Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (1 Viewer)

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spero almeno la metà di quanto mi inquieto io quando leggo lui

posso chiederti cosa te lo rende insopportabile ? ... siete comunque in tanti a pensarla così

 

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epidermicamente:
.la espressione immutabile e mai un accenno di sorriso
quei rari sembra annibal lechter


tecnicamente:
come dire.......la "gurità" ???????

... non è telegenico , vedendolo a tanti viene da grattarsi ... però 'ci prende' .... tanti altri 'guru' invece decisamente meno

 

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Economia

Verso il G20/ Wen Jiabao chiede agli Usa il rispetto degli impegni presi e i T-bond perdono terreno

Sabato 14.03.2009 12:48
Che succede se nel bel mezzo di una crisi un creditore inizia a dare segni di impazienza e a lanciare moniti al suo debitore circa l'importanza di rispettare i patti e tutelare le proprietà del creditore medesimo? Che un brivido corre lungo la schiena del soggetto che si è indebitato. Più o meno questa è stata la reazione, venerdì, del mercato obbligazionario statunitense di fronte alle nuove dichiarazioni del presidente cinese Wen Jiabao.
Proprio mentre a Brighton si apriva l'incontro, destinato a concludersi nella giornata di sabato, in preparazione del vertice del G20 di Londra del mese entrante, nel quale secondo molti gli Stati Uniti cercheranno di ottenere nuovi impegni da parte dell'Unione Europea, oltre che di coinvolgere la Cina stessa e il Medio Oriente nello sforzo per sostenere le economie più deboli, a Pechino nel corso dell'assise annuale dell'Assemblea Popolare Nazionale Jiabao dapprima esprimeva la fiducia della Cina nella possibilità di superare la crisi e i migliori auguri ai vari paesi del mondo.
Poi ribadiva che l'impegno di Pechino è quello di consentire una crescita del Pil dell'8% almeno anche per quest'anno. Infine chiedeva che gli Stati Uniti (che in queste settimane hanno varato piani per 787 miliardi di dollari di stimoli, contro i circa 200 miliardi degli europei) "mantengano la propria credibilità, onorino gli impegni e garantiscano la sicurezza degli asset cinesi". Un brivido a quel punto ha scosso il mercato dei bond americani e, indirettamente, i principali mercati obbligazionari occidentali.
Con una riserva in valuta estera pari ormai a 2 triliardi di dollari Cina è infatti il principale creditore degli Usa ed è dunque direttamente interessata all'evolversi della crisi economica: "Abbiamo prestato enormi capitali all'America e sicuramente ci interessiamo della loro sicurezza" ha spiegato Jiabao. Che poi ha aggiunto: "Parlando francamente, sono veramente un po' preoccupato. Quindi riconfermo la nostra richiesta che l'America mantenga la parola data, rispetti le promesse e garantisca la sicurezza dei capitali cinesi".
I timori del mercato obbligazionari sono forse esagerati, visto che è improbabile che Pechino voglia togliere il terreno da sotto i piedi a Obama proprio in un momento così delicato, iniziando a liquidare le proprie posizioni. Ma il sostegno cinese non è privo di costi, anzitutto politici, con Pechino che è tornata a reagire duramente alle proteste occidentali a favore del Tibet e del rispetto dei diritti umani al suo interno, nonché a rinnovare la richiesta affinchè gli Usa per primi (ma anche l'Europa) cessino il loro sostegno a Taiwan, a sua volta considerata parte della "madre patria" e dunque un affare interno in cui gli altri stati non debbono mettere il naso.
Oltre a questi costi c'è poi da stare certi che Pechino utilizzerà la leva dell'eventuale sostegno alle economie in maggiori difficoltà per ottenere nuove aperture commerciali e regole più favorevoli alle proprie esportazioni. Non è certo una prospettiva rassicurante, ma al punto in cui siamo non paiono esservi molte alternative se non quelle di trovare un compromesso che possa non scontentare troppo nessuno, nell'attesa di nuove regole capaci di ridefinire anche la gestione della globalizzazione economica.
Luca Spoldi

 

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Hai voglia ad iniettare ma se poi mancano gli acquirenti occidentali per i loro prodotti...!?!

Le misure economiche poi vanno a beneficio dei connazionali e quelli più poveri per sostentamento di beni di prima necessità, non certo per aiutare l'import di beni occidentali....

le cifre e questi messaggi, più che letti, andrebbero interpretati correttamente,

noi temiamo un periodo di crisi anche lungo, disoccupazione, recessione, etc., più poveri ma comunque sfamati...

la rischiano invece di ritrovarsi qualche decina di milioni di operai e contadini in piazza e con lo stomaco vuoto...
sama

Sei troppo ( secondo me ) pessimista,
la Cina non è più quella di 20 anni fa ( numeri e cifre lo fotografano con chiarezza )

Gli USA lo hanno capito per primi e H.Clinton il primo viaggio importante,
non a caso lo ha fatto in Cina ( non solo per farsi acquistare i Treasury ).

L'asse Cina-Usa ogni giorno di più sarà quello che potrà più di ogni altro, guidare il globo fuori dal crac totale ( e non è detto che sarà una passeggiata, anzi.. )

La Cina " ha oggigiorno i mezzi più che sufficienti " per sfamare e progredire, e vede e scommette su di un futuro assai promettente.

La dimostrazione " concreta " è l'accapparramento tramite joint ventures con i Paesi africani ricchi di materie prime, la Russia ed altre nazioni con tali peculiarità ( la Cina finanzia-mette i soldi e in cambio .... )

Senza volermi dilungare è palese che le chances migliori le abbia la Cina ( già individuata comunque anche dai vari rapporti della Cia in tempi non sospetti e confermati ai giorni nostri )

Ovviamente la Cina non è la panacea per i nostri mali, nè potrebbe risolverli, ma per fortuna che è in tali condizioni,
poichè costituirà un driver sicuro per l'economia globale.

Ai posteri l'ardua sentenza ovviamente.
l

 

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Roubini ....



