Macroeconomia Crisi finanziaria e sviluppi

11:13 AM S&P affirms U.S. AAA rating, but says risks to the country's top sovereign rating have increased "noticeably" since September. S&P's "reasonable worst-case scenario" sees net general government debt rising from its 2008 level of 42% of GDP to as much as 75% by 2011.

S.A.
 
Analyst Earnings Revisions Still Extremely Negative


In our prior post, we highlighted how given the unusual proportion of companies lowering guidance, investors are not expecting much from companies heading into this earnings season. Looking at trends in earnings estimate revisions among analysts shows a similar picture. Each week in our Bespoke Earnings Estimate Revisions report, we summarize trends in analyst expectations within sectors and groups. For each sector and group, we calculate the net number of companies that have seen positive earnings revisions over the last month (positive revisions minus negative revisions).
As shown below for the S&P 1500, although they are off their lows from November, net revisions (red line) remain near their lowest levels since the start of 2008, and they're lower than they were heading into any of the last four earnings seasons. Over the last four weeks, analysts have collectively lowered EPS forecasts for 982 companies, and only raised forecasts for 140.
The only question now is, have analysts finally gotten ahead of the downward spiral in corporate earnings and adequately anticipated the declines that occurred during the fourth quarter? Or was the fourth quarter so bad that even the current pace of negative revisions is not enough?
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Si prevede un 2009 disastroso per la prima economia europea. Dalla Germania giungono dati allarmanti. Il prodotto interno lordo tedesco ha perso fra l’1,5 e il 2% nell’ultimo trimestre del 2008. La recessione si accompagna a una caduta a picco delle esportazioni e a un crollo degli ordinativi industriali. Secondo gli esperti il PIL quest’anno dovrebbe retrocedere di altri 2 o 3 punti percentuali. La congiuntura è fra le peggiori degli utimi decenni, ma il governo, in un anno elettorale, non può che ostentare ottimismo. Per Angela Merkel il bicchiere tedesco è mezzo pieno, soprattutto rispetto ai calici vuoti degli altri:
“Abbiamo parecchi fondi a disposizione. Parecchi. Ma stiamo aspettando il momento giusto per stanziarli. Abbiamo deliberatamente frenato la corsa al rialzo che ci chiedevano in ambito europeo. Rispetto alla fase che stanno attraversando altri paesi, non abbiamo veramente nulla da temere”.
Lunedì scorso il governo federale ha varato un nuovo piano da 50 miliardi di euro destinato a rilanciare la crescita e sostenere l’occupazione. Il pacchetto ha però ricevuto un’accoglienza tiepida da parte della confindustria tedesca, che l’ha giudicato timido e tardivo, visto che gli investimenti non cominceranno ad arrivare prima di luglio.
Al pesante quadro si aggiungono le cattive notizie che arrivano dalla Deutsche Bank, la prima banca tedesca, che calcola una perdita netta pari a 3,9 miliardi di euro per il 2008. Lo stato tedesco potrebbe decidere di entrare indirettamente nel capitale via una filiale finanziaria di Deutsche Post.
 
Greece’s Sovereign Credit Rating Cut to A- by S&P Bloomberg 14 gennaio 2009
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Greece had its sovereign credit rating lowered one step by Standard & Poor’s, which cited the country’s weakening finances.

The rating was cut to A- with a “stable” outlook, S&P said today in a statement from London. Greek stocks and bonds fell after the announcement.

The fallout from the global credit crisis is battering the European economy, prompting ratings companies to reassess the risk to investors of holding the debt of some governments. S&P said Jan. 12 Spain faced “significant challenges” and may have its top AAA classification lowered. Portugal may also have its AA- rating lowered, S&P said yesterday.

“The ongoing global financial and economic crisis has, in our opinion, exacerbated an underlying loss of competitiveness in the Greek economy,” a team of S&P analysts led by London- based Marko Mrsnik said in today’s statement.

Greek bonds erased gains after the decision, with the yield on the benchmark 10-year note rising two basis points to 5.38 percent. The ASE Index of stocks extended losses, falling as much as 5.5 percent, the most in more than two months.

Heaviest Debt Load

Sliding support for the government of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis hampered Greece’s ability to ride out the economic slowdown by taking measures such as cutting spending. The nation, which adopted the euro in 2001, has the heaviest debt load in the 16-member region after Italy, forecast by the government to increase to more than 91.4 percent of gross domestic product in 2009. It may breach 100 percent by 2011, S&P said.

The cost of hedging against losses on Greek government debt rose 14 basis points to 246 today, according to CMA Datavision prices for credit default swaps. Credit-default swaps, contracts conceived to protect bondholders against default, pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a country or company fail to adhere to its debt agreements. An increase signals deterioration in the perception of credit quality.

