CRISI UCRAINA-GUERRA.POLITICA ETICA MORALE CONSIDERAZIONI RANDOM


... no comment...
ecco l'articolo

he gas is still flowing through the pipelines across Europe. The oil is still being unloaded at the refineries. And €800m a day is being sent straight to Moscow.
Germany and to a lesser extent Italy are effectively funding Vladimir Putin's brutal assault on Ukraine. Shelling of innocent civilians, mass rapes, and the destruction of whole cities is being financed by European consumers and industry.
True, Germany is debating cutting off the gas. It is setting targets for winding up the payments to Russia and exploring alternative supplies that would keep the lights switched on.
And yet for now it has decided the cost to German industry would be too high. That is completely unacceptable. If the Germans don't want to make that sacrifice, it is up to them. Yet there is no reason why the rest of the world should tolerate that. The moment is surely close for sanctions to be imposed on Germany.
Anyone buying German goods is funding the war – and while stopping energy imports would not end it immediately they would make it a lot shorter and save tens of thousands of innocent lives.
In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the UK, the United States, and of course the European Union have imposed round after round of sanctions. Yachts belonging to Putin’s corrupt gang of cronies have been seized in the ritzier resorts around the Mediterranean.
Football clubs have been put into trust to be sold to more acceptable owners. Some, but not all, of the Russian banks have been frozen out of the financial system, and, with a handful of shameful exceptions, most Western companies have closed down their operations in the country.
All of that will have a significant impact on the Russian economy. Its GDP is estimated to drop by 10pc to 20pc this year. That is going to cause real pain.
There is a gaping hole in the package, however, and it hardly takes a microscope to see it. Europe is still importing vast quantities of Russian gas, and to a lesser extent oil, with most of it flowing into Germany and Italy.

Even worse, the soaring price of natural gas since the invasion means the amount paid to Moscow has doubled in the last year. Europe is sending Putin a cheque for €800m (£662m) a day.
We can sequester yachts and cut off Netflix if we want to. And yet the blunt truth is that the regime in the Kremlin can simply shrug all that off.
There is still plenty of money to keep the economy going, and to finance even the catastrophic losses of men, machinery and ammunition suffered by an inept, poorly led Russian army. Only an immediate ban on Russian gas would make a real difference.
Here’s the problem, however. Germany has decided that would cause too much economic pain. There would be “social unrest”, according to the economy minister Robert Habeck.
There could be a catastrophic loss of competitiveness, according to the German chemicals industry, with major manufacturers warning that they might have to close plants for months.
An “emergency gas plan” drawn up in Berlin warns of potential rationing, and return to working from home, and offices and factories switching to three days a week. It is not, the government has concluded, worth the pain it would cause.
In reality, that is debatable. Plenty of independent assessments have concluded that even closing down Russian gas completely would cause only a mild recession. It might amount to 2pc or perhaps 3pc of output lost, and even that would be recovered in a year or so.

Germany is one of the richest societies in the world, and, at 60pc, has one of the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios, and could add 10 points to that to pay for the damage without anyone really noticing.
It would be less expensive than dealing with Covid-19. It is simply that the German government and its industrial leaders have decided it is not a price worth paying.
Germany is free to make that decision if it wishes, but there is no reason why the rest of the world should accept it. In effect, anyone buying German cars, chemicals, machine tools, or electrical equipment is paying for Russian gas. And that Russian gas is paying the soldiers shelling cities in Ukraine.
The solution? It is not hard to figure out. As more and more atrocities by Russian soldiers are uncovered, surely the moment has arrived to put sanctions on Germany as well.
That could work in a variety of different ways. There could be temporary tariffs imposed on Germany exports, with the money sent to Ukraine to pay for its war effort and to help the millions of refugees (admittedly, that would be illegal under EU law, but there would be nothing to stop the UK, US, Canada, Australia and many others).
We could impose a six-month ban on German exports, and keep extending it until the war was over, or the gas pipelines closed down. Alternatively, we could organise consumer boycotts. After all, anyone buying a new BMW or Volkswagen is indirectly paying for Putin’s army – a point worth keeping in mind when choosing a new car.
There wouldn’t be much of a cost. Sure, Germany is one of the world’s leading manufacturers. But we can buy cars from France, or Japan, and chemicals from South Korea or the US.
There is nothing it makes that can’t be relatively simply sourced elsewhere. The impact in Germany, however, would be dramatic. Cutting off the gas would hurt its industries. But so would not cutting off the gas.
In fact, the hit from keeping the pipes open would probably be worse. The equation would change dramatically.
True it wouldn't end the war overnight. Putin might struggle on with his failing campaign for a while. But it would shorten the war, save thousands of Ukrainian lives – and that is surely a step worth taking.
Related Topics
 
1650445679058.png
 
The Second Wave of the Russian Oil Shock Is Starting
Declining crude output identified by satellite imagery heralds a longer-lasting increase in oil prices.
Flaring.

