Obbligazioni societarie GM, Ford, Chrysler: il 3D dell'automotive USA
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
Researcher
Stop Loss? No, Thanks!!!
Altra cosa very interesting: in bancarotta i contratti UAW di GM sarebbero carta straccia, giusto? Mettiamo il caso che a UAW "sia imposto" di accettare condizioni più favorevoli per GM (+ penalizzanti per i dipendenti di GM), rispetto a quelle che UAW ha con Ford "outside bankruptcy"....che succede, Ford avrebbe diritto alle condizioni di GM?
Altra cosa interessante da seguire
Altra cosa interessante da seguire
paologorgo
Chapter 11
As the General Motors (GM) and Chrysler bankruptcy is now a matter of weeks if not days away (if one listens to CNBC "it is all priced in") I could not help but wonder just what the fallout of a bankruptcy would be on security holders in the structured realm. And any such consideration would have to take into account the potential fallout from the OEs but also within the entire supply chain (which few are talking about on prime time TV).
The most impacted parties in question, of course, are not common shareholders who have taken their beatings, but the corporate synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which not only have their survival to worry about on a day to day basis, but now have to consider what the "out of left field" implications would be from a rolling default among the entire autoproduction vertical (not to mention just how/where CDOs mark their appropriate books with regard to a plethora of impaired securities).
Moody's has some interesting observations on the topic:
For all practical purposes, it is still likely early to draw full conclusions, save to say that there will be significant losses across all CDOs classes. And abusing Melissa Francis' favorite term "second derivative", one can only speculate what the downstream effects of material CDOs impairments will be to leveraged parties who own these securities directly or indirectly.
Bottom line is, while the outcome for GM's common stock is rather binary at this point with all signs pointing to $0, the full impact of the Detroit implosion will likely be much more pronounced than the shallow talking heads on TV vouch it will be.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/130697-a-few-thoughts-on-the-upcoming-auto-sector-implosion
The most impacted parties in question, of course, are not common shareholders who have taken their beatings, but the corporate synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which not only have their survival to worry about on a day to day basis, but now have to consider what the "out of left field" implications would be from a rolling default among the entire autoproduction vertical (not to mention just how/where CDOs mark their appropriate books with regard to a plethora of impaired securities).
Moody's has some interesting observations on the topic:
Even though CDOs maintain only small exposures to the two troubled automakers, there may be collateral damage as the bankruptcies ripple through the U.S. auto industry. Our CDO ratings, however, are unlikely to be significantly affected because of previous, forward-looking changes to our rating assumptions and stress tests.
CDO exposure to Chrysler and GM is not large. Of 2,262 Moody’s-rated CDOs, none have exposure to Chrysler. Some 10% have exposure to GM, of which the average amount is 1% with a range from 0.25% to 2.45%. Pro forma model analyses suggest that ratings of more than two thirds of exposed CDOs will be unaffected even if CDS settlement amounts approach 100%.
Nevertheless, there may be collateral damage from a bankruptcy. A GM bankruptcy may worsen the credit position of some GM affiliates, such as General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) or Residential Capital LLC (ResCap). Similarly, the credit effect on suppliers (e.g., Visteon ) or users (e.g., Hertz ) would be negative. Even competitors may suffer, possibly as an unintended result of government intervention, from effects that impede their competitiveness, cause the loss of mutual suppliers, or further harm consumer confidence.
CDO exposures to the U.S. auto industry, in general, are more significant than just for Chrysler and GM. Nearly 25% of all CDOs have some exposure to U.S. autos, and of those with exposure, the average exposure is 5.2% with a range from 0.2% to 24%.
The chart below (click to enlarge) shows exposure across all Moody’s-rated CSOs to the top 20 U.S. auto industry companies.CDO exposure to Chrysler and GM is not large. Of 2,262 Moody’s-rated CDOs, none have exposure to Chrysler. Some 10% have exposure to GM, of which the average amount is 1% with a range from 0.25% to 2.45%. Pro forma model analyses suggest that ratings of more than two thirds of exposed CDOs will be unaffected even if CDS settlement amounts approach 100%.
Nevertheless, there may be collateral damage from a bankruptcy. A GM bankruptcy may worsen the credit position of some GM affiliates, such as General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) or Residential Capital LLC (ResCap). Similarly, the credit effect on suppliers (e.g., Visteon ) or users (e.g., Hertz ) would be negative. Even competitors may suffer, possibly as an unintended result of government intervention, from effects that impede their competitiveness, cause the loss of mutual suppliers, or further harm consumer confidence.
CDO exposures to the U.S. auto industry, in general, are more significant than just for Chrysler and GM. Nearly 25% of all CDOs have some exposure to U.S. autos, and of those with exposure, the average exposure is 5.2% with a range from 0.2% to 24%.
For all practical purposes, it is still likely early to draw full conclusions, save to say that there will be significant losses across all CDOs classes. And abusing Melissa Francis' favorite term "second derivative", one can only speculate what the downstream effects of material CDOs impairments will be to leveraged parties who own these securities directly or indirectly.
Bottom line is, while the outcome for GM's common stock is rather binary at this point with all signs pointing to $0, the full impact of the Detroit implosion will likely be much more pronounced than the shallow talking heads on TV vouch it will be.
http://seekingalpha.com/article/130697-a-few-thoughts-on-the-upcoming-auto-sector-implosion
Researcher
Stop Loss? No, Thanks!!!
SmarTrend® News Watch: S&P Upgrades Ford's Debt Rating
After Ford Motor (NYSE:F) completed its distressed debt exchange, Standard & Poor's upgraded their debt from SD- (selective default minus) to CCC+. However, S&P maintained its negative outlook rating on the company.
http://www.mysmartrend.com/briefs.asp?nwdate=20090413&story=48
After Ford Motor (NYSE:F) completed its distressed debt exchange, Standard & Poor's upgraded their debt from SD- (selective default minus) to CCC+. However, S&P maintained its negative outlook rating on the company.
http://www.mysmartrend.com/briefs.asp?nwdate=20090413&story=48
Ultima modifica:
Researcher
Stop