Titoli di Stato area Euro SLOVENIA - Operativo titoli di stato

Slovenia: elezioni presidenziali l'11/11

Capo di stato uscente Turk si ricandida, dato favorito

25 luglio, 16:29




(ANSA) - LUBIANA, 25 LUG - Le elezioni presidenziali in Slovenia si terranno l'11 novembre e l'eventuale ballottaggio, se nessuno dei candidati gia' al primo turno otterra' la maggioranza del 50% dei voti, tre settimane piu' tardi. Lo ha annunciato oggi il presidente del Parlamento di Lubiana, Gregor Virant. La campagna elettorale iniziera' il 12 ottobre. Tra coloro che hanno deciso di candidarsi anche l'attuale presidente Danilo Turk che 5 anni fa fu eletto come indipendente e che i sondaggi danno per favorito.
 
INSIGHT-Slovenia rues bank mismanagement as bailout talk grows


Thu Jul 26, 2012 4:00am EDT

* Banks shackled with 6 bln euros in bad loans
* Burden could force Slovenia to seek bailout
* Culture of lending to people, firms with political links
* Biggest bank may need 500 bln euros by end-2013

By Marja Novak




LJUBLJANA, July 26 (Reuters) - When he took control of his country's biggest bank in 2009, Drasko Veselinovic expected a rough ride.
He knew Slovenia's state-owned Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) was facing difficulty as the country's boom years began grinding to a halt.

But what he did not expect was the same politicians who berated him in public to be privately asking for secret favours.
Some "would strongly criticise me in the media", he told Reuters, "and on the very same day they would press one of my colleagues on the management board for a loan for a certain company".

In the years when Slovenia was booming, and the success of this tiny ex-Communist Alpine state was seen as little short of a miracle, NLB seemed to epitomise what had gone right.

Now, as Slovenia joins the list of euro zone countries facing a possible bailout, the bank's tale seems to sum up not only what went wrong here, but the toxic mix of politics and finance that has bedevilled the banking system across Europe.
NLB denies giving loans based on political connections.

Green and mountainous in its 8,000 square miles between Italy and Austria, Slovenia had been a trailblazer for the rest of the former Yugoslavia and eastern Europe.

When the country of 2 million people joined Europe's single currency in 2007, its economy was the union's fastest growing, driven by exports of Renault cars, household appliances and pharmaceuticals.

It even ran a balanced budget and was the envy of its fellow former Yugoslav republics, countries that, unlike Slovenia, had been stunted and scarred by ethnic conflict.

Tall and distinguished in wire-rimmed glasses, Veselinovic, 53, had run the Slovenian bourse until 2004, and rose to become Chief Executive Officer of NLB in early 2009, signing up to a five-year term.

But he resigned within three months, citing political interference. The state now owns 64 percent of NLB, up from 59 percent after a capital hike this month.

"The political pressure took various forms, but was always present," said Veselinovic.
"I had to leave because I didn't agree with some of the crazy ideas of politicians, which would have meant big problems for the bank even sooner than they actually came about."

Since his departure it has emerged that Slovenia's state-owned banks, NLB chief among them, are shackled with huge portfolios of bad loans that Slovenia's now-shrinking economy can ill afford to cover. These include 1.5 billion euros of loans at NLB that the country's finance minister said in July would probably not be repaid.

NLB told Reuters it had about 3 billion euros of poorly performing loans, but could not say how much would be repaid. Its plight has triggered speculation that Slovenia may become the sixth member of the 17-nation currency union to seek a bailout from its partners.

DENIAL

Accused of handing big loans to the politically connected with insufficient regard for risk, NLB has swallowed four capital injections totalling more than 1 billion euros since Slovenia joined the euro, the latest funded solely by the state when it provided 381 million euros in fresh capital this month.

Both the current government and opposition are trading blame for the crisis, accusing the other of political interference; most analysts say the blame should be shared.

"I never called any banker and told him to give someone a loan of 1 million or 10 million euros ... But there are people who have such power," Prime Minister Janez Jansa, of the ruling Slovenian Democratic Party, told television channel Kanal A last week, referring to a NLB loan for a project of an opposition-controlled city council.

