Obbligazioni bancarie MONITOR Principali banche mondiali (3 lettori)

[Broker88]

A Londra il Tamigi è in piena,
stanno alzando i parapetti :

MPS Capital Services
...........................................................................................................
In UK questa mattina il Tesoro ha annunciato nuove misure di iniezione di liquidità che dovrebbero aggiungere
almeno 100Mld£
ai 250Mld già annunciati ad ottobre dal piano precedente.

La BOE sarà autorizzata a creare un fondo col quale acquisterà,
a partire dal 2 febbraio,
fino a 50Mld£ (74Mld$) di asset privati di elevata qualità inclusi i bond corporate,
le commercial paper ed i prestiti sindacati.

Gli acquisti saranno finanziati dall’emissione di T-Bill e, qualora necessario,
saranno utilizzati come strumento di politica monetaria nel tentativo di raggiungere il proprio target di inflazione.

Il 30 gennaio terminerà lo Special Liquidity Scheme introdotto lo scorso aprile (swap di asset collateralizzati con T-Bills ).
Per garantire la liquidità di lungo periodo viene estesa la durata della discount window facility da 30 giorni ad 1 anno.

Il governo ha inoltre esteso la durata dello schema di credito garantito a tutto il 2009,
introducendo anche la possibilità di garanzia (totale o parziale) ad alcune emissioni di ABS con rating AAA.

Il Tesoro ha infine annunciato che aumenterà la propria quota in RBS (dal 50% al 70%) convertendo i 5Mld£ di azioni privilegiate acquistate l’anno scorso in azioni ordinarie.
....................................................................................

Ormai si sta passando alle nazionalizzazioni vere e proprie.
Dato che l'Inghilterra ha fatto scuola più di una volta in questa crisi, non mi sorprenderei se Obama nei prox giorni non scopiazzi.


Una domanda "un po particolare"
Le perdite disastrose dell'ultimo trimestre secondo voi sono dovute al default Lehman con consieguente deleverage all'n-esima potenza oppure si sarebbero verificate ugualmente?

La cosa è interessante per capire se è vero il ragionamento di Tremonti di "salvare il salvabile" tutelando la parte bancaria sana e lasciando perdere le banche d'affari che obiettivamente nel sistema economico non è che c'entrino molto

 

[The Beast]

La cosa è interessante per capire se è vero il ragionamento di Tremonti di "salvare il salvabile" tutelando la parte bancaria sana e lasciando perdere le banche d'affari che obiettivamente nel sistema economico non è che c'entrino molto

ma a parte Mediobanca che tra l'altro si sta avventurando nel settore retail quali sono le "banche d'affari" pure italiane?

 

[Imark]

Ed intanto anche in Danimarca potrebbe esserci del marcio (nel sistema bancario... ).

Ps: però gli Stati nazionali il rischio lo sanno prezzare molto bene, altro che storie... 10% è quello che chiedono i danesi alle loro banche, 7,5% minimo con step up semestrali quello che l'Italia dovrebbe chiedere per i propri subordinati convertibili con i quali irrobustire la patrimonializzazione delle nostre banche.

Altro che cedolini pistola...

By Christian Wienberg

Jan. 19 (Bloomberg) -- Denmark will offer loans to banks and mortgage lenders worth 100 billion kroner ($17.8 billion) in the country’s biggest ever bailout as lawmakers across the political divide work to avert a protracted recession.

The state will lend as much as 75 billion kroner to banks and the rest to mortgage companies at an interest rate determined by each company’s financial strength, averaging 10 percent, lawmakers agreed yesterday. A previous package had provided government backing for deposits and interbank loans.

Without the package, the economy would have contracted 2.9 percent this year, as businesses curtail investments and consumers cut spending amid limited access to credit, the Confederation of Danish Industry, DI, said on Jan. 13. With the package, the economic contraction will be limited to about 1.9 percent, DI estimates. Danish banks tightened lending in the fourth quarter and will limit loans further in coming months, the central bank said last week.

“If we don’t act, there’s a considerable risk that even healthy businesses won’t be able to borrow sufficient funds to secure daily operations, jobs and growth,” Finance Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen said in the statement.

Danske Bank A/S, the country’s biggest lender, opened 14 percent higher, its biggest gain in 20 years, and was trading up 2.5 kroner, or 4.3 percent, at 60.75 kroner as of 11:37 a.m. in Copenhagen.

Denmark will also set up a 20 billion-krone fund that will provide loans to the country’s export businesses, to help boost the trade balance.

‘Frozen’

The central bank has estimated that Danish banks need to refinance 20 billion kroner of subordinated debt through 2010 in a credit market Peter Engberg Jensen, chairman of the Danish Mortgage Bankers Association, has described as “frozen.” Banks would have to reduce loans to consumers and businesses by about 10 times the amount that they fail to refinance, according to Jensen.

