Obbligazioni valute high yield CRISI RUSSIA/UCRAINA discussioni, notizie e operatività
camaleonte
Forumer storico
Russia in High-Stakes battaglia per un sistema monetario New Global
Bretton Woods si sta disintegrando sotto i nostri occhi
Cinese - mossa russa da sistema basato $ è reale questa volta
La Russia si sta muovendo proprio patrimonio in oro in previsione di sconvolgimento economico globale
Rublo a buon mercato è tonificante produzione nazionale russa, l'autosufficienza
La Russia è moralmente preparato per una lunga guerra economica, disposti a fare sacrifici"
Russian news: - Russia Insider
Bretton Woods si sta disintegrando sotto i nostri occhi
Cinese - mossa russa da sistema basato $ è reale questa volta
La Russia si sta muovendo proprio patrimonio in oro in previsione di sconvolgimento economico globale
Rublo a buon mercato è tonificante produzione nazionale russa, l'autosufficienza
La Russia è moralmente preparato per una lunga guerra economica, disposti a fare sacrifici"
Russian news: - Russia Insider
Jackrussel
Forumer storico
Molto interessante...ma anche assai poco rassicurante...
se facessero sul serio davvero, siamo proprio solo all'inizio
E che si fa ? si comprano lingotti ?
Myskin
Forumer stoico
New York, December 05, 2014 -- Absent a further substantial fall in oil prices, the Russian central bank's foreign exchange reserves (FXRs) are sufficient to cover the country's external debt obligations in 2015, says Moody's Investors Service in a report published today.
Moody's report, entitled "Foreign Exchange Reserves Decreasing but Sufficient to Cover 2015 External Debt Needs," is available on www.moodys.com. Moody's subscribers can access this report via the link provided at the end of this press release.
According to official data, the Bank of Russia (CBR)'s FXRs (as of 1 December 2014) are at USD361 billion. This is more than sufficient to cover the country's external debt payment obligations through 2015, which amount to roughly USD130 billion across government, banks and corporate debt, according to Moody's.
That assumption holds even when excluding the USD150 billion of FXRs counted as the central bank reserves that come from the government's two special savings Funds -- the National Wealth Fund (NWF) and Reserve Fund (RF). While these two Funds have specific mandates and are therefore unlikely to be used either to intervene in the foreign exchange market or to finance the government's external debt payments, like the CBR's own reserves, the amounts placed in the central bank contain liquid, marketable assets, that can be utilized if required.
Moody's assumes that in exceptional circumstances the government would be willing to authorize the use of the government's special Funds for paying external debt or other urgent priorities. The need for such action could arise if oil prices were to fall still further, eroding the current account surplus, or if there were a further escalation of tensions/international sanctions leading to a revival of capital flight at a higher pace, which would put additional pressure on the ruble.
The CBR's intention to cap daily interventions in the foreign exchange market (in principle to USD350 million per day, as announced in early November) should help preserve foreign currency reserves for debt servicing, although this decision is being tested by continued ruble volatility.
Moody's notes that, according to official data, central bank FX sales to support the ruble dropped from USD29 billion in October to around USD1 billion in November after the change in policy. Nonetheless, severe pressure on the ruble -- resulting from a steep fall in oil prices in the past week -- poses a significant challenge to the new exchange rate policy. As seen in recent days, the CBR will intervene more aggressively to support the ruble if it believes financial stability is threatened.
Furthermore, as long as the Ukraine crisis persists, Russian entities will have little or no access to foreign exchange on the capital markets, so Moody's expects that private and public companies' reliance on the central bank's reserves will eventually increase
Moody's report, entitled "Foreign Exchange Reserves Decreasing but Sufficient to Cover 2015 External Debt Needs," is available on www.moodys.com. Moody's subscribers can access this report via the link provided at the end of this press release.
According to official data, the Bank of Russia (CBR)'s FXRs (as of 1 December 2014) are at USD361 billion. This is more than sufficient to cover the country's external debt payment obligations through 2015, which amount to roughly USD130 billion across government, banks and corporate debt, according to Moody's.
