Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (1 Viewer)

[stockuccio]

sono punti di vista ... per me sono infinitamente più terroristi quelli che raccontano favole ai risparmiatori invitandoli nel paese dei balocchi ... ci sono due andamenti contrapposti, quello dell'economia reale e quello della finanza, a me interessa il primo, del primo parlo, poi ognuno è libero di gettarsi nella mischia ... io partecipo alla ricerca della realtà in modo che ognuno agisca nella CONSAPEVOLEZZA ... ecco a me interessa che chi si getta nella mischia lo faccia CONSAPEVOLMENTE

ci ricorda Marco Sarli nel suo blog che 'I primi venticinque mesi della tempesta perfetta hanno, peraltro, indotto un fortissimo processo di concentrazione nel settore creditizio a stelle e strisce, basti pensare che, come sottolineava un servizio dell’Associated Press diffuso nel fine settimana le tre banche statunitensi che si sono fatte carico di Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide, Wachovia Bank e Washington Mutual sono giunte a concentrare su sé stesse 2.300 miliardi di dollari di depositi, ovvero il 30 per cento dei depositi bancari americani, mentre ne rappresentavano soltanto il 20 per cento tre anni fa,' ... ecco appunto, il problema del too big to fail si è esacerbato, finora fanno saltare solo banche medio-piccole

nel frattempo la Cina ritira l'oro dal suolo inglese e subisce l'immediata reazione 'Il dipartimento del Commercio americano ha annunciato ieri di aver imposto dazi preliminari compresi tra il 10,90 e il 30,69 per cento su importazioni di tubi d’acciaio cinesi per complessivi 2,6 miliardi di dollari. La mossa era stata caldeggiata dai produttori e dai sindacati americani del settore secondo cui le importazioni di acciaio cinesi a prezzi bassissimi hanno portato alla perdita di migliaia di posti di lavoro negli Stati Uniti. Furiosa la reazione cinese giunta ieri mattina. «La Cina è molto preoccupata per questa vicenda - ha dichiarato un portavoce del governo cinese - e ci opponiamo con vigore a misure protezioniste del genere».'

tempi interessanti

 

[mostromarino]

sono punti di vista ... per me sono infinitamente più terroristi quelli che raccontano favole ai risparmiatori invitandoli nel paese dei balocchi ... ci sono due andamenti contrapposti, i

assolutamente d`accordo

ma non ricordo di aver mai visto qui,grazie a Dio

un articolo che invitasse nel paese dei balocchi

anzi,ma sempre scritti da benpensanti


d`accordo anche sulla prevalenza economica rispetto alla
finanziarizzazione....
sfondi porta aperta
ma la economia,deprimendo soltanto
non la aiuti

imho

 

[stockuccio]

...

un articolo che invitasse nel paese dei balocchi

....

quello di turani

si vorrebbe (almeno io) discutere dell'andamento e delle prospettive dell'economia ... dicendo schiettamente come la si pensa ... senza dover passare per gufo o il contrario

 

[Gaudente]

'Il dipartimento del Commercio americano ha annunciato ieri di aver imposto dazi preliminari compresi tra il 10,90 e il 30,69 per cento su importazioni di tubi d’acciaio cinesi per complessivi 2,6 miliardi di dollari

adesso mi spiego come mai la STP&I http://www.stpi.co.th/ ha fatto un balzo del 40% in pochi giorni...beh ogni tanto una botta di culo ci vuole

 

[stockuccio]

Denninger ci va giù duro ... pensavo alle conseguenze in Italia intitolando un articolo in quel modo contro l'equivalente di Obama


President Obama Speaks - And Lies (Again)

President Obama stood in New York at "high noon" and talked about how we must have "change", and that we have "helped homeowners avoid foreclosures", how "we must put in place reforms" and that "we have helped come back from the brink" and "an irresponsible period of crisis."
In fact, in his speech he said:

So I want to urge you to demonstrate that you take this obligation to heart. To put greater effort into helping families who need their mortgages modified under my administration's homeownership plan. To help small business owners who desperately need loans and who are bearing the brunt of the decline in available credit. To help communities that would benefit from the financing you could provide, or the community development institutions you could support. To come up with creative approaches to improve financial education and to bring banking to those who live and work entirely outside the banking system. And, of course, to embrace serious financial reform, not fight it.
​

Really Mr. President?
Perhaps you would like to explain this - the outcome of the FHA under your Administration thus far?