Spokesmen for the two main opposition parties, Positive Slovenia and the Social Democrats, gave no immediate comment.
In a statement to Reuters, NLB rejected the accusation of favouritism.

"Political connection cannot be the basis for a loan. Loans are given based on checking the credit rating of the creditor, judging the project that is being financed and estimating the money flow that would ensure that the loan will be repaid," the company said.

Finance Minister Janez Sustersic says NLB may need another injection of up to 500 million euros ($613 billion) by the end of next year.

Local media reports say Slovenia's second and third-largest banks - state-owned Nova KBM and partially state-owned Abanka Vipa - might together need 150 million euros this year to cover bad loans.

Not a problem while the good times rolled, but Slovenia's 36 billion euro economy is now facing a renewed contraction of at least 0.9 percent this year, according to a government forecast, as demand for its exports in crisis-hit Europe wanes.

The budget gap reached 6.4 percent of economic output in 2011, more than double the EU's target ceiling.
The government strenuously denies needing a bailout for its ailing banks, for now. The markets are not so sure.

Slovenian five-year credit default swaps are up more than 200 percent on a year ago at 440 basis points, and the government was forced in April to shelve plans to issue a 1.5 billion euro sovereign bond because the yield demanded exceeded 5 percent.

The reluctance of successive Slovenian governments to sell the country's major assets, including its banks, is now coming back to haunt them.

The plight of NLB, Nova KBM and Abanka Vipa "provides the greatest proof of the damage done by state ownership and the links between the economy and politics", said economist Igor Masten.

Masten served for three years on the NLB's supervisory board, which is mostly state-appointed, but was dismissed in June as part of a changing of the guard when a new centre-right coalition came to power with its own ideas on how the bank should be run.

The three banks, which control more than 50 percent of the Slovenian banking market, now account for the lion's share of about 6 billion euros in bad loans, or 11.8 percent of all loans at the end of March. Most date back to the boom years of 2006-2008.

Both Masten and Veselinovic declined to name names or elaborate on the most egregious political meddling.
One case that has surfaced is that of Simona Dimic, who as an aide to then Prime Minister Borut Pahor in 2009 received a loan of 350,000 euros from NLB at a relatively low interest rate.

Slovenian media jumped on the sum and the favourable terms as evidence of favouritism, and Dimic later resigned citing media pressure, though she denied getting special treatment or other wrongdoing.

Citing national interest, Slovenia for years shunned suitors for its stakes in key enterprises but is now scrambling to sell off the banks.

RUSH TO PRIVATISE

The country's last big bank sales were back in 2001, when SKB was sold to France's Societe Generale, and in 2002 when Banka Koper was sold to Italy's Sanpaolo IMI. Both banks now operate profitably.

In 2002, Slovenia sold 34 percent of NLB to Belgian banking and insurance group KBC but later rebuffed KBC's efforts to take a majority stake.
KBC did not take part in NLB's capital hike this month, and its share in the bank is now 22 percent.

The government hopes that by reducing its majority stake in the two largest banks, NLB and Nova KBM, to 25 percent, it could drive down the interest it has to pay on its bonds. It also wants to create a state holding firm to take over bad loans in the state banking sector.

Analysts say it must also free up the labour market, raise the retirement age and improve the efficiency of the public health system if the economy is to really turn the corner.

"The situation in private banks is much better than in the banks owned by the state," Prime Minister Jansa told reporters this month.
"Keeping the banks in state hands would only lead to the constant need for capital hikes."

But buyers are hard to come by, particularly after successive governments blocked a number of major privatisation deals.
Last year, the previous centre-left government blocked the sale of Slovenia's largest food retailer Mercator to its Croatian rival Agrokor, saying the deal would hurt the Slovenian food industry and the economy as a whole.

And in 2008, Jansa's then centre-right government rejected all bids for the national telecoms operator Telekom, saying they were too low.