“This will soften up the situation and give banks more muscle,” Peter Straarup, chief executive officer at Copenhagen- based Danske, said in a TV2 News interview. The bank will let shareholders at its annual general meeting decide whether to participate in the package.

‘Excellent Example’

Denmark passed its first rescue plan on Oct. 10, with banks setting aside 35 billion kroner to cover potential losses, and the state pledging to cover losses that exceed that amount. That package won European Commission approval the same day, with EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes calling it an “excellent example” for other member states to follow.

Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stated repeatedly he doesn’t want the state to become a shareholder in Denmark’s banks, saying government “has no place in company board rooms.” In contrast, the U.K. today presented its second bank rescue package, worth 100 billion pounds ($147 billion), and is raising its stake in Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc to 70 percent.

All banks and mortgage lenders operating in Denmark can apply for the loans. The government will charge 9 percent to banks deemed to hold a “good” rating, 9.75 percent to banks with a “moderate” rating, and 11.25 percent to banks with a “bad” rating, it said. The loans, which the government will give in the form of hybrid core capital, will run for at least three years.

‘Pretty Generous’

“Banks don’t have to pay anything but interest for three years, and that’s pretty generous, even at this interest rate,” Finn Oestrup, professor at the Copenhagen Business School, said in a phone interview. “This helps the banks who’ve been in trouble the past year the most, because they would have found it very difficult to bolster their capital through other means.”

Banks and mortgage lenders participating in the new package can only deduct half of their executives’ pay from tax in a measure to prevent “disproportionate” management wages, the government said. Executives will also be banned from participating in new stock option programs and their bonuses must not exceed 20 percent of annual pay.

Denmark’s banks reported a combined profit drop of 76 percent in the third quarter as writedowns on bad loans surged 82-fold, according to the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority.

Last year, 13 lenders were either bailed out by the central bank or bought by rivals. Denmark will lose a quarter of its 140 banks within the next two years, according to a November poll of bank executives published by the Danish financial industry’s union.

Recession

The Danish economy is in the middle of a two-year recession, the longest period of decline in more than two decades, according to estimates by Deutsche Bank AG and Danske. Denmark’s gross domestic product probably fell 0.2 percent last year and will contract 1.4 percent in 2009, according to Deutsche Bank.

Danish corporate bankruptcies rose 11 percent to a record in December, while the number of Danish home foreclosures jumped 34 percent in that month, Statistics Denmark said Jan. 7.

 

[Broker88]

ma a parte Mediobanca che tra l'altro si sta avventurando nel settore retail quali sono le "banche d'affari" pure italiane?

No, no...il discorso era generale dato che da sempre sostiene che a crisi globale si deve trovare soluzione globale.

Lui diceva che se tutto non si può salvare, allora Merrill-Morgan-Goldman si può farle cadere salvando solo le banche "vere" quali BofA, Citi, JPM, ...

 

[METHOS]

Crisi: Abn Amro, 13 mld euro rosso 2008 a perimetro costante
di ANSA
A causa delle perdite nell'investment banking

(ANSA)- ROMA, 19 GEN- Abn Amro ha chiuso il bilancio 2008, a perimetro costante, con un rosso di 13 mld di euro nell'intero 2008. La causa sono le perdite nell'investment banking. La banca olandese, smembrata e divisa fra Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis e Santander che l'acquistarono per 72 mld nel 2007, consiste oggi di varie attivita' che devono ancora essere trasferite ai suoi nuovi proprietari.

 

[METHOS]

No, no...il discorso era generale dato che da sempre sostiene che a crisi globale si deve trovare soluzione globale.

Lui diceva che se tutto non si può salvare, allora Merrill-Morgan-Goldman si può farle cadere salvando solo le banche "vere" quali BofA, Citi, JPM, ...

Voglio proprio vedere il giorno in cui lascieranno cadere la goldman. Se con lehman è successo il finimondo con goldman è la catastrofe...