That assumption holds even when excluding the USD150 billion of FXRs counted as the central bank reserves that come from the government's two special savings Funds -- the National Wealth Fund (NWF) and Reserve Fund (RF). While these two Funds have specific mandates and are therefore unlikely to be used either to intervene in the foreign exchange market or to finance the government's external debt payments, like the CBR's own reserves, the amounts placed in the central bank contain liquid, marketable assets, that can be utilized if required.
Moody's assumes that in exceptional circumstances the government would be willing to authorize the use of the government's special Funds for paying external debt or other urgent priorities. The need for such action could arise if oil prices were to fall still further, eroding the current account surplus, or if there were a further escalation of tensions/international sanctions leading to a revival of capital flight at a higher pace, which would put additional pressure on the ruble.
The CBR's intention to cap daily interventions in the foreign exchange market (in principle to USD350 million per day, as announced in early November) should help preserve foreign currency reserves for debt servicing, although this decision is being tested by continued ruble volatility.
Moody's notes that, according to official data, central bank FX sales to support the ruble dropped from USD29 billion in October to around USD1 billion in November after the change in policy. Nonetheless, severe pressure on the ruble -- resulting from a steep fall in oil prices in the past week -- poses a significant challenge to the new exchange rate policy. As seen in recent days, the CBR will intervene more aggressively to support the ruble if it believes financial stability is threatened.
Furthermore, as long as the Ukraine crisis persists, Russian entities will have little or no access to foreign exchange on the capital markets, so Moody's expects that private and public companies' reliance on the central bank's reserves will eventually increase
captain sparrow
Forumer storico
finchè non si vende prendendo il loss, la perdita è solo sulla carta. nel 2009, su $neozelandesi e australiani, perdevo 250 k. ho tenuto duro, anche se qualche notte in bianco l'ho fatta, e alla fine ho gainato un 40/50k fra capitale e differenza cambio. non disperiamodifatti, oramai anche se c'è una tregua in corso non importa più a nessuno
brutto fine anno comunquemi sono fumato k su k
camaleonte
Forumer storico
Sarebbe il caso a prescindere da tutto sto casino.
Sono del parere che come dice il detto: mai vendere la pelle dell'orso prima di averlo ammazzato e qui, hanno a che fare con l'orso russo. Non bisogna dimenticare che durante l'assedio di Leningrado, i russi, sono stati capaci di resistere per 900 giorni, pertanto se dovessero capitolare, sarebbero disposti a tutto.
camaleonte
Forumer storico
Angela Merkel: l'Europa vuole avere buoni rapporti con la Russia - Notizie - Politica - La Voce della Russia
Come spesso accade di leggere, a seconda delle circostanze fa dichiarazioni contraddittorie.
Sarei curioso di vedere la sua reazione e degli altri burocrati europei, in caso di chiusura dei rubinetti del gas da parte della Russia o, le sanzioni sono lecite in senso univoco...?
Come spesso accade di leggere, a seconda delle circostanze fa dichiarazioni contraddittorie.
Sarei curioso di vedere la sua reazione e degli altri burocrati europei, in caso di chiusura dei rubinetti del gas da parte della Russia o, le sanzioni sono lecite in senso univoco...?
saverio1973
BOND SUB.
Se dall'incontro di domani non esce anche una minima cosa direi che si esce dalla russia IMHO
Spero senza perdite....
Perchè quelle riserve se vengono utilizzate per difendere il rublo ed anche per coprire il debito temo che nel giro di due anni sono esaurite.
Saluti
Myskin
Forumer stoico
report dell'altro giorno di Moody's
The oil price decline comes at an unfavourable time for Russia (Baa2 negative). The Russian currency has already been under
pressure due to increased capital outflows and an economic slowdown, exacerbated by economic sanctions from the EU, Japan
and the US. Furthermore, Russia faces increasing geopolitical event risks related to the crisis in Ukraine.
