Abstract: Our baseline view for the ECB does not anticipate sovereign QE. Instead, we expect the ECB to enhance the existing strategy\low cost loans to banks and non-sovereign asset purchases\over the coming months as the macro landscape improves. Our expectation is that by the time we get to next spring, there will be enough improvement in the macro landscape, the balance sheet, the credit environment and financial markets to stay the ECBfs hand on sovereign QE. But we recognize that it will be a close call and that recent developments provide a serious challenge to our view.
One challenge comes from ECB commentary. President Draghi and Vice-President Const?ncio have both given forceful speeches over the past week. Draghi emphasized urgency and efficacy, while Const?ncio emphasized legality and dismissed moral hazard. Between them they swept aside the objections to sovereign QE from some other council members: that the central bank can be patient in waiting for inflation to rise, that sovereign QE is ineffective, that it is legally problematic and that it creates moral hazard regarding government behavior. These speeches raise two possibilities. First, that Draghi will push for sovereign QE more quickly than we anticipate and call for a decision before the macro environment has improved. And second, that the ECB will leap over the next steps we anticipate\making the TLTROs more attractive and expanding non-sovereign purchases into non-financial corporate debt, agencies and supranationals\and go straight to sovereign QE.
The other challenge comes from the macro environment. While the growth data remain inconclusive about whether a momentum upswing is underway, the inflation data are taking a step down. In November, headline inflation fell to 0.3%, while core inflation was 0.7%. Following the failure of OPEC to reach an agreement on cutting output, headline inflation is likely to fall to zero in the early months of next year. Normally, the ECB is minded to look through the impact of modest moves in oil prices. But, this time is likely to be different, for two reasons. First, the move in oil prices over recent months is huge and could feed through to core inflation, although there is some mitigation from the lower currency. And second, the ECB is particularly sensitive at the moment to how an environment of sustained low headline inflation weighs on inflation expectations.
For now we are sitting tight, although it would not take much for us to add sovereign QE to the baseline projection. The ECB is unlikely to announce anything at next weekfs meeting, but could provide greater clarity around their thinking on sequencing and timing.
A cyclical upswing in the region over the coming months plays a key role in our ECB forecast. The growth upswing that we anticipate in the Euro area requires Germany to step up significantly from the stagnation of the past six months. We have to acknowledge that we do not fully understand German growth performance this year. The simple narrative suggesting that Russian sanctions and the slowdown in China have hit the Euro areafs largest trading nation more heavily than elsewhere in the region does not square with the data. According to the 3Q GDP report, German exports have grown strongly over the summer. The weakness in GDP was dominated by a collapse in machinery investment and a huge inventory drag. To the extent that Russia and China have played a role, it looks to be more through an indirect sentiment channel rather than a direct trade channel. German corporates may have cut back their spending in response to worries about the global economy which have not been reflected yet in export orders or exports. But, another aspect of this puzzle concerns employment. Corporates have continued to hire solidly, and post vacancies at a rapid pace, even as they have cut back on capital spending and inventory accumulation. It is hard to reach an holistic understanding of German corporate behavior.
We continue to believe that Germany will rebound, although it is still early days. The move up in the IFO survey in November, and a solid retail sales report in October, are certainly encouraging developments. It is also important to note a number of developments which will support growth in Germany and in the region as a whole: as well as the decline in oil prices, there is the decline in the currency, a further fading of the fiscal headwind and a gradual improvement in credit growth as private sector deleveraging headwinds fade.