Obbligazioni bancarie MONITOR Principali banche mondiali (1 Viewer)

[yellow]

o pobacco............
sono le sue parole testuali...?

Yes, il virgolettato è la riprova
( di una risposta tradotta ovviamente in italiano)



Timori di un finanziere qual'è De Benedetti :


25.05.09 09:01 - Economia: De Benedetti, la bufera non e' finita (Mi.Fi.)



...............................................................................................................

Il discorso ricade poi sui mercati, in particolare sulle banche.
De Benedetti afferma "non sarei sorpreso se il sistema (bancario, ndr) nascondesse ancora perdite pesanti.
Avremo ancora qualche brutta sorpresa".
........................................................................................................................................

 

[paologorgo]

Also, DIF-Insured deposits have hit an all time record high of $4.8 trillion, an increase of $90 billion from December 31 as depositors have been seeking a safe haven from the market in Q1 (click on chart, below, to enlarge). It is unknown if they would have done so, had they known their "insured" deposits will cover only the first 0.27% of depositors if there is another bank failure tsunami. As there is only one more month left in Q2 it will be curious to see it there will be a rotation out of deposits into investments at June 30, concurrent with the time we will know what the current level on the DIF is.Of course, as this data will be available some time in September, by then it may be completely worthless as one would imagine at some point the mystical futures buying force, end of month convenient fund deleveraging, or whatever else you want to call it, will have finally exhausted its market pulling strength.




http://seekingalpha.com/article/140503-fdic-s-fund-reserve-ration-plunges-to-0-27-of-deposits

 

[aurelianuse]

Articolo da Bloomberg.
Barclays pensa di vendere parecchi asset dopo le recenti perdite,tra cui la divisione di asset management e i fondi di ishares.
Cosa resterà della terza banca d'inghilterra dopo tante dismissioni (e dopo tante perdite,ben 18,6 mld) ?



Barclays in Talks With BlackRock, Others on BGI Sale (Update1)
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By Jon Menon
June 8 (Bloomberg) -- Barclays Plc, the U.K.’s third- largest bank, said it’s in talks with BlackRock Inc. and other bidders about a sale of its asset management division and iShares exchange traded funds unit.
“The discussions are not yet concluded and there are a number of significant open issues which could affect the nature and terms of any transaction,” the London-based company said today in a statement.
The bank is in talks to sell its Barclays Global Investors unit to BlackRock, the world’s biggest publicly traded asset manager, in a deal worth more than $10 billion, people familiar with the situation said June 6. London-based Barclays has also held talks about selling BGI to Bank of New York Mellon Corp, the people added.
Barclays, which shunned government funds, is seeking to raise cash after $18.6 billion of credit losses and writedowns. The bank agreed in April to sell BGI’s iShares unit to CVC Capital Partners for $4.4 billion. The bank has until June 18 to look for better alternatives to that deal. Barclays said today it would update investors on the sale before June 19.
A takeover of BGI would also be the biggest ever in the fund-management industry, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. It would exceed BlackRock’s $8.5 billion takeover of Merrill Lynch & Co.’s investment management business in 2006.
To contact the reporter on this story: Jon Menon in London at [email protected]

 

[troppidebiti]

SCHEDA - Svalutazioni e perdite banche in Europa e Usa 2007-oggi

Reuters - 09/07/2009 12:13:05

9 luglio (Reuters) - Da inizio 2007, i maggiori istituti bancari Usa ed europei hanno perso finora oltre 900 miliardi di dollari su asset tossici e sofferenze.

Nel periodo 2007-2010 si calcola che il rosso assommi a quasi 2.500 miliardi di dollari, grossolanamenti suddivisi tra le perdite sui titoli e quelle sui prestiti, secondo le stime del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. A livello geografico la bilancia delle perdite è vista invece più spostata sugli Usa - per cui il colpo è da 1.600 miliardi di dollari contro "solo" 737 milioni a carico delle banche europee.

