Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione mago gambamerlo
- Data di Inizio
FNAIOS
Aò
Ciao Zio...Secondo me che esca dall' UE, pochissime, per tutti i discorsi già fatti, primo fra tutti che sarebbe un forte segnale di debolezza.
Più che l'uscita dall'€ come diceva pure Tommy sarà difficile fare ingoiare a tutta Syrizia i "nuovi" accordi (ma prima degli accordi pure la trattativa) ed è quindi facilissimo che se vince Tspiras si apra una fase di forte instabilità politica (non vedo proprio come possa durare) con annessa volatilità.
Anche se riescono a fare politicamente numero.
Il problema è che nelle varie trattative si inizieranno a fare i salti mortali (probabilmente) con idee di trasferimenti di qua, passaggi di là...Capriole normative...Con conseguente aumentato rischio anche per i privati che si potrebbero trovare coinvolti in queste capriole.
Poi c'è il discorso BCE...Con il cannone (anche zoppo) approvato e pronto il contagio non dovrebbe più diffondersi e che la Grecia rimanga fuori dai mercati escluso per il loro equivalente dei nostri BOT, potrebbe non essere un problema (in questi giorni ne abbiamo avuto la prova).
Poi ci sono gli indici USA (ed Europei "pregiati") ai massimi dei massimi, contestualmente una totale decorrelazione con il petrolio e la Fed pronta a rialzare i tassi, mentre il sud europa ancora stenta.
Insomma non solo la Grecia, ma tutto il mercato è instabile, nel 2011 fu più semplice perché era crollato tutto insieme, quindi dove toccavi andavi in gain.
Adesso i segnali sono opposti e altri fenomeni (incluso quello greco) si sono completamente sganciati dal contesto.
ficodindia
Forumer storico
Se prevale la posizione europeista, ad esempio del vicepresidente del Parlamento europeo di Syriza Papadimoulis, (vedi Syriza: «La vera minaccia per l?Europa è l?austerità» | Linkiesta.it) non ci sarà default e quindi la probabilità che i nostri GGB siano rimborsati a 100 è elevata. Viceversa se prevale la posizione radicale di Syriza, posto che riesca ad ottenere la maggioranza assoluta, ci sarà il rifiuto unilaterale ad adempiere agli obblighi imposti dalla Troika e quindi la Grecia uscirà dall'euro e credo dall'UE ( vedi Entra nel vivo la campagna elettorale. Tsipras: ?giorno storico per la democrazia. Samaras: ?Grecia resta in UE? | euronews, mondo). Ma in quest'ultimo caso credo che Syriza sia destinato a disintegrarsi facendo cadere la Grecia nel caos.
Ultima modifica:
FNAIOS
Aò
Il titolo dell'articolo ok, poi se leggi vedi che come dice l'articolista ci vogliono nervi saldissimi almeno quanto la propria strategia (che potrebbe diventare proprio malgrado di lunghissimo periodo) con soldi bloccati per X anni e come unica prospettiva quella di andare in pari.
FNAIOS
Aò
Sì, ma lì si apre il problema dei "soldi bloccati" cioè si arriva in tribunale e anche lì i ggb restano bloccati X anni prima di un rimborso.
Magician
Forumer attivo
With Greece’s parliament failing to elect a President in the final round of voting, there will be new elections in January 2015. We run through the key points to watch for here, namely whether SYRIZA’s lead in opinion polls will continue to narrow, which parties will make it into parliament and the wildcard of former PM Mr Papandreou’s new party. In terms of Greek bonds, we remain highly cautious with political risk very high and ‘warnings’ from European policymakers likely to start to be aired more publically. ECB liquidity is safe for Greece until the end of February but we expect this to be used as part of the Troika’s negotiation strategy after the new government is elected.
Please click the link above for the full note.
New Greek elections: Sunday 25 January should be the election date, with both a governing coalition and new President needing to be decided upon ahead of a rush to seal a deal with the Troika before the deadline for the bailout extension at end February.
Greek political developments: We highlight key things to watch for. We focus on four key points, with the first two being the most critical:
(1) The likely emergence of a new political force on the left of Greece politics, led by former PM Mr Papandreou, which could take votes from SYRIZA and PASOK.