Bluntly: You're lying when it comes to having these institutions make only sustainable, safe and sound loans, along with helping Americans keep their homes.
(The spreadsheet can be found here: http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AirpBiMjpGTLdHdfWkJlM2JBbHBiZkpuZk9vTldBV1E&hl=en) and reproduced off HUD's own web page at https://entp.hud.gov/sfnw/public/.
The worse news? The portfolio has doubled over the last two years, with 2.6 million loans added (of a total of 5.18 million.)
So what's the story on recent loans? We don't have an accurate number on that, but this much is clear: The claim that FHA only has a single-digit default and delinquency rate, and is helping Americans own and keep their homes is a BALD-FACED LIE.
Sustainable mortgages eh? "Helping homeowners" eh?
Not a snowball's chance in Hell according not to your lies but the mathematical FACTS as represented in ACTUAL default rates.
ONE IN FIVE FHA mortgages is either late or in foreclosure?
ONE IN FIVE?!
I'm tired of the lying and so is everyone else.
We The People demand THE TRUTH.
THE TRUTH is that:

FHA has been and still is putting Americans into loans they cannot afford, as is proved by the default and foreclosure statistics.
The housing and banking industry HAS NOT reformed its ways, specifically, pushing loans on people they cannot afford, and the FHA is blatantly conspiring with these clowns in APPROVING loans that statistically have a one in five shot at failure.
The claim that these mortgage programs are "helping Americans" is a damned lie. No program that winds up with one in five borrowers unable to pay - a rate double that of credit-card defaults - can be said to be "sustainable", "safe", or 'helping homeowners."
​

We must clear the bad, un-serviceable debt from the system. Papering it over or worse, transferring it to The Federal Government where you think people won't find it won't work.
The only solution to the housing crisis is that prices for homes must come down to where they are actually affordable on a long-term, sustainable basis. This means that we must demand 20% down payments, 28% front end and 36% back end ratios, without exception.
I have said this must happen for more than two years and now the results on "the alternative" pushed by the Federal Government, including Fannie, Freddie and the FHA are in: their promulgated "alternative" does not work, cannot work, and is leading to ruinously-bad default rates, leaving homeowners just as screwed as they were before - if not more so.
FHA and VA are today writing loans with 3.5% down (and in fact 0% down if you use the $8,000 "home buyers credit") and ignoring safe and sound front and back end ratio limits in a desperate attempt to prevent that which must happen to restore a sound housing industry: A decline in prices to sustainable levels.
THE EFFORT TO PAPER OVER THE TRUTH WITH MORE AND MORE LIES HAS FAILED.
I understand that the housing and lending "industry", particularly the latter, are desperate to prevent a contraction to sustainable pricing as house prices returning to sustainable levels will wipe out a huge number of banks - including some of our nation's largest institutions.
But whether they (or you) like it or not this has to happen and the longer we "resist" the inevitable decline all the way to sustainable pricing and closing the insolvent institutions you and The Fed are propping up through blatant accounting fictions the worse the outcome will be for America and our economy.
Thanks to Krista for digging up the facts. We cannot allow, as citizens, the outrageous lies of our government, delivered by a grinning teleprompter-reading handmaiden to those who have and continue to loot the public and its' Treasury, to stand unchallenged.

 

[stockuccio]

Robert Reich

The Continuing Disaster of Wall Street, One Year Later

As he attempted to do with health care reform last week, the President is trying to breathe new life into financial reform. He's using the anniversary of the death of Lehman Brothers and the near-death experience of the rest of the Street, culminating with a $600 billion taxpayer financed bailout, to summon the political will for change. Yet the prospects seem dubious. As with health care reform, he has stood on the sidelines for months and allowed vested interests to frame the debate. Nor has he come up with a sufficiently bold or coherent set of reforms likely to change the way the Street does business, even if enacted.