"Slovenia rejected serious bidders several times, as in the cases of NLB, Mercator and Telekom, so it's no longer credible as a serious seller, and that's why it's even more difficult to find a buyer for NLB now," said Veselinovic.

NLB was one of 12 local lenders and firms that planned to sell their joint stake in Mercator when the government stopped the deal last year.

Having banked on about 100 million euros for NLB from the sale, CEO Bozo Jasovic quit. He remains in charge as the government seeks a successor.

"The political pressure around the sale of Mercator was quite open," said former NLB supervisory board member Masten.
"Ministers were writing to the (NLB) management demanding that they take into account the consequences for the Slovenian food industry and the economy."

Veselinovic, who now teaches at Ljubljana's Faculty of Economics, said Slovenia could still avoid a bailout, "but the price will again by paid by the taxpayers".

"Given that the price that could be reached for NLB is low, Slovenia will probably end up keeping the bank while all the bad loans of the past will be covered by the budget, which means by the taxpayers."
 
Ultima modifica:
Slovenia, Moody's decapita top bank

Declassati di più gradi i tre maggiori istituti finanziari del paese






LUBIANA - L'agenzia Moody's ha declassato di più gradi il rating creditizio delle tre maggiori banche slovene, spiegando che gli istituti finanziari sloveni sono i peggio capitalizzati in tutta l'Europa centrale e orientale. Lo riferiscono i media di Lubiana citando un comunicato di Moody's diffuso nella tarda serata di ieri.

Il rating della Nova ljubljanska banka (Nlb) è sceso di tre punti, da Ba2 a B2, quello della Nova kreditna banka Maribor (Nkbm) di quattro, da Ba2 a B3, come pure della Abanka Vipa, sceso da Ba3 a Caa1, con una outlook negativo per tutte e tre. L'agenzia aveva già declassato le tre banche agli inizi di aprile.

I primi due istituti sono in maggioranza di proprietà dello Stato sloveno, mentre nella Abanka la Slovenia possiede una quota rilevante delle azioni. Secondo Moody's il declassamento è legato al peggioramento dei fondamentali delle tre banche, incluso «un duraturo e consistente peggioramento della qualità delle loro proprietà» e una «crescita rapida» del volume di prestiti che non potranno essere restituiti.


(Corriere del Ticino.ch)
 
(Il Sole 24 Ore Radiocor) - Milano, 03 ago - Moody's ha
abbassato il rating sul debito sovrano della Slovenia a
'Baa2' da 'A2', mantenendo al tempo stesso sulla valutazione
l'outlook 'negativo'. La decisione dell'agenzia riflette,
spiega una nota, soprattutto tre fattori: a) la necessaria
ulteriore ricapitalizzazione del suo sistema bancario
aumenta il rischio di altre passivita' cristallizzate per il
debito sovrano b) il costo per il finanziamento dello Stato
e' in aumento e il suo accesso al mercato e' sempre piu'
difficile c) l'economia slovena continua a essere debole
mentre aumenta la sua vulnerabilita' agli shock, con il
settore corporate gia' debole che deve fare i conti con le
sfide fiscali del Governo. Le prospettive 'negative'
riflettono invece la visione di Moody's che le sfide per il
finanziamento del debito sovrano e i rischi del suo sistema
finanziario rimangono elevate. Il deterioramento
macroeconomico amplifica questo rischio e apre alla
possibilita' che il Paese possa chiedere un aiuto esterno.
Man-
 
Slovenia/ Tassi bond schizzano dopo taglio rating Moody's

Governo: scelta sorprendente, aiuto Ue non ci serve






Lubiana, 3 ago. (TMNews) - Rendimenti in rialzo per i titoli di Stato sloveni dopo che ieri in serata Moody's ha tagliato il rating sul debito sloveno, una mossa definita sorprendente dal governo di Lubiana che ha smentito ancora una volta la necessità di un salvataggio della Ue.

"La decisione di declassare la Slovenia ha sorpreso il governo dato che non prende in considerazione" le misure di austerità adottate nei mesi recenti, afferma un comunicato del ministero delle Finanze.

