Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi (3 lettori)

negusneg

New Member
Nessuno che parla della notizia della giornata? :D

U.S. Stocks Gain, 10-Year Treasury Yields Fall Most Since 1962

By Cristina Alesci and Daniel Kruger

March 18 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. stocks and Treasuries surged and the dollar tumbled after the Federal Reserve unexpectedly announced plans to buy $1 trillion of bonds in an effort to lower consumer borrowing costs and end the recession.
The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index added 2.1 percent, extending its rally since last week’s 12-year low to 17 percent. Yields on 10-year notes dropped the most since at least January 1962 after the central bank said it will spend $300 billion buying Treasury debt and up to another $750 billion on bonds backed by government-controlled mortgage companies. The dollar sank the most against the euro since September 2000.
“This is a huge step,” said Thomas Girard, who helps manage $115 billion in fixed-income securities with New York Life Investment Management in New York. “It’s a draw the line in the sand-type of event.”
The S&P 500 rose to 794.35 at 4 p.m. in New York and earlier surpassed 800 for the first time in a month. The stock index trimmed its 2009 loss to 13 percent. Yields on benchmark 10-year notes plunged 0.50 percentage point to 2.51 percent. The dollar depreciated as much as 3.3 percent to $1.3493 per euro.
Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is trying to bolster housing and hasten the end of the 14-month U.S. recession. He stepped up efforts after unemployment increased to 8.1 percent and economists forecast the economy will shrink through the middle of the year. Fed officials also kept the benchmark interest rate at between zero and 0.25 percent to combat the “weak” short- term economic outlook, according to a statement today.
‘Big Positive’
“This is definitely a big positive,” said Noman Ali, a Toronto-based money manager at MFC Global Investment Management whose group manages $20 billion of U.S. equities. “This will bring down the risk premium and interest rates for corporate borrowers as well. That helps credit growth and hopefully helps turn the economy.”
Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. each jumped more than 22 percent, leading a gauge of financial shares in the S&P 500 to a 10 percent rally and the highest level in a month. The index has surged 54 percent since March 6.
The central bank also said it will consider expanding the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, meant to unfreeze business and consumer lending, to include “other financial assets.”
The Fed’s announcement was “good old-fashioned ‘shock and awe,’” said Scott Simon, the head of mortgage-bond investing at Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond manager. “It’s certainly going to get mortgage rates even lower.”
Record Lows
Treasuries had lost investors 3.4 percent since December, on course for the worst three-month period since the third quarter of 1980, when they fell 5.06 percent, according to a Merrill Lynch & Co. index. Investor concern about rising supplies of debt and gains in equities depressed prices, pushing yields up from record lows in the fourth quarter.
Thirty-year bond yields fell to a record low of 2.509 percent on Dec. 18, less than three weeks after Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke first mentioned the option of buying Treasuries. Yields climbed to as high as 3.84 percent earlier today.
Strategists at primary dealers UBS AG, Bank of America Corp., Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. had forecasted that central bank policy makers wouldn’t provide plans to purchase U.S. debt.
‘Powerful Bullet’
“We thought it was a lower-probability event but we always knew that if the Fed did use this clearly powerful bullet it would cause a huge drop in yields,” said Suvrat Prakash, an interest-rate strategist in New York at BNP Paribas Securities Corp., another primary dealer.
Yields on 10-year Treasury notes rose 33 basis points in the two days after the last policy meeting Jan. 28, when the Federal Open Market Committee said the central bank might buy longer-term Treasuries to revive lending but gave no further details.
“It is something the Fed needs to do to help the economy,” said David Coard, head of fixed-income trading in New York at Williams Capital Group, a brokerage for institutional investors. “It’s wonderful for Treasuries.”
During World War II, the central bank agreed to purchase unlimited amounts of government obligations from banks to keep interest rates low to finance the war, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
 

stockuccio

Guest
con quelli di oggi a quanto siamo arrivati ? 13000 miliardi ?
... oliare bene le rotative ... facciamo centomila miliardi e non se ne parli più ... tanto i dollari li compreranno felici e giulivi i cinesi :lol::lol:

azz ... avevo scritto Nouriel minuscolo ... un errore imperdonabile e immeritato ... davanti a un grande come Lui mi inchino volentieri

WheelbarrowBen.JPG
 

stockuccio

Guest
..but what if the debt today is already too big???
Simple!
You eliminate it. Poof! You shall see. The FASB has already started working this magic. By allowing corporations to write down their debts on level 3 assets, you are seeing the back door to this "disappearing man in the box" routine.