Let's be clear: The Street today is up to the same tricks it was playing before its near-death experience. Derivatives, derivatives of derivatives, fancy-dance trading schemes, high-risk bets. “Our model really never changed, we’ve said very consistently that our business model remained the same,” says Goldman Sach's chief financial officer.

The only difference now is that the Street's biggest banks know for sure they'll be bailed out by the federal government if their bets turn sour -- which means even bigger bets and bigger bucks.

Meanwhile, the banks' gigantic pile of non-performing loans is also growing bigger, as more and more jobless Americans can't pay their mortgages, credit card bills, and car loans. So forget any new lending to Main Street. Small businesses still can't get loans. Even credit-worthy borrowers are having a hard time getting new mortgages.

The mega-bailout of Wall Street accomplished little. The only big winners have been top bank executives and traders, whose pay packages are once again in the stratosphere. Banks have been so eager to lure and keep top deal makers and traders they've even revived the practice of offering ironclad, multimillion-dollar payments – guaranteed no matter how the employee performs. Goldman Sachs is on course to hand out bonuses that could rival its record pre-meltdown paydays. In the second quarter this year it posted its fattest quarterly profit in its 140-year history, and earmarked $11.4 billion to compensate its happy campers. Which translates into about $770,000 per Goldman employee on average, just about what they earned at height of boom. Of course, top executives and traders will pocket much more.

Every other big bank feels it has to match Goldman's pay packages if it wants to hold on to its "talent." Citigroup, still on life-support courtesy of $45 billion from American taxpayers, has told the White House it needs to pay its twenty-five top executives an average of $10 million each this year, and award its best trader $100 million.

A few banks like Goldman have officially repaid their TARP money but look more closely and you'll find that every one of them is still on the public dole. Goldman won't repay taxpayers the $13 billion it never would have collected from AIG had we not kept AIG alive. (In one of the most blatant conflicts of interest in all of American history, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein attended the closed-door meeting last fall where then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, who was formerly Goldman's CEO, and Tim Geithner, then at the New York Fed, made the decision to bail out AIG.) Meanwhile, Goldman is still depending on $28 billion in outstanding debt issued cheaply with the backing of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Which means you and I are still indirectly funding Goldman's high-risk operations.

So will the President succeed on financial reform? I wish I could be optimistic. His milktoast list of proposed reforms is inadequate to the task, even if adopted. The Street's behavior since its bailout should be proof enough that halfway measures won't do. The basic function of commercial banking in our economic system -- linking savers to borrowers -- should never have been confused with the casino-like function of investment banking. Securitization, whereby loans are turned into securities traded around the world, has made lenders unaccountable for the risks they take on. The Glass-Steagall Act should be resurrected. Pension and 401 (k) plans, meanwhile, should never have been allowed to subject their beneficiaries to the risks that Wall Street gamblers routinely run. Put simply, the Street has been given too many opportunities to play too many games with other peoples' money.

But, like the health care industry, Wall Street has platoons of lobbyists and an almost unlimited war chest to protect its interests and prevent change. And with the Dow Jones Industrial Average trending upward again -- and the public's and the media's attention focused elsewhere, especially on health care -- it will be difficult to summon the same sense of urgency financial reform commanded six months ago.

Yet without substantial reform, the nation and the world will almost certainly be plunged into the same crisis or worse at some point in the not-too-distant future. Wall Street's major banks are already en route to their old, dangerous ways -- now made more dangerous by their sure knowledge that they are too big to fail.

