Obbligazioni societarie HIGH YIELD e oltre, verso frontiere inesplorate - Vol. 1

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ahi.. gli indomiti sono quelli che muoiono primi...
cmq bid su francoforte a 51,5 ( per adesso ):titanic:

Sta risalendo... denaro compreso fra 50 e 51, sparito il 48-49 di stamattina

Stavo dando un occhio al bilancio dei primi sei mesi 2012 che allego insieme al prospetto del bond. A parte il conto economico che faceva un po' schifo e probabilmente anche il Q3 sarà indecente, lo stato patrimoniale evidenziava 365 milioni di assets (di cui 274 di impianti) e un long term debt di 315 milioni di euro (tutto sul bond). In caso di default, credo che il recovery sia intorno a quello di Seat se non più alto, anche perchè, a quanto pare non c'è debito bancario sovraordinato se non le solite linee di credito che però non si vedono. Il bond era stato emesso per 345 milioni (poi hanno fatto un'altra emissione da 80), ma hanno fatto anche buy back, per rimborsare un PIK e un senior e un tasso variabile sub. Questo però è un senior secured e a 50 è - secondo me - sui minimi assoluti. A meno di grosse sorprese che hanno indotto la società a posticipare la pubblicazione dei dati, potrebbe essere solo speculazione sull'onda della news.
speriamo che sia stato il bottom.
Io cmq non svendo, le idde restano quelle per cui l'avevo presa appena poco sotto i 70.
 
Camfin: Moody's MAGYAR TELECOM downgrades

speriamo che sia stato il bottom.
Io cmq non svendo, le idde restano quelle per cui l'avevo presa appena poco sotto i 70.