Source > Bloomberg | Jan 14
 
Caccia aperta ai corporate bond

di Morya Longo

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15 gennaio 2009





Moody's prevede che quest'anno 300 società finiscano in default in tutto il mondo. Una media di 25 "casi-Parmalat" ogni singolo mese. Eppure, nonostante questa prospettiva tutt'altro che incoraggiante, gli investitori sono tornati a comprare obbligazioni aziendali e – strano ma vero – anche bond legati ai mutui. Lo dimostra innanzitutto il fatto che i tassi d'interesse nelle ultime settimane sono notevolmente scesi: in America – secondo i dati di Merrill Lynch – i rendimenti dei corporate bond con rating elevati sono diminuiti mediamente di 100 punti base rispetto ai tassi interbancari, dal massimo del 5 dicembre. Segno che gli acquisti hanno fatto salire i prezzi e, di conseguenza, scendere i rendimenti. Ma la dimostrazione più efficace arriva dal fatto che le aziende di Stati Uniti ed Europa sono tornate ad emettere obbligazioni: in questo primo scorcio di 2009 – secondo Bloomberg – sono stati lanciati bond aziendali per 49,9 miliardi di dollari, contro i 16,8 miliardi dello stesso periodo del 2008. Record dallo scorso maggio. Insomma: le Borse crollano, ma le obbligazioni emesse dalle stesse società quotate in Borsa sembrano essere diventate un nuovo oggetto dei desideri.
 
ECONOMIA





Confermati i provvedimenti annunciati: si torna al livello del 2003
Ancora più basso il tasso sui depositi bancari, che scende all'1%

Costo del denaro, Bce taglia ancora
Tasso al 2%, è il minimo storico


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Il presidente della Bce Jean-Claude Trichet



FRANCOFORTE - La Banca centrale europea ha tagliato il costo del denaro di mezzo punto percentuale portando il tasso principale di Eurolandia dal 2,50% al 2%, il minimo storico segnato il 5 giugno del 2003. Lo ha deciso oggi il Consiglio direttivo dell'istituto centrale a Francoforte. La decisione era ampiamente attesa dal mercato.

Alla luce della decisione odierna, il tasso sui depositi scende quindi all'1% e quello marginale al 3%. Il differenziale fra il costo del denaro negli Stati Uniti e quello nell'Eurozona si attesta sul 2%, tenuto conto che la Fed ha praticamente azzerato il tasso sui Fed Funds fissando un range compreso tra zero e 0,25%.

La decisione di ridurre i tassi sui depositi in maniera ancor più consistente, potrebbe puntare a incentivare le banche a erogare credito nel circuito economico, piuttosto che lasciare fondi immobilizzati presso la stessa Bce. Già un mese fa lo stesso presidente Jean-Claude Trichet aveva esplicitamente segnalato di volersi assicurare che i recenti tagli dei tassi si trasferissero pienamente al sistema economico.

Secondo Confindustria i provvedimenti adottati dalla Banca europea arrivano però in ritardo. L'interbancario, afferma l'organizzazione imprenditoriale nella congiuntura flash, si sta normalizzando grazie alle aspettative di ulteriori tagli mentre la stretta creditizia si sta diffondendo. "In Italia si confermano le difficoltà nel credito - si legge nell'analisi mensile del Centro studi della Confindustria - per le imprese -1,4% a novembre su ottobre (tolta la stagionalità) e +6% annuo (dall'8,4%); a dicembre le condizioni peggiorano per il 74,6% delle imprese che hanno chiesto erogazioni. Per le famiglie -0,6% in un mese (-0,7% annuo); meno mutui (-0,1%) e (-2,2%)".
http://oas.repubblica.it/RealMedia/...BottomLeft,x40,x41,x42,x43,x44,x45,x46!Middle

(15 gennaio 2009)
 
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:
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Depression 2009: The Largest Train Wreck in Economic History The Market Oracle 15 gennaio 2009
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Change is a constant whether perceived or not; but only when we see it do we believe it has occurred. Then, it is too late.

The phrase, speculative bubble, is used to describe the financial tumescence that characterizes the often manic unfounded rise of asset values. The phrase, however, is inadequate for it fails to convey the destructive aftermath that follows; for such purposes, train wreck, is a better description. In 2009, the largest train wreck in economic history is about to occur.

Unfounded manic speculation, e.g. the 2002-2007 real estate bubble, is not new. Similar manic speculation occurred in internet stocks in the 1990s, radio stocks in the 1920s, as it did in railroad stocks in the 19th century and in tulip bulbs in the 17 th century. Manic speculation is as human as the markets.