Reflections on the latest dead cat bounce or bear market sucker’s rally

Nouriel Roubini | Mar 14, 2009
It is déjà vu all over again. We have already seen this Groundhog Day movie at least six times over and over again in the last year or so: the market starts to rally – this time around about 8% in a week - and the chorus of optimists starts to say that this is the bottom of the economic and financial crisis and that we are at the beginning of a sustained stock market rally that signals the true end of this bear market.
Even before the latest bear market rally started last week I wrote the following on March 2nd:
Of course you cannot rule out another bear market sucker’s rally in 2009, most likely in Q2 or Q3: the drivers of this rally will be the improvement in second derivatives of economic growth and activity in US and China that the policy stimulus will provide on a temporary basis: but after the effects of tax cut will fizzle out in late summer and after the shovel-ready infrastructure projects are done the policy stimulus will slack by Q4 as most infrastructure projects take year to be started let alone finished; similarly in China the fiscal stimulus will provide a fake boost to non-tradeable productive activities while the traded sector and manufacturing continues to contract. But given the severity of macro, household, financial firms and corporate imbalances in the US and around the world this Q2 or Q3 sucker’s market rally will fizzle out later in the year like the previous 5 ones in the last 12 months.
And, as we pointed out here on March 9th:
I have also argued that another bear market rally may occur some time in Q2 or Q3 of this year and may end up like the previous six. Indeed in the last 12-18 every time something dramatic happens (that leads to a lower stock market low) and the government reacts to it with a more aggressive policy action optimists come out and say that this is the dramatic and cathartic event that suggests that a bottom has been reached: they said that after Bear Stearns, after the collapse and rescue of Fannie and Freddie, after Lehman, after AIG, after the TARP was announced, after the G7 communique’, after the $800 fiscal stimulus package was announced last November (the onset of the latest sucker’s rally).
And after a while markets are again “shocked shocked” (to paraphrase the French police inspector in Casablanca) to discover that the macro news are much worse than expected in the US and abroad, that earnings news are much worse than expected not just for financials, realtors, home builders and consumer discretionary firms but also for most other non-financial firms, and that financial markets/firms shocks/news are worse than expected.
And indeed, as predicted, in the last week another bear market rally has started in earnest; the latest rally is just a dead cat bounce. Let us explain next in much detail why this is another bear market rally…