La nota aggiunge che il governo di centrodestra guidato da Janez Jansa ritiene che "in questo momento non ci sia necessità di un aiuto finanziario da parte del meccanismo Ue". Ieri sera Moody's ha tagliato il rating della Slovenia a Baa2 da A2, mantenendo un outlook negativo sul debito del piccolo Paese dell'eurozona.

Tra i motivi del declassamento l'agenzia di rating cita l'eventualità che il sistema bancario sloveno possa avere necessità di ulteriori ricapitalizzazioni, l'aumento dei tassi sul credito bancario e la crescente vulnerabilità agli shock legata alla dipendenza del Paese dall'export.

I tassi sui bond decennali sloveni sono balzati al 7,03% dal 6,76% di ieri sera.

Il ministero ha detto di avere risorse sufficienti per proseguire "indisturbato a finanziare" il bilancio di quest'anno senza dover ricorrere ai mercati internazionali. "Nel futuro il governo continuerà ad attuare le riforme strutturali necessarie e a garantire l'equilibrio dei conti pubblici, mantenendo gli impegni presi con la Ue" si legge nel comunicato del ministero.

(fonte Afp)
 
Slovenia Downgrade by Moody’s Increases Chances of Rescue


By Boris Cerni and Agnes Lovasz - Aug 3, 2012 8:05 PM GMT+0200






Slovenia’s downgrade by Moody’s Investors Service, which said its struggling banks will need government funding, increases the likelihood that the Adriatic nation will become Europe’s sixth bailout victim. Standard & Poor’s cut its debt grade today.

Moody’s lowered the rating three levels to Baa2, two levels above investment grade, and maintained its negative outlook. S&P cut the rating to A, five steps below the top investment grade, from A+, assigning a negative outlook that indicates it’s more inclined to trim its assessment further than raise it or leave it unchanged.

“The likelihood of support being needed is very high,” Jaime Reusche, a New York-based Moody’s analyst, said in the statement. “This potential additional debt burden comes at a time when the government is already facing significant challenges in its efforts to consolidate its fiscal position.”

Slovenia may become the sixth euro-region member after Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus to require a rescue as the 17-nation currency area grapples with a deepening debt and banking crisis. The nation’s biggest banks -- Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d., Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. and Abanka Vipa d.d. -- rely on the European Central Bank for liquidity and had their deposit ratings cut by Moody’s on July 25 as their bad loans continue to climb.


Bond Yield

The yield on Slovenia’s 4.375 percent bond maturing in January 2021, surged 41 basis points, or 0.41 percentage point, to 7 percent at 7:08 p.m. in Ljubljana, according to data compiled by Bloomberg News.

Political risks to the implementation of an economic overhaul and deteriorating asset quality at banks have contributed to “financial sector external funding contracting sharply, government funding costs increasing, and the domestic economy weakening,” S&P said today in a statement.

Funding costs are increasing because of Slovenia’s growing reliance on “shorter-term issuance” and domestic banks, Moody’s said late yesterday. The country’s three largest lenders may need a capital injection equal to as much as 8 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, Moody’s said.


‘Deeply Regrets’


The Slovenian government “deeply regrets” the downgrade “as the rating company hasn’t taken into account measures that have been undertaken to consolidate public finances,” the Finance Ministry said in an e-mailed statement. “Slovenia, considering its budget gap and public debt, cannot be compared with Spain, Italy or Greece and the banking sector isn’t as big as in Spain.”

Slovenia “at the moment” has no need to ask for assistance from the EU and “isn’t exposed to refinancing risks” with funding sufficient to finance the budget until year-end “even with increased market uncertainties,” the ministry said today.

The government of Prime Minister Janez Jansa has pledged to cut spending this year by 800 million euros ($990 million) and narrow a budget deficit that swelled to 6.4 percent of GDP last year. The 2012 deficit goal is 3.5 percent, Moody’s said.

“Continued weakness in the economy could hinder the achievement of these targets,” the rating company said. “Additional capital injections into the banking system could materially affect the country’s deficit trends.”