Evaporflation

Rich Hartmann - Miss America | Mar 18, 2009
Today I will argue that the standard measures by which we assess our economic health no longer apply to our current situation. The most common terms "Inflation" & "Deflation" are based on the general price level of goods and services. Inflation is the increase in price, thus limiting the purchase power of your money. Deflation is the decrease in price, and increase in purchasing power. My argument is that the general price level of goods and services is temporarily not price-able, and the purchasing power of all currencies is unknown due to due to the lack of transparency of overall credit and debt at all levels of the economy (from Countries and Governments through companies and households) due to known and unknown variables and their known and unknown ripple effects. The broad systemic risk of commingled good/toxic assets in the globally interconnected financial world has now limited the ability to accurately measure factual and fictional wealth based on fusion of such infinite variables of destruction. In addition, the unknown levels of wealth creation, extraction and destruction, coupled with actual consumption leave us with a decreasing denominator in relation to the increasing nominator of debt. As we teeter on the edge of an economic abyss, pricing goods like an automobile becomes impossible. The factory says it cost $18,000 to produce. The retailer said it costs $25,000 to move. The buyer, based on the current status of the market, their employment, and the availability of credit will be willing to pay between $0 - $25,000 for the automobile. This is obvious and has always been the case, but unlike past situations, when the person walked out without buying the car, there was the assumption that someone else will walk in and buy it. That pricing mechanism is based on the fact that there will be a buyer to finance the cars production, and their purchase would fall somewhere between that $18,000 - $25,000 range. Depending on the strength or severity of the economy, that price level (inflation/deflation) would be found. That is not the case anymore! In the current environment, there are many more cases where there is no bid at all. The new price model needs to include $0 - $25,000
For that same reason, hedge commodities are sitting on a plateau where they could either fall off the cliff, or shoot to the sky. Oil sits at $40-45 with the risk of dropping to the $20's and the risk of rocketing to $200 a barrel. Gold sits at $900, with a $2,000+ ceiling and a sub $500 basement. Milk and Orange Juice may be $4, or they may be $20? At the same time, the purchasers of all goods and services are sitting on the brink of having an income, house and various other assets or having nothing at all except existing debt obligations.
With that said, how do you price a CDO? How do you price GM? How do you price the USD? How do you price a house? How do you price a car? How do you price eggs?
At the moment, we have economic history pricing goods and services since there is no transparency, confidence or consistency to attain current supply/demand price. Without these factors secured, all you have is a risky wager that borders on being an extremely explosive or implosive bet that could play itself out in a couple of days time. That kind of volatility leaves us stabbing at prices that are nothing better then guesses based on dogmatic review rather then the actual consumer's current reality. Those kinds of shocks don’t bring about the price discovery that supply and demand in a capitalist market would accurately set.
Evaporflation, Vaporflation and Condenflation occur when natural economic factors like inflation and deflation meet with such an immense artificial force, that direction of price and purchase power become temporarily unattainable. They can be immeasurable due to the ambiguity of the calculating factor of: time of creation, synthetic composition, velocity and size.
Evaporflation - is the disappearance of debt, or increase of credit to bring about a net debt reduction. (Disappearing debt also brings about the destruction of credit creation) It occurs as there is an increase in the difference between overall credit/cash/liquidity in relation to the overall debt obligations at a rate where the difference grows at a perpetual rate of motion. Through debt reductions and credit infusions, the pressure on the economic system can be vented in a manipulated fashion. If obstructed or without a large enough release valve, Evaporflation will lead to Vaporflation.
Vaporflation - is the rapid disappearance of debt, or increase of credit to bring about a net debt reduction. It is hyper inflationary and hyper deflationary. It can easily lead to combustion during the venting process and if not contained would lead to a complete meltdown / collapse.
The difference between Evaporflation and Vaporflation is the level at which the debt outpaces the credit. If debt outpaces credit beyond the sustainable levels of vaporflation, we will reach combustion (collapse). We have seen some of the early bailout packages (venting) combust. Bear Stearns, Lehman, and the first $350billion from Bush/Paulson bailout are samples of combustion during the venting process. Recapitalization, cannibalism, and self preservation absorbed all available liquidity, thus vaporizing institutions or programs that had nowhere to sit when the music stopped.
Whenever there is a large decrease in overall wealth being met with less then needed reduction of overall debt obligations, no reduction of debt obligations, or an increase in debt obligations in relation to the overall credit/cash/liquidity it would lead to either evaporflation or vaporflation rather inflation or deflation. This is why we have not seen any favorable direction in inflation or deflation. The reason for this anomaly is due to the fact that the lead up to the crisis was also misdiagnosed. What preceded this was a phenomenon called: Condenflation.
Condenflation – Is the self propulsion or positive feedback loop of credit creation through debt, where un-vented credit does not accurately reflect the actual inflation/hyperinflation of the credit cycle, due to the offsetting (real) long term debt. This can be and was attained through fractional reserve banking, leverage and unregulated markets meeting with the giant pools of liquidity and the circular loop of alchemy that led to more credit creation without yet another venting of inflation. The recycling of fractional reserves and leverage went well beyond their intended safe levels as the ratio of risk became immeasurable, and small shocks could lead to systemic risk due to cross pollinating and counterparty risk.