THE DELUSION OF RATIONAL MARKETS

The first stock exchange in the world was the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, established in 1602. Amsterdam was also the site of the world first speculative bubble, Tulip Mania, which appeared shortly thereafter, 1621-1636

This is from Wikipedia's recounting of Tulip Mania:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulip_mania :

.. traders signed contracts before a notary to purchase tulips at the end of the season (effectively futures contracts). Thus the Dutch, who developed many of the techniques of modern finance, created a market for durable tulip bulbs.

Short selling was banned by an edict of 1610, which was reiterated or strengthened in 1621 and 1630, and again in 1636. Short sellers were not prosecuted under these edicts, but their contracts were deemed unenforceable…

As the flowers grew in popularity, professional growers paid higher and higher prices for bulbs with the virus [a tulip-specific virus that caused more spectacular colored tulips] . By 1634, in part as a result of demand from the French, speculators began to enter the market.

In 1636, the Dutch created a type of formal futures markets where contracts to buy bulbs at the end of the season were bought and sold. Traders met in "colleges" at taverns and buyers were required to pay a 2.5% "wine money" fee, up to a maximum of three florins, per trade.

Neither party paid an initial margin nor a mark-to-market margin, and all contracts were with the individual counterparties rather than with the exchange. No deliveries were ever made to fulfill these contracts because of the market collapse in February 1637…

The contract price of rare bulbs continued to rise throughout 1636. That November, the contract price of common bulbs without the valuable mosaic virus also began to rise in value. The Dutch derogatorily described tulip contract trading as windhandel (literally "wind trade"), because no bulbs were actually changing hands. However in February 1637, tulip bulb contract prices collapsed abruptly and the trade of tulips ground to a halt.

It is clear that today's “complex and sophisticated” markets are not as unique as some would believe. What is new, however, are the circumstances and consequences of the current collapse. Today, financial markets are a global phenomena; and so, too, will be the consequences.

The invention of the stock market in Amsterdam in 1602 combined with the issuance of the Bank of England's credit-based paper money in 1694 was to change the course of human history for the next three hundred years. That epoch is now ending.

The world that credit gave rise to is collapsing as is its credit-based foundation, turning like the proverbial carriage into a pumpkin at midnight, as the hoped for financial fairy tale turns instead into a nightmare of defaulting debt in 2009.

The collapse of global markets and global trade is a sign we have reached the end of this epoch. The current financial collapse is the beginning of its end. When it is over, so, too, will be the era it spawned. Human history moves in waves. Another is about to begin.

ON THE TRAIL OF JOHN LAW

Last year during the Christmas holidays, Martha and I toured the Bank of England's museum on Threadneedle Street in The City of London, the original cistern of the global well of paper-based credit. Last year, the mood in London was still hopeful. It is no longer.

This Christmas holiday, we followed the trail of John Law from Amsterdam to Paris to Venice . John Law, a Scottish banker and economic theoretician was well acquainted with Amsterdam 's financial markets before introducing paper money and subsequent financial ruin to the nation of France on his way to escape, exile and eventual burial in Venice .

It is perhaps appropriate than John Law is buried in the Chiesa di San Moisè; a church in Venice now surrounded by fashionable stores such as Gucci, Fendi, Valentino, Prada, and Versace, luxury retailers who profited handsomely from the excesses of the recent global bubble.

But just as the speculative bubble of Tulip Mania presaged today's markets, the story of John Law has particular relevance to the current collapse. The combination of financial markets and paper money is a volatile mixture and none was ever so destructively volatile as John Law's introduction of paper money to the financial markets of France .

John Law believed it was not necessary that money possess intrinsic value such as did gold or silver, money could be fiat, paper notes issued by government edict, an idea resembling those later promoted by American economist Milton Friedman.

John Law's disastrous experiment with paper money combined with his role in the Mississippi Land Company, a stock bubble on the scale of Tulip Mania, eventually transformed France and much of Europe into an economic wasteland leading eventually to the overthrow of the French nobility.

John Law's destructive influence on France has been exceeded, however, by today's extraordinary über- mixture of central bank credit-based paper money, excessive risk and leverage and the globalization of markets—a volatile mixture whose fragility, extreme size and combustibility are now about to destroy the 300 year old world built on debt and paper money.

ON THE SELF-CORRECTING NATURE OF IRRATIONAL MARKETS

In November 2006, Professor Antal Fekete addressed the 2007 class of MBA students at the University of Chicago , the then bailiwick of Milton Friedman, the well-known academic apologist for fiat currencies.

Professor Fekete was to deliver a scathing rebuttal of Friedman's theories. The professor, a long-time proponent of the gold standard and its role in monetary affairs, believed that John Maynard Keynes on the left and Milton Friedman on the right had given intellectual comfort to policies responsible for today's monetary problems—the elimination of gold from the international monetary system.

But Professor Fekete did not deliver his address criticizing Friedman. The day before he was to speak, Milton Friedman passed away. Instead of criticizing Friedman, Professor Fekete instead warned the students about the fragility of today's paper markets, markets that had become an extraordinary inverse pyramid of derivatives (then $480 trillion, now $668 trillion) and potential defaults built on irredeemable promises.