First, note that since the previous bear market rallies were of the order of a 15 to 20% increase in equity prices the latest 8% rally may still have some steam and time to continue. The drivers of the latest bear market rally are the ones that we have already discussed – and deconstructed recently – in this forum; here are the arguments of the optimists:
1. While the first derivative of economic activity is still negative the second derivative is becoming positive around the world: i.e. output, employment, demand etc. are still contracting but they are – or will soon be - contracting at a slower rate than in Q4 of 2008. As long as the second derivative is positive rather than negative economic activity will bottom out some time in H2 of 2009 and the recession will be over sooner rather than later.
2. The policy stimulus, both monetary but especially fiscal, in the US, China and the rest of the world is starting to have traction and will contribution to the slowdown in the rate of economic decline and eventually –sooner rather than later – contribute to the economic recovery
3. Stock markets have already fallen in the US and globally by over 50% and are now way oversold. Earnings have fallen a lot but will recover soon as economic activity will soon stabilize. And since stock markets are forward looking and bottom out 6 to 9 months before the end of the recession we must be now at the bottom if the economy will recover by H2 or, at the latest, by year end.
4. Banks and financial stocks are way oversold; Citi, JP Morgan, Bank of America and other banks are now saying that they will be profitable this year and that they will not need any further injection of capital by the government. The financial system is solvent and the undershooting of banks’ equity prices was way too excessive.
Let us explain again – as we discussed most of these points here before – and flesh out in more detail why each of these optimistic arguments is incorrect or, at least, too early and exaggerated.
As far as the first optimistic argument is concerned – i.e. that the second derivative of economic activity is turning positive - we have already discussed why that argument is way too early and exaggerated. As discussed here on March 2nd:
“For those who argue that the second derivative of economic activity is turning positive (i.e. economies are contracting but a slower rate than in Q4 of 2008) the latest data don’t confirm this relative optimism. In Q4 of 2008 GDP fell by about 6% in the US, 6% in the Eurozone, by 8% in Germany, by 12% in Japan, by 16% in Singapore and by 20% in South Korea. So things are even more awful in Europe and Asia than the US…
First, note that most indicators suggest that the second derivative of economic activity is still sharply negative in Europe and Japan and close to negative in the US and China: some signals that the second derivative was turning positive for US and China (a stabilizing ISM and PMI, credit growing in January in China, commodity prices stabilizing, retail sales up in the US in January) turned out to be fake starts. For the US, the Empire State and Philly Fed index of manufacturing are still in free fall; initial claims for unemployment benefits are up to scary levels suggesting accelerating job losses; the sales increases in January is a fluke (more of a rebound from a very depressed December after aggressive post-holiday sales than a sustainable recovery).
For China the growth of credit in China is only driven by firms borrowing cheap to invest in higher returning deposits not to invest; and steel prices in China have resumed their sharp fall. The more scary data are those for trade flows in Asia with exports falling by about 40 to 50% in Japan, Taiwan, Korea for example. Even correcting for the effect of the new Chinese Year exports and imports are sharply down in China with imports falling (-40%) more than exports. This is a scary signal as Chinese imports are mostly raw materials and intermediate inputs; so while Chinese exports have fallen so far less than the rest of Asia they may fall much more sharply in the months ahead as signaled by the free fall in imports.
With economic activity contracting in Q1 at the same rate as in Q4 a nasty U-shaped recession could turn into a more severe L-shaped near-depression (or stag-deflation) as I argued for a while (most recently in my Sunday New York Times op-ed). The scale and speed of syncronized global economic contraction is really unprecedented (at least since the Great Depression) with a free fall of GDP, income, consumption, industrial production, employment, exports, imports, residential investment and, more ominously, capex spending around the world. And now many emerging market economies – as argued here for a while- are on the verge of a fully fledged financial crisis starting with Emerging Europe”.
As far as the second argument is concerned – i.e that the policy stimulus will soon lead to an economic recovery - we already pointed out that this argument is also overdone:
Fiscal and monetary stimulus is becoming more aggressive in the US and China – again less so in the Eurozone and Japan where policy makers are frozen and behind the curve. But such stimulus is unlikely to lead to a sustained economic recovery. Monetary easing – even unorthodox – is like pushing on a string when the problems of the economy are of insolvency/credit rather than just illiquidity; when there is a global glut of capacity (housing, autos, consumer durable, massive excess capacity because of years of overinvestment by China, Asia and other emerging markets) and strapped firms and households don’t react to lower interest rates as it takes years to work out this glut; when deflation keeps real policy rates high and rising while nominal policy rates are close to zero; when high yield spreads are still 2000 bps relative to safe Treasuries in spite of zero policy rates.
Fiscal policy in the US and China has also its limits. Of the $800 billion of the US fiscal stimulus only $200 bn will be spent in 2009 with most of it being back-loaded to 2010 and later. And of this $200 half is tax cuts that will be mostly saved rather than spent as households are worried about jobs and about paying their credit card and mortgage bills (of last year’s $100 bn tax cut only 30% was spent and the rest saved). Thus, given the collapse of five out of six components of aggregate demand (consumption, residential investment, capex spending of the corporate sector, business inventories and exports) the stimulus from government spending will be puny this year.
Chinese fiscal stimulus will also provide much less bang for the headline buck ($480 billion). For one thing you got an economy radically depending on trade: trade surplus of 12% of GDP; exports above 40% of GDP and most of investment (that is almost 50% of GDP) going to the production of more capacity/machinery to produce more exportable goods. The rest of investment is in residential construction (now falling sharply following the bursting of the Chinese housing bubble) and infrastructure investment (that is the only component of investment that is rising). With massive excess capacity in the industrial/manufacturing sector and thousands of firms shutting down why would private and state owned firms invest more even if interest rates are lower and credit is cheaper: given the glut of capacity monetary and credit easing is like pushing on a string. Forcing state owned banks and firm to lend more and to spend/invest more will only increase – after a short term boost spending and economic activity – the size of non-performing loans and the amount of excess capacity. And with most economic activity and fiscal stimulus being capital-intensive rather than labor intensive the drag on job creation will continue.
So without a recovery in the US and global economy there cannot be a sustainable recovery of Chinese growth. And with the US recovery requiring lower consumption, higher private savings and lower trade deficits a US recovery requires China’s and other surplus countries (Japan, Germany, etc.) growth to depend more on domestic demand and less on net exports. But with domestic demand growth being anemic in surplus countries (China, Japan, Germany, and emerging economies relying on export led growth) for cyclical and structural (demography, weak household income growth as massive and excessive corporate profits/savings that are hoarded rather than transferred back to households in the form of dividends). So recovery of the global economy cannot occur without a rapid and orderly adjustment of global current account imbalances.
