Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (1 Viewer)

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Leaving Affordable Mortgage May Become Winning Gambit (Update1) - Bloomberg.com
So-called strategic defaults, in which homeowners stop paying their mortgages while remaining current on other debts, rose 128 percent to 588,000 last year, according to Experian PLC, a Dublin-based credit-checking company, and Oliver Wyman, a New York-based consulting firm. Two-thirds of those who walked away defaulted on their primary residences.
La vedo dura :specchio: per le banche recuperare i mutui se anche chi potrebbe pagare non lo fa perche' al di fuori della casa non e' attaccabile:

Ten states are so-called non-recourse, prohibiting deficiency judgments after most home foreclosures: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington, according to the National Consumer Law Center, based in Boston. The bank can repossess your home in those states, not other assets, to settle the debt.
 

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disoccupazione USA al 17% ... dicono al 9,8%




l'ultima newsletter di Mauldin, la riporto perchè cita anche la teoria di Nash ... 'a beautiful mind', bellissimo film
Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
Another Finger of Instability by John Mauldin
October 2, 2009

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In this issue:[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] Fingers of Instability
Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles
Stability Leads to Instability
A Stable Disequilibrium
3 Billion and Counting
The Texas Senate Race - A Game Changer
60 Years and Counting
[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown - the first instinct is to eliminate these distressing states. First principle: any explanation is better than none... The cause-creating drive is thus conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear ..." Friedrich Nietzsche[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]This weekend I turn 60 and have been a little more introspective than usual. I am often told that the letter I wrote well over three years ago on ubiquity and complexity theory and the future of the economy was the best letter I have ever done. I went back to read it, and it has aged well. I basically outlined how a financial crisis would unfold, and now it has.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]On reflection, I think that there are perhaps other, even larger, events in our future than the recent credit crisis and recession; yet, just as in 2006, there is a great deal of complacency. But as we will see, there are fingers of instability building up that have the potential to create large disruptions, both positive and negative, in our future. And for the political junkies in the room, I offer a brief insight into what may be one of the more intriguing behind-the-scenes developments in recent years. Now, to the letter. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"Any explanation is better than none." - Nietzsche[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And the simpler the explanation, it seems in the investment game, the better. "The markets went up because oil went down," we are told (except that when oil went up, then there was another reason for the movement of the markets). But we all intuitively know that things are far more complicated than that. However, as Nietzsche noted, dealing with the unknown can be disturbing, so we look for the simple explanation.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"Ah," we tell ourselves, "I know why that happened." With an explanation firmly in hand, we now feel we know something. And the behavioral psychologists note that this state actually releases chemicals in our brain that make us feel good. We become literally addicted to the simple explanation. The fact that what we "know" (the explanation for the unknowable) is irrelevant or even wrong is not important in achieving the chemical release. And thus we look for reasons.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The credit crisis happened because of Greenspan's monetary policy. Or maybe it was a collective mania. Or any number of things. Just as the proverbial butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon triggers a storm in Europe, maybe an investor in St. Louis triggered the credit crisis. Crazy? Maybe not. Today we will look at what complexity theory tells us about the reasons for earthquakes, tornados, and the movement of markets. Then we look at how the world and that investor in St. Louis are all tied together in a critical state. Of course, what state and how critical are the issues. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] We are going to start our explorations with excerpts from a very important book by Mark Buchanan, called [ame="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0609809989/frontlinethou-20"]Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen[/ame]. I HIGHLY recommend it to those of you who, like me, are trying to understand the complexity of the markets. Not directly about investing, although he touches on it, it is about chaos theory, complexity theory, and critical states. It is written in a manner any layman can understand. There are no equations, just easy-to-grasp, well-written stories and analogies.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]As kids, we all had the fun of going to the beach and playing in the sand. Remember taking your plastic buckets and making sandpiles? Slowly pouring the sand into an ever bigger pile, until one side of the pile started an avalanche?[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Imagine, Buchanan says, dropping one grain of sand after another onto a table. A pile soon develops. Eventually, just one grain starts an avalanche. Most of the time it is a small one, but sometimes it builds on itself and it seems like one whole side of the pile slides down to the bottom.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Well, in 1987 three physicists, named Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Weisenfeld, began to play the sandpile game in their lab at Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. Now, actually piling up one grain of sand at a time is a slow process, so they wrote a computer program to do it. Not as much fun, but a whole lot faster. Not that they really cared about sandpiles. They were more interested in what are called nonequilibrium systems.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]They learned some interesting things. What is the typical size of an avalanche? After a huge number of tests with millions of grains of sand, they found that there is no typical number. "Some involved a single grain; others, ten, a hundred or a thousand. Still others were pile-wide cataclysms involving millions that brought nearly the whole mountain down. At any time, literally anything, it seemed, might be just about to occur."