(2) Which political parties will meet the 3% threshold to enter parliament. Independent Greeks (ANEL) are the key here, particularly as they are potential SYRIZA coalition partners for SYRIZA.
(3) Will the public ‘punish’ anyone for new elections. Polls have consistently showed a majority against early elections; will new elections now hurt any party?
(4) Will the SYRIZA lead continue to narrow. Opinion polls show a steady but narrowing lead for SYRIZA but Mr Samaras preferred for economic competence and leadership. Will this gap narrow further?
Next for Greece: ECB liquidity safe until February but major headline risk now.
We see little reason for an imminent reversal of sentiment for Greek assets and expect further underperformance. ECB liquidity assured until end February but its withdrawal (of Greek government bond eligibility or potentially even ELA access) is likely to be a strong-arm negotiating tactic from the ECB as a member of the Troika in negotiations with the new government.
We think most scenarios of Greek Euro exit are over-simplistic and not our base case, however we think some “warnings” to the Greek political system of this risks of a confrontational negotiating strategy are likely to be forthcoming in the coming weeks from both domestic and European policymakers.
Fonte RBS
Please click the link above for the full note.
New Greek elections: Sunday 25 January should be the election date, with both a governing coalition and new President needing to be decided upon ahead of a rush to seal a deal with the Troika before the deadline for the bailout extension at end February.
Greek political developments: We highlight key things to watch for. We focus on four key points, with the first two being the most critical:
(1) The likely emergence of a new political force on the left of Greece politics, led by former PM Mr Papandreou, which could take votes from SYRIZA and PASOK.
(2) Which political parties will meet the 3% threshold to enter parliament. Independent Greeks (ANEL) are the key here, particularly as they are potential SYRIZA coalition partners for SYRIZA.
(3) Will the public ‘punish’ anyone for new elections. Polls have consistently showed a majority against early elections; will new elections now hurt any party?
(4) Will the SYRIZA lead continue to narrow. Opinion polls show a steady but narrowing lead for SYRIZA but Mr Samaras preferred for economic competence and leadership. Will this gap narrow further?
Next for Greece: ECB liquidity safe until February but major headline risk now.
We see little reason for an imminent reversal of sentiment for Greek assets and expect further underperformance. ECB liquidity assured until end February but its withdrawal (of Greek government bond eligibility or potentially even ELA access) is likely to be a strong-arm negotiating tactic from the ECB as a member of the Troika in negotiations with the new government.
We think most scenarios of Greek Euro exit are over-simplistic and not our base case, however we think some “warnings” to the Greek political system of this risks of a confrontational negotiating strategy are likely to be forthcoming in the coming weeks from both domestic and European policymakers.
Fonte RBS
Magician
Forumer attivo
BARCLAYS
·On the third and last round of the presidential election, the government coalition candidate, Mr. Stavros Dimas received 168 favorable votes out of a possible 300. This compares with 160 and 168 votes in the first and second rounds respectively (where a 200 vote majority was required). Thus, support for the government’s presidential candidate remains unchanged and below the required majority of 180.
·According to the Greek constitution, the Parliament now needs to be dissolved and general elections held. Today it was decided that they will take place on January 25. After that, if it transpires that a coalition government is required, extra time may be needed to facilitate its formation. We expect increased market volatility given the higher uncertainty about the potential election outcome and the policy stance of the new government, especially since Syriza has never been in government.
·Most recent polls have shown a steady picture with Syriza polling in first position. Although the gap between Syriza and New Democracy has tended to narrow in early December (compared with previous months), Syriza has consistently polled in first position since July this year (see Figure below). Based on these polls, we would expect Mr Tsipras’ party (ie, Syriza) to win the general elections. However, the polls also signal that Mr Tsipras would not be able to gather an absolute majority in Parliament, implying that he would have to seek coalition partner(s). We think that Syriza could form a government coalition with some members of PASOK, and/ or To Potami. An alternative scenario would be that Syriza decides to stay in opposition, particularly given that Greece has yet to pass the fifth programme review (to receive financing and before negotiating a precautionary line), which implies that the country will remain closely monitored by Troika. Our baseline scenario implies negative ramifications for the economy, for example, uncertainty would hurt confidence even excluding any effects from newly decided policies. From this perspective, we would welcome a quick resolution with elections held quickly and expediency in the event that a coalition is required.