Flaring.
Photographer: SOPA Images/LightRocket
By
Javier Blas
21 aprile 2022, 08:00 CEST
Listen to this article
4:36
Share this article

Follow the authors
headshot of Javier Blas

Javier Blas is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering energy and commodities. He previously was commodities editor at the Financial Times and is the coauthor of "The World for Sale: Money, Power, and the Traders Who Barter the Earth’s Resources." @JavierBlas

-17.04-3.35%
Open

The lights are dimming over the Russian oil industry – literally.

The Kremlin is doing its best to conceal the full impact of formal and informal energy sanctions after its invasion of Ukraine. But Moscow can’t hide from the satellites above Siberia that measure the amount of light its oilfields emit as unwanted gas is burned, or flared: The higher the production, the more flaring and the more light – and vice versa.

The flaring data, combined with anecdotal information from traders and leaks of official Russian statistics, suggest that eight weeks into the war, Moscow is finally succumbing to the impact of government-imposed penalties and companies’ self-sanctions. On average, Russian oil output is down 10% from its pre-war level.
Cliff Edge
Russian oil production has fallen sharply so far in April, with the monthly average heading to 10 million barrels a day, its lowest since September 2020

Sources: Bloomberg and OilX
April is forecast based on current production trends
More production losses are likely as Western refiners and traders walk away from Russia upon the expiry of supply contracts in coming weeks. The European Union is also considering baby steps to reduce its purchases of Russian oil, trying to find ways to sidestep German opposition to the measures. “We are currently developing smart mechanisms so that oil can also be included in the next sanctions package," EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the Bild am Sonntag.

For consumers – and central banks in inflation-fighting mode – declining Russian production signals the beginning of a second, and likely longer lasting, wave of oil price increases. For Vladimir Putin, the stakes are even higher: revenue from oil and gas sales has so far helped cushion the blow of international sanctions, stabilizing the ruble and financing his military machine. A lasting decline in production that outweighs any price increase would be a longer-term headwind for Russia’s economy on top of the direct costs of the war.

The first phase of the oil-price shock from Putin’s invasion was as intense as it was brief. Russian output proved more resilient than expected; China’s Covid lockdowns reduced demand, and the U.S. and its allies released millions of barrels from their strategic petroleum reserves. Brent, the global oil benchmark, initially surged to $139.13 a barrel on March 7 in the first days of the Russian military campaign but retreated nearly 30% to a low of $97.57 a barrel by April 11.

The second phase is likely play out in slow motion over a longer period, risking more economic havoc. Brent crude has already climbed back to near $110 a barrel, and prices will probably rise gradually as the market absorbs the supply losses. Seasonal peak demand is still two-and-a-half months away, with the summer holiday period of the northern hemisphere, and retail gasoline prices are sure to climb.

Brent has averaged $99.20 a barrel so far this year. In 2008, when prices hit an all-time high, the average price year-to-date at this time of year was $98.40 a barrel. The only potential relief is bad economic news: a recession in the U.S. and Europe is the clearest obstacle to $100-plus oil.

Russian oil production is likely to drop further in coming months, judging by statistics from OilX, a consultancy that uses imaging data from NASA satellites to measure flaring. It estimates that output fell earlier this month to a low of 9.76 million barrels a day. On average, Russia pumped about 10.2 million barrels a day in the first two weeks of April. While the losses appear to have stabilized in recent days, April represents a big drop from the 11.1 million of February, before the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and the 11 million of March.

The behavior of the Russian oil companies themselves highlights the declining international demand for their product. State-controlled Rosneft PJSC is trying to sell millions of barrels of crude in Europe and Asia via tenders that close on Thursday. Typically, Rosneft sells via long-term deals with commodity traders like Vitol Group, Trafigura Group and Glencore Plc. But Western traders face a deadline of May 15 from the EU that restricts their dealings with Rosneft and several other Russian companies to “essential” activity needed to supply the EU. What essential means is open to interpretation, and for now many traders are simply reducing their dealings.

If the production losses so far in April continue and deepen in May, as many in the industry expect, the laws of supply and demand will take over. Oil markets are like the proverbial tanker: they take time to turn. But turning they are. And that means prices are heading higher, again.

More From Bloomberg Opinion:
  • The Frailty of Russia's Fortress Economy: Marques & Johnson
  • Russian Default Is a Question of When, Not If: Marcus Ashworth
  • An Oil Price Rally Is Bad. A Diesel Crisis Is Worse: Javier Blas

Want more from Bloomberg Opinion? Terminal readers head to OPIN <GO>. Web readers, click here.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Javier Blas at [email protected]
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
James Hertling at [email protected]


0 COMMENTS
Have a confidential tip for our reporters?
Get in touch

Before it's here, it's on the
Bloomberg Terminal
Learn more


LIVE ON BLOOMBERG
Watch Live TVListen to Live Radio



 


Ognuno si farà la sua idea... Conoscendo un po' i tedeschi

Io la mia ce l'ho... A, meno che non si siano trasformati... Ne dubito
Resto al momento ancora incredulo a vedere come "incassano"
:cool:

Non soldi
Ma cazzotti
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Alto