 

[stockuccio]

anche il capo economista della BIS non è ottimista http://www.efinancialnews.com/homepage/content/1055165162

 

[stockuccio]

perdite in aumento per le carte di credito http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/09/credit-cards-most-institutions-report.html

con stimoli vari timida ripresa dei consumi ad agosto rispetto al mese precedente, in forte calo rispetto ad un anno fa http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a8_sOT4URwgc e http://econompicdata.blogspot.com/2009/09/retail-numbers-strong-that-is-if-you.html

 

[stockuccio]

http://www.terranauta.it/a1349/decr...ello_sviluppo_e_della_crescita_economica.html

 

[stockuccio]

Desperately seeking an exit strategy


Nouriel Roubini
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail Last updated on Wednesday, Sep. 16, 2009 11:24AM EDT

There's a general consensus that the massive monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and support of the financial system undertaken by governments and central banks around the world prevented the deep recession of 2008-2009 from devolving into the Second Great Depression.
Policy-makers were able to avoid a depression because they had learned from the policy mistakes made during the Great Depression of the 1930s and Japan's near depression of the 1990s. As a result, policy debates have shifted to arguments about what the recovery will look like: V-shaped (rapid return to potential growth), U-shaped (slow and anemic growth) or even W-shaped (a double dip). During the global economic free fall between last fall and this spring, an L-shaped economic and financial Armageddon was still firmly in the mix of plausible scenarios.
But the crucial policy issue ahead is how to time and sequence the exit strategy from this massive monetary and fiscal easing. Clearly, the current fiscal path being pursued in most advanced economies – the reliance of the United States, the euro zone, the United Kingdom, Japan and others on very large budget deficits and rapid accumulation of public debt – is unsustainable.
These deficits have been partly monetized by central banks, which, in many countries, have pushed their interest rates down to 0 per cent (in Sweden's case, to below that), and sharply increased the monetary base through unconventional quantitative and credit easing. In the United States, for example, the monetary base more than doubled in a year.
If not reversed, this combination of very loose fiscal and monetary policy will lead to a fiscal crisis and runaway inflation, together with another dangerous asset and credit bubble. So the key issue for policy-makers is to decide when to mop up the excess liquidity and normalize policy rates – and when to raise taxes and cut government spending, and in which combination.
The biggest policy risk is that the exit strategy from monetary and fiscal easing is somehow botched, because policy-makers are damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they have built up large, monetized fiscal deficits, they should raise taxes, reduce spending and mop up excess liquidity sooner rather than later.
The problem is that most economies are now barely bottoming out, so reversing the fiscal and monetary stimulus too soon – before private demand has recovered more robustly – could tip these economies back into deflation and recession. Japan made that mistake between 1998 and 2000, just as the United States did between 1937 and 1939.
But if governments maintain large budget deficits and continue to monetize them as they have been doing, at some point – after the current deflationary forces become more subdued – bond markets will revolt. When that happens, inflationary expectations will mount, long-term government bond yields will rise, mortgage rates and private market rates will increase, and one would end up with stagflation (inflation and recession).
So how should we square the policy circle?
First, different countries have different capacities to sustain public debt, depending on their initial deficit levels, existing debt burden, payment history and policy credibility. Smaller economies – like some in Europe – that have large deficits, growing public debt and banks that are too big to fail and too big to be saved may need fiscal adjustment sooner to avoid failed auctions, rating downgrades and risk of a public-finance crisis.
Second, if policy-makers credibly commit to raise taxes and reduce public spending (especially entitlement spending), say, in 2011 and beyond, when the economic recovery is more resilient, the gain in market confidence would allow a looser fiscal policy to support recovery in the short run.
Third, monetary policy authorities should specify the criteria they will use to decide when to reverse quantitative easing, and when and how fast to normalize policy rates. Even if monetary easing is phased out later rather than sooner – when the recovery is more robust – markets and investors need clarity in advance on the parameters that will determine the timing and speed of the exit. Preventing another asset and credit bubble by including the price of assets such as housing in determining monetary policy is also important.
Getting the exit strategy right is crucial: Serious policy mistakes would significantly heighten the threat of a double-dip recession. Moreover, the risk of such a mistake is high, because the political economy of countries such as the United States may lead officials to postpone tough choices about unsustainable fiscal deficits.
In particular, the temptation for governments to use inflation to reduce the real value of public and private debts may become overwhelming. In countries where asking a legislature for tax increases and spending cuts is politically difficult, monetization of deficits and eventual inflation may become the path of least resistance.
Nouriel Roubini is professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.