In the meanwhile the adjustment of US consumption and savings is continuing. The January personal spending numbers [addendum: and the February retail sales] were up for one month (a temporary fluke driven by transient factors) and personal savings were up to 5%. But that increase in savings is only illusory. There is a difference between the national income account (NIA) definition of household savings (disposable income minus consumption spending) and the economic definitions of savings as the change in wealth/net worth: savings as the change in wealth is equal to the NIA definition of savings plus capital gains/losses on the value of existing wealth (financial assets and real assets such as housing wealth). In the years when stock markets and home values were going up the apologists for the sharp rise in consumption and measured fall in savings were arguing that the measured savings were distorted downward by failing to account for the change in net worth due to the rise in home prices and the stock markets.
But now with stock prices down over 50% from peak and home prices down 25% from peak (and still to fall another 20%) the destruction of household net worth has become dramatic [addendum: -20% in 2008 based on the latest flow of funds data]. Thus, correcting for the fall in net worth personal savings are not 5% - as the official NIA definition suggests – but rather sharply negative. In other terms given the massive destruction of household wealth/net worth since 2006-2007 the NIA measure of savings will have to increase much more sharply than has currently occurred to restore the severely damaged balance sheet of the households. Thus, the contraction of real consumption will have to continue for years to come before the adjustment is completed.
As far as the third argument is concerned – that stock markets are way oversold and that earnings will soon recover – we have also discussed recently why it is flawed:
If you take a macro approach earnings per share (EPS) of S&P 500 firms will be – quite realistically in 2009 - in the $ 50 to 60 range (I say realistically as some may even argue that in a severe recession they could fall to $40). Then, the question is what the multiple, i.e. the price earnings (P/E) ratio will be on such earnings. It is realistic to expect that the multiple may fall in the 10 to 12 range in a U-shaped recession. Then, even in the best scenario (earnings at 60 and P/E at 12) the S&P index would be at 720. If either earnings are closer to 50 or the P/E ratio is lower at 10 then the S&P could fall to 600 (12 x 50 or 10 x 60) or even to 500 (10 x 50). Equivalently the Dow (DJIA) would be at least as low as 7000 and possibly as low as 6000 or 5000. And using a similar logic we argued that global equities – following the US - had another 20% plus downside risk.
These predictions were made when the S&P 500 was close to 900 and the DIJA was close at 9000. This basic macro approach was the reason why we argued that the latest bear market sucker’s rally – the one going from late November 2008 to early January 2009 – would fizzle out and new lows would be reached. Indeed, like previous bear market rallies of the last year this one went bust – falling over 20% - and the DJIA and the S&P broke below the 7000 and 700 upper limit of our range for US equities. With the DJIA and the S&P now well below the “7” range the next test for the markets may be 6000 and 600 for the two indices.
I have also argued that another bear market rally may occur some time in Q2 or Q3 of this year and may end up like the previous six. Indeed in the last 12-18 every time something dramatic happens (that leads to a lower stock market low) and the government reacts to it with a more aggressive policy action optimists come out and say that this is the dramatic and cathartic event that suggests that a bottom has been reached: they said that after Bear Stearns, after the collapse and rescue of Fannie and Freddie, after Lehman, after AIG, after the TARP was announced, after the G7 communique’, after the $800 fiscal stimulus package was announced last November (the onset of the latest sucker’s rally).
And after a while markets are again “shocked shocked” (to paraphrase the French police inspector in Casablanca) to discover that the macro news are much worse than expected in the US and abroad, that earnings news are much worse than expected not just for financials, realtors, home builders and consumer discretionary firms but also for most other non-financial firms, and that financial markets/firms shocks/news are worse than expected.
As repeatedly argued here these financial markets/firms worse than expected news are many: news that more and more financial institutions are effectively insolvent and will have to be taken over by the government; news that highly leveraged institutions – such as hedge funds – will be forced to deleverage further and thus sell illiquid assets into illiquid markets; news that even non-levered investors (retail, mutual funds, etc.) that lost 50% plus into equities are burned out and want to reduce their exposure to equities; and news that a number of emerging market economies are on the verge o a contagious financial crisis.
Why even small open economies such as emerging market ones matter for global risk asset prices? Take the case of Iceland, a small island of 300000 folks in the middle of the Atlantic: the local banks borrowed abroad 12 times the GDP of the country and invested it into toxic asset. Now the banks are bust and the Icelandic government is bust as the banks are too-big-to-be-saved: thus local banks now selling distressed and illiquid assets into illiquid global markets is having ripple effects on global markets.
So if a tiny Iceland can have contagious effects how much larger the contagion would be if a larger and more important emerging market were to enter a fully fledged financial crisis (Latvia or Hungary or Ukraine or Pakistan or Venezuela)? Even a mere rating downgrade of Ukraine a few days ago had shocking effect on financial markets in Emerging Europe and even in the EU ones…
On the upside one could argue that the aggressive policy stimulus in the US and other countries will lead to a faster sustained economic and financial markets recovery that expected here. We have discussed why this “sustained” as opposed to “temporary in Q2-Q3” recovery is highly unlikely to take place. But the bullish argument for a non-bear market and early persistent recovery of global equities is based on a better than expected recovery of the US and global economy.
Earlier this year – at the peak of the latest bear market rally - I met Abby Cohen – the ever bullish equity markets expert at Goldman Sachs who predicted a 25% equity rally for 2008 and is making again a similarly bullish call for 2009. I asked her if we disagreed on earnings or on the multiple (P/E). It turns out that our forecasts for earning per share for S&P 500 firms are similar: 50-60 range for me, 55-60 range for her. But she argued that a P/E in the 1012 range was too low as investors would ignore the bad earnings numbers for 2009: if a rapid recovery of earnings were to occur in 2010 and beyond investors would discount the 2009 bad number and assign to them a much higher multiple of 17 or even more.
The trouble with that argument is that, with the US and global economy in a massive slump and with deflationary forces at work it is hard to believe that a massive economic recovery will occur in 2010 thus lifting sharply earnings: even in a U-shaped scenario US growth in 2010 would be 1% or lower and Eurozone and Japanese growth would be close to 0%. Thus, with weak growth deflationary pressure would be still lingering thus putting pressure on profits, pricing power of firms and thus profit margins. Thus, even in a U-shaped scenario a rapid rally of equities is highly unlikely.
It is true that equity prices are forward looking and they usually tend to bottom out six to nine months before the end of a recession as equity prices are forward looking and they see ahead of the curve the light at the end of the tunnel. So the optimists seeing a recovery of growth in the second half of 2009 argue that equities should start to rally on a sustained basis now (or even six months ago). But this severe U-shaped recession in the US may not be over at the 24th month date (December 2009). Most likely the unemployment rate will rise throughout 2010 all the way well above 10% and the growth rate will be so weak (1% or closer to 0%) that we will remain in a technical recession for most of 2010 (36 months if the recession is over only in December 2010). Thus, the bottom of the stock market may occur in late 2009 at the earliest or possibly some time in 2010.