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The piles were indeed completely chaotic in their unpredictability. Now, let's read this next paragraph from Buchanan slowly. It is important, as it creates a mental image that helps me understand the organization of the financial markets and the world economy. (emphasis mine)[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"To find out why [such unpredictability] should show up in their sandpile game, Bak and colleagues next played a trick with their computer. Imagine peering down on the pile from above, and coloring it in according to its steepness. Where it is relatively flat and stable, color it green; where steep and, in avalanche terms, 'ready to go,' color it red. What do you see? They found that at the outset the pile looked mostly green, but that, as the pile grew, the green became infiltrated with ever more red. With more grains, the scattering of red danger spots grew until a dense skeleton of instability ran through the pile. Here then was a clue to its peculiar behavior: a grain falling on a red spot can, by domino-like action, cause sliding at other nearby red spots. If the red network was sparse, and all trouble spots were well isolated one from the other, then a single grain could have only limited repercussions. But when the red spots come to riddle the pile, the consequences of the next grain become fiendishly unpredictable. It might trigger only a few tumblings, or it might instead set off a cataclysmic chain reaction involving millions. The sandpile seemed to have configured itself into a hypersensitive and peculiarly unstable condition in which the next falling grain could trigger a response of any size whatsoever."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Something only a math nerd could love? Scientists refer to this as a critical state. The term critical state can mean the point at which water would go to ice or steam, or the moment that critical mass induces a nuclear reaction, etc. It is the point at which something triggers a change in the basic nature or character of the object or group. Thus, (and very casually for all you physicists) we refer to something being in a critical state (or use the term critical mass) when there is the opportunity for significant change.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"But to physicists, [the critical state] has always been seen as a kind of theoretical freak and sideshow, a devilishly unstable and unusual condition that arises only under the most exceptional circumstances [in highly controlled experiments]... In the sandpile game, however, a critical state seemed to arise naturally through the mindless sprinkling of grains."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Thus, they asked themselves, could this phenomenon show up elsewhere? In the earth's crust, triggering earthquakes, or as wholesale changes in an ecosystem - or as a stock market crash? "Could the special organization of the critical state explain why the world at large seems so susceptible to unpredictable upheavals?" Could it help us understand not just earthquakes, but why cartoons in a third-rate paper in Denmark could cause worldwide riots?[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Buchanan concludes in his opening chapter, "There are many subtleties and twists in the story ... but the basic message, roughly speaking, is simple: The peculiar and exceptionally unstable organization of the critical state does indeed seem to be ubiquitous in our world. Researchers in the past few years have found its mathematical fingerprints in the workings of all the upheavals I've mentioned so far [earthquakes, eco-disasters, market crashes], as well as in the spreading of epidemics, the flaring of traffic jams, the patterns by which instructions trickle down from managers to workers in the office, and in many other things. At the heart of our story, then, lies the discovery that networks of things of all kinds - atoms, molecules, species, people, and even ideas - have a marked tendency to organize themselves along similar lines. On the basis of this insight, scientists are finally beginning to fathom what lies behind tumultuous events of all sorts, and to see patterns at work where they have never seen them before."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Now, let's think about this for a moment. Going back to the sandpile game, you find that as you double the number of grains of sand involved in an avalanche, the likelihood of an avalanche becomes 2.14 times more likely. We find something similar with earthquakes. In terms of energy, the data indicate that earthquakes become four times less likely each time you double the energy they release. Mathematicians refer to this as a "power law," a special mathematical pattern that stands out in contrast to the overall complexity of the earthquake process.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Fingers of Instability[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]So what happens in our game? "... after the pile evolves into a critical state, many grains rest just on the verge of tumbling, and these grains link up into 'fingers of instability' of all possible lengths. While many are short, others slice through the pile from one end to the other. So the chain reaction triggered by a single grain might lead to an avalanche of any size whatsoever, depending on whether that grain fell on a short, intermediate or long finger of instability."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Now, we come to a critical point in our discussion of the critical state. Again, read this with the markets in mind (again, emphasis mine):[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"In this simplified setting of the sandpile, the power law also points to something else: the surprising conclusion that even the greatest of events have no special or exceptional causes. After all, every avalanche large or small starts out the same way, when a single grain falls and makes the pile just slightly too steep at one point. What makes one avalanche much larger than another has nothing to do with its original cause, and nothing to do with some special situation in the pile just before it starts. Rather, it has to do with the perpetually unstable organization of the critical state, which makes it always possible for the next grain to trigger an avalanche of any size." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Now, let's couple this idea with a few other concepts. First, Nobel laureate Hyman Minsky points out that stability leads to instability. The more comfortable we get with a given condition or trend, the longer it will persist and then, when the trend fails, the more dramatic the correction. The problem with long-term macroeconomic stability is that it tends to produce unstable financial arrangements. If we believe that tomorrow and next year will be the same as last week and last year, we are more willing to add debt or postpone savings in favor of current consumption. Thus, says Minsky, the longer the period of stability, the higher the potential risk for even greater instability when market participants must change their behavior. (And, three years later, we can now all see that truth. But it was not as obvious to a lot of people in 2006.)[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Relating this to our sandpile, the longer that a critical state builds up in an economy, or in other words, the more "fingers of instability" that are allowed to develop a connection to other fingers of instability, the greater the potential for a serious "avalanche."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Or, maybe a series of smaller shocks lessens the long reach of the fingers of instability, giving a paradoxical rise to even more apparent stability. As the late Hunt Taylor wrote, in 2006:[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"Let us start with what we know. First, these markets look nothing like anything I've ever encountered before. Their stunning complexity, the staggering number of tradable instruments and their interconnectedness, the light-speed at which information moves, the degree to which the movement of one instrument triggers nonlinear reactions along chains of related derivatives, and the requisite level of mathematics necessary to price them speak to the reality that we are now sailing in uncharted waters. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"... I've had 30-plus years of learning experiences in markets, all of which tell me that technology and telecommunications will not do away with human greed and ignorance. I think we will drive the car faster and faster until something bad happens. And I think it will come, like a comet, from that part of the night sky where we least expect it." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A second related concept is from game theory. The Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash) is a kind of optimal strategy for games involving two or more players, whereby the players reach an outcome to mutual advantage. If there is a set of strategies for a game with the property that no player can benefit by changing his strategy while (if) the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A Stable Disequilibrium[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]So we ended up in a critical state of what Paul McCulley called a "stable disequilibrium." We have players of this game from all over the world tied inextricably together in a vast dance through investment, debt, derivatives, trade, globalization, international business, and finance. Each player works hard to maximize their own personal outcome and to reduce their exposure to "fingers of instability."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But the longer we go on, asserts Minsky, the more likely and violent an "avalanche" is. The more the fingers of instability can build. The more that state of stable disequilibrium can go critical on us.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Go back to 1997. Thailand began to experience trouble. The debt explosion in Asia began to unravel. Russia was defaulting on its bonds. Things on the periphery, small fingers of instability, began to impinge on fault lines in the major world economies. Something that had not been seen before happened: the historically sound and logical relationship between 29- and 30-year bonds broke down. Then country after country suddenly and inexplicably saw that relationship in their bonds begin to correlate, an unheard-of event. A diversified pool of debt was suddenly no longer diversified.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The fingers of instability reached into Long Term Capital Management and nearly brought the financial world to its knees.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]So, where are the fingers of instability today? Where are the fault lines that could trigger another crisis? Are there any early warning signs? I see two possibilities, one positive and one negative.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Chad Starliper sent me the following graph. It shows the debt-to-GDP ratio for the US, adding in various levels of debt. For instance, the ratio of debt to GDP for all levels of government debt is 87%. But if you add household and business debt along with the GSE (government-sponsored enterprises) like Fannie and Freddie, the ratio rises to 331%. If you add in future benefits of Social Security and Medicare, the number becomes more like 1,000%.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT] [FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]
jm100209image001_5F00_1A88AE1C.jpg
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[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The Obama administration tells us that the government deficit is going to be well over $1 trillion a year for at least ten years. And that does not take into account the outlier years in the 2020s when the really heavy lifting of Social Security and Medicare kicks in. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]There is a truism that goes a little like, "If something can't happen, then it won't." Let me make a prediction. We won't have a trillion-dollar deficit in ten years. Why? Because it can't happen. The market will simply not allow it.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]As I have written, we can run large deficits almost forever, as long as the deficits are less than nominal GDP. While it may not be the wise thing to do, it does not bring down the system.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But when you start adding to the deficit in amounts significantly larger than nominal GDP, there is a limit. Each dollar, like the grains of sand, adds to the potential instability of the system. Is it $2 trillion more? $3 trillion? No one can know, but the longer it goes, the worse the ensuing financial earthquake will be.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The current political class and their intentions are dangerously close to killing the golden goose. It is one thing to steal the eggs; it is an altogether different thing to kill the goose through ignorance of the consequences. And the size of the deficit, for as long as they plan to have it, will most assuredly kill the goose.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Just as I was writing in 2006 about the potential for a crisis, and yet the party went on for quite some time, I think the party can limp along now. But there will come a point when the party is over. Interest rates on the long end will rise precipitously, forcing mortgages up and making the deficit even worse. It will be an even worse crisis than the one we have just gone through. And there will be fewer options for policy makers, and none of them will be good or pleasant. And it will take most people unawares. They will see the current trend and project it into the future. And they will be hit hard. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Can we avoid this calamity? Yes, we can wrestle the US budget deficit back under some kind of control, close to nominal GDP or on a clear trajectory to get there within a reasonable time (say, a few years). As noted above, we can run deficits close to nominal GDP almost forever. But there is no political willpower to do that now. And so, the market will at some point force the hand of the political class. That investor in St. Louis, or China or (????) will decide not to buy government debt at such low rates. The avalanche will start. And everyone will be surprised at the ferocity of the crisis. Except you, gentle reader. You have been warned.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Let me re-emphasize that point. If we do not get our act together, the results could be truly serious. And it is not just the US. Japan, as I have written, unless it changes, will hit the wall in the next few years. There are some really sick actors in Europe. You are going to have to be far more nimble and prepared for this next crisis, should it arise, than you were for the last one. Over the next few months, I will be devoting some space to helping us think through how we do that. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]3 Billion and Counting[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And now for something a little more positive. From the beginning of the wireless revolution and the development of the internet, it was not until 2001 that we finally had one billion people connected. It only took another six years to add another billion. And sometime in 2011, somewhere in the world, we will add yet another billion. We are adding some 70,000 people a day, with smarter and cheaper computers, phones, and netbooks. By some estimates, there will be five billion connected to the network by 2015.