MAGYAR TELECOM 9,50% vto. 15/12/16 call 15/12/12 a 109.50% ISIN: XS0473176658
Rating Action:
Moody's downgrades Invitel's CFR to Caa1 from B3, outlook remains negative
Global Credit Research - 17 Sep 2012
London, 17 September 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Magyar Telecom B.V. ("Invitel") to Caa1 from B3. Moody's also downgraded the rating on the senior secured notes due 2016 to Caa1 from B3. The outlook remains negative.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade of Invitel's ratings reflects (i) the accelerating decline in voice revenues, Invitel's highest margin product, to the benefit of mobile substitution and triple-play cable operators which continues to put pressure on Invitel's EBITDA margins (ii) weaker than expected growth in the internet segment which fails to generate enough positive momentum to counter the drop in ARPU (iii) an uncertain macro-economic environment (iv) aggressive policy-making exemplified by the previous crisis tax levied on telecom operators and the recently announced telecom tax which will be fully borne by the company (iv) expectations that continued negative free cash-flow might leave the company with a weak liquidity profile which makes the sustainability of the current capital structure uncertain in the medium-term.
Invitel's Caa1 CFR is supported by the company's (i) leading position as the second-largest fixed-line telecommunications service provider in Hungary; (ii) sound profitability levels with EBITDA margin between 40%-45%; (iii) long dated maturity profile as the company has no scheduled debt repayment before 2016.
The downgrade mainly captures the continuing weak profile of Invitel's liquidity profile with the company fully reliant on current cash positions to absorb its negative free cash flow. In addition, capex spending, although somewhat discretionary, is needed to upgrade networks and/or maintain market position in certain regions and cannot be sustainably halted. At the current pace of cash-burning, Moody's believes the company could be left with minimal liquidity by the end of 2013. The current capital structure hence appears untenable in its current state absent any financial shareholder support, which, until now, has not been expressed.
The downgrade also reflects Invitel's performance in the first half of 2012 which shows no halting of the declining trends observed in voice revenues with this segment recording a 22% drop in residential and 7% in corporate revenues (both in constant currency terms) in H1 2012 vs. H1 2011. In addition to fixed to mobile substitution and the bundled telephone offers from cable operators, the increasingly tough competitive environment has also driven prices down as clients look for best-value alternatives in a tough domestic economic climate.
In addition, the Hungarian Forint (Invitel's main operating currency), which declined to a record low at the end of 2011, has continued to be volatile in the first half of 2012 and future currency movements remain largely unpredictable. This is compounded by an aggressive strategy from the government to impose taxes on the telecommunication industry. First, since 2010, through a three year "crisis-tax" on the operators which cost Invitel EUR10.9million in 2011 and now through a "Telecom Tax" based on end-user traffic. Although this is in essence a consumer tax, the company has decided not to pass on the increased costs as it fears the consequences on churn would outweigh the margin benefits.
The negative outlook reflects Moody's views that (i) the current capital structure is under pressure given the lack of long term liquidity solution and the lacklustre performance expectations (ii) the competitive and macro-economic landscapes will continue to put pressure on Invitel's end-customers and hence limit a potential recovery (iii) the cash-flow profile of the issuer will, eventually, be constrained by the required continued investment in its network infrastructure.
What Could Change the Rating -- Up
Whilst Invitel's ratings are currently constrained by the company's limited financial flexibility, its rating outlook could stabilise following (i) tangible signs of a stabilising market environment; (ii) meaningful growth in Internet and broadband activity; (iii) sustained free cash flow generation; and/or (iv) substantial cash injection from the sponsor to stabilise Invitel's long term liquidity profile.
What Could Change the Rating -- Down
Negative ratings pressure would arise following (i) no apparent resolution over the currently weak liquidity profile of the company or explicit support from the sponsor; (ii) further reduction in the company's EBITDA and free cash flow generation.
The principal methodology used in rating Magyar Telecom B.V. was the Global Telecommunications Industry Methodology published in December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Invitel's CFR to Caa1 from B3, outlook remains negative
Global Credit Research - 17 Sep 2012
London, 17 September 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Magyar Telecom B.V. ("Invitel") to Caa1 from B3. Moody's also downgraded the rating on the senior secured notes due 2016 to Caa1 from B3. The outlook remains negative.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade of Invitel's ratings reflects (i) the accelerating decline in voice revenues, Invitel's highest margin product, to the benefit of mobile substitution and triple-play cable operators which continues to put pressure on Invitel's EBITDA margins (ii) weaker than expected growth in the internet segment which fails to generate enough positive momentum to counter the drop in ARPU (iii) an uncertain macro-economic environment (iv) aggressive policy-making exemplified by the previous crisis tax levied on telecom operators and the recently announced telecom tax which will be fully borne by the company (iv) expectations that continued negative free cash-flow might leave the company with a weak liquidity profile which makes the sustainability of the current capital structure uncertain in the medium-term.
Invitel's Caa1 CFR is supported by the company's (i) leading position as the second-largest fixed-line telecommunications service provider in Hungary; (ii) sound profitability levels with EBITDA margin between 40%-45%; (iii) long dated maturity profile as the company has no scheduled debt repayment before 2016.
The downgrade mainly captures the continuing weak profile of Invitel's liquidity profile with the company fully reliant on current cash positions to absorb its negative free cash flow. In addition, capex spending, although somewhat discretionary, is needed to upgrade networks and/or maintain market position in certain regions and cannot be sustainably halted. At the current pace of cash-burning, Moody's believes the company could be left with minimal liquidity by the end of 2013. The current capital structure hence appears untenable in its current state absent any financial shareholder support, which, until now, has not been expressed.
The downgrade also reflects Invitel's performance in the first half of 2012 which shows no halting of the declining trends observed in voice revenues with this segment recording a 22% drop in residential and 7% in corporate revenues (both in constant currency terms) in H1 2012 vs. H1 2011. In addition to fixed to mobile substitution and the bundled telephone offers from cable operators, the increasingly tough competitive environment has also driven prices down as clients look for best-value alternatives in a tough domestic economic climate.
In addition, the Hungarian Forint (Invitel's main operating currency), which declined to a record low at the end of 2011, has continued to be volatile in the first half of 2012 and future currency movements remain largely unpredictable. This is compounded by an aggressive strategy from the government to impose taxes on the telecommunication industry. First, since 2010, through a three year "crisis-tax" on the operators which cost Invitel EUR10.9million in 2011 and now through a "Telecom Tax" based on end-user traffic. Although this is in essence a consumer tax, the company has decided not to pass on the increased costs as it fears the consequences on churn would outweigh the margin benefits.
The negative outlook reflects Moody's views that (i) the current capital structure is under pressure given the lack of long term liquidity solution and the lacklustre performance expectations (ii) the competitive and macro-economic landscapes will continue to put pressure on Invitel's end-customers and hence limit a potential recovery (iii) the cash-flow profile of the issuer will, eventually, be constrained by the required continued investment in its network infrastructure.
What Could Change the Rating -- Up
Whilst Invitel's ratings are currently constrained by the company's limited financial flexibility, its rating outlook could stabilise following (i) tangible signs of a stabilising market environment; (ii) meaningful growth in Internet and broadband activity; (iii) sustained free cash flow generation; and/or (iv) substantial cash injection from the sponsor to stabilise Invitel's long term liquidity profile.
What Could Change the Rating -- Down
Negative ratings pressure would arise following (i) no apparent resolution over the currently weak liquidity profile of the company or explicit support from the sponsor; (ii) further reduction in the company's EBITDA and free cash flow generation.
The principal methodology used in rating Magyar Telecom B.V. was the Global Telecommunications Industry Methodology published in December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
 