Also the “6-9 months ahead forward looking stock market view” is not always borne in the data. During the last recession the economic bottomed out in November 2001 and GDP growth was robust in 2002 but the US stock markets kept on falling all the way through the first quarter of 2003. So not only the stock markets were not “forward looking”: they actually lagged the economic recovery by 18 months rather than lead it by 6-9 months. A similar scenario could occur this time around: the real economy sort of exits the recession some time in 2010 but growth is so weak and anemic while deflationary forces keep an additional lid on pricing power of corporations and their profit margins that US equities may – like in 2002 - move sideways for most of 2010 – with a number of false starts of a real bull market – as economic recovery signals remain mixed.
Finally, regarding the fourth optimistic argument – that banks stocks are oversold, that most banks will be profitable in 2009 and that most banks are not insolvent – it is worth considering both what we have been writing previously and some additional points.
First, notice that it with policy rates – Fed Funds - at 0%, with massive quantitative easing, with credit easing allowing banks to dump toxic assets on the Fed balance sheet and with a new government program that allowed banks to borrow at riskless rates almost $200 billion dollars at medium term maturities the Fed and the Treasury are heavily subsidizing banks and other financial institutions. Second, in its latest incarnation – the TALF – now even hedge funds will be able to borrow – up to a trillion dollars - at government rates – and leverage their investments 20 times to purchases new ABS issued by banks and reap a nice spread over LIBOR with very limited risk (effectively investors in TALF will at most make a zero return on the investment in the bad state of the world and make a high return - 15-20% annualized - if all goes well). With policy and borrowing rates equal to zero or close to zero for banks and broker dealers their intermediation margins are obviously positive as lending rates are much higher. But this is a direct huge subsidy of the financial institutions that is being paid by savers that are now earning 0% or close to 0% on $10 trillion of bank deposits. Third, add to this massive subsidy various forms of government forbearance – fudging by regulators on the true valuation of illiquid and toxic assets, parking illiquid assets in level 3 “lala land” of valuations, easing of capital requirements, using AIG to bail out its counterparties to the tune of $160 billion and, soon enough, suspension of mark to market accounting – and you get other cosmetic plastic surgery on the earnings and writedowns by financial institutions. Fourth, the government has already committed $9 trillion dollars of bailout funds to the financial system and already disbursed $2 trillion of that amount. Without such support – that has taken the form of at least 12 separate new and unorthodox support programs - most financial institutions in the US would already be literally fully under and bust.
So it is no wonder that Citi, Bank of America and JP Morgan can argue that they will be making this year a profit “before provisions”. That is the most important caveat: while operational margins can be positive if you borrow at 0% and lend at much higher rates, the actual P&L and balance sheet of banks and broker dealers depends also on writedowns. And delinquencies, charge-off rates and writedowns are rising rapidly as both the loans and securities are showing mounting losses given the worsening of the economic recession. Losses are spreading from subprime to near prime and prime mortgages; to commercial real estate; to credit cards, auto loans and student loans; to leveraged loans and corporate boans; to industrial and commercial loans; to loans to real estate developers; to muni bonds and sovereign bonds of emerging markets and European economies where sovereign spreads are rising; and to the entire alphabet soup of credit derivatives that securitized these loans and mortgages (MBS, CMBS, CDOs, CLOs, CMOs, CPDOs, ABS, etc.). So for the major banks to argue that they are profitable before provisions on losses is a joke: such losses are now officially over $1.2 trillion globally (and $900 billion for US financial institutions) and they will be at least $2.2 trillion (according to the conservative estimates of the IMF and of Goldman Sachs) and as high as $3.6 trillion according to the peak time estimates of such losses according to our most recent study.
And according to independent analysts of the financial system – Meredith Whitney, Chris Whalen – charge off rates on loans – let alone additional losses on securities – are rising at alarming rates: they are already at levels twice as high as in the 1990-91 recession and they will soon enough – given recent trends be much higher double further. So, regardless of whether you got smarter management or not (i.e. it does not matter if you are JP Morgan and run by someone as brilliant as Jamie Dimon) the macro picture trumps any other bank-specific factors (the loan book of JP Morgan is as exposed to residential and commercial mortgages, consumer credit and other loans as any other major bank): i.e. with the unemployment rate going above 9% in 2009 and highly likely to reach 10% in 2010, with GDP growth likely to be 1% or lower in 2010, with home prices likely to fall – conservatively - at least another 15%, with commercial real estate rents now falling about 40 to 50% and valuation bound to fall 30 to 40% then losses on any category of banks loans and mortgages and consumer credit will sharply rise over time; and losses on the assets that securitized these loans/mortgages will increase over time.
Indeed, as we argued here at the beginning of March
The debate on “bank nationalization” is borderline surreal: with the US government having already committed – between guarantees, investment, recapitalization, liquidity provision - about $9 trillion of government financial resources to the financial system (and having already spent $2 trillion of this staggering $9 trillion figure). Thus, the US financial system is de-facto nationalized as the Fed has become the lender of first and only resort rather than the lender of last resort and the Treasury is the spender and guarantor of first and only resort. The only issue is whether banks and financial institutions should also be nationalized de jure rather than only de facto. But even in this case the distinction is only between partial nationalization and full nationalization: with 36% (and soon to be larger) ownership of Citi the US government is already the largest shareholder of Citi. So what is the non-sense about not nationalizing banks? Citi is already effectively partially nationalized; the only issue is whether it should be fully nationalized.
Ditto for AIG that lost $62 bn in Q4 and $99 bn in all of 2008 and is already 80% government-owned; with such staggering losses it should be formally 100% government owned. And now the Fed and Treasury commitment of public resources to the bailout of the shareholders and creditors of AIG has gone from $80 billion to $162 billion. Given that common shareholders of AIG are already effectively wiped out (the stock has become a penny stock) the bailout of AIG is a bailout of the creditors of AIG that would now be insolvent without such a bailout. AIG sold over $500 billion of toxic CDS protection and the counterparties of this toxic insurance are major US broker dealers and banks.
News and banks analysts’ reports suggested that Goldman Sachs got about $25 billion of the government bailout of AIG and Merrill Lynch was the second largest benefactor of the government largesse. These are educated guesses as the government is hiding which are the counterparty benefactors of the AIG bailout (maybe Bloomberg should sue the Fed and Treasury again to have them disclose this information). But some things are known: Lloyd Blankfein was the only CEO of a Wall Street firm who was present at the NY Fed meeting when the AIG bailout was discussed. So let us not kid each other: the $162 bailout of AIG is a non-transparent, opaque and shady bailout of the AIG counterparties: Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and other domestic and foreign financial institutions. So for Treasury to hide behind the “systemic risk” excuse to fork today another $30 billion to AIG is a polite way to say that without such bailout (and another half a dozen government bailout programs such as the TAF, TSLF, PDCF, TARP, TALF and a program that allowed $170 billion of additional debt borrowing by banks and other broker dealers with a full government guarantee) Goldman Sachs and every other broker dealer and major US bank would already be fully insolvent today.