Nearing Recession


Slovenia’s export-driven economy is teetering on the brink of a second recession in three years as demand for its goods in Europe fades amid a crisis that has threatened to rip apart the single-currency region since its start in Greece in late 2009.

“The prospect for an International Monetary Fund and EU bailout depends much more heavily on how events pan out in the euro zone,” William Jackson, an emerging-markets economist at Capital Economics in London, said by phone. “If we see another substantial flare up in tensions, then the Slovenian government could find borrowing on the markets is prohibitively costly.”

Slovenia’s five-year credit default swaps were at 424 basis points today, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, after reaching a record high of 434 basis points on July 9. The derivatives are used by investors to speculate on the country’s ability to repay debt. Romania’s CDS were at 415 basis points while Hungary’s stood at 460 basis points, data show.



To contact the reporters on this story: Boris Cerni in Ljubljana at [email protected]; Agnes Lovasz in London at [email protected]
 
TEXT-S&P affirms 'BBpi' unsolicited rating on Nova Kreditna Bank

Tue Aug 7, 2012 2:05pm IST


(The following statement was released by the rating agency)
Aug 07

Overview
-- We lowered our sovereign credit rating on Slovenia to 'A' from 'A+' and revised our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment to 'group 7' from 'group 6', owing to increased economic risk.
-- We lowered Nova Kreditna Bank Maribor's (NKBM) stand-alone credit profile to the 'b' category from the 'bb' category because we believe its financial profile will continue to weaken, in line with the banking system as a whole.
-- That said, we believe NKBM would receive financial support from the Slovenian government in case of need, because we view the bank as having high systemic importance.
-- We are therefore affirming our unsolicited public information rating on NKBM at 'BBpi'.

Rating Action

On Aug. 7, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBpi' unsolicited public information (pi) rating on Slovenia-based Nova Kreditna Bank Maribor d.d. (NKBM).
We do not use outlooks or modifiers (+ or -) for pi ratings.

Rationale

The affirmation reflects our view that the government of Slovenia (A/Negative/A-1) would provide extraordinary financial support to NKBM if needed. This offsets the negative impact on NKBM's financial profile--and those of all Slovenian banks--of Slovenia's weakening economic resilience and what we see as accumulated imbalances, reflected in mounting nonperforming loans (NPLs) and credit losses for the banking sector (see "Long-Term Rating On Republic of Slovenia Lowered To 'A'; Outlook Negative," published Aug. 3, 2012, and "BICRA On Slovenia Revised To Group '7' From Group '6'," published Aug 6, 2012).

We believe NKBM's financial profile, as well as that of the Slovenian banking system as a whole, will continue to deteriorate. As a result, we have revised down our assessment of the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to the 'b' category from the 'bb' category.

The lowering of the SACP factors in the negative impact of higher economic risk in Slovenia on our anchor, which is our starting point for assigning a bank a long-term rating. We have lowered our anchor for banks operating in Slovenia to 'bb' from 'bb+'. This reflects our revised Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) for Slovenia, which we lowered to 'group 7' from 'group 6'.

That said, we continue to see NKBM as having "high" systemic importance and Slovenia as supportive toward its banking sector, according to our criteria. This is because NKBM is the second-largest bank in the country, with a market share in loans and deposits of around 12%. Therefore, as we continue to factor in our expectation of extraordinary support from the government, the lowering of NKBM's SACP has not led to a lowering of our unsolicited pi rating.

NKBM's SACP is affected by weaker asset quality, with rising nonperforming loans (NPLs, 16.7% in March 2012 compared with 15.7% in 2011 and 12.8% in 2010), and squeezed margins. As a result, NKBM can't generate sufficient revenues to cover the losses that may arise from these NPLs. On March 31, 2012, NKBM's reserving rate (the proportion of loan loss reserves to NPLs) was 65%, which is low since we expect NPLs to continue rising to more than 18% by the end of the year. Like other Slovenian banks, NKBM is exposed to highly leveraged construction and real-estate companies. These borrowers' credit quality has rapidly weakened since 2008 after years of overheating and consequent bankruptcies.