The students gave little thought to the Professor's warnings. They had prepared too long for their chance at the brass ring offered by Wall Street investment banks, the wealthy moneychangers in the temple of fiat currencies.

As about-to-be graduates of the prestigious MBA program at the University of Chicago , the students had much to expect upon graduation. When the Professor delivered his remarks, the August 2007 credit contraction was still nine months in the future; close, but still well outside the world of possibilities the students believed real.

One student asked:“Even if you're right, won't the markets self-correct?”

To the true-believers in paper money, paper markets and paper profits, self-correction was the accepted ideological panacea to whatever the markets would do.

That student never expected that the coming self-correction would wipe away his expected future. That instead of a large starting salary with significant bonuses at Lehman's, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, or Morgan Stanley, he instead would be wondering how he could repay his student loans when the bank he believed would be his future home had collapsed or merged with another institution to avoid insolvency.

At the time, such possibilities appeared improbable if not outright impossible. Today, they have become the precursors of what is yet to be. A world so at odds with yesterday, that few can imagine what will happen next.

Dmitry Orlov is one of the few that can do so.

DMITRY ORLOV'S FIVE STAGES OF COLLAPSE

Dmitry Orlov, author of Reinventing Collapse; The Soviet Example and American Prospects (New Society Publishers, 2008), watched the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and predicted a similar crisis would later occur in America .

Buckminster Fuller had also predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union and America in 1981— the twilight of the world's power structures— in his book, The Critical Path (St. Martin's Press, 1981). Both nations crippled by excessive debt brought on by excessive military spending (what Bucky called killingry ) were fading behemoths whose passing would make way for a better world.

Orlov writes:

Having given a lot of thought to both the differences and the similarities between the two superpowers - the one that has collapsed already, and the one that is collapsing as I write this - I feel ready to attempt a bold conjecture, and define five stages of collapse, to serve as mental milestones as we gauge our own collapse-preparedness and see what can be done to improve it…

Stage 1: Financial collapse. Faith in "business as usual" is lost. The future is no longer assumed to resemble the past in any way that allows risk to be assessed and financial assets to be guaranteed. Financial institutions become insolvent; savings are wiped out, and access to capital is lost.

Stage 2: Commercial collapse. Faith that "the market shall provide" is lost. Money is devalued and/or becomes scarce, commodities are hoarded, import and retail chains break down, and widespread shortages of survival necessities become the norm…

Stage 1 in Orlov's scenario is well underway. The vast majority of investment and commercial banks are now insolvent, propped up and still in business only because of recently granted government guarantees designed to prevent workers from realizing their life savings are in imminent danger.

In Orlov's Stage 1, savings and access to capital are lost. In modern economies, capital, i.e. credit-based paper, has been substituted for real money, gold and silver. Credit-based paper money is no more real money than an image/belief in god is GOD. Savings, in mature credit-based economies as the US and UK are now virtually non-existent.

Capital is but thinly disguised credit and credit is now rapidly disappearing, a condition that will be fatal for those addicted to its continuing presence, e.g. corporations, governments and workers, especially in the US , UK , Europe , etc. New loan activity has fallen 91 % year to year. The consequences will be unprecedented and extraordinary.

In 2009, the economic train wreck now in motion will occur. It will not be a one time event. It will be a successive series of protracted crisis in conjunction with continuing breakdowns in access to credit, goods and services, an escalating and cascading series of pre vio usly unimaginable events.

In today's monetarily debased markets, credit has become essential for all commercial activity. This dream of bankers is the nightmare of producers and savers. Credit becomes compounding debt which becomes bankers' profits also resulting in increasing defaults and bankruptcies. Modern economics is not rocket science. It's an abomination on the economic body of mankind.

Stage 2 in Orlov's scenario will follow in the wake of Stage 1. Stage 2 is closer today than it was yesterday. The end game predicted by some will now become the reality for all. The predicted events have no basis in recent memory for those who will be affected.

The three hundred year old world founded on credit-based paper money is ending. The world's central banks which substituted paper for gold are finding themselves unable to solve the problems their fiat money has created. The consequences are far greater than people can imagine—a limitation that will not prevent them from happening.

GOLD, SCISSORS, PAPER

We who have grown up in the world of credit and debt have no memory or real understanding of the role that gold played in monetary affairs prior to the substitution of central bank credit-based paper for sound money. When the connection was cut between gold and money, few understood the consequences, consequences which are now upon us.

Uncle Milton and Uncle John
Gave much thought to what was wrong
But their bright ideas about the public purse
Have now made things so much worse

Discussion of the monetary role of gold and silver has been expunged from discussion in today's universities. One of the world's great economic thinkers whose writings consistently predicted today's collapse, Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian School of Economics was never accorded a paid position in an American university.