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A study done in 2005 of 21 developing countries by Leonard Waverman of the London Business School "... showed that an extra 10 mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country leads to an additional 0.59% of growth in GDP per person." (Jump Point)[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Think of each one of those additional connected people as a grain of sand. We have already seen a large surge in productivity from the internet and mobile phones. Farmers in India now know what the prices are for their products and don't have to take lowball offers from middlemen. Fishermen in Indonesia can call around and find where they can get the best price for their day's catch.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Tom Hayes argues in his book [ame="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/007154562X/frontlinethou-20"]Jump Point[/ame] that, because of the growing connectivity, rather large changes are coming to the way we organize our lives. It is a very interesting book and one that I will review in depth at some point. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But what Hayes calls the Jump Point is what I referred to as critical mass. "In mathematics it is called a 'jump discontinuity.' In engineering, this is known as a 'step phase change.' In climatology, it is called an 'abrupt delta.' I call it a Jump Point - a change in the environment, in this case the business environment, so startling that we have no choice but to regroup and rethink the future." (from the introduction)[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Not all of the changes are benign. The potential for business and marketing models to be turned on their head is rather striking. I recommend the book to those who are thinking about the future. It is easy to read, provocative, and well written. You can get it at [ame="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/007154562X/frontlinethou-20"]Amazon.com[/ame]. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]I wrote this three years ago: "Today more than ever your portfolio should be targeting absolute return strategies. In a world with fingers of instability that may be connected in ways we have not seen in the past, caution is the order of the day. If we do see a slowing US economy later this year, the average complacent investor is not going to be happy as his diversified portfolio all seems to be going south at the same time."[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]That is still true today. To talk with my recommended managers around the world you can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws if your net worth is $1.5 million or more. If you are in the US and are still on your way to becoming an accredited investor, you can sign up at Questionnaire - Capital Management Group, Inc.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The Texas Senate Race - A Game Changer[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Indulge me for a moment while I delve into a little inside politics. I used to be very involved in Texas politics, but when I sold my business in 1999 and had to go back to work for a living, I mostly left out political commitments, although I do keep up and have a lot of friends. There is something happening in Texas that has the potential to shake things up, and I thought I would give my readers a heads up. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Long-time Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison has let everyone know that she intends to come back to Texas and run for governor next year against current governor Rick Perry, who is going to run for his third term. Hutchison has indicated that she will resign sometime this fall, which will give Perry the right to appoint a Senator to fill the seat. He has told associates that if he does, the appointment will be a game changer. Who in the Texas political landscape could be termed a game changer? Not one of the half dozen middle-aged white guys who would love the appointment. Not that some of them would be bad choices, just not a game changer. Another woman? There is not one who has run a statewide race and has the necessary experience.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Then there is my long-time good friend Michael Williams. Michael has run statewide three times as the chairman of the Texas Rail Road Commission which, despite the name, is responsible for energy as well as railroads. It is a very powerful post in Texas. He is wildly popular with the grass roots and conservatives in the state. He is one of the best speakers on the stump in the country. He has a powerful command of the energy problem we face. He is totally electable as a Senator. And he is black.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Now that is the definition of a game changer. He will burst on the national scene with a presence. If Governor Perry truly wants to do something that will change the game not just for Texas but for the country, he will appoint Michael at his first opportunity and allow him to run in the primary as a sitting Senator. Michael will be at my birthday party Saturday night, along with his beautiful and extremely smart wife, Donna. Next week on the 12th of October I will be hosting a small private fundraiser at my home for those interested in meeting Michael. You can click here to respond.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And for the locals wanting to help in the campaign, Michael's web site is http://www.williamsfortexas.com. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]60 Years and Counting[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]I turn 60 on Sunday, although we will be celebrating with parties on Friday and Saturday. For whatever reason, when I turned 50 I was apprehensive. I can quite honestly say that I am excited about this birthday, and the future. For all the problems we are facing as a country and as a world linked together, I think this is the most exciting time to be alive in the history of the world. And the next 30 years are going to be much better than the last 60![/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]And you, gentle reader, are part of my reason to be so optimistic about the future. I continue to be amazed that so many people find the writings of this humble analyst to be worth their time. In truth, we are all constantly bombarded with more and more emails, advertisements, phone calls, letters, books, papers, and information, and it is getting harder and harder to focus on what is really critical. You give me the most important gift that anyone can receive in the Information Age, and that is the gift of your attention. You have hundreds of opportunities to divert it elsewhere, and yet you give me some of your precious time. I am grateful, and will always strive to make this letter worthy of your interest.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Finally, my good friend Sir Ed Artis of Knightsbridge fame, who is now in the Philippines, writes that he urgently needs funds to ship needed medical and relief supplies that have been already donated and are waiting on the docks. The disaster in the Philippines is quite tragic and calls out to those of us around the world who can help. You can go to KBI Current Missions to learn more and to donate.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]My daughter Tiffani points out that I have guests arriving for my party and I need to hit the send button, so have a great week. I am going to run and enjoy my friends and some great Texas barbeque. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] [/FONT][FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Your always in a critical state analyst,