Ultima modifica:
The downgrade mainly captures the continuing weak profile of Invitel's liquidity profile with the company fully reliant on current cash positions to absorb its negative free cash flow. In addition, capex spending, although somewhat discretionary, is needed to upgrade networks and/or maintain market position in certain regions and cannot be sustainably halted. At the current pace of cash-burning, Moody's believes the company could be left with minimal liquidity by the end of 2013. The current capital structure hence appears untenable in its current state absent any financial shareholder support, which, until now, has not been expressed.
The downgrade also reflects Invitel's performance in the first half of 2012 which shows no halting of the declining trends observed in voice revenues with this segment recording a 22% drop in residential and 7% in corporate revenues (both in constant currency terms) in H1 2012 vs. H1 2011. In addition to fixed to mobile substitution and the bundled telephone offers from cable operators, the increasingly tough competitive environment has also driven prices down as clients look for best-value alternatives in a tough domestic economic climate.
In addition, the Hungarian Forint (Invitel's main operating currency), which declined to a record low at the end of 2011, has continued to be volatile in the first half of 2012 and future currency movements remain largely unpredictable. This is compounded by an aggressive strategy from the government to impose taxes on the telecommunication industry. First, since 2010, through a three year "crisis-tax" on the operators which cost Invitel EUR10.9million in 2011 and now through a "Telecom Tax" based on end-user traffic. Although this is in essence a consumer tax, the company has decided not to pass on the increased costs as it fears the consequences on churn would outweigh the margin benefits.
The negative outlook reflects Moody's views that (i) the current capital structure is under pressure given the lack of long term liquidity solution and the lacklustre performance expectations (ii) the competitive and macro-economic landscapes will continue to put pressure on Invitel's end-customers and hence limit a potential recovery (iii) the cash-flow profile of the issuer will, eventually, be constrained by the required continued investment in its network infrastructure.

Grazie Camfin :up: Sembra che stiano bruciando cassa ed estro il prossimo anno sarà necessario un aumento di capitale. Il richio è che potrebbe essere chiesto in cambio acnhe una ristrutturazione del debito senior
 
Ultima modifica:
Grazie Camfin :up: Sembra che stiano bruciando cassa ed estro il prossimo anno sarà necessario un aumento di capitale. Il richio è che potrebbe essere chiesto in cambio acnhe una ristrutturazione del debito senior

Questa e' una notizia un po vecchia.

Ma reitero la mia filosofia. Diffidare di HY di piccole societa' tanto piu' posseduti da private equity. Questi devono mettere equity nella societa'. Cmq a questi prezzi sconta gia' scemari ultrapessimistici.


CMA-CGM e' l'esatto opoosto in questo senso con la sola controindicazione che non e' quotata (anche se si quotera').
 
Buongiorno Gaudente,
tu che (giustamente) non fai sconti agli emittenti traballanti, cosa pensi dei bonds HY della Franz Haniel ? Per quel poco che ne so, credo che abbia una partecipazione del 30% nella Metro ed il controllo della Celesio (pharma).
Grazie di un tuo giudizio, se vuoi.
Ho dato un'occhiata e rapidamente desistito perche' sarebbe necessario sciropparsi davvero tutto il bilancio per dare un giudizio sensato ed essendo i bond abbondantemente sopra la pari a mio avviso non ne vale la pena.
Anche questa societa' ha parecchi immateriali iscritti nell'attivo ma essendo la gestione operativa in utile non e' detto che debbano necessariamente essere cancellati , e' comunque preoccupante che l'utile semestrale sia stato cancellato dalla gestione finanziaria (svalutazioni ?).
Il mio consiglio e' di vendere perche' a questi prezzi ormai lo yield to maturity e' al livello di un BTP e non vale la pena di tribolare dietro ad un corporate per queste remunerazioni, ma non si tratta necessariamente di una cattiva societa'.
 
Grazie Gaudente, se hai qualcosa da segnalare in altre aree te ne sarei grato ... conosci per esempio qualche emittente turco?
Mi hai fatto ricordare che in uno dei tanti conti che ho sparsi per il mondo ho in deposito delle obbligazioni emesse da una banca turca di seconda schiera, la Bank Pozitif in lire turche cedola 10,125% , ma quotano 101,55 e scadono tra meno di un anno , quindi adesso hanno uno yield dell'8,38% dal quale bisogna pure detrarre il 10% di tasse al governo turco .... ormai non convengono piu'.
 
Questa e' una notizia un po vecchia.

Ma reitero la mia filosofia. Diffidare di HY di piccole societa' tanto piu' posseduti da private equity. Questi devono mettere equity nella societa'. Cmq a questi prezzi sconta gia' scemari ultrapessimistici.


CMA-CGM e' l'esatto opoosto in questo senso con la sola controindicazione che non e' quotata (anche se si quotera').

Sì è vecchia, ma a volte vale la pena andare a rivedersi quello che avevano detto perchè col tempo ci si dimentica. Per il resto, sono pienamente d'accordo, anche su CMA-CGM :)
 
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