 basis points from last year, and declining rent prices. (The OCR is the perception of risk investors see. The overall cap rate goes up when the overall risk in the market is up.)
Given the warning signs on the horizon, it’s plausible that Wells Fargo would try to unload some of these troubled loans on the secondary market. But according to multiple private investment shops set up to invest in distressed debt, Wells isn’t selling them. If Wells were to sell the loans, not only would the bank have to book a loss, but would also have to pay out on those pesky credit default swaps.
Instead of selling the loans, sources inside Wells commercial group told BankImplode that they have been instructed to modify loans for customers in default by adjusting the interest rate, but not change the maturity date. Why? According to Meredith Whitney, founder and CEO of Meredith Whiney Advisory Group, Wells is working an accounting game of “extend and pretend.”
“If the bank doesn’t change a maturity date, then it does not have to take an impairment charge on its books, which would affect earnings,” says Whitney. If the loans don’t look like they are impaired, the rating agencies then do not have to downgrade the billions of CMBS that Wachovia sold to other banks and investors. Moody’s backed out of such a downgrade last month, after it previously warned downgrades were coming on $4.1 billion of Wachovia Bank commercial mortgage securities because it now expects principal and interest payments to continue.
Adds Whitney “We’ve seen Wells Fargo play modification games with its own loans. Why wouldn’t they do it with the loans they took on from Wachovia?” On Tuesday on CNBC, Whitney said again “I don’t know if those commercial modifications are going to work.”
In response to analyst expressing doubts that the near $40 billion structured into the purchase of Wachovia for losses in its total portfolio will be enough, CEO John Stumpf spoke out. Stumpf told investors at the Barclays conference this week, Wells Fargo has used $2.2 billion in credits for losses from Wachoiva’s commercial mortgages, or one-fifth of the $10.4 billion in total losses it expects from those loans.
Unfortunately for investors, banks hold CDS liabilities off balance sheet and do not recognize them as a loss until they actually have to pay it. Wachovia at least disclosed in its third quarter 2008 10-K (on note 15) that credit derivatives are a regular part of how they finance commercial activities, and add that such instruments ‘don’t meet the criteria for designation as an accounting hedge’.
Given that a specific number for CDS exposure is not yet tenable, it’s hard to say how many billions are at risk. Yet most market players who follow this bank said when those CMBS de-lever and the derivatives come due, it will be a problem for which Wells is absolutely not adequately capitalized.
To give Wells Fargo credit, it might not even know the size of the problem. BankImplode could not find an analyst who covers the stock to say Wells actually has enough loss reserves built in for it, but regardless the analysts are very concerned about the bank’s health based on the data that they do see. Both Whitney and Paul Miller of FBR Capital Markets both have gone on-air and written in notes to clients that Wells’ loan loss reserves are not enough to handle coming impairments to residential loans. Miller has a recommended stock price of $15 while WFC is currently trading around $29.
So could Wells really have enough capital to handle the liability of credit derivatives that will likely come due within the year? As we watch more and more of the junior tranches of commercial mortgage back securities Wachovia sold become worthless, how will Wells Fargo afford to pay for the risk premiums Wachovia promised they’d cover of if the loans blew up? From all indications, the bank cannot meet these obligations unless it raises more capital, sells good assets for a loss, or puts more of that TARP money to use instead of sending it back to taxpayers, as CEO John Stumpf has promised. So much for “earning our way out” of the financial crisis.
[Additional reporting by Chris Gillick]
Editors Note: This reporter holds no relevant stock positions. Teri Buhl is an investigative journalist who has written for Trader Monthly, New York Post, Housingwire, and Dealbreaker.
stockuccio
Guest
Giannino ... cita tra gli altri anche l'articolo del Telegraph da me riportato ieri
Meno credito: ciò che le banche centrali NON riescono a impedire, e perché
Negli Stati Uniti, dove a differenza che da noi non comanda l’ABI, da un paio di giorni media e bloggers si interrogano a centinaia su questa chart. Si riferiva a questo, Pietro Monsurrò nel suo post di questa mattina. A produla e commentarla, sono stati economisti come Tim Congdon del FMI e David Rosenberg di Gluksin Shelf. La massa degli impieghi cponti nua a diminuire negliUSA a un tasso dell’1% al mese, per ogni mese da 11 mesi a questa parte. La deflazione del credito si aggiunge a quella dei prezzi, dei salari, degli asset immobiliari. Non male, se si pensa che tutti intonano la canzone “siamo fuori dalla crisi”. Tra i tanti commenti, mi limito a segnalarne alcuni, come quello di Ambrose Evans-Pritchard sul Telegraph, quello di Tyler Durden su Zerohedge, quello di Mr Practical su Minyanville. Si potrebbe pensare che questi daoi interessano solo gli americani. E’ sbagliato: perché la restrizione di credito, con molta più opacità sui dati, è in corso anche da noi. Di conseguenza, ne de derivano tre importanti constatazioni.
La prima è: la liquidità oceanica pompata sui mercati dalle banche centrali non è in grado di evitare sinora la deflazione del credito.
La seconda: ciò avviene perché, sino a ora, gli operatori del mercato – le banche, essenzialmente – scontano a maggior velocità la svalutazione di collaterali e garanzie degli impieghi, di quanto invece le banche centrali tentino di monetizzare i debiti attraverso le nuove iniezioni di liquidità, pur attraverso tutta la nuova panoplia di strumenti a tal fine posti in essere dall’autunno 2008 a oggi.