Ill transparent markets acted like a pressure cooker. Liquidity/credit became trapped (unable to inflate) in a system that was not letting the vapor escape. The gradual release of this pressure would've deflated overheated markets (that were severely understating the short term credit/gain, and long term loss/debt) where an equilibrium of loss and gain could have been attained (and thus contained.) ...but instead, a collusive cycle between Financial, Political, and Media outlets was born for short tem profit. The short term upside became so easily attainable for the malfeasant, that the downside risks falsely appeared to be non existent. The trap itself, became self propelling through manipulation, greed, and misguided confidence. The false sense of confidence permeated every country, market, and home where the expectation of gains bordered on entitlement, and created a temporary self fulfilling loop.
On the upswing, the liquidity in the markets pressure cooker had gone well beyond the boiling point. Real inflation was being severely understated as it did not weigh the short term credit versus long term debt properly. Redemptions, consumption, poor investment decisions, excess and larceny started to finally extract the credit (liquidity/liquid) from the pressure cooker. (The release of pressure was never properly reflected in the inflationary upswing so disinflation did not occur in the release.) When the markets pressure cooker reached what appeared to be a saturation point, (equilibrium) it was too late to realize that this was not the actual case. The unrealized exit of liquidity, coupled with the growing wave of debt obligations led to the immediate downside pressure of evaporflation (which was happening on the surface) and vaporflation (which was occurred beneath the surface). This pressure needed a release valve. Subprime became that escape!
Within the “pressure cooker” analogy, the size of the pressure cooker has grown (debt), and there is less liquid (credit) in the pot. The pressure (the actual “pressure” is “the market” i.e. supply/demand, inflation/deflation, etc…) continues to build at an accelerating rate as there was less “liquid” in the pressure cooker, and the pressure cooker’s surface area continued to grow (which lead to a point beyond boiling) The stimulus plans, rate cuts, TARP, etc have added little bits of liquid to the pot, keeping us from vaporflation, but leave us in the current unique phase of evaporflation. The attempt to saturate the market, and reach equilibrium will be better achieved when a larger batch of liquid is poured in, and the size of the pot is reduced.
With that said, the size and scale of artificial economic forces that we have created, was overlooked and underestimated which has left the price discovery mechanism flawed. …thus technically (and in reality), leaving the natural forces of inflation and deflation directionless as their driving forces (the price of goods and services, and purchase power) are inaccurate.
The rest is present history.
All the best, Miss America
p.s. Ironic… in true scientific form, the “solid” that housing has always been through sub prime (sublimation) has vaporized that solid to a gas!
p.p.s. Back when I started working on this theory in July and August, I had already concluded that bailouts would be a forgone conclusion. In addition, I sighted the future FASB mark to market adjustments that would take place, along with netting CDS (pair offs) for debt write downs, the flight to USD (which was at 70% value against the base basket) and the principal reduction plan. (which has been partly enacted) Attached is the post: By Miss America on 2008-08-08 16:26:31
“The whole debt forgiveness thing is part of my Evapor-flation theory. (Sorry to keep beating people over the head with this) Likewise, I threw this together rather quick, so it's not my best work. Today's situation is unique. People try to draw historic parallels that don't have true comparable variables. You've got: · Inflation Camps · Deflation Camps · Stagflation Camps · Reflation Camps · Disinflation Camps · Hyperinflation Camps · Stagnation Camps
Within these camps, you have people that follow: · Keynesian · Austrian · NeoClassic · ACME theory.
None of it is invalid. ...in fact, it's all valid. .but no theory or camp, can account for the seen and unseen variable that now confront us. It will be a combination of many "flations" that we see, rooted from the base worldwide currency.
What we have today is unique for new reasons: · The base currency that rules the land is the USD (which is ground zero for the problem) · The debt ratio has gained a perpetual self fulfilling momentum · The flight to safety is also the USD (through the US Gov't) · The flight to commodities is all priced in USD! · The US Markets (through Counterparty Risk) have created the ultimate safety net · The USD markets have become Globalized and so interwoven with every country · that their downward spiral affects EVERYONE! (this list goes on quite longer.)
..but yet, the population grows. ..and needs more food ..more shelter ..more jobs ..and more credit ..and more debt
..but what if the debt today is already too big???
Simple!
You eliminate it. Poof! You shall see. The FASB has already started working this magic. By allowing corporations to write down their debts on level 3 assets, you are seeing the back door to this "disappearing man in the box" routine. (The FASB has allowed this as the counterbalance to writing down their assets on level 3 assets. BUT IT'S NOT!!! .and that's the beauty.) In much the same way, as these corporations take back auction rate bonds back onto their books, they will also mark up, their write down of overall debt.
Eventually, in round robin fashion, you will see the off balance sheet debt being paired off against other counterparty debt to eliminate overall debt. Debt will evaporate. It has already started. It is the only answer for a debt that can't be paid. Sorta like Chapter 11, it's a restructuring that's going on.
This, along with many other smaller factors are where I come to my Evapor-flation call! (years from now, you can say you heard it here first)
Personally, instead of these stimulus plans that will help mask this evaporation (by adding money to replace evaporated money) I'd rather see some sort of public write down of debt. (Something like: an across the board 10% principal reduction of all home loans. This puts extra money in the consumer's pockets on a monthly basis. This enables them to make more payment on mortgages, and pay more taxes, which trickles up to the government. .whom can then use that additional cash flow to keep bailing out the TPTB that made the bad loans in the first place. Where we're at now, the Gov't is going to keep bailing out the corporation regardless. so why not start at the bottom, and trickle up.)”
 