In addition, NKBM has limited capacity to generate capital internally. Margins are historically lower in Slovenia than in Central Eastern Europe, partly reflecting the dominance of state-owned banks, and are not sufficient to create buffers to absorb credit losses in recessionary times. NKBM was heavily loss making in 2011 and we expect it to post another loss and at best a marginal profit in 2013. Even if NKBM's balance sheet--and therefore its risk-weighted assets--is shrinking, we believe its capital position will further deteriorate from the current level in the absence of any capital increase. We still believe our projected risk-adjusted capital ratio before diversification should stay at around 5% by the end of 2013, a "moderate" level according to our criteria.

The unsolicited pi rating on NKBM reflects the 'bb' anchor for a bank operating predominately in Slovenia, as well as our view that its business position, funding, and liquidity are neutral factors for the rating, while its capital and earnings and risk position, are negative factors for the rating.

Related Criteria And Research

-- BICRA On Slovenia Revised To Group '7' From Group '6', Aug. 6, 2012
-- Long-Term Rating On Republic of Slovenia Lowered To 'A'; Outlook Negative, Aug. 3, 2012
-- Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
-- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
Ratings List


Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. (Unsolicited Ratings)
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBpi/--/--
 
Ultima modifica:
Fitch downgrades 6 Slovenian banks, outlook negative








Thu Aug 9, 2012 8:46pm IST

Aug 9 - Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. (NLB), Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. (NKBM), Abanka Vipa d.d., Gorenjska Banka (GB), Banka Celje d.d. (BC) and Probanka d.d.. The agency has also downgraded their Viability Ratings (VRs) and lowered the Support Rating Floors (SRFs).

At the same time, the agency has affirmed Banka Koper's (BK) IDRs and downgraded its VR. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs of all the banks are Negative. A full list of rating actions is at the end of this commentary.

RATING ACTION RATIONALE, DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: NLB AND NKBM'S IDRS AND SRFS The downgrades of the Long-term IDRs of NLB and NKBM to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', and revisions of the SRFs, reflect the weakening of the Slovenian government's credit profile, and hence its ability to provide support to the banks (see 'Fitch Downgrades Slovenia to 'A-'; Outlook Negative' dated 8 August 2012 at Fitch Ratings - Dedicated to providing value beyond the rating).

The three-notch difference between the sovereign's ratings and the state-owned banks' ratings reflects the current lack of an articulated and credible plan to strengthen NKBM and NLB's solvency, and previous delays with capital injections into both banks.

At the same time, the ratings continue to be driven by the banks' majority state ownership, high systemic importance, the track record of capital support (albeit after significant delays) in H111 (NKBM and NLB) and in Q212 (NLB), the potential availability of EU support mechanisms for bank recapitalisation, in case of need, and Fitch's base case expectation that the recapitalisation needs of the two banks (about EUR1.5bn under the base scenario) should be affordable for the sovereign.

Fitch's view of probable support also takes into account the government's stated intention to maintain a blocking minority (25% stake plus one share) in both banks and potential reputational damage for the authorities should NKBM or NLB default.

The Negative Outlooks on NKBM's and NLB's ratings reflect the Negative Outlook on the sovereign rating. The ratings could be downgraded again if there was a further sovereign downgrade, a prolonged failure to articulate and implement a bank recapitalisation plan, or if the banks' recapitalisation needs are substantially greater than currently anticipated.

RATING ACTION RATIONALE, DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: VRS; ABANKA, GB, BC AND PROBANKA'S LONG-TERM IDRS The downgrades of the seven banks' VRs reflect varying degrees of further deterioration in their standalone profiles, in light of growing impaired loans, tighter capitalisation and the weaker than expected performance of the Slovenian economy, which Fitch now forecasts to contract by 1.1% in 2012.

The VRs also continue to reflect high levels of credit risk in the banks' corporate loan portfolios, particularly exposures to the highly leveraged real estate/construction sector and holding companies, and low levels of reserve coverage of impaired loans.

They also reflect the banks' generally weak pre-impairment performance, driven by moderate interest rate spreads and high levels of non-cash generating assets. However, the VRs also consider the present generally comfortable liquidity positions of the banks, which are sufficient to service market funding.