 

[paologorgo]

Wall Street Voodoo


By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: January 18, 2009
Old-fashioned voodoo economics — the belief in tax-cut magic — has been banished from civilized discourse. The supply-side cult has shrunk to the point that it contains only cranks, charlatans, and Republicans.
But recent news reports suggest that many influential people, including Federal Reserve officials, bank regulators, and, possibly, members of the incoming Obama administration, have become devotees of a new kind of voodoo: the belief that by performing elaborate financial rituals we can keep dead banks walking.
To explain the issue, let me describe the position of a hypothetical bank that I’ll call Gothamgroup, or Gotham for short.
On paper, Gotham has $2 trillion in assets and $1.9 trillion in liabilities, so that it has a net worth of $100 billion. But a substantial fraction of its assets — say, $400 billion worth — are mortgage-backed securities and other toxic waste. If the bank tried to sell these assets, it would get no more than $200 billion.
So Gotham is a zombie bank: it’s still operating, but the reality is that it has already gone bust. Its stock isn’t totally worthless — it still has a market capitalization of $20 billion — but that value is entirely based on the hope that shareholders will be rescued by a government bailout.
Why would the government bail Gotham out? Because it plays a central role in the financial system. When Lehman was allowed to fail, financial markets froze, and for a few weeks the world economy teetered on the edge of collapse. Since we don’t want a repeat performance, Gotham has to be kept functioning. But how can that be done?
Well, the government could simply give Gotham a couple of hundred billion dollars, enough to make it solvent again. But this would, of course, be a huge gift to Gotham’s current shareholders — and it would also encourage excessive risk-taking in the future. Still, the possibility of such a gift is what’s now supporting Gotham’s stock price.
A better approach would be to do what the government did with zombie savings and loans at the end of the 1980s: it seized the defunct banks, cleaning out the shareholders. Then it transferred their bad assets to a special institution, the Resolution Trust Corporation; paid off enough of the banks’ debts to make them solvent; and sold the fixed-up banks to new owners.
The current buzz suggests, however, that policy makers aren’t willing to take either of these approaches. Instead, they’re reportedly gravitating toward a compromise approach: moving toxic waste from private banks’ balance sheets to a publicly owned “bad bank” or “aggregator bank” that would resemble the Resolution Trust Corporation, but without seizing the banks first.
Sheila Bair, the chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, recently tried to describe how this would work: “The aggregator bank would buy the assets at fair value.” But what does “fair value” mean?
In my example, Gothamgroup is insolvent because the alleged $400 billion of toxic waste on its books is actually worth only $200 billion. The only way a government purchase of that toxic waste can make Gotham solvent again is if the government pays much more than private buyers are willing to offer.
Now, maybe private buyers aren’t willing to pay what toxic waste is really worth: “We don’t have really any rational pricing right now for some of these asset categories,” Ms. Bair says. But should the government be in the business of declaring that it knows better than the market what assets are worth? And is it really likely that paying “fair value,” whatever that means, would be enough to make Gotham solvent again?
What I suspect is that policy makers — possibly without realizing it — are gearing up to attempt a bait-and-switch: a policy that looks like the cleanup of the savings and loans, but in practice amounts to making huge gifts to bank shareholders at taxpayer expense, disguised as “fair value” purchases of toxic assets.
Why go through these contortions? The answer seems to be that Washington remains deathly afraid of the N-word — nationalization. The truth is that Gothamgroup and its sister institutions are already wards of the state, utterly dependent on taxpayer support; but nobody wants to recognize that fact and implement the obvious solution: an explicit, though temporary, government takeover. Hence the popularity of the new voodoo, which claims, as I said, that elaborate financial rituals can reanimate dead banks.
Unfortunately, the price of this retreat into superstition may be high. I hope I’m wrong, but I suspect that taxpayers are about to get another raw deal — and that we’re about to get another financial rescue plan that fails to do the job.

 

[yellow]