And even with the $2 trillion of government support most of these financial institutions are insolvent as delinquencies rates and charge-off rates are now rising at a rate – given the macro outlook – that expected credit losses for US financial firms will peak at $3.6 trillion ($1.8 trillion for US banks and broker dealers that had a capital of only $ 1.4 trillion in Q3 of 2008). So, in simple words, the US financial system is effectively insolvent.
This is indeed the worst financial crisis and economic crisis since the Great Depression and, unless policy makers all over the world start waking up rather than being asleep at the wheel and start to implement Powell-style overwhelming policy force we may end-up with a multi-year near depression or stag-deflation as we have not seen since the Great Depression.
So when you all add it up together the latest rally is just a dead cat’s bounce or another bear market sucker’s rally. The latest one may continue for a while longer – as the recent ones have been in the 15-20% range and the last one from November to January was actually 25%. If all gets right another 25% bounce cannot be ruled out before it runs out of steam. In recent conversations with many investors I have repeatedly heard the following remark: “Since I have lost 50 to 60% since the peak of 2007 I hope we have a nice 20-30% bear market rally so that I can dump all my stocks at the peak of this temporary rally to minimize my losses and getting out of stocks altogether before they fall again to new lows.” With investors having such a “positive” attitude towards equities you know what the fate of the latest bear market rally will be.
Indeed for a while a spate of relatively good news may push this bear market rally further up: some economic indicators showing a positive second derivative, fiscal stimulus in the US, China and other countries reducing the rate of GDP contraction in Q2 and Q3 before a new slump in Q4, monetary easing helping markets and financial institutions, banks earning nice intermediation margins before further massive writedowns that will be delayed through various forms of regulatory forbearance, Chinese monetary, credit and fiscal pump priming leading a drugged recovery that will increase the productive overcapacity and lead to a temporary recovery of oil and commodity prices.
But the fundamentals of the economy and of financial markets and financial institutions are still bearish for the many reasons discussed above.
So, as we argued recently:
“most likely we can brace ourselves for new lows on US and global equities in the next 12 to 18 months. Eventually a more sustained recovery will occur once we are closer to clear signals that this ugly global U-shaped recession is not turning into a L-shaped near depression and that the global economic recovery is clear and sustained. Until then expect very volatile and choppy US and global equity markets with new lows reached in the next months and the year ahead.”
We have also argued that it is possible to avoid an L-shaped near-depression and to remain in a U-shaped severe recession that will be over some time in 2010. And that a true economic recovery and true self-sustaining rally in equity markets will depend on the appropriate pursuit of very aggressive economic policies to restore global growth. We have discussed such policies in recent times and we will flesh out in more detail the policies that are required to avoid the L near-depression and make the U shorter than otherwise.
In the next few months the financial markets and asset prices will be driven by opposing forces that will pull them in opposite directions: more aggressive policy actions should lead to second derivatives of economic activity becoming – at least temporarily – positive suggesting the eventual trough of this recession. But the process of deleveraging of households, financial institutions and firms will continue making the vicious circle of contracting financial markets – and ensuing liquidity and credit crunch - and contracting economy leading to greater losses and greater financial crunch.
Thus, the alleged bottoming out of the economic contraction may have – like financial markets – a couple of false starts: recovery of some indicators in Q2 and Q3 followed by a renewed slump in Q4 once the temporary drugged boost of the fiscal and policy stimulus is worn out and recessionary and deflationary and deleveraging forces take again the upper hand. And such new boom- new bust cycle may be also accelerated if some of the financial shocks – major banks being bust and being taken over by the government, deleveraging by highly leveraged hedge funds, trouble in private equity and LBOs, surge in corporate default rates, trouble among other financial institutions such as insurance companies, some emerging markets going bust – reemerge sooner rather than later.
And at every step of this cycle – as in the last 18 months – you can expect that worse than expected macro news and financial shocks – that are bearish for markets and that lead to more aggressive shorting of equities and other risky assets – will be followed by more esoteric and unorthodox monetary and fiscal and credit policies that will lead to short-squeezed and renewed bear market rallies.
A more robust and sustained recovery of stock markets and financial markets – rather than other temporary bear market rallies – will require stronger, more coherent and aggressive policy actions by the US and other countries – Europe, Japan, China, and other advanced and emerging market economies – that is still – so far lacking. Policies are going in the right direction – monetary easing, fiscal easing, beginning of a real clean-up of the financial system and of its toxic assets, actions to stem the mortgage foreclosure crisis and to reduce the debt burden of insolvent households, appropriate forms of regulatory forbearance, liquidity/lending provision to emerging market economies suffering from a sudden stop of capital and from a massive reversal of capital inflows, policies to restore the transparency of financial markets and improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions.
Policies are indeed moving in the right direction – the first derivative is positive – but their second derivative is still negative as these actions are reactive rather than proactive to a worsening of the economic and financial outlook. A robust switch of economic indicators to a positive second derivative requires policy actions also having a positive second derivative. As long as this second derivative of policy remains negative the chances that the second derivative of economic activity will become positive – a true sign that economies are closer to bottoming out and thus recover – will remain low. That is why the upcoming G20 meeting should emphasize – as I have argued and as the US policy makers are arguing – policy actions to lead us out of this crisis rather than policies that are relevant for the long term well functioning of the economy and financial system (i.e. the reform of the system of supervision and regulation of the financial system).
Indeed, policy reforms that strengthen the system in the long run may be counter-productive in the short-run as, in the short run, greater regulatory forbearance is part of the tool kit necessary to get out of this crisis. Indeed, in the short run stabilizing regulatory forbearance may include: appropriate easing of capital adequacy ratios that reduce the credit crunch in the short run rather than tightening of them via dynamic provisioning that is beneficial in the long run; appropriate forms of suspension of some forms of mark-to-market fair value accounting that reduce transparency in the short run as opposed to greater transparency that is beneficial in the long run; less short-run reliance on destabilizing rating downgrades rather than reforms that make the ratings more realistic and credible over time.
So, in conclusion and caveat emptor for investors: Dear investors, do enjoy this dead cat bounce and bear market sucker’s rally; most likely most of you will jump the ship as soon as this rally loses its steam; and your attempt to jump ship will make the next round of the bear market bust even faster. Today short-selling covering is leading to a more pronounced bear market rally; at some point in the future the capitulation of investors trying to sell their equities at the peak of the latest bear market rally will make the next round of the bear market bust faster and more pronounced. So, don’t wait too long until you jump ship while the financial Titanic hits the next financial iceberg: you may get squeezed and crashed in the rush to the lifeboats.