Qui sotto una lista delle perdite per banca stimate nel periodo iniziato nel 2007 (miliardi di dollari ai tassi di cambio attuali, tabella in inglese) ---------------------------------------------------------------- BANK 2007 2008 2009 YTD TOTAL
---------------------------------------------------------------- Citigroup (C.N) 29.1 63.4 11.9 $104.4
Wachovia Corp* 4.0 73.4 $77.4
Merrill Lynch** 25.1 38.6 $63.7
HSBC (HSBA.L) 19.3 30.3 4.8 $54.4
UBS (UBSN.VX) 50.6 3.6 $54.2
Bank of America (BAC.N) 12.1 29.2 6.9 $48.2
Washington Mutual*** 5.1 36.7 $41.8
Fannie Mae 4.7 26.9 7.2 $38.8
Royal Bk Scotland (RBS.L) 7.0 23.5 8.0 $38.5
Freddie Mac 5.2 24.4 7.1 $36.7
Lloyds (LLOY.L) & 6.8 28.9 $35.7
Barclays (BARC.L) 7.0 16.5 7.2 $30.7
Lehman Brothers**** 12.5 14.0 $26.5
Morgan Stanley (MS.N) 10.3 10.1 0.8 $21.2
Commerzbank/Dresdner 3.9 13.3 2.8 $20.0
JPMorgan Chase (JPM.N) 4.5 10.2 4.4 $19.1
Deutsche Bank 4.0 11.2 2.8 $18.0
Credit Suisse (CSGN.VX) 3.5 11.9 1.5 $16.9
Santander (SAN.MC) 4.8 8.3 3.1 $16.2
IKB && $14.7
National City***** $14.0
BNP Paribas + 2.4 8.0 2.5 $12.9
Wells Fargo (WFC.N) 3.5 8.7 0.5 $12.7
Unicredit (UCG.MI) 3.5 5.1 2.4 $11.0
ING 7.1 2.4 $9.5
Bayern LB 1.1 8.0 $9.1
C.Agricole + 2.7 4.4 1.5 $8.6
BBVA (BBVA.MC) 2.7 4.2 1.3 $8.1
Intesa Sanpaulo (ISP.MI) 1.6 4.5 1.0 $7.1
Societe Gen + 1.3 3.7 1.9 $6.9
Goldman Sachs (GS.N) 1.7 4.9 $6.6
Canadian Imp Bk Commerce $6.5
Natixis + 2.0 2.5 1.3 $5.8
Erste Bank 0.8 2.5 0.7 $4.0
Bear Stearns****** 3.0 0.6 $3.6
Fortis $3.1
WestLB $3.0
Standard Chartered (STAN.L) 0.8 1.8 $2.6
Rabobank 0.8 1.7 $2.5
--------------------------------------------------------------- Total $914.7

(Sources: Reuters/annual reports/company filings)

Estimates based on writedowns and losses from subprime securities, mortgages, CDOs, derivatives and SIVs, and credit losses and loan loss provisions.


NOTES:
* Acquired by Wells Fargo at the end of last year.

** Acquired by Bank of America on Jan 1.

*** Assets acquired by JPMorgan in September.

**** Filed for bankruptcy in September.

***** Bought by PNC Financial Services Group in December.

****** Bought by JPMorgan in March 2008.

& Includes HBOS, taken over by Lloyds in January.

&& Bought by Lone Star August after state-led bailouts.

+ France bank estimates based on 'cost of risk'.

 

[Imark]

A Moody's non piace la soluzione tedesca sulla bad bank... il rischio resterebbe in capo alle banche, seppure con effetti diluiti su di un arco di tempo molto ampio.

Germany's new bad banks provide no clean-cut transfer of risk

Frankfurt, July 20, 2009 -- Germany's proposed bad bank scheme that aims to help German commercial and public sector banks recover from the impact of the global financial crisis presents several drawbacks but also some benefits, says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment.

According to the rating agency, the bill confirms the overriding intention of the central government to protect the interest of German taxpayers. As a result, it offers a solution that allows banks to offload assets, but then (unlike options available in some other jurisdictions) leaves them largely liable for any related future credit losses

The bill proposes two types of bad bank. One is designed as a special purpose vehicle ("SPV") that can assume structured credit products, whereby likely future losses on such products are calculated upfront and have to be paid, in instalments over 20 years, out of any future net profits of the transferring bank as far as these would be paid out as dividends to shareholders.

The second alternative is a public sector vehicle ("PSV") to which banks would be able to offload not only structured credit products but also whole portfolios of non-core, or non-strategic assets. If used by a public sector bank, this vehicle would need to be guaranteed by the bank's public sector owners, which would have to absorb future losses to the degree that these cannot be covered out of profits of the transferring bank.

"In our view, the suggested design of Germany's new bad bank scheme leaves the main risks and returns with the transferring bank, albeit spread over a long period of time. Given that the banks will in principle have unlimited liability to cover any future bad bank-incurred losses, their true economic capitalisation may be more difficult to decipher," says Katharina Barten, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Analyst and author of the report.

The rating agency also observes that the bill allows for the transfer of not only structured credit products but also loans and even whole business segments. However, the bill fails to properly clarify the value at which assets will have to be transferred, in particular loan assets. "Moody's therefore views the actual capital relief offered by the new German bad bank solution with caution," adds Ms Barten.

In terms of the implications for Moody's bank ratings, the agency recognises that the bad bank solution offers the initial benefit of addressing current asset and business model issues as well as immediate regulatory capital relief. However, this needs to be balanced with the medium-term implications relating to future loss recognition, the potential expense and tax burden, and more limited transparency and predictability of future earnings profiles.

These factors have the potential to fully outweigh most of the initial benefits of the scheme, thus resulting in very limited positive rating impact, if any. Moody's considers Germany's bad bank scheme to be a small and rather reluctant step in the right direction, but believes that substantially more will need to be done in order to find a solution to the persisting solvency problems of the German banking sector

 

[Alobar]

Da quando, negli ultimi due anni, ho cominciato a occuparmi di investimenti, non mi sono mai interessato molto di banche in genere e di banche USA in particolare, in quanto ho evitato (fortunatamente!) come la pece i loro titoli.