Although given the status of a visiting professor by New York University , Mises was not paid a salary and had to depend on outside assistance in order to survive. That far lesser teachers were salaried in America is an indication why today most American economists are unable to adequately explain or solve our economic problems.

PUTZES FROM PRINCETON

The influence of the US military-industrial complex over academic discourse, while exceedingly effective, has come at a considerable cost to the nation. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of this possibility in his Farewell Speech to the nation in 1961. Freedom and intellectual inquiry are not unrelated—nor are tyranny and blind obedience.

Professor Fekete's intended address at the University of Chicago was titled Where Friedman Went Wrong and included the following quote from Professor Walter E. Spahr, Chairman of the Department of Economics at NYU from 1927 to 1956:

What is the meaning of a gold standard and a redeemable currency? It represents integrity. It insures the people's control over the government's use of the public purse. It is the best guarantee against the socialization of a nation. It enables a people to keep the government and banks in check. It prevents currency expansion from getting ever farther out of bounds until it becomes worthless. It tends to force standards of honesty on government and bank officials. It is the symbol of a free society and an honorable government. It is a necessary prerequisite to economic health. It is the first economic bulwark of free men.

Professor Spahr's eloquent words are a timely reminder of the importance of the gold standard and do much to explain how we have arrived at our current circumstances. The gold standard is the constraint upon bankers and government that would have prevented the disaster that is now upon us; and, now in 2009, it is too late to undo what they have done.

Professor Spahr understood that the essential role of gold in monetary systems is to prevent bankers and government from overstepping the bounds of sound governance and prudent banking, bounds, which if undone, will bring ruin to the nation and to its people.

When President Nixon severed the ties between the US dollar and gold—as encouraged to do so by Milton Friedman—the very fears of men such as Spahrs and Fekete were set in motion. Now, three decades later, the results are in.

Financial markets are frozen, global trade is slowing rapidly, governments have debased their now fiat currencies and the collective excesses of government and bankers have brought the world to the edge of another Great Depression.

The warnings of those such as Spahr and Fekete were not heeded. Indeed, they were not even heard. The suppression of open dialogue and issues contrary to the purposes of corporate, banking and government interests carried over into colleges and universities as well as the media. It has cost America dearly.

Only When Freedom Is Lost Do The Reasons For Its Absence Become Clear

For those interested in the critical role of the gold standard, Professor Fekete will be giving a series of lectures March 27, 28 and 29 in Hungary . The gold standard as well as the backwardation of gold and silver and the coming depression will be discussed. For information, contact [email protected] Indirizzo e-mail protetto dal bots spam , deve abilitare Javascript per vederlo . I will also give a talk at the conference.

THE LEGACY OF JOHN LAW VERSUS THE FUTURISTIC VISION OF R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER

I was fortunate to have met Marshall Thurber in law school in 1966, a friendship that has lasted far longer than my abbreviated tenure at law school. I am especially fortunate that Marshall later became a close friend and important supporter of Buckminster Fuller and his work.

In November, during a discussion about the current crisis which was predicted by Fuller more than 25 years ago, Marshall recommended I read Fuller's final book, Grunch Of Giants (Design Science Press, 1983).

Out of print and offered at the time through Amazon at a collector's price of $199, Marshall offered to send me his original signed draft if the book was not readily available. Fortunately, Marshall then directed me to the website of the Buckminster Fuller Institute where its price was $17.95, see http://bfi.org/?q=node/406 .

I finished reading Fuller's extraordinary work, Grunch Of Giants , on Christmas Day as Martha and I crossed the Alps . At this time I will refrain from a personal recapitulation as the work stands on its own and readers are easily capable of reaching their own conclusions. Nonetheless, Grunch of Giants confirmed for me the greatness and breadth of Fuller's vision.

After reading Grunch of Giants I could not help but see the clear distinction between two diametrically opposed visions/versions of our world: At one end of the spectrum is John Law's “Scarcity Theory of Value” and at the other is Buckminster Fuller's “False Assumptions of Scarcity”

The two assumptions and theories are diametrically opposed in intent and consequence and do much to explain the difference between today's world of crisis (confirming John Law's theories on scarcity) and tomorrow's possible promise (Buckminster Fuller's belief in abundance)

EMERGENCE THROUGH EMERGENCY

Because of Marshall Thurber 's friendship with Buckminster Fuller, I am aware of Fuller's belief in “Universal Emergence Through Emergency”. It is increasingly clear that today's crisis is rapidly approaching that of an emergency—the prerequisite for Universal Emergence.

Let us stand aside and help its birth. A new and better world is on its way. Gold and silver will help in the interim.

By Darryl Robert Schoon

Source > The Market Oracle
 
What’s the difference between Ireland and Iceland? –One letter and about 6-months!

