A slew of new sanctions were introduced targeting individuals, companies, projects, and trading and delivery mechanisms that are vital to Moscow’s LNG operations. This aligns with comments earlier this year from the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt that: “We’re going to keep tightening the screws [on Russia’s major LNG sector projects such as Arctic LNG 2]. We’re going to continue to designate a broad range of entities involved in development of other key energy projects, future energy projects as well, and associated infrastructure including the Vostok Oil Project, the Ust Luga LNG Terminal, and the Yakutia Gas Project.”
On 22 November last year, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated Russia intended its LNG market share to rise to 20 percent (at least 100 million tons per year) by 2030, from the current 8 percent (around 33 tons in 2023).
This ties into the other main reason why the U.S. continues to target Russia’s LNG business so aggressively, which is the increasing geopolitical importance of the energy source in the relationship between Russia and China. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, LNG has become the most important swing energy source in an increasingly insecure world. Unlike oil or gas that is transported through pipelines, LNG does not require years and vast expense in building out a complex infrastructure before it is ready to transport anywhere. Once gas has been converted to LNG, it can be shipped and moved anywhere within a matter of days and bought reliably either through short- or long-term contracts or immediately in the spot market. In the event of another major global conflict breaking out – as many expect to happen in and around Taiwan within the next three years – the importance of LNG will only increase further, as existing oil and gas land transportation routes from Russia to China are unlikely to remain functional for long.
Russia’s Arctic LNG sector is potentially huge, comprising over 35,700 billion cubic metres of natural gas and over 2,300 million metric tons of oil and condensate, the majority of which are in the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas, lying on the south side of the Kara Sea.
E il portavoce del partito del presidente fa sapere che Volodymyr Zelensky annuncerà mercoledì un ricambio di “oltre il 50%” del suo esecutivo. “Come promesso, già questa settimana ci si può aspettare un grande cambiamento nel governo. Più del 50% dei membri del consiglio dei ministri subirà dei cambiamenti”, ha dichiarato il portavoce David Arakhamia su Telegram. “L’elenco definitivo sarà determinato nella riunione del 4 settembre. Vi preghiamo di seguire solo le notizie ufficiali”, ha aggiunto. E secondo Ukrainska Pravda, che cita fonti dell’ufficio del presidente, il rimpasto potrebbe coinvolgere anche il ministro degli Esteri Dmytro Kuleba, che potrebbe essere sostituito dal primo vice ministro degli Esteri Andrei Sibiga.
The EU's ambassador to Ukraine, Katarina Mathernova, noted that, in the summer, military support from the bloc is at the same level as it was in spring 2022 -- down to a trickle -- and added that Ukrainians "cannot shoot commitments, but need real ammunition." She also warned about the possibility of a "cold and dark winter," with Russia hampering around 70 percent of Ukraine's prewar energy production.
Mi sa che ormai sono alla fusione. Se ci metti anche la situazione sul campo...Sembra che la situazione politica in Ucraina si stia surriscaldando.
Ucraina, il governo Zelensky perde altri pezzi: si dimettono tre ministri
Licenziato anche il numero due dell'Anticorruzionewww.ilfattoquotidiano.it
The U.S. Tightens The Screw Again On Russia’s Vital LNG Sector | OilPrice.com
One of the principal reasons for this focus of the U.S. and its allies on effectively destroying Russia’s ship-borne LNG sector is that it now acts as a key source of revenue for the funding of the war against Ukraineoilprice.com