L'analisi di N.Roubini è concreta-realistica ed anche i numeri sono coerenti e logici ( purtroppo ),
ma bisognerà vedere i Mercati con quali parametri valuteranno ( parlo dell'azionario ).

Potrebbero adottare multipli di 15/17 come nell'ultimo decennio e allora la notte sarebbe meno scura,
potrebbero altresì aggiungervi altre considerazioni statistiche e non solo,
associandole anche a valutazioni in scala Schiller ( non certo un ottimista, ma un serio studioso-analista ), ed anche in questo caso la prospettiva potrebbe risultare meno catastrofica.

In ogni caso ecco uno studio, che lascia e giustifica valutazioni assai diverse a seconda che..., anche con utili per azione su S&P 500 nella forchetta bassa a 40 Usd :

http://seekingalpha.com/article/124829-s-p-500-valuation-analysis-near-bottom

 

[Imark]

Hai voglia ad iniettare ma se poi mancano gli acquirenti occidentali per i loro prodotti...!?!

Le misure economiche poi vanno a beneficio dei connazionali e quelli più poveri per sostentamento di beni di prima necessità, non certo per aiutare l'import di beni occidentali....

le cifre e questi messaggi, più che letti, andrebbero interpretati correttamente,

noi temiamo un periodo di crisi anche lungo, disoccupazione, recessione, etc., più poveri ma comunque sfamati...

la rischiano invece di ritrovarsi qualche decina di milioni di operai e contadini in piazza e con lo stomaco vuoto...
sama

Se vogliono davvero spingere sul mercato interno, oltre alla realizzazione delle infrastrutture, i cinesi devono anche sostenere il consumo interno...

Ma per farlo, serve il passaggio da un capitalismo selvaggio (fa ridere pensare questo di uno stato formalmente comunista, ma tant'è... ) ad una economia sociale di mercato.

Voglio dire: se in Cina non c'è un sistema previdenziale pubblico ed i cinesi sono costretti oramai da qualche decennio alla politica del figlio unico, come ci si aspetta che i cinesi non risparmino forsennatamente ?

Nella cultura cinese c'è il l'elemento per cui sono i figli a mantenere i genitori quando questi cessano di lavorare, ma oggi "i figli" non ci sono più: c'è "il figlio" che magari ha già problemi di suo...

Il varo di un sistema pensionistico pubblico potrebbe indurre i cinesi a risparmiare in maniera un po' meno forsennata, potendo confidare in una fonte di sostentamento certa dopo la cessazione dell'attività lavorativa.

 

[lorenzo63]

Hai voglia ad iniettare ma se poi mancano gli acquirenti occidentali per i loro prodotti...!?!

Le misure economiche poi vanno a beneficio dei connazionali e quelli più poveri per sostentamento di beni di prima necessità, non certo per aiutare l'import di beni occidentali....

le cifre e questi messaggi, più che letti, andrebbero interpretati correttamente,

noi temiamo un periodo di crisi anche lungo, disoccupazione, recessione, etc., più poveri ma comunque sfamati...

la rischiano invece di ritrovarsi qualche decina di milioni di operai e contadini in piazza e con lo stomaco vuoto...
sama

Economia

Verso il G20/ Wen Jiabao chiede agli Usa il rispetto degli impegni presi e i T-bond perdono terreno

Sabato 14.03.2009 12:48
Che succede se nel bel mezzo di una crisi un creditore inizia a dare segni di impazienza e a lanciare moniti al suo debitore circa l'importanza di rispettare i patti e tutelare le proprietà del creditore medesimo? Che un brivido corre lungo la schiena del soggetto che si è indebitato. Più o meno questa è stata la reazione, venerdì, del mercato obbligazionario statunitense di fronte alle nuove dichiarazioni del presidente cinese Wen Jiabao.
Proprio mentre a Brighton si apriva l'incontro, destinato a concludersi nella giornata di sabato, in preparazione del vertice del G20 di Londra del mese entrante, nel quale secondo molti gli Stati Uniti cercheranno di ottenere nuovi impegni da parte dell'Unione Europea, oltre che di coinvolgere la Cina stessa e il Medio Oriente nello sforzo per sostenere le economie più deboli, a Pechino nel corso dell'assise annuale dell'Assemblea Popolare Nazionale Jiabao dapprima esprimeva la fiducia della Cina nella possibilità di superare la crisi e i migliori auguri ai vari paesi del mondo.
Poi ribadiva che l'impegno di Pechino è quello di consentire una crescita del Pil dell'8% almeno anche per quest'anno. Infine chiedeva che gli Stati Uniti (che in queste settimane hanno varato piani per 787 miliardi di dollari di stimoli, contro i circa 200 miliardi degli europei) "mantengano la propria credibilità, onorino gli impegni e garantiscano la sicurezza degli asset cinesi". Un brivido a quel punto ha scosso il mercato dei bond americani e, indirettamente, i principali mercati obbligazionari occidentali.
Con una riserva in valuta estera pari ormai a 2 triliardi di dollari Cina è infatti il principale creditore degli Usa ed è dunque direttamente interessata all'evolversi della crisi economica: "Abbiamo prestato enormi capitali all'America e sicuramente ci interessiamo della loro sicurezza" ha spiegato Jiabao. Che poi ha aggiunto: "Parlando francamente, sono veramente un po' preoccupato. Quindi riconfermo la nostra richiesta che l'America mantenga la parola data, rispetti le promesse e garantisca la sicurezza dei capitali cinesi".
I timori del mercato obbligazionari sono forse esagerati, visto che è improbabile che Pechino voglia togliere il terreno da sotto i piedi a Obama proprio in un momento così delicato, iniziando a liquidare le proprie posizioni. Ma il sostegno cinese non è privo di costi, anzitutto politici, con Pechino che è tornata a reagire duramente alle proteste occidentali a favore del Tibet e del rispetto dei diritti umani al suo interno, nonché a rinnovare la richiesta affinchè gli Usa per primi (ma anche l'Europa) cessino il loro sostegno a Taiwan, a sua volta considerata parte della "madre patria" e dunque un affare interno in cui gli altri stati non debbono mettere il naso.
Oltre a questi costi c'è poi da stare certi che Pechino utilizzerà la leva dell'eventuale sostegno alle economie in maggiori difficoltà per ottenere nuove aperture commerciali e regole più favorevoli alle proprie esportazioni. Non è certo una prospettiva rassicurante, ma al punto in cui siamo non paiono esservi molte alternative se non quelle di trovare un compromesso che possa non scontentare troppo nessuno, nell'attesa di nuove regole capaci di ridefinire anche la gestione della globalizzazione economica.
Luca Spoldi