Posted on January 15th, 2009 at 5:38 am by Dean Popplewell

The time has come to deliver, but, will he? The ECB rate decision is what we have been waiting for all week. Maybe the downgrading of Greece yesterday and the potential downgrades of Spain and Portugal could put Trichet and Co. under further pressure to justify deeper cuts rather than the widely expected 50bp (2.50%). With the FX market trading on interest rate expectations, one would expect the EUR to gain major traction with 50bp ease or more, just like Cable last week. But, we are talking about the ECB and historically they have a tendency to disappoint!
The US$ is weaker in the O/N trading session. Currently it is lower against 10 of the 16 most actively traded currencies, in ‘subdued’ trading range ahead of the ECB rate announcement.

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The market anticipated it to be bad, but this bad? US Retail Sales plummeted twice as much as anticipated, as the record job losses and credit crunch discouraged spending by Americans last month. The data combined with revisions to previous months provides an even bleaker picture than capital markets could have imagined. Analysts have already noted that with receivables coming due at the end of this month, the market can expect retail bankruptcy filings to accelerate. Headline sales were down -2.7%, while core sales ex-autos were down -3.1%. Compared to last years readings, retail sales were about -10% lower than the previous year. This has made for the sharpest yearly retreat in retail since WWII. Analysts also noted that until they see next weeks data they don’t know how much can be attributed to ‘price effect’ however the market will be looking for one of the sharpest declines in the volume of sales in 60-years in addition to deep discounting. Oct. was revised down 50bp, from -2.9% to -3.4% m/m, and Nov. was revised lower from -1.8% to -2.1%, m/m. As per the norm nowadays’ lower gas prices had a material impact on the Dec. reading, but even ex-autos and ex-gas sales were down -1.5% m/m. There was no big surprises with discretionary items also getting hit during the holiday season as electronics store sales (-1.0%), home furniture and furnishings (-1.8%), clothing stores (-2.5%), sporting (-0.4%), general merchandise (-1.3%) and non-store retailers (-1.9%) all experienced losses.
The US$ currently is lower against the EUR +0.04%, GBP +0.15%, CHF +0.12% and JPY +0.61%. The commodity currencies are once again weaker this morning, CAD -0.13% and AUD -0.25%. Nothing technically or fundamentally can provide support for the ailing loonie at the moment. The flight to quality aka the greenback has driven the CAD dollar to new month lows. The currency has remained under intense pressure as commodity prices continue to suffer. After yesterday’s weekly EIA report, do not expect the loonie to outperform any time soon. Last summer, unprecedented peaks in oil prices helped buoy Canada’s export market (50% of all exports are commodity based). This provided a cushion for the Canadian economy as its southern partner fell into a recession. However, since oil prices have plummeted -77% since the peak in July, Canada’s exports have been deteriorating at a rapid pace, adding to economic weakness in other areas of the economy, and causing the BOC to continue its easing campaign. Futures traders are pricing in a 75bp ease next week (1.50%). Nov. was no exception as the value of exports plunged -6.8%, m/m, outpacing the -4.8% decline in imports, all this on the back of lower oil prices and weaker auto-exports, this causing a more than expected narrowing in the trade surplus to +$1.28b, the lowest level in 11-years. Even worse Oct. trade surplus was also revised down to +$2.25b from +$3.78b, once again due to energy prices and volumes. The currency remains guilty by its association and proximity to its largest trading partner, the US. Consensus has the loonie trading under pressure for the remainder of this quarter and backing up towards the 1.2800 level again.
Australia’s unemployment rate rose to its highest level in 2-years (4.5% vs. 4.4% m/m) as mining companies, airlines, and automakers fired full-time workers, adding to signs the economy faces its 1st recession in 18-years. This has put the AUD under pressure as investors due to global equities seek risk aversion trading strategies (0.6609).
Crude is lower O/N ($36.66 down -66c). The weekly EIA reports ended up being more of a hindrance than an aid for crude prices yesterday. Crude prices fell this weeks report showed that crude stockpiles climbed to a 16-month high as fuel demand continues to deteriorate. Crude stocks increased +1.14m barrels to +326.6m last week, the highest since August 2007. While fuel demand dropped 6% to an average +18.6m barrels a day, surprisingly the largest 1-week decline in 5-years. Demand destruction continues to be the bearish element for these weekly reports, despite the cold spell throughout North America, refineries continue to produce more fuel than is currently needed. Gas inventories rose +2.07m barrels to +213.5m, higher than the anticipated +1.85m expected. On the other hand supplies of distillate fuels (includes heating oil and diesel) surged +6.35m barrels to +144.2m, the biggest gain again in 5-years. The disappointing US retail sales figures did not help either, the data solidified global concerns that fuel demand will decline even further because of the recession in the US, Europe and Japan. Earlier this week the Energy Department said that global demand will average +85.1m barrels a day this year that will be down approximately -810k from last year. The geo-political issues in Gaza and the on-going Russian Ukraine natural gas crisis is no match for demand destruction caused by weakening economies. Analysts anticipate that we will once again test Dec. lows of around $32 on the back of the North American reports been so poor. Gold finding a toe hold this week did not last very long, the yellow metal once again has come under pressure as the greenback remains better bid vs. the EUR, thus eroded its appeal as an alternative investment ($811). Maybe Trichet cutting deeper than anticipated will provide some support later this morning!
The Nikkei closed 8,023 down -415. The DAX index in Europe was at 4,403 down -19; the FTSE (UK) currently is 4,169 down -11. The early call for the open of key US indices is lower. The 10-year Treasury yields eased 16bp yesterday (2.15%) and are little changed in the O/N session. Treasuries aggressively rallied after the dismal US retail Sales numbers. Sales have now successfully fallen for a 6th consecutive month, fuelling speculation that the US economic slump is deepening. This has convinced investors to seek the safety of government debt for now.
Filed under: Dean's FX
 