·Regardless of whether Syriza decides to lead a government or stay in opposition, we think it is important to understand the party’s line on three key topics: EMU exit, Sovereign default and the Troika programme. Generally, we find that its stance on these issues has softened materially over the past couple of years.
·EMU exit: Syriza is clearly no longer calling for Greece to leave the euro area/EU.
·Sovereign default: Reuters reported (15 May 2014) that Mr Tsipras said that he would be keen to seek an international write-off of about one-third of Greece’s debt. Nonetheless, importantly, he added that he would prefer a consensus solution rather than using the option of a Greek default as a tool. In addition, more recently, The Financial Times (19 September 2014), cited Mr Tsipras as saying that eurozone countries should grant debt relief to Greece. He argued that the debt should be restructured into GDP-linked bonds, offering an incentive to other eurozone government to boost growth in Greece. Such a statement seems to be a progression from his initial proposal released in January 2014 (as he was gearing up for the EC presidency). In his 10-point manifesto, he notably called for a European debt conference. We think OSI remains a possibility for Greece, but not in the near term and only in the context of a successful completion of the programme and new conditionality for a new credit line from the ESM (and separate financial support from the IMF). We think an outright default remains unlikely although it cannot be entirely ruled out. Similar to an EMU exit, such an outcome would bring very significant financial stress, and Greece’s nascent recovery in growth and confidence would be reversed, particularly as the country remains highly dependent on external financing.
·Troika programme: Syriza has always strongly opposed “troika” intervention. Mr Tsipiras has recently softened his stance, limiting his opposition to the design of the current programme. In his 10-point programme, he notably called for an immediate end to austerity, suspending the new European fiscal framework. Furthermore, he has reportedly been willing to implement an €11bn fiscal stimulus programme, which calls for, among other things, restoring the minimum monthly salary to €750 (broadly where it was before) and restoring pensions and public employee salaries. In our view, it appears unlikely that Greece’s international creditors would agree with some of those measures (notably to cancelling some of the measures to improve competitiveness). Instead, we think Syriza would have to negotiate macroeconomic conditionality with the troika to unlock the necessary financial support. The reforms/macroeconomic conditions are likely to be focused on structural and pro-growth reforms, while preserving past fiscal consolidation measures. A key element here is the role of the ECB under a potential QE programme, which we expect to be announced on 22 Jan 2015. It is likely that a troika programme would be a necessary condition for the ECB to include GGBs into the QE programme.
·Finally, we think that the uncertainty generated by the upcoming Greek general elections is likely to create some volatility in other European markets, especially in the European periphery. While we do not expect the market dynamics that took place when “redenomination risk” was still relevant (ie. prior to mid 2012), the general elections in Portugal and Spain in 2015 will likely extend the uncertainty of the Greek elections, especially if Syriza wins. Portugal will have general elections by mid 2015 and Spain by end 2015. In Spain the radical-left party Podemos, which has similar political ideology to that of Syriza, has publicly supported a restructuring of the Spanish public debt and the overturn of the labour market and pension reforms of recent years.
·On the third and last round of the presidential election, the government coalition candidate, Mr. Stavros Dimas received 168 favorable votes out of a possible 300. This compares with 160 and 168 votes in the first and second rounds respectively (where a 200 vote majority was required). Thus, support for the government’s presidential candidate remains unchanged and below the required majority of 180.
·According to the Greek constitution, the Parliament now needs to be dissolved and general elections held. Today it was decided that they will take place on January 25. After that, if it transpires that a coalition government is required, extra time may be needed to facilitate its formation. We expect increased market volatility given the higher uncertainty about the potential election outcome and the policy stance of the new government, especially since Syriza has never been in government.