Mah: intanto le decine di milioni di operai cinesi licenziati ci sono già.Attorno a dicembre c'erano scene da film nelle stazioni (assalto ai treni che ritornavano alle campagne); Riguardo alle esportazioni di Pechino: il discorso relativo ad evitare il protezionismo a mio avviso deve essere inteso come la richiesta dell'America affinchè venga sostenuto l'export cinese ovvero i loro introiti che sostengono a loro volta gli usa.Il cane che si morde la coda.
Come detto a diverse riprese esiste un surplus mondiale di produzione ed è un problema che volenti o nolenti si dovrà presto o tardi affrontare.. ho letto sul sole giovedi o venerdi che chi ha l'industria ripartirà prima,vero o meglio probabilmente sarà cosi'.
Ma è anche vero che nel suo complesso fatto salvo poche cose l' industria occidentale è malata: è oberata di carichi fiscali, di costi , che la rendono ben poco competitiva nei confronti di altre realtà.Quindi si foraggia un sistema tendenzialmente malato con molti impianti obsoleti che nn sono stati tenuti in efficenza e/o sostituiti, ammodernati perchè si punta oramai ad altre aree del pianeta; in altre parole si ripartirà senza avere risolto i problemi ma solo spostati in là.
Ho letto anche del problema sociale rappresentato dalla mancanza di una assistenza sociale cinese: nn ne sono informato, magari in un prox viaggio ne farò tesoro di questo suggerimento; però si puo'0 dire fin da ora che conoscendo un po' il loro modo di vedere le cose...come dire? nn credo che per loro sia un problema.

 

[yellow]

Se vogliono davvero spingere sul mercato interno, oltre alla realizzazione delle infrastrutture, i cinesi devono anche sostenere il consumo interno...

Ma per farlo, serve il passaggio da un capitalismo selvaggio (fa ridere pensare questo di uno stato formalmente comunista, ma tant'è... ) ad una economia sociale di mercato.

Voglio dire: se in Cina non c'è un sistema previdenziale pubblico ed i cinesi sono costretti oramai da qualche decennio alla politica del figlio unico, come ci si aspetta che i cinesi non risparmino forsennatamente ?

Nella cultura cinese c'è il l'elemento per cui sono i figli a mantenere i genitori quando questi cessano di lavorare, ma oggi "i figli" non ci sono più: c'è "il figlio" che magari ha già problemi di suo...

Il varo di un sistema pensionistico pubblico potrebbe indurre i cinesi a risparmiare in maniera un po' meno forsennata, potendo confidare in una fonte di sostentamento certa dopo la cessazione dell'attività lavorativa.

Concordo, hai sottolineato un fattore non secondario
per promuovere un futuro incremento dei consumi interni.

Stamane M.Faber :

Bloomberg.com
Buy China, Emerging Markets Over 2 Years, Faber Says

China and other emerging markets offer value over the next two years as growth picks up, investor Marc Faber said.
Investors should buy stocks and other assets in China after the market falls to its 2008 low to profit from an expected recovery,
Faber said in an interview with Bloomberg Television.
China is the world’s best-performing stock market this year.
........................................................................................................

Stock markets are "not particularly expensive" and investors should consider buying them in anticipation of a recovery,
Faber advised. The MSCI global index is valued at 11 times reported earnings,
half its 10-year average multiple of 22.

 

[Imark]

A chi sono andati i soldi delle iniezioni di liquidità in AIG ? Per tramite dei pagamenti effettuati su CDS e quant'altro, quei soldi hanno fornito liquidità alle banche di mezzo mondo...


AIG details $105 billion in payouts

Cash used to cover collateral payments, wind down derivatives contracts

By Sam Mamudi & Simon Kennedy, MarketWatch
Last update: 9:22 a.m. EDT March 16, 2009


NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- American International Group revealed on Sunday details of $105 billion of government funds that it paid to U.S. and international banks including Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Societe Generale.

The cash paid to AIG's so-called counterparties was used to cover collateral payments, cancel derivatives contracts and meet obligations at its securities lending business.

Now majority-owned by the government, AIG has received more than $170 billion in bailout funds to keep it in operation since mid-September, when it found itself on the verge of collapse.

Most of the leading U.S. and European banks were represented on the list of recipients of AIG payouts. Goldman Sachs Group got the biggest single total, receiving $12.9 billion.

Bank of America Corp. and brokerage subsidiary Merrill Lynch together received $12 billion, followed by Societe Generale, which took $11.9 billion, and Deutsche Bank, on the receiving end of $11.8 billion.

Payments to municipalities totaled another $12.1 billion.

"AIG recognizes the importance of upholding a high degree of transparency with respect to the use of public funds," the company said in a statement.
AIG had previously argued that disclosing the identity of counterparties could damage its business relationships or cause competitive harm, but it's come under increasing pressure from lawmakers to provide details.

Counterparty payouts

AIG said that between Sept. 16 and Dec. 31, it paid out $22.4 billion in collateral related to credit default swaps, or CDS. Such swaps are essentially insurance policies on a company's debt in case it were to default.

The largest recipient of these payouts was France's Societe Generale, which received $4.1 billion, while Germany's Deutsche Bank received $2.6 billion and Goldman Sachs took $2.5 billion. Merrill Lynch and Bank of America got, between them, $2 billion.

Over the same period, the insurer paid $43.7 billion to securities lending counterparties. Chief among these was U.K.-based Barclays PLC, which received $7 billion. Deutsche Bank got $6.4 billion, as did the combination of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch.

Another $27.1 billion went for payouts made to cancel some CDS contracts. The top recipients of these monies were Societe Generale and Goldman Sachs, who received $6.9 billion and $5.6 billion, respectively. See AIG's disclosures in full.

The remainder of the $173 billion of taxpayer money that AIG has received has been used to repay debt, boost capital levels at some of its units and fund vehicles created to wind down its derivatives contracts.

AIG's shares, once part of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, have fallen more than 99% from their peak early in 2007.

The announcement over bailout payments came after the company became embroiled in a row over bonus payments to employees at AIG Financial Products, the unit largely responsible for its near collapse last year.

The decision to pay around $450 million in bonuses elicited howls of protest in Washington.

Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., the powerful chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, called on the government to examine whether the bonuses can be legally recovered

 

[stockuccio]

A chi sono andati i soldi delle iniezioni di liquidità in AIG ? Per tramite dei pagamenti effettuati su CDS e quant'altro, quei soldi hanno fornito liquidità alle banche di mezzo mondo...


.....

tutta colpa di Cassano ... no ... non il pibe de Bari http://www.cobraf.com/forum/coolpost.php?topic_id=6063&reply_id=149300