yellow

Forumer attivo
Della serie " non si è mai finito di imparare ", arriva la risposta a Krugman da parte di L.Bini Smaghi,

che devo dire appare puntuale, precisa, circostanziata e nella sostanza condivisibile :

Ecco perché Krugman sbaglia sull’euro, di Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

19 Marzo 2009 - Fonte La Repubblica

CARO direttore, sono rimasto sorpreso dall’articolo di Paul Krugman pubblicato su Repubblica di martedì scorso,
nel quale si avanza l’ipotesi che l’Europa abbia commesso un errore dieci anni fa nell’adottare l’euro.

Il motivo è che l’area dell’euro non si è ancora dotata della capacità istituzionale di reagire a una crisi profonda come quella che stiamo attraversando, e così rischia di avere la peggio.

Le affermazioni contenute nell’articolo non sono sostenute dall’evidenza empirica.

Capisco l’esigenza di essere sintetici, e di non annoiare i lettori con troppe cifre, ma bisogna evitare di incappare in gravi imprecisioni.

Cerchiamo di fare chiarezza.


Cominciamo dalla politica fiscale, dove secondo Krugman l’Europa, in confronto agli Stati Uniti, non è stata in grado di avviare una politica di rilancio adeguata.

Secondo le stime recenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, l’impulso fiscale dei paesi europei è nell’insieme paragonabile a quello americano,
soprattutto se si tiene conto degli ammortizzatori sociali che,
diversamente dagli Stati Uniti, in Europa sono importanti.

Ad esempio, per il biennio 20092010 le misure discrezionali adottate in Germania sommano al 3,5% del Prodotto lordo, contro il 3,8% degli Stati Uniti.

In alcuni paesi europei, come l’Italia, l’impulso è limitato, a causa del debito elevato, ma in altri l’espansione fiscale complessiva è superiore a quella degli Stati Uniti.


L’impressione che gli Stati Uniti abbiano fatto di più può nascere dai successivi pacchetti finanziari varati a sostegno del sistema bancario americano,
che ne ha però maggior bisogno di quello europeo.

In termini di stimolo alla domanda aggregata,
invece,
le differenze non sono ampie.


Passando alla politica monetaria, quello che conta per valutare il grado di espansione è il confronto tra i tassi d’interesse di mercato, non quelli ufficiali.