Even though a sharp drop in oil prices is a key credit risk for Russia given that around 50% of central government fiscal
revenues, 65% of exports and 17%-25% of GDP are linked to the energy sector, Russia’s susceptibility to oil price shocks has
nevertheless declined. This is due to a more flexible exchange rate, which lowers both fiscal and external vulnerability when
compared with the global financial crisis during which the central bank tried to defend a fixed exchange rate.
Russia's fiscal vulnerability has diminished because the currency depreciation induced by lower oil prices (via lower current
account inflows and larger capital account outflows) provides a natural hedge as it leads to higher oil-related revenues
denominated in local currency.
Furthermore, Russia’s fiscal rule reduces its vulnerability to falling oil prices because it triggers lower expenditures in future
years. During a transition to a budget based on lower oil prices and consequently lower expenditures, Russia would have the
ability to finance its budget gaps from its Reserve Fund.
External vulnerability has also declined as there is now a limited need for intervention in the foreign-exchange market by the
central bank to stabilize the exchange rate. This implies lower reserve losses and ultimately a higher cushion of foreign-exchange
reserves available to cover external obligations. Russia currently has $360 billion in foreign-exchange reserves which comfortably
cover total external repayments of $131 billion until the end of 2015. Furthermore, Russian banks are net external creditors,
while Russian corporates are net external debtors but have external buffers and are large foreign currency earners.
We do not expect an external liquidity crisis to materialize as a consequence of lower oil prices, even if they were to fall to $60/
barrel on a prolonged basis. At the same time, Russia’s external buffers are finite and external liquidity will become challenging
in 2016. In particular, risks to external liquidity currently relate to renewed capital flight and continued lack of access to
international capital markets due to the international sanctions, for which there is currently no end in sight.
*** un estratto della parte che riguarda la Russia, c'è anche il venezuela, da leggere
The oil price decline comes at an unfavourable time for Russia (Baa2 negative). The Russian currency has already been under
pressure due to increased capital outflows and an economic slowdown, exacerbated by economic sanctions from the EU, Japan
and the US. Furthermore, Russia faces increasing geopolitical event risks related to the crisis in Ukraine.
Even though a sharp drop in oil prices is a key credit risk for Russia given that around 50% of central government fiscal
revenues, 65% of exports and 17%-25% of GDP are linked to the energy sector, Russia’s susceptibility to oil price shocks has
nevertheless declined. This is due to a more flexible exchange rate, which lowers both fiscal and external vulnerability when
compared with the global financial crisis during which the central bank tried to defend a fixed exchange rate.
Russia's fiscal vulnerability has diminished because the currency depreciation induced by lower oil prices (via lower current
account inflows and larger capital account outflows) provides a natural hedge as it leads to higher oil-related revenues
denominated in local currency.
Furthermore, Russia’s fiscal rule reduces its vulnerability to falling oil prices because it triggers lower expenditures in future
years. During a transition to a budget based on lower oil prices and consequently lower expenditures, Russia would have the
ability to finance its budget gaps from its Reserve Fund.
External vulnerability has also declined as there is now a limited need for intervention in the foreign-exchange market by the
central bank to stabilize the exchange rate. This implies lower reserve losses and ultimately a higher cushion of foreign-exchange
reserves available to cover external obligations. Russia currently has $360 billion in foreign-exchange reserves which comfortably
cover total external repayments of $131 billion until the end of 2015. Furthermore, Russian banks are net external creditors,
while Russian corporates are net external debtors but have external buffers and are large foreign currency earners.
We do not expect an external liquidity crisis to materialize as a consequence of lower oil prices, even if they were to fall to $60/
barrel on a prolonged basis. At the same time, Russia’s external buffers are finite and external liquidity will become challenging
in 2016. In particular, risks to external liquidity currently relate to renewed capital flight and continued lack of access to
international capital markets due to the international sanctions, for which there is currently no end in sight.
*** un estratto della parte che riguarda la Russia, c'è anche il venezuela, da leggere
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