EDITORIALE – Crisi economica
Se la politica non si affranca dalla finanza
Alfonso Tuor
La crisi economica e finanziaria morde con sempre maggiore forza. I dati, che vanno dalla forte diminuzione dei consumi americani alla contrazione del 2% nel quarto trimestre dell’economia tedesca, fino al calo delle esportazioni cinesi, dimostrano che le condizioni dell’economia mondiale sono peggiori di quanto ci si potesse aspettare.

Inoltre, concluso il periodo delle ferie natalizie, è tornato alla ribalta il problema centrale di questa crisi: lo stato comatoso del settore finanziario. Infatti non vi sono miglioramenti delle condizioni di salute del sistema bancario, nonostante le ricapitalizzazioni degli istituti di credito americani ed europei operate dagli Stati e i continui interventi delle banche centrali.


A riprova di questa tesi si potrebbero citare numerosi fatti. Citigroup è comunque il più significativo. Il colosso bancario americano è ancora sull’orlo della bancarotta nonostante ricapitalizzazioni per complessivi 89 miliardi di dollari da parte dello Stato americano e sebbene Washington abbia concesso garanzie per 309 miliardi di dollari. Il grande conglomerato finanziario sta ora vendendo «pezzi» delle sue attività e pensa di creare (con il sostegno implicito delle autorità) una «bad bank» dove parcheggiare oltre 600 miliardi di titoli tossici.

La situazione non è migliore in Europa, come hanno confermato i casi di Commerzbank nazionalizzata di fatto dal Governo tedesco, e di Deutsche Bank che ha preannunciato una perdita di circa 7,5 miliardi di franchi nel quarto trimestre dell’anno scorso. Persino una banca ritenuta solida come il colosso inglese HSBC sarà costretta, secondo gli analisti di Morgan Stanley, a varare un aumento di capitale di ben 30 miliardi di dollari. In questo contesto non sorprende che l’attenzione sia tornata su UBS, la quale il prossimo 10 febbraio comunicherà una perdita per l’esercizio 2008 nettamente superiore ai 20 miliardi di cui finora si vocifera.
Lo stesso presidente della Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, ha dovuto ammettere che non vi è alcuna speranza di uscire da questa crisi se non si risana il sistema bancario. Bernanke ha addirittura precisato che risulterà insufficiente anche il pacchetto fiscale di Obama da 800 miliardi di dollari. E si può aggiungere tranquillamente che sorte analoga toccherà al taglio di mezzo punto dei tassi deciso ieri dalla Banca centrale europea e al pacchetto fiscale di 50 miliardi di euro annunciato all’inizio di questa settimana dal Governo tedesco.

Il motivo è semplice. La crisi finanziaria ha già investito l’economia reale. Le industrie europee, americane e di altri continenti si trovano strette in una tenaglia: da un canto, i fatturati diminuiscono rapidamente (in alcuni rami si registrano contrazioni del 30%) e, dall’altra, l’accesso al credito è chiuso, poiché il sistema bancario è riluttante a concedere nuovi crediti, oppure è estremamente oneroso, con tassi di interesse molto elevati nonostante il ribasso del costo del denaro attuato dalle banche centrali. La conseguenza è un circolo vizioso: la recessione produce nuove sofferenze che aggravano la crisi bancaria, le banche concedono meno prestiti rendendo più profonda la recessione e così via. In pratica, il settore bancario non svolge più (non concedendo crediti) il suo ruolo di trasmissione degli impulsi di politica monetaria. Quindi, anche il taglio dei tassi europei riduce i costi di rifinanziamento delle banche, ma ha scarsa o nessuna influenza sull’accesso e sul costo del credito delle imprese industriali.