Tale confronto evidenzia che i tassi europei sono sostanzialmente in linea con quelli in vigore negli Stati Uniti, e in alcuni casi addirittura inferiori.

Ad esempio i tassi interbancari con scadenza a 6 e 12 mesi sono più bassi da questa parte dell’Atlantico, di 20 e 30 punti base, rispettivamente.

Se si considerano i tassi d’interesse reali, cioè al netto dell’inflazione,
i tassi interbancari europei sono nettamente più bassi di quelli americani.

I tassi praticati dal sistema bancario sui mutui o sui prestiti alle imprese sono sostanzialmente allineati,e in alcuni casi sono più bassi in Europa.


Guardando poi all’operatività della banca centrale,
dopo l’iniziale immissione di liquidità per oltre 90 miliardi di euro,
nell’agosto del 2007,
il bilancio della Bce è progressivamente aumentato di circa 600 miliardi di euro, raggiungendo una dimensione pari al 16% del Pil
(contro il 13% della Riserva federale americana).

Con una differenza, però.


I finanziamenti della Bce al sistema bancario sono erogati contro garanzie, cosicché i rischi per i contribuenti europei sono minimizzati.


Secondo Krugman il fatto che la Bce non abbia alle sue spalle un governo che copra eventuali perdite le impedisce di essere più “temeraria”.


Questa visione presuppone che debbano essere i contribuenti a pagare, con la tassa dell’inflazione, le difficoltà del sistema bancario.


Non sono sicuro che tale visione rifletta la volontà popolare negli Stati Uniti.


Di certo non è il caso dei paesi dell’euro.


La tesi di Krugman, in sintesi, è che in una situazione di crisi è meglio avere una sola autorità decisionale, come negli Stati Uniti, piuttosto che 16 governi diversi che hanno difficoltà a coordinarsi,
come nel caso dell’area dell’euro.


La tesi sembra ragionevole, in teoria.

Ma non è in grado di spiegare ;):down:come mai la decisione più devastante di questi ultimi mesi - quella di lasciar fallire una banca di importanza sistemica in piena crisi finanziaria -
sia stata presa proprio laddove c’era una sola autorità in carica,
mentre in Europai 16 governi dell’area dell’euro sono riusciti ad evitare un tale errore.


Non è in grado di spiegare come mai i 16 governi dell’area dell’euro siano riusciti in questi mesi ad accordarsi sulle politiche da mettere in atto per ricapitalizzare il sistema bancario,
per garantire i finanziamenti a medio termine e per rimuovere i titoli tossici dai bilanci bancari,
decisioni che sono diventate punto di riferimento per il G-20.


Krugman conclude che se paesi come la Spagna non avessero adottato l’euro oggi starebbero meglio.

Di nuovo, in teoria l’idea di poter svalutare la propria moneta può sembrare attraente.

In realtà, quando il commercio internazionale si contrae e i mercati finanziari dubitano delle monete più deboli,
lo strumento della svalutazione rischia di peggiorare la fiducia degli operatori, aggravando ulteriormente la crisi economica e finanziaria.

L’esperienza italiana del 1992-93 lo conferma.


Krugman dovrebbe farsi un giro nei paesi europei che non hanno l’euro,
e che vorrebbero averlo rapidamente,
per rendersi conto che talvolta c’è una notevole discrepanza tra la teoria dei libri di testo e la realtà dei fatti concreti.


Nessuno sostiene che tutto è perfetto in Europa, al contrario.


Bisogna continuare a rafforzare il processo di integrazione e migliorare il coordinamento delle politiche economiche e finanziarie.


Basandosi però su ciò che è stato costruito finora, in particolare l’euro.

L’autore è membro del Comitato Esecutivo della Banca Centrale Europea. Fonte La Repubblica
 

piergj

Forumer attivo
Condivido quanto affermato in Italia...

...punto per punto....sicuramente di può fare di più ma fino ad ora gli Americani stan facendo più errori che altro.

basta vedere la decisione di Procumo e C. sui premi dirigenziali e quanto accaduto in Usa col caso Aig - tesoro.

Alcune volte non è da valutare la teoria ma come si mettono in pratica le cose. L'iniezione di fiducia che può dare l'atto avviato dal banchiere italiano è infinitamente più grande della massa di dollari stampati per sostenere i T-Bond .

A costo zero.