Wall Street Voodoo


By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: January 18, 2009
Old-fashioned voodoo economics — the belief in tax-cut magic — has been banished from civilized discourse. The supply-side cult has shrunk to the point that it contains only cranks, charlatans, and Republicans.
But recent news reports suggest that many influential people, including Federal Reserve officials, bank regulators, and, possibly, members of the incoming Obama administration, have become devotees of a new kind of voodoo: the belief that by performing elaborate financial rituals we can keep dead banks walking.
To explain the issue, let me describe the position of a hypothetical bank that I’ll call Gothamgroup, or Gotham for short.
On paper, Gotham has $2 trillion in assets and $1.9 trillion in liabilities, so that it has a net worth of $100 billion. But a substantial fraction of its assets — say, $400 billion worth — are mortgage-backed securities and other toxic waste. If the bank tried to sell these assets, it would get no more than $200 billion.
So Gotham is a zombie bank: it’s still operating, but the reality is that it has already gone bust. Its stock isn’t totally worthless — it still has a market capitalization of $20 billion — but that value is entirely based on the hope that shareholders will be rescued by a government bailout.
Why would the government bail Gotham out? Because it plays a central role in the financial system. When Lehman was allowed to fail, financial markets froze, and for a few weeks the world economy teetered on the edge of collapse. Since we don’t want a repeat performance, Gotham has to be kept functioning. But how can that be done?
Well, the government could simply give Gotham a couple of hundred billion dollars, enough to make it solvent again. But this would, of course, be a huge gift to Gotham’s current shareholders — and it would also encourage excessive risk-taking in the future. Still, the possibility of such a gift is what’s now supporting Gotham’s stock price.
A better approach would be to do what the government did with zombie savings and loans at the end of the 1980s: it seized the defunct banks, cleaning out the shareholders. Then it transferred their bad assets to a special institution, the Resolution Trust Corporation; paid off enough of the banks’ debts to make them solvent; and sold the fixed-up banks to new owners.
The current buzz suggests, however, that policy makers aren’t willing to take either of these approaches. Instead, they’re reportedly gravitating toward a compromise approach: moving toxic waste from private banks’ balance sheets to a publicly owned “bad bank” or “aggregator bank” that would resemble the Resolution Trust Corporation, but without seizing the banks first.
Sheila Bair, the chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, recently tried to describe how this would work: “The aggregator bank would buy the assets at fair value.” But what does “fair value” mean?
In my example, Gothamgroup is insolvent because the alleged $400 billion of toxic waste on its books is actually worth only $200 billion. The only way a government purchase of that toxic waste can make Gotham solvent again is if the government pays much more than private buyers are willing to offer.
Now, maybe private buyers aren’t willing to pay what toxic waste is really worth: “We don’t have really any rational pricing right now for some of these asset categories,” Ms. Bair says. But should the government be in the business of declaring that it knows better than the market what assets are worth? And is it really likely that paying “fair value,” whatever that means, would be enough to make Gotham solvent again?
What I suspect is that policy makers — possibly without realizing it — are gearing up to attempt a bait-and-switch: a policy that looks like the cleanup of the savings and loans, but in practice amounts to making huge gifts to bank shareholders at taxpayer expense, disguised as “fair value” purchases of toxic assets.
Why go through these contortions? The answer seems to be that Washington remains deathly afraid of the N-word — nationalization. The truth is that Gothamgroup and its sister institutions are already wards of the state, utterly dependent on taxpayer support; but nobody wants to recognize that fact and implement the obvious solution: an explicit, though temporary, government takeover. Hence the popularity of the new voodoo, which claims, as I said, that elaborate financial rituals can reanimate dead banks.
Unfortunately, the price of this retreat into superstition may be high. I hope I’m wrong, but I suspect that taxpayers are about to get another raw deal — and that we’re about to get another financial rescue plan that fails to do the job.

Ottima segnalazione !

Un MANIFESTO mirabile, che offre innumerevoli spunti,
e smaschera " con cognizione di causa " il caos, le manovre e le assurdità
in itinere.

Da conservare a futura memoria

 

[yellow]

19.01.09 17:19 - Irlanda: azioni banche ai minimi di tutti i tempi
DUBLINO (MF-DJ)--Le azioni delle tre principali banche irlandesi hanno oggi toccato i minimi di tutti i tempi.
A pesare sul comparto, accanto ai generali timori legati allo stato di salute delle banche europee, e' stato anche l'annuncio delle dimissioni del numero uno di Bank of Ireland, Brian Goggin. In questo momento, Allied Irish Banks crolla del 55% a 0,65 euro, Bank of Ireland perde il 41% a 0,44 euro e Irish Life & Permanent affonda del 43% a 1,25 euro. Le azioni Anglo Irish Bank sono invece sospese dalla scorsa settimana, in seguito alla nazionalizzazione della banca irlandese. liv

 

[negusneg]

Una domanda "un po particolare"
Le perdite disastrose dell'ultimo trimestre secondo voi sono dovute al default Lehman con consieguente deleverage all'n-esima potenza oppure si sarebbero verificate ugualmente?

La cosa è interessante per capire se è vero il ragionamento di Tremonti di "salvare il salvabile" tutelando la parte bancaria sana e lasciando perdere le banche d'affari che obiettivamente nel sistema economico non è che c'entrino molto

Bella domanda

La mia impressione è che lasciar fallire Lehman abbia scatenato una reazione, con una forte componente psicologica, che ha impresso una accelerazione decisiva alla crisi e ne ha aggravato di molto la profondità.

Però tutto questo non sarebbe stato possibile senza gli altri due madornali errori che sono stati commessi dopo lo scoppio della crisi:

1) la scelta di non costringere le banche da subito a fare veramente chiarezza (il famoso problema dei "corpi" di cui tanto si parlò) che ha portato ad un crollo definitivo della fiducia e

2) la decisione di procrastinare l'adozione di un nuovo sistema di regole, e la riforma del sistema dei rating, in grado di riportare un livello decente di trasparenza sul mercato.

Senza questi due errori era inevitabile che si arrivasse ad una crisi, anche se IMHO senza il crack Lehman la crisi sarebbe stata molto diversa e forse più gestibile.