Oggi le preoccupazioni su Anbag sembrano rivolgersi alla tenuta del sistema finanziario cinese, piuttosto che alle sorti di VIVAT.
Quoto dall'articolo del WSJ sotto: "Its premium income plunged 99% in April while its solvency ratio halved in the first quarter from the previous year."
How Anbang Could Clog China’s Financial Plumbing
WSJ - How Anbang Could Clog China’s Financial Plumbing
The acquisitive insurer is a key lender to other Chinese financial institutions
China’s decision to detain the chairman of Anbang Insurance Group, one of the country’s most acquisitive companies, is stunning in itself. The knock-on effects on the Chinese financial system could deepen the drama.
The initial focus since
Wu Xiaohui’s detention has been on Anbang’s insurance business. Chinese regulators have told banks to reduce their dealings with the company, The Wall Street Journal has reported: In recent days many have
slowed their marketing of Anbang investment products.
If customers of Anbang—owner of New York’s Waldorf Astoria hotel—start surrendering their policies and stop buying new ones, that could accelerate a continuing cash drain at the company.
China’s insurance regulator has already been clamping down on the primary source of Anbang’s cash since late last year—short-term, high-yielding investment products disguised as insurance policies. Its premium income plunged 99% in April while its solvency ratio halved in the first quarter from the previous year.
Some investors have already wised up to the broader problems if the cash Anbang has used for its global spending spree dries up. The bonds of Dutch insurer Vivat, which Anbang bought in 2015, plummeted on Thursday.
But investors should also look hard at
Anbang’s assets at home. The company’s tentacles reach far and deep into China’s financial system, with one key route being its lending of short-term funds into Chinese money markets.
Take its dealings with Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank, a provincial bank of which Anbang owns more than one-third, and which itself has some 40 subsidiaries across towns and villages in China. Anbang provides around 40% of the deposits for Chengdu Rural, and accounts for 80% of its related-party transactions, most of which are short-term, money-market loans. The bank also pays Anbang a high 5% interest on its deposits and holds some of Anbang’s debt.
Such tight relationships illustrate how financial stress at Anbang could quickly ripple through China’s banking system. Banks like Chengdu Rural have already become increasingly reliant on short-term wholesale funding and have been resorting to capital raises: The loss of a big cash provider like Anbang could cause real pain. Interbank funding conditions are already tight in China—the country’s central bank made its
biggest one-day cash injection into the market in nearly six months on Friday. If the detention of Anbang’s chairman leads to the company stepping back more broadly from Chinese markets, the saga could have a while to run.