Tbond-tbills-tBUND-ti amo MARJA (VM 10 anni in borsa)

[dan24]

eh no eh no
ti nego l'appoggio, anche se esplicitamente richiesto
abbassare i tassi BCE serviva a nà segha ieri come oggi
il taglio della FED ha aggravato il problema
regole ci volevano e ci vogliono
così , come ho letto , si salva il malato dall'infarto
e si festeggia a grappa e sigarette

ma visto che la FED tagliava e tagliava...la Bce lasciando andare lo spread tra i tassi..ha solo aggravato e spinto la speculazione sulel commodities e l'euro che hanno dato la mazzata finale alla Ns economia...

no ha fatto bene la Bce a farsi inkulare con mesi di svalutazione del dollaro e pompaggio commodities con GS che ha messo apposto il bilancio sull'ICE ..ma dai...

se la Fed e la Bce fossero state concordi nel mantenere i tassi inalterati era una cosa...ma farsi inkulare dagli Usa ..beee questa è la dimostrazione della loro idiozia...ed adesso si trovano a DOVER TAGLIARE...DOPO UN RIALZO DI 0,25 IN LUGLIO A CHE CA-ZZO E' SERVITO?????

 

[maria]

27255-19925

l'euroribor sceso un niente...se non si torna vicini al TUF è un macello

grazie dan , ce li avevo sotto gli occhi ma...oggi gira così

Ci sentiamo, byeeee. Meglio staccare prima che ne combini una delle mie...

 

[gipa69]

beh, in Italia andò ben peggio, nel '70 c'era la scala mobile che produsse una inflazione devastante

non so però come era andata in Germania... qualcuno ha un CPI per la Germania ?
a parte che adesso siamo in una situazione ancora diversa, quindi il parallelo storico non è così essenziale...

In Germania l'inflazione era sostenuta ma non forte come in USA o in Italia.
Ma sono daccordo con te il parallelo storico non può esserci perchè la situazione è diversa, i motivi per cui la situazione è diversa sono davvero tanti che elencarli adesso rimarrei qua a scrivere per due o tre ore...
pensiamo solo alla causa della crisi di allora ed alla causa della crisi di adesso e noteremo una certa differenza.
Però nei prossimi anni inflazione ci sarà....

gran pezzo di Coxe......

Our innate skepticism about the assumed 99-44/100% reliability of macro​

models comes from our recollections about Herman Kahn in 1972. He was
the global intellectual darling who, after years of labor, unveiled the first
all-inclusive computer-based econometric forecast of the global economy. It
was a masterpiece, using, we were told, every important economic variable.
Sadly for the brilliant scientist, the model didn’t include the price of oil, or the
availability of anchovies—because nothing of any importance had happened
to oil prices or the anchovy harvest for years. Then came the Yom Kippur War​

and the El Niño-driven disappearance of the anchovies; the world was beset
with fuel and food inflation, and the Kahn model that would supposedly be​

the global standard for years was abandoned.​

Wall Street’s “Black Swan” for this decade was house price deflation. Bear​

Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and other investment banking organizations built
models based on the evidence that house prices nationally had never fallen​

for as much as a year since World War II—which meant forever. (The 1930s​

were considered to be as irrelevant for assessing modern liquidity and​

solvency risks, as the Crisis of 1907.) So that careful editing of historical data​

meant there was no endogenous risk in housing mortgages as an asset class.
The Street then proceeded to add layers of complexity that made individual
mortgagors’ ability to service debt impossible for external valuators to
appraise. Most notably, the modelers made no provision for the possibility
that widening the housing market to include millions of marginal and​