John Mauldin
[/FONT]
 

stockuccio

Guest
segnalo il solito articolo ottimo di Mazzalai sui dati occupazionali ... un pò di luce nell'oscurità 'ufficiale'

tempi duri per Bank of America ... equity virtualmente uguale a zero, la FDIC che dice che i bondholder devono sacrificarsi ... azz
The Institutional Risk Analyst: Bank of America: How Much Should Bond Holders be Haircut to Restore Solvency?


Bank of America: How Much Should Bond Holders be Haircut to Restore Solvency?

October 5, 2009

"Banking in all countries hangs together so closely that the strength of the best may easily be that of the weakest if scandal arises owning to the mistakes of the worst… Just as a man cycling down a crowded street depends for his life not only on his skill, but more on the course of the traffic there." Hartley Withers
The Meaning of Money
Smith, Elder & Co., London (1906)
"Gran, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, Und grim des Lebens goldner Baum."
("Theory is a greybeard, and Life a fresh tree, green and golden")
Mephistopheles speaking to the student
Faust
Goethe
This past week in the IRA Advisory Service, we added M&T Bancorp (NYSE:MTB) to our coverage list. As of Q2 2009, MTB was rated "A" by the IRA Bank Monitor's Stress Index due to its below-peer loss rate and strong operating results. We also started to describe for our clients our concerns about the outlook for Bank of America (NYSE:BAC), which was rated "C" as of Q2 2009 by the IRA Bank Monitor. Click here to register for the IRA Bank Cart and look up the rating for your bank.
If you reduce the increasingly difficult situation facing the largest banks down to its essence, the problem is politicians picking winners and losers. If we don't have losers in our economic life, then there are no winners either. If we don't resolve troubled banks, then all of our banks will be bad, as the century-old Whithers quote above suggests. And the fact that Washington will not let large, mediocre institutions such as BAC fail means that our entire financial system is getting sicker, not recovering as the politicians ask you to believe. The different financial and operational situations facing BAC and other members of the large bank peer group illustrate the point.
As we told CNBC's Fast Money on Friday, the departure of Ken Lewis as CEO is probably the best news for BAC equity and bond holders in many years. Whoever is eventually selected to replace Lewis, though, is facing a tough task. In his column in the New York Times over the weekend, Joe Nocera makes that point as he talks about the culture of mediocrity that Lewis promoted at BAC, a culture where competent managers were systematically forced out by the human resources department of BAC.
For all of his insider savvy and HR muscle within the bank, Lewis really was not an operator. BAC, after all, is a combination of dozens of companies merged over the last 30 years that were never actually integrated. The mergers "worked" because the old NCNB HR department ruthlessly squeezed down personnel costs. These are "process" people, after all, who believe that you can identify tasks that can be done by one person, then train that person and pay him/her well below average. This is what they call "synergies" at BAC. This goal of short-term cost cutting pervades BAC and has led to an organization that produces narrowly focused employees and business units, with no incentive to innovate or manage risk on an enterprise basis as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, not to mention federal banking laws.
The operational mess left behind by Lewis at BAC makes a mockery of terms like "internal systems and controls," as used in the Sarbanes-Oxley. As Nocera describes, Lewis forced his managers into product silos instead of a customer focused horizontal organization, and never attempted to fully integrate the organization so as to have a complete view of the risks the bank takes on both retail and institutional exposures. For example, an individual customer at BAC could have many distinct contacts with the bank; a branch banker, private banker, high touch brokerage, discount brokerage, a HELOC lending officer, a mortgage lending officer, a credit card representative, and a P&C insurance rep, to name just a few of the possibilities. And all of these silos come together only in Ken Lewis' office. Thus there was no way for the mortgage credit guys to stop the HELOC guys from making huge credit mistakes. And like most big lenders, they did make huge mistakes.
Keep in mind that Hugh McColl and Lewis reportedly disliked to spend money on integration. Few of the IT systems in the various targets acquired over the years actually talk to one another. Even had Lewis had wanted his managers to communicate, they could not do so. This is why, to this day, each state in which BAC operates has a distinct ABA#. Inter-district deposits and payments must be processed by hand. And the same penny-wise mentality has now stripped most of the value -- that is, highly skilled, experienced people -- out of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch.
Now contrast the situation at BAC with JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM), which has for many years excelled at integrating acquisitions quickly and onto a common IT platform. Indeed, while many give Jaime Dimon high marks as an M&A banker - and we do as well - the real secret of the JPM deal machine is the excellent back office staff, a rich legacy that goes all the way back to the merger with Chemical Bank. Yeah, that's right, Chemical Bank, one of the most technologically advanced institutions of its time. This is one reason why we constantly remind our clients that banks, even large banks, are vastly different one to the next. But in addition to operations, the key distinction to make between BAC and JPM is senior management.
As we have noted before and we'll probably state again, the difference between BAC and Wells Fargo (NYSE:WFC), on the one hand, and JPM on the other, is that Jaime Dimon had the good sense to buy WaMu from the FDIC after it was restructured via the resolution process. All of the legacy liabilities of WaMu, including the legal liabilities from the massive securitizations sponsored by Washington Mutual Inc., were left in the DE bankruptcy court after the FDIC took control of the bank unit. That is why the cleansing process of bankruptcy is so important to the restoration of a healthy, growing economy.

