maurizi0
Forumer storico
ecco queste cose fanno pensare:
We believe the largest problem facinng Bernanke is high and rising long term interest rates. With record fundinng requirementts by the Treasury, looming rrefinancing disasters in commmercial real estate (CRE), massive upcoming defaults in prime, Alt-A and credit card, and waning ennthusiasm for the US Dollar, he can ill afford the econommic meltdown that a massive repatriation of US Treasuries and Dollars would have.
Once long term yields reach a critical level (which we cannot know and would be difficuult to even estimate), the FR becomes locked in a money printing cycle that will ulltimately becomme hyperinflationary and resuult in the FR haaving to buy everry US Bond, Note and Bill in order to preveent the econommic Armageddoon that comes wwith a panicked exodus from US debt and currency. Such a meltdownn would be a 10 on a scale off 1 to 10 where as last Fall was perhaps a 2 or 3, at best.
dacché la conclusione :
If Bernanke’s biggest threat is high long term yields, the easiest way to prevent or postpone a yield ramp is to kill the stock market and create a flight to safety situation that lowers long term yields. As the 30 Year yield started rapidly advancing in May of this year, we became increasingly vocal that this was a likely scenario.
When it hit 4.83% on June 10 (and the 10 Year broke 4.00%), and we became aware that that M2 non-seasonally adjusted (M2 NSA) was on the decline as it had been the previous summer preceding the fall meltdown, we become open to the possibility of a large correction, perhaps to retest the 666 low in the S&P500.
cioé questi sono negativi sul mercato da giugno 2009... ma ammettono che :
During this time, we revised our theory and became open to the possibility that there would not be an intentional market crash, but that Bernanke and the FRNY would engage in a dance that would see equities rise, then correct just as Treasuries were in danger of picking up downward momentum (and yields upwards momentum), then correct again just when it appeared that equities were in danger of crashing. In retrospect, this was the more logical choice because the FRNY, with the large member banks on its board, would not have permitted another major equities downturn if it could help it
When it hit 4.83% on June 10 (and the 10 Year broke 4.00%), and we became aware that that M2 non-seasonally adjusted (M2 NSA) was on the decline as it had been the previous summer preceding the fall meltdown, we become open to the possibility of a large correction, perhaps to retest the 666 low in the S&P500.
cioé questi sono negativi sul mercato da giugno 2009... ma ammettono che :
During this time, we revised our theory and became open to the possibility that there would not be an intentional market crash, but that Bernanke and the FRNY would engage in a dance that would see equities rise, then correct just as Treasuries were in danger of picking up downward momentum (and yields upwards momentum), then correct again just when it appeared that equities were in danger of crashing. In retrospect, this was the more logical choice because the FRNY, with the large member banks on its board, would not have permitted another major equities downturn if it could help it