Anche quella di pensare, ancora, che la svalutazione sia l'unica maniera di esportare e risollevare le sorti industriali di un paese, mi sembra una idea vecchia e poco aderente alle reali conseguenze che vivrebbe una nazione con una moneta in balìa dei mercati. Ricordo bene il 92-93.

Ancora : L'espansione del bilancio fed senza collateral è una bomba ad orologeria, già non mi fido dei titoli dati alla BCE, figuriamoci non avere nulla in cambio o comunque categorie ancor più infime di titoli sub-prime.

E poi gli ammortizzatori sociali europei sono decisamente più ampli di quelli (da creare) americani.

C'è qualche cosa che mi sfugge. Forse Krugman si riferisce all'impasse che c'è stata sui singoli interventi in favore dell'industria. Che è stata affrontata, singolarmente, da ogni paese.....

Non lo sò...ma come mai attacca l'europa? han paura che un Euro forte possa attrarre i cinesi? la loro paura è forse che il Dollaro ricada ad 1,60 contro Euro.

Perchè sappiamo che la loro intenzione è , di nuovo, questa. stampare biglietti verdi a più non possso. ed una europa che sbaglia, a loro farebbe comodo.

mah !

PJ
 

yellow

Forumer attivo
...punto per punto....sicuramente di può fare di più ma fino ad ora gli Americani stan facendo più errori che altro.

basta vedere la decisione di Procumo e C. sui premi dirigenziali e quanto accaduto in Usa col caso Aig - tesoro.

Alcune volte non è da valutare la teoria ma come si mettono in pratica le cose. L'iniezione di fiducia che può dare l'atto avviato dal banchiere italiano è infinitamente più grande della massa di dollari stampati per sostenere i T-Bond .

A costo zero.

Anche quella di pensare, ancora, che la svalutazione sia l'unica maniera di esportare e risollevare le sorti industriali di un paese, mi sembra una idea vecchia e poco aderente alle reali conseguenze che vivrebbe una nazione con una moneta in balìa dei mercati. Ricordo bene il 92-93.

Ancora : L'espansione del bilancio fed senza collateral è una bomba ad orologeria, già non mi fido dei titoli dati alla BCE, figuriamoci non avere nulla in cambio o comunque categorie ancor più infime di titoli sub-prime.

E poi gli ammortizzatori sociali europei sono decisamente più ampli di quelli (da creare) americani.

C'è qualche cosa che mi sfugge. Forse Krugman si riferisce all'impasse che c'è stata sui singoli interventi in favore dell'industria. Che è stata affrontata, singolarmente, da ogni paese.....

Non lo sò...ma come mai attacca l'europa? han paura che un Euro forte possa attrarre i cinesi? la loro paura è forse che il Dollaro ricada ad 1,60 contro Euro.

Perchè sappiamo che la loro intenzione è , di nuovo, questa. stampare biglietti verdi a più non possso. ed una europa che sbaglia, a loro farebbe comodo.

mah !

PJ


Sinceramente, pur condividendo nella sostanza Bini Smaghi,
che ha espresso un'ECCELLENTE controanalisi,
non credo assolutamente che le critiche di Krugman ( che seguo da oltre 10 anni ) nascondano secondi fini,
è oltre che un valente economista, una persona LIMPIDISSIMA
( che ha sempre goduto tra l'altro dell'amicizia e di massima considerazione da parte di:eek: P.Sylos Labini e di Modigliani ).

P.S Anche i grandi non sono immuni da imprecisioni
 

stockuccio

Guest
la mossa di Bernanke mi sembra indicativa di come pensano di pagare i debiti gli statunitensi ... ma veramente c'è ancora chi vuole comprare debito USA oltretutto con i recenti rendimenti da fame ? ... perchè non credo si tratti di una leggerissima iniezione 'temporanea' :)
 

yellow

Forumer attivo
occhio :

*BoE: comincera' ad acquistare bond societari da 25/3

;)La abbiniamo a questa :

MPS Capital Services


.............................................................................
l’Istituto ( FED ) acquisterà ulteriori 750Mld$ di Mbs garantiti da Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac
(portando il tetto massimo da 500 a 1.250Mld$)
ed aumenterà da 100 a 200Mld$ la quota di bond emessi direttamente dalle agenzie.

Ha aggiunto inoltre di considerare una possibile espansione del programma Talf,
allargando probabilmente ;)il range di asset finanziari accettati come collaterale.


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