Ora, l’oligarchia finanziaria che ha causato questa crisi, con l’autorevole sostegno della Federal Reserve, sostiene una tesi semplice: non si può uscire dalla crisi, se prima gli Stati non risanano il sistema bancario. Questa tesi, apparentemente seduttiva, dimentica di esplicitare i costi enormi di questo salvataggio. Un’idea della grandezza dei capitali necessari la si può ricavare dalle migliaia di miliardi finora spesi da Stati e da banche centrali senza ottenere alcun risultato apprezzabile. Negli Stati Uniti si sono già spesi 8.000 miliardi di dollari, nell’Unione Europea la cifra è di poco inferiore. Per risanare i catastrofici bilanci delle grandi banche occorrerebbero altre migliaia di miliardi.

Se non si crede alla teoria che i soldi possano essere stampati all’infinito senza alcuna conseguenza negativa, bisogna concludere che i governi devono scegliere chi aiutare, poiché non hanno le risorse finanziarie per salvare sia le famiglie sia le imprese sia le banche. È quanto ha detto recentemente il ministro italiano Giulio Tremonti, il quale teme che il tentativo di salvare tutti farà sì che non si riuscirà ad aiutare nessuno e si provocherà unicamente un ulteriore peggioramento della crisi.
Come sostiene Tremonti, bisogna ammettere realisticamente che si può salvare solo la parte buona del sistema bancario e concentrare le risorse per rilanciare l’economia, per difendere l’occupazione e il sistema industriale. Per essere più chiari, fino a quando non si cominceranno a fare queste scelte non vi è alcuna possibilità che si esca veramente dalla crisi. Il costo di salvare tutto e tutti rischia di essere tale da incrinare la fiducia nei titoli con cui gli Stati finanziano i loro disavanzi pubblici e nelle stesse monete. A questo riguardo già si cominciano ad avvertire alcuni segnali preoccupanti.

La scelta non riguarda unicamente il governo americano e i governi europei. Spetterà anche al Consiglio federale se e quando i sette saggi saranno chiamati a chinarsi di nuovo sul dossier UBS (e tutto lascia supporre che questo appuntamento non sia molto lontano).

In attesa che le élites politiche si affranchino dallo stato di dipendenza nei confronti dell’oligarchia finanziaria, saremo costretti a confrontarci con l’aggravarsi della recessione, con continui interventi miliardari per salvare le banche e pacchetti di rilancio che non produrranno gli effetti desiderati, ma solo un sollievo temporaneo. Insomma, continueremo ad assistere al peggioramento della crisi.
16.01.09 12:44:05 Oggi sul CdT (versione completa per soli abbonati)
 
Un Richiamo : credit crunch e credito Commerciale

Eh si, bisogna prendere atto che al credit crunch e al risvolto , che tutti ci aspettavamo tranne i politici e i tesserati più sfegatati, relativo al taglio dei crediti alle PmI.

Si perchè per le Grandi Imprese sarà tutto un altro discorso.

In questi ultimi due mesi stiamo assistendo, lo dico come osservatorio ufficioso ma attendebile, ad un forte blocco nei pagamenti commerciali fra controparti commerciali.

Mi spiego con un esempio, anzi due :

a) A novembre di ordino le merci che venderò a Natale, ma ti pago a gennaio. Tolgo di mezzo la Banca che non presta. Il venditore ci sta perchè ha i magazzini pieni. Gli ordini di produzione (tutti dalla Cina) sono stati fatti 10 mesi prime in base a stime e statistiche datate 2007. Abbiamo nebessità di tentare la carta. vendiamo a credito.
A gennaio si arriva al dunque. Chi havenduto : pagherà ; diversamente immaginate che problema per grossisti e produttori

b) terra,terra...non mi pagano, io non ti pago.

Sono, gli operatori economici, tutti in fibrillazione. Attendono le prime scadenze commerciali, a 30gg-60 e 90. Poi scoppierà , veramente, il credit crunch. In tutta la sua veemenza.

Se è vero che in un mondo dove sono le multinazionali a non pagare ed a lasciare le piccole PMI fornitrici di semi-lavorati e servizi a bocca asciutta (vedi Nord est italiano) è vero che la realtà delle PMi del resto italico è legata ad altre PMI. Più o meno grandi ma più o meno tutte con dietro non capitale di azionisti , ma capitale dello stesso soggetto che guida l'azienda.
Cioè il capitale famigliare dell'imprenditore.

Uno sforzo (magari quasi coercitivo perchè questi managers bancari fanno pena) dovrà indurre imprenditori e banche a fare un fifty-fifty della situazione. E' l'unica via.

ci vogliono detassazioni, incentivi agli investimenti, cambi manageriali ai vertici bancari

Saluti

Pierluigi
 

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