Loan/deposit ratios remain high, but wholesale funding providers have to a large degree been shifted from international financial markets to the fully-state owned Slovene Export and Development Bank and the ECB.

Fitch notes that deposits have generally been stable to date, which is also underpinned by material long-term deposits sourced from the central government.
In total, Fitch estimates that a further EUR3.5bn (about 10% of forecast 2012 GDP) of fresh capital will be needed to restore the sector's viability, assuming a rise in NPLs to 25% (end-May: about 18%, based on Fitch's estimations), prudent NPL provisioning at 80% and a system Tier 1 ratio of 10%.

However, recapitalisation needs may reach EUR5.5bn (about 15.5% of GDP) should NPLs rise to 33%. The downgrades of Abanka, GB, BC and Probanka's VRs have also driven the downgrades of their Long-term IDRs.

The revision of the SRFs also contributed to the downgrades of Abanka, BC and Probanka's Long-term IDRs. Each of the seven banks' VRs could be downgraded again if there is a further marked deterioration in asset quality, capitalisation or liquidity (for example due to significant deposit outflows).

If a downgrade of Abanka, GB, BC or Probanka's VR is not offset by provision of external support, the Long-term IDRs of these banks would also be likely downgraded. A stabilisation of the inflow of bad debts, strengthening of capitalisation (capital increases are currently planned at some banks) and improved performance of the Slovenian economy would reduce negative pressure on the ratings.

RATING ACTION RATIONALE, DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: SRFS OF ABANKA, GB, BC AND PROBANKA The downgrades of Abanka, GB, BC and Probanka's SRFs reflects Fitch's revised opinion on the potential for state support to be made available to domestic, privately-owned banks.

In Fitch's view, support from the Slovenian authorities for these banks is uncertain and cannot be relied upon given their private ownership, the reluctance of the authorities to inject capital into state-owned banks, and the banks' smaller market shares, relative to NLB and NKBM. Abanka's SRF of 'B-' reflects its higher domestic systemic importance compared with other private banks in Slovenia.

The SRFs of the privately-owned domestic banks could be upgraded if the authorities articulate and implement a plan to recapitalise the banking sector as a whole.

RATING ACTION RATIONALE, DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: BK's IDRS BK's IDRs are driven by potential support from its 97.56% owner, Intesa Sanpaolo ('A-'/Negative).
The ratings could be downgraded if ISP's Long-term IDR, which currently has a Negative Outlook, was downgraded.

The rating actions are as follows:

NLB
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', removed from Rating Watch Negative (RWN), assigned Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3 ', removed from RWN Support Rating: affirmed at '2', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'

NKBM
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', removed from RWN, assigned Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3 ', removed from RWN Support Rating: affirmed at '2', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'bb' Hybrid capital instrument: downgraded to 'CC' from 'B+'

Abanka
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'BB-', removed from RWN, assigned Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B' Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'BB-', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b' Hybrid capital instrument: downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC' Guaranteed notes: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'

Probanka
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to ' CCC' from 'B', removed from RWN Short-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'C' from 'B' Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'NF' from 'B', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'

Banka Celje
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB', Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B' Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'NF' from 'BB-', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b+' from 'BB'

Gorenjska Banka
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB- from 'BB', Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B' Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3', removed from RWN Support Rating Floor: revised to 'NF' from 'BB-', removed from RWN Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb'

Koper
Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+', Negative Outlook Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2' Support Rating: affirmed at '2' Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb' from 'bb+'

Additional information is available on Fitch Ratings - Dedicated to providing value beyond the rating. The ratings above were solicited by, or on behalf of, the issuer, and therefore, Fitch has been compensated for the provision of the ratings.

Applicable criteria, 'Global Financial Institutions Rating Criteria', dated 16 August 2011 and 'Rating Bank Regulatory Capital and Similar Securities', dated 15 December 2011, are available at Fitch Ratings - Dedicated to providing value beyond the rating.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research: Global Financial Institutions Rating Criteria Rating Bank Regulatory Capital and Similar Securities
 
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