submarginal borrowers who had historically been excluded from the ranks
of approved borrowers might be a new risk factor, or that the boom in home
equity and piggyback loans would put millions of “conventional” mortgagors
at risk. The rating agencies, enticed by huge fees, looked at the models, and
began issuing AAA ratings by the trillions. Investors near and far rushed to
load up on high-yielding risk-free merchandise.
A new “shadow banking system” of hedge funds, Credit Default Swap
players, and supercharged investment banks emerged to control and manage
the absorption of the torrents of complex products. Supplies of these
computer-spawned marvels seemed unlimited, because their issuance was
unconstrained by such old-hat prejudices as requiring homebuyers to show
records of steady employment, or certifying that monthly mortgage payments
should not exceed set percentages of after-tax income of the borrowers.
Mathematics-based hedge funds sprang up like mushrooms after a summer
rain. Each time they bought a CDO, or a piece thereof, they confirmed that
the price shown on the Banks’ books for these creations was genuine market
value.
The resultant housing boom delighted home builders, realtors, home owners,​

speculators, mortgage originators (old, new, and fly-by-night), Fannie and​

Freddie and their Congressional shills, Wall Street, and George W. Bush.
The boom was also great for the employment data. At one point, the number
of licensed real estate brokers in California was almost equal to the number
of houses sold the previous year.
When we read that statistic, and looked at such indicators as the booming
stock price of Countrywide Financial, we recalled the story of a somewhat
skeptical 19th Century macro-economist who theorized, during a boom,
about an ideal economy in which everyone made a precarious living taking
in each other’s laundry.
The other major contributor to the seemingly exponential growth of these
mathematical masterpieces was a new banking creature, the Structured
Investment Vehicle, or SIV. The SIV was the second serious deviant from the
international banking solvency and liquidity systems that were the brainchild
of history’s greatest Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker.​

Mr. Volcker’s going-away gift to the global financial system when he retired
in 1987 was organizing the committees and research for what would be
known as the Basel Accord. Like the other central bankers, Mr. Volcker was
thoroughly sick of having to bail out bad banks. So the Accord was a rulebased
system for analyzing all global banks’ balance sheets according to an
international formula. This was resisted by many nations’ regulators, but
the selling feature was that it was voluntary and didn’t displace local rulemaking.
Any bank considering making interbank loans to a bank in a foreign
jurisdiction could look at its risk-adjusted financial statement and see whether
it would be a reliable borrower. Result: interbank lending accelerated to
undreamt-of peaks, and bank failures became almost extinct. In the history
of global finance, there had been no similar achievement. As the memory
of past banking crises receded, financial friction virtually disappeared and​

credit flowed more and more rapidly at a time the WTO was also expanding​

global trade to undreamt-of levels.
The Age of Pure, Free Global Capitalism had dawned with the end of the
Soviet Empire.
Tragically, this success spawned frustration and greed among many leading
international banks who believed their own risk models made the Basel Rules
obsolete—for them. So they managed to get agreement on a replacement
for Basel, called Basel II, which let some conspicuously virtuous European
banks which had demonstrated unbroken success of their own risk models
use those models for balance sheet valuation. In recent months, some of​

those virtuous banks have been publicly deflowered, notably the bank that​

liked to claim that its long and storied history has been characterized by
old-fashioned Scottish canniness.​

​

​

Some of the big North American banks became so envious of the heavilylevered
investment banks—like the glittering Goldman—that they determined
to find schemes to expand their leverage to levels more in accordance
with their own intellectual brilliance. They believed they were as smart as
Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and Bear Stearns, so why shouldn’t they earn the
kinds of bonuses those investment banks’ top managements earned? Surely
“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house” wasn’t meant to apply to an
investment house. Besides, publishing the Ten Commandments in public
places had been banned.
Thus were born the SIVs. Whether by coincidence or not, they came on the
scene at about the time an impatient and greedy group of managers within
a US natural gas utility known as Enron decided to abandon the staid utility
model and become a virtual corporation that was attuned to the cool ethos​