Ora, che sto cercando di transumare lentamente dal TF al TV, mi trovo nella condizione di dover necessariamente investire in banche in quanto i titoli legati all'euribor, a parte alcune eccezioni (poco remunerative, come ENEL e ENI), sono tutti emessi da banche.

Tutto questo lungo preambolo, per chiedere la vostra opinione attuale sulla Goldman Sachs, di cui vorrei comprare il TV 02.02.2015, che ora quota intorno ai 92 e offre euribor3mesi+0.40, e cioè, considerato il prezzo, poco meno del 2% oltre l'euribor3mesi. Grazie!

Ci sarebbe anche la MERRILL LYNCH TV 22.07.2014, che quota intorno a 88, ma lì da quanto ho letto nel forum il discorso sembra un po' più complicato...

Buona domenica!

 

[Imark]

Da quando, negli ultimi due anni, ho cominciato a occuparmi di investimenti, non mi sono mai interessato molto di banche in genere e di banche USA in particolare, in quanto ho evitato (fortunatamente!) come la pece i loro titoli.

Ora, che sto cercando di transumare lentamente dal TF al TV, mi trovo nella condizione di dover necessariamente investire in banche in quanto i titoli legati all'euribor, a parte alcune eccezioni (poco remunerative, come ENEL e ENI), sono tutti emessi da banche.

Tutto questo lungo preambolo, per chiedere la vostra opinione attuale sulla Goldman Sachs, di cui vorrei comprare il TV 02.02.2015, che ora quota intorno ai 92 e offre euribor3mesi+0.40, e cioè, considerato il prezzo, poco meno del 2% oltre l'euribor3mesi. Grazie!

Ci sarebbe anche la MERRILL LYNCH TV 22.07.2014, che quota intorno a 88, ma lì da quanto ho letto nel forum il discorso sembra un po' più complicato...

Buona domenica!

Entrambe molto speculative, visto il tarocco contabile conclamato sui bilanci ... in piccole dosi, come faresti per dei bond HY, tenendo in considerazione il fatto che in particolari circostanze gli asini possono anche volare in finanza, ma prima o poi atterrano (e talvolta, trattasi di hard landing).

 

[paologorgo]

Entrambe molto speculative, visto il tarocco contabile conclamato sui bilanci ... in piccole dosi, come faresti per dei bond HY, tenendo in considerazione il fatto che in particolari circostanze gli asini possono anche volare in finanza, ma prima o poi atterrano (e talvolta, trattasi di hard landing).

La prima frase di Alobar avrei potuto scriverla anch'io, ci sto alla larga da un paio di anni, magari per mia incapacità ad approfondirne i bilanci... - ma anch'io sto pensando se non vale la pena darci un'occhiata, a 'ste maledette banche...

in giro per il web alla ricerca di altre cose (e non ho controllato i dati, devo essere sincero...) ho trovato questo:

Extending this to fundamental analysis, take a guess who's returns these are:

1991: 14.9%
1992: 28.1%
1993: 27.7%
1994: 22.3%
1995: 11.3%
1996: 21.2%
1997: 22.1%
1998: 19.2%
1999: 16.1%
2000: 15.9%
2001: 11.7%
2002: 15.7%
2003: 17.7%
2004: 17.0%
2005: 15.2%
2006: 18.3%
2007: 1.8%

They are the reported return on equity of Bear Stearn (as reported from Bloomberg)...right up until the very end. As Seth Klarman writes in his 2004 letter, "While others attempt to win every lap around the track, it is crucial to remember that to succeed at investing, you have to be around at the finish."

volano, ma la gravità tende ad arrivare all'improvviso...

 

[troppidebiti]

La prima frase di Alobar avrei potuto scriverla anch'io, ci sto alla larga da un paio di anni, magari per mia incapacità ad approfondirne i bilanci... - ma anch'io sto pensando se non vale la pena darci un'occhiata, a 'ste maledette banche...

in giro per il web alla ricerca di altre cose (e non ho controllato i dati, devo essere sincero...) ho trovato questo:

Extending this to fundamental analysis, take a guess who's returns these are:

1991: 14.9%
1992: 28.1%
1993: 27.7%
1994: 22.3%
1995: 11.3%
1996: 21.2%
1997: 22.1%
1998: 19.2%
1999: 16.1%
2000: 15.9%
2001: 11.7%
2002: 15.7%
2003: 17.7%
2004: 17.0%
2005: 15.2%
2006: 18.3%
2007: 1.8%

They are the reported return on equity of Bear Stearn (as reported from Bloomberg)...right up until the very end. As Seth Klarman writes in his 2004 letter, "While others attempt to win every lap around the track, it is crucial to remember that to succeed at investing, you have to be around at the finish."

volano, ma la gravità tende ad arrivare all'improvviso...

le banche italiche anche sono messe maluccio qui nessuno ne parla ma la situazione inizia a diventare pesantuccia

 

[Ninetto]

le banche italiche anche sono messe maluccio qui nessuno ne parla ma la situazione inizia a diventare pesantuccia

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