La terza: se come sempra le banche centrali non sono ancora affatto in c0ntrollo del moltiplicatore monetario, delle due l’una. Potete pensare che, per quanto modesti e poco energiche siano state le spinte coattive riservate dai regolatori alle banche, comunque la crescente pressione nei loro confronti a ricapitalizzarsi e ad attuare il deleveraging abbia sortito un effetto esattamente opposto a quello di ricreare fiducia. Non è la mia opinione. Oppure penserete, se avete abbastanza coraggio, che è il sistema attuale come lo conosciamo delle banche centrali a fare inesorabilmente acqua, e che occorre cambiarlo dalle fondamenta. Abolirle, direbbe Ron Paul, pensando a Thomas Jefferson e Andrew Jackson contro Alexander Hamilton. Oppure – come pensa John Taylor – adottare un nuovo sistema monetario e obiettivi di inflation targeting ormai planetari, in grado di commisurarsi al mercato aperto mondiale della moneta, per contenere l’effetto erosivo sempre più potente che carry trading e impieghi di liquidità massicci su asset mobiliari prevalgano rispetto alla trasmissione degli impulsi all’economia reale.
Meno credito: ciò che le banche centrali NON riescono a impedire, e perché
Negli Stati Uniti, dove a differenza che da noi non comanda l’ABI, da un paio di giorni media e bloggers si interrogano a centinaia su questa chart. Si riferiva a questo, Pietro Monsurrò nel suo post di questa mattina. A produla e commentarla, sono stati economisti come Tim Congdon del FMI e David Rosenberg di Gluksin Shelf. La massa degli impieghi cponti nua a diminuire negliUSA a un tasso dell’1% al mese, per ogni mese da 11 mesi a questa parte. La deflazione del credito si aggiunge a quella dei prezzi, dei salari, degli asset immobiliari. Non male, se si pensa che tutti intonano la canzone “siamo fuori dalla crisi”. Tra i tanti commenti, mi limito a segnalarne alcuni, come quello di Ambrose Evans-Pritchard sul Telegraph, quello di Tyler Durden su Zerohedge, quello di Mr Practical su Minyanville. Si potrebbe pensare che questi daoi interessano solo gli americani. E’ sbagliato: perché la restrizione di credito, con molta più opacità sui dati, è in corso anche da noi. Di conseguenza, ne de derivano tre importanti constatazioni.
La prima è: la liquidità oceanica pompata sui mercati dalle banche centrali non è in grado di evitare sinora la deflazione del credito.
La seconda: ciò avviene perché, sino a ora, gli operatori del mercato – le banche, essenzialmente – scontano a maggior velocità la svalutazione di collaterali e garanzie degli impieghi, di quanto invece le banche centrali tentino di monetizzare i debiti attraverso le nuove iniezioni di liquidità, pur attraverso tutta la nuova panoplia di strumenti a tal fine posti in essere dall’autunno 2008 a oggi.
La terza: se come sempra le banche centrali non sono ancora affatto in c0ntrollo del moltiplicatore monetario, delle due l’una. Potete pensare che, per quanto modesti e poco energiche siano state le spinte coattive riservate dai regolatori alle banche, comunque la crescente pressione nei loro confronti a ricapitalizzarsi e ad attuare il deleveraging abbia sortito un effetto esattamente opposto a quello di ricreare fiducia. Non è la mia opinione. Oppure penserete, se avete abbastanza coraggio, che è il sistema attuale come lo conosciamo delle banche centrali a fare inesorabilmente acqua, e che occorre cambiarlo dalle fondamenta. Abolirle, direbbe Ron Paul, pensando a Thomas Jefferson e Andrew Jackson contro Alexander Hamilton. Oppure – come pensa John Taylor – adottare un nuovo sistema monetario e obiettivi di inflation targeting ormai planetari, in grado di commisurarsi al mercato aperto mondiale della moneta, per contenere l’effetto erosivo sempre più potente che carry trading e impieghi di liquidità massicci su asset mobiliari prevalgano rispetto alla trasmissione degli impulsi all’economia reale.
Geller
Banned
Non vi è alcun dubbio che l'attuale crisi è caratterizzata da luci ed ombre.
Non ancora pienamente indagata, non ancora veramente in via di soluzione, fonte inesauribile di disagio e incertezze, una specie di "cavallo bicefalo" che non consente di capire la direzione definitiva che prenderà ...
Pertanto è sacrosanto continuare a monitorare e predicare prudenza.
Tuttavia, se quotidianamente un coro quasi unanime di istituzioni si leva per proclamare la prox uscita dal tunnel della crisi economico-finanziaria dobbiamo in certo qual modo tenerne conto.
Può darsi che l'ottimismo delle max autorità sia eccessivo o addirittura strumentale e che i mercati siano divenuti troppo euforici, ma se il futuro si rivelerà davvero roseo come da più parti lo si continua a dipingere, molti potrebbero rimpiangere di non avervi creduto per tempo.
Non ancora pienamente indagata, non ancora veramente in via di soluzione, fonte inesauribile di disagio e incertezze, una specie di "cavallo bicefalo" che non consente di capire la direzione definitiva che prenderà ...
Pertanto è sacrosanto continuare a monitorare e predicare prudenza.
Tuttavia, se quotidianamente un coro quasi unanime di istituzioni si leva per proclamare la prox uscita dal tunnel della crisi economico-finanziaria dobbiamo in certo qual modo tenerne conto.
Può darsi che l'ottimismo delle max autorità sia eccessivo o addirittura strumentale e che i mercati siano divenuti troppo euforici, ma se il futuro si rivelerà davvero roseo come da più parti lo si continua a dipingere, molti potrebbero rimpiangere di non avervi creduto per tempo.
stockuccio
Guest
una domanda che per fortuna qualcuno ancora al mondo si pone ...
ma chi è che compra ?
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/09/18/72761/just-who-is-buying-this-rally/?source=rss
ma chi è che compra ?
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/09/18/72761/just-who-is-buying-this-rally/?source=rss