The founders of the United States did not embed a requirement in the Constitution that the Congress create federal bankruptcy courts because they were nice guys. Rather, they knew that a healthy society needs finality in matters of insolvency, a crucial truth that concepts such as "too big to fail" and "systemic risk" short-circuit. For every loser in a business failure, like the equity and bond holders of Washington Mutual Inc., there is a winner, as in the equity and bond holders of JPM. This is why arguments made by economists and politicians about the frightful "systemic" effects of large bank failures do us all such a disservice. Economists, never forget, are basically risk averse, otherwise they would run real businesses, employ real people and take real risks in the markets instead of just talking about them in theory. Thus the quotation from Faust above.

While the Big Media focuses on the personalities and political problems at BAC, we instead focus our Advisory Service clients on the rest of the story, namely the bank's festering off-balance sheet ("OBS") exposure from securitized HELOCs, first lien mortgages and complex structured assets that are a legacy of the Countrywide and Merrill transactions, and also of BAC's own securitization activities. Countrywide reportedly securitized nearly 80% of its HELOC loans, rancid credits that now trade in the 40s in the distressed markets, so just do the math.

Banks currently report that 5% of the $1 trillion or so in existing HELOCs are delinquent, but our sources in the secondary market say that the true situation is closer to 15%. In the current deflationary environment in real estate, the loss severity on these HELOCs is likely to be 100%. Now you know why the largest banks are working so hard to reduce unused lines (See "Exposure at Default: As Banks Shrink, So Does the Economy"), but EAD only measures on-balance sheet exposures. If you want to understand the totality of the potential loss exposure facing the largest banks that were active in securitization, take the FDIC data series for unused credit lines and add a zero.

By eschewing securitization and buying banks after they have been restructured, JPM gained a huge advantage for its equity and bond holders. BAC and WFC, on the other hand, still face the daunting task of cleaning up the mess left by the troubled acquisitions of Countrywide, Merrill Lynch and Wachovia. In the case of BAC, we hear that this includes buying defaulted mortgage paper at par from the various securitization vehicles sponsored by BAC directly or acquired from Countrywide and/or Merrill Lynch. The latter, in case you've forgotten, was the biggest CDO sponsor on Wall Street. This one reason we told our friends at Fast Money that we believe BAC is next in line behind Citigroup (NYSE:C) in terms of financial problems and could be back in the arms of the US government by the middle of 2010.

The thing that many people still don't understand about securitizations is that it was not just overtly profitable for the sponsors. There also was a hidden profit in many deals that were not disclosed, a profit that is now become a liability. Consider a hypothetical example based on actual deals. Say Countrywide created a new DE trust and contributed $100 million face amount of loans to the entity, call it "QSPE1" for "qualifying special purpose entity" under the FASB rules, which incidentally are scheduled to be rescinded at the end of the year. The folks at Moody's (NYSE:MCO), S&P or Fitch would then be paid a fee to provide a rating for the new entity prior to the issuance of securities. We'll come back to this point in a future comment.
In return, QSPE1 gave Countrywide an IOU for $100 million and then sold bonds to investors for at least that amount, allowing QSPE1 to repay the IOU to Countrywide. But the dirty little secret that Wall Street still conceals from the Congress, the public and the shareholders of all banks is that the collateral contributed by Countrywide to QSPE1 was not worth nearly $100 million, but in some cases closer to $95 million or even less. This is why during the interview earlier this year ("Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge'), Ann talked about the fact that the mezzanine tranches of many late-vintage securitizations never converge on "AAA," unlike an auto or credit card securitization. In plain English, this means that there is never enough collateral inside QSPE1 to pay the investors interest and principal -- without an under-the-table subsidy from the sponsor.
For many years in the securitization sector, the fact of a secular increase in the value of collateral masked these unsafe and unsound practices in the banking industry. Sponsors such as Countrywide were assumed to be willing to "cure" such defects -- that is, substitute collateral in the event of a default or advance cash to the securitization trust -- in order to make sure that the trustee in charge of QSPE1 was able to make timely payments to bond holders. The legal fiction was that QSPE1 and Countrywide were separate entities, but the economic reality is that QSPE1 and Countrywide are one and the same.

Click here to see Ann's presentation from the June 10, 2009 PRMIA event, "Regulation of Credit Default Swaps & Collateralized Debt Obligations." Look at slides 12-16, showing various securitizations by Ford (NYSE:F) and the last by Countrywide. Notice that while all of the F deals converge on "AAA" early, the Countrywide deal never accumulates sufficient collateral and cash to ensure repayment of bond investors. Only because Countrywide and other issuers were willing to "cure" these deals with undocumented payments to the securitization trust could investors ever be repaid.

In fact, the reliance by Buy Side investors and regulators on the reps & warranties by sponsors of securitizations provided a source of hidden recourse all the way up the securitization food chain. And not just in residential mortgages. By the early part of this decade, the practice of under-collateralization of securitizations became a pervasive problem for any type of origination that had scale, at least inside the institutions for whom cheating was the business model, including Countrywide, C and Lehman Brothers.

Securitization was once a hidden cash cow for the sponsors, but now that the situation is reversed. Collateral values have fallen dramatically and will fall further in the next 12-18 months, thus banks such as BAC, WFC and C must take that hidden windfall profit out of their pockets and essentially reverse the original transaction - and then some. Otherwise they get sued. This is why the dealers are desperately trying to buy-off prospective plaintiffs with under-the-table payoffs to prevent this ugly reality from being exposed through litigation. This is yet another reason why we laugh uncontrollably when the economists suggest that Lehman should or could have been bailed out.