·Most recent polls have shown a steady picture with Syriza polling in first position. Although the gap between Syriza and New Democracy has tended to narrow in early December (compared with previous months), Syriza has consistently polled in first position since July this year (see Figure below). Based on these polls, we would expect Mr Tsipras’ party (ie, Syriza) to win the general elections. However, the polls also signal that Mr Tsipras would not be able to gather an absolute majority in Parliament, implying that he would have to seek coalition partner(s). We think that Syriza could form a government coalition with some members of PASOK, and/ or To Potami. An alternative scenario would be that Syriza decides to stay in opposition, particularly given that Greece has yet to pass the fifth programme review (to receive financing and before negotiating a precautionary line), which implies that the country will remain closely monitored by Troika. Our baseline scenario implies negative ramifications for the economy, for example, uncertainty would hurt confidence even excluding any effects from newly decided policies. From this perspective, we would welcome a quick resolution with elections held quickly and expediency in the event that a coalition is required.
·Regardless of whether Syriza decides to lead a government or stay in opposition, we think it is important to understand the party’s line on three key topics: EMU exit, Sovereign default and the Troika programme. Generally, we find that its stance on these issues has softened materially over the past couple of years.
·EMU exit: Syriza is clearly no longer calling for Greece to leave the euro area/EU.
·Sovereign default: Reuters reported (15 May 2014) that Mr Tsipras said that he would be keen to seek an international write-off of about one-third of Greece’s debt. Nonetheless, importantly, he added that he would prefer a consensus solution rather than using the option of a Greek default as a tool. In addition, more recently, The Financial Times (19 September 2014), cited Mr Tsipras as saying that eurozone countries should grant debt relief to Greece. He argued that the debt should be restructured into GDP-linked bonds, offering an incentive to other eurozone government to boost growth in Greece. Such a statement seems to be a progression from his initial proposal released in January 2014 (as he was gearing up for the EC presidency). In his 10-point manifesto, he notably called for a European debt conference. We think OSI remains a possibility for Greece, but not in the near term and only in the context of a successful completion of the programme and new conditionality for a new credit line from the ESM (and separate financial support from the IMF). We think an outright default remains unlikely although it cannot be entirely ruled out. Similar to an EMU exit, such an outcome would bring very significant financial stress, and Greece’s nascent recovery in growth and confidence would be reversed, particularly as the country remains highly dependent on external financing.
·Troika programme: Syriza has always strongly opposed “troika” intervention. Mr Tsipiras has recently softened his stance, limiting his opposition to the design of the current programme. In his 10-point programme, he notably called for an immediate end to austerity, suspending the new European fiscal framework. Furthermore, he has reportedly been willing to implement an €11bn fiscal stimulus programme, which calls for, among other things, restoring the minimum monthly salary to €750 (broadly where it was before) and restoring pensions and public employee salaries. In our view, it appears unlikely that Greece’s international creditors would agree with some of those measures (notably to cancelling some of the measures to improve competitiveness). Instead, we think Syriza would have to negotiate macroeconomic conditionality with the troika to unlock the necessary financial support. The reforms/macroeconomic conditions are likely to be focused on structural and pro-growth reforms, while preserving past fiscal consolidation measures. A key element here is the role of the ECB under a potential QE programme, which we expect to be announced on 22 Jan 2015. It is likely that a troika programme would be a necessary condition for the ECB to include GGBs into the QE programme.
·Finally, we think that the uncertainty generated by the upcoming Greek general elections is likely to create some volatility in other European markets, especially in the European periphery. While we do not expect the market dynamics that took place when “redenomination risk” was still relevant (ie. prior to mid 2012), the general elections in Portugal and Spain in 2015 will likely extend the uncertainty of the Greek elections, especially if Syriza wins. Portugal will have general elections by mid 2015 and Spain by end 2015. In Spain the radical-left party Podemos, which has similar political ideology to that of Syriza, has publicly supported a restructuring of the Spanish public debt and the overturn of the labour market and pension reforms of recent years.
neosephiroth86
Forumer storico
Nel frattempo sembra che il rapporto Syriza-Dimar sia già naufragato
locco68
violaforever
l'Europa per bocca di Draghi non vuole default, Syriza ha garantito che i depositi dei greci saranno salvi.....sara' trattativa, e il default o ristrutturazione lo vedo estremo, con un 10% di possibilità, mentre per l'uscita dall' euro vedo il 3%.......
nuovi aiuti e allentamento delle tensioni politiche per me la piu' probabile.....
nuovi aiuti e allentamento delle tensioni politiche per me la piu' probabile.....
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