of the tech boom. Enron wanted to achieve greater leverage and flexibility, so​

they set up off-balance-sheet companies known as Special Purpose Entities
(SPEs) to raise funds to finance Enron’s rapid growth.
Enron’s greed and deceit ended badly. And, in the ensuing furor over its
collapse, Washington responded with Sarbanes-Oxley, which passed in
indecent haste, and with the prosecution and conviction of Enron’s top
management.
However, the bankers who had set up SIVs apparently learned nothing from
Enron’s collapse, except the importance of not being caught. Their SPEs
(SIVs) were financed separately and raised gigantic sums, but the banks’
“sponsorship” of these new creatures was somewhat vague. The SIVs didn’t
go on the banks’ balance sheets for Basel or regulatory purposes, but because
they borrowed using short-term commercial paper and invested long term,
they greatly expanded banks’ real leverage, and increased the all-important
Return on Equity—a crucial component of senior officers’ bonus packages.
The operating principle was that the extra returns from leverage were evidence
of the extra brain power of bankers.
Banks can go bust in three ways:
1. Through a liquidity crisis arising from borrowing short and investing long
and being forced to pay off short-term debt at a time the long investments,
though still of good quality, are too illiquid to provide needed cash.
2. By borrowing short and investing long in bad investments that cannot be
sold at anything approaching the price at which they were acquired.
3. By getting caught both ways…​

​

spectacularly.​

​

 

[dan24]

grazie dan , ce li avevo sotto gli occhi ma...oggi gira così

Ci sentiamo, byeeee. Meglio staccare prima che ne combini una delle mie...

de nada

SOc. Gen sospesa al ribasso

 

[f4f]

ma visto che la FED tagliava e tagliava...la Bce lasciando andare lo spread tra i tassi..ha solo aggravato e spinto la speculazione sulel commodities e l'euro che hanno dato la mazzata finale alla Ns economia...

no ha fatto bene la Bce a farsi inkulare con mesi di svalutazione del dollaro e pompaggio commodities con GS che ha messo apposto il bilancio sull'ICE ..ma dai...

se la Fed e la Bce fossero state concordi nel mantenere i tassi inalterati era una cosa...ma farsi inkulare dagli Usa ..beee questa è la dimostrazione della loro idiozia...ed adesso si trovano a DOVER TAGLIARE...DOPO UN RIALZO DI 0,25 IN LUGLIO A CHE CA-ZZO E' SERVITO?????

discorso lungo ....
magari avrebbero carryato pure l'euro
e sarebbe scoppiato tutto prima

perchè si carrya una valuta??




per me il 'piano B' era svalutare il dolllaro per fregare tutti i detentori di debiti USA .... e gli è skopiato in faccia ....
ma tanto è tutta fantaeconomia

 

[f4f]

Nobel per l'Economia a Krugman

Premiato per i suoi studi sui modelli di commercio e sulla localizzazione delle attività economiche. Krugman, neokeynesiano, ha 55 anni e insegna all'Università di Princeton. Nei suoi modelli indica modelli nei quali i Paesi potrebbero guadagnare dall'imposizione di barriere protezionistiche

 

[dan24]

discorso lungo ....
magari avrebbero carryato pure l'euro
e sarebbe scoppiato tutto prima

perchè si carrya una valuta??




per me il 'piano B' era svalutare il dolllaro per fregare tutti i detentori di debiti USA .... e gli è skopiato in faccia ....
ma tanto è tutta fantaeconomia

cè che stai a dì? cacchio carry una valuta se non c'e' differenziale tassi?

 

[f4f]

cè che stai a dì? cacchio carry una valuta se non c'e' differenziale tassi?

hai ragione, ho sbagliato i termini

intendevo :
mi indebito contro commodity, a tassi bassi
del resto, hanno carryato il dollato contro l'euro o contro grain-oil etc?

 

[dan24]

hai ragione, ho sbagliato i termini

intendevo :
mi indebito contro commodity, a tassi bassi
del resto, hanno carryato il dollato contro l'euro o contro grain-oil etc?

lo hanno fatto perchè vendevano dollari indebitandosi al 2% e comprando euro al 4% ..e riversando la liquidità sulle commodities.....se i tassi erano in europa esempio al 3% ..non avrebbero mai messo in piedi una cosa del genere

 

[dan24]

agli islandesi gli rimane che ficcarsi dentro un gayser

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aVFtDRGwcc50