So now you know why we remain so bearish on BAC, WFC, C and other aggressive sponsors of the trillions of dollars in securitizations originated over the past decade. And the sad part is that for retail investors, there is still virtually no disclosure by these banks describing this specific risk factor. That is why many Sell Side firms are still able to post "Buy" recommendations on BAC and its peers, because they can point to the paltry public disclosure filed with the SEC and say: "Gee, we didn't know." But you can bet that just about every Sell Side analysts who follows money center banks for a living knows precisely those hidden risk factors of which we speak.
And now you too understand why the banking industry and even federal bank regulators have been making noises about delaying the change in the FASB rules regarding OBS vehicles like QSPE1 in our hypothetical example above. But as we explained to subscribers to The IRA Advisory Service last week, whether the FASB changes the rules or not will be irrelevant to the economic and true legal reality facing the large issuers of securitization. We'll be digging into the details of BAC's OBS black hole in the IRA Advisory Service in coming weeks.
Keep in mind that federal regulators, who have been aware of the problems with securitization since day one, have made this situation progressively worse by allowing large zombie banks to continue to merge with one another, especially in the case of BAC. Ken Lewis and the HR department of BAC have already destroyed much of the value of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch by driving many of the best people out of these organizations. But the real question to ask is why the economists and lawyers who populate the federal bank supervision community permitted and even encouraged these mergers in the first instance.
Just as Lewis and his henchmen in the HR department of BAC drove the best people out of that organization by picking winners, our political class in Washington, in the Congress and among the regulatory community, is doing the same thing with the "too big to fail" banks. And by continuing to protect large zombie banks under the ridiculous rubric of "systemic risk," we are dooming the US economy to years of economic stagnation and mediocrity.
The only reason the US economy regenerates itself is because we allow failure. When we legislate away the opportunity for failure, we also eliminate the possibility of renewal and gain. The more we try to avoid systemic risk, the more America will become like the moribund states of the EU, where corporate failures are effectively outlawed, there is no private capital formation to create new banks and companies, and there is no growth in employment or opportunities for the vast majority of Europeans.

At the end of the day, the true threat of "systemic risk" is not financial, but political. Until we purge this creation of the economists from our national vocabulary, we are not going to make any progress toward emerging from the current crisis. As we told our friends on Fast Money , the good news is the recession is over, but the bad news is that the depression has begun. And this next downward leg of the economic crisis will be deeper and more painful because we allow politicians in Washington to pick winners and losers in our financial markets.

So far, the winners have been the bond holders and the counterparties of of the zombie banks and AIG, who are subsidized by equity infusions from the US Treasury. But we notice that Bloomberg News reports that FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair suggested yesterday that creditors of large banks should help to pay for future bank failures by limiting their claims in the event of insolvency. So we ask this question of the readers of The IRA: If you assume, as we do, that the equity of BAC is a zero, where should bond holders be haircut in order to recapitalize the bank without further financial support from the US taxpayer? We'll start the bidding at 70 cents on the dollar.




 

lorenzo63

Age quod Agis
Caution Creeps Into Corporate Bond Market, MEAN: PRENDI I SOLDI E SCAPPA???

This year's dramatic recovery in risk appetites began in the corporate bond market. Could it end there too? A string of weak U.S. macroeconomic data last week, culminating in Friday's poor employment report, sent a shudder through a market that has delivered returns of 14% to 15% for investors in the U.S., U.K. and Europe so far this year. This may be just a hiccup. But there are signs investors may be starting to take some money off the table.

An example is the sudden rise in the amount of corporate bonds purchased by the Bank of England under its quantitative easing program. On Friday, the BOE spent £113 million ($180.3 million) on buying bonds -- the most in any single operation since it launched the program in late March. By contrast, in July and August its purchases of bonds had dwindled to close to zero. Even more telling, market-makers offered to sell the BOE over £330 million of bonds -- another record amount, according to Evolution Securities.

That may simply reflect the continuing debate over exit strategies: Banks are keenly aware that some unusual facilities such as the BOE program have a limited life, and so may be keen to take advantage of them while they exist. In similar fashion, this may explain some of the recent activity in government-guaranteed bond sales by banks -- such as those by Citigroup -- even as additional sources of funding such as senior unsecured debt and covered bonds have become more accessible.

The alternative explanation is that investors have done so well this year they are looking to lock in profits ahead of the approaching year-end. That may be particularly true of investors who are new to credit, such as those who have piled into retail corporate bond funds, who may prove more flighty than traditional asset managers. If that phenomenon gathered pace, the risk is that could reduce liquidity in the corporate bond markets, further pressuring prices.

At the least, there could be a shift toward sectors seen as safe havens. ING on Monday advised European credit investors to switch out of cyclical bonds that have rallied hardest and move into safer noncyclical credits such as telecoms, summing up their view snappily as: "Take the money and run."
 

stockuccio

Guest
l'opinione di Nouriel


How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble

Nouriel Roubini | Oct 6, 2009
From The Wall Street Journal:

The Central Bank needs to watch asset prices and raise rates quickly when it decides the time is right.

By Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer



Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve face a number of very difficult challenges in the years ahead. They include:

• Resisting pressure to monetize deficits, which would eventually cause high inflation.

• Implementing an exit strategy from the massive monetary easing of the past year.

• Maintaining the Fed's independence, which has been compromised by the direct and indirect bailout of financial institutions and congressional attempts to micromanage the central bank.

• Properly calculating asset prices and the risk of asset bubbles according to the Taylor rule, an important guideline central banks use to set interest rates.

• Supervising and regulating the financial system more effectively, particularly in the role of "systemic risk" regulator.

The first two tasks are closely related. In order to prevent a persistent monetization of deficits that would lead to inflation, the Fed must implement an exit strategy from the unconventional monetary easing that began in late 2008. If the fiscal and monetary stimulus is taken away too soon, there is the risk of relapsing into deflation. If it is taken away too late, we may eventually face a fiscal crisis and an inflationary recession, or stagflation.

The Fed does not control fiscal policy. But to avoid a game of chicken wherein loose fiscal policy forces the Fed to monetize deficits to prevent a spike in bond yields, the Fed needs to pre-emptively state it won't be buying more Treasury bills.

As for the exit from monetary easing, the Fed must learn from the fateful mistake it made after the 2001 recession. Then, the central bank cut the federal-funds rate too much and kept it too low for too long. It also moved far too slowly when the normalization occurred—in small increments of 0.25% from summer 2004 until the summer of 2006, when it peaked at 5.25%. Normalization took two full years. It was in that period of slow normalization that the housing, mortgage and credit bubbles spiraled out of control. The lesson learned: When you normalize, move rapidly, or prepare for another dangerous bubble.

Of course, this is easier said than done. From 2002 to 2006, the Fed moved slowly because the recovery appeared anemic and because of significant deflationary pressures. This time around, the recession is more severe—unemployment is at 9.8% and is expected to peak above 10%, and we are experiencing actual deflation. Therefore, the incentive not to exit too soon will be greater and the risk of creating another bubble is greater. Indeed, the sharp increase in the stock market and commodities, and narrowing of credit spreads since March, are partly due to a wall of global liquidity chasing assets and already causing asset inflation.

If the conflict between economic growth and financial stability requires that monetary policy remain loose, then it is critical that the supervisors and regulators of the banking sector move aggressively to prevent another bubble from emerging. Thus they should quickly adopt the regulatory reforms agreed to by the G-20—including a new insolvency regime for financial institutions deemed "too big to fail," a serious approach to limiting "systemic risk," and appropriate rules governing incentives and compensation for bankers and traders.

It won't be easy to define systemic regulation and too-big-to-fail. There is a significant risk that doing so will provide an implicit guarantee for large and complex financial institutions. There is also a longer-term risk that actions taken by congressional and regulatory agencies will distort global financial markets. Western financial institutions now depend heavily on state financial backing, and several governments have tweaked rules and regulations to support the large financial institutions that are now at least partially taxpayer-owned. Further, governments could increasingly require domestic financial institutions to lend more at home, which will curtail their foreign operations. Creating a system of effective financial regulation—while resisting the impulse to favor domestic institutions—will be a real challenge for most countries, including the U.S.

Over time, once the fed-funds rate is normalized, incorporating asset prices into monetary policy making is also necessary to ensure financial stability. While it is correct that the fed-funds rates may not be the most effective instrument at controlling asset and credit bubbles, excessively cheap money is always a source of such bubbles. So faster normalization of the fed-funds rate will eventually be important.

The Fed's involvement in quasi-fiscal operations creates other challenges. As long as the Fed remains involved in maintaining financial stability and in preventing other episodes of systemic risk, it will be hard to eliminate the perception that the Fed will be involved as a lender of last resort for too-big-to-fail firms. So far, this Pandora's Box remains open.

The way to prevent future moral-hazard distortions is to create a regulatory regime where too-big-to-fail institutions have much higher capital requirements: a greater liquidity buffer, lower leverage, and lower involvement in risky and illiquid investments if they are depository banks. They should be supervised internationally and must be able to be closed down in an orderly fashion should failure loom.

The Fed is currently resisting a Treasury-led effort to review how it is organized out of concern it might forfeit its independence. Yet the governance structure of the New York and other regional Federal Reserve banks left them effectively controlled by large financial institutions last year, so such a review is necessary. While congressional interference in the Fed's jurisdiction is a danger, the recent quasi-fiscal activities of the Fed bear a review.

The Fed also needs a greater regulatory backbone. The Fed had the power to regulate mortgage markets but failed to use this power out of a misplaced deference to laissez-faire attitudes and Wall Street. Regulating mortgage markets requires a careful balance: short-term regulatory forbearance to avoid a greater credit crunch, along with medium-term countercyclical supervisory actions in order to prevent the emergence of further asset and credit bubbles.

Establishing financial stability—in addition to price stability and growth—is the essential role of the central bank. Achieving this goal in a way that avoids moral-hazard distortions, as with the too-big-to-fail finance institutions, and prevents another bubble in the next years will surely be one of the greatest challenges ever faced by the Fed.

Mr. Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, is co-author of the "The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing" (Oxford University Press, 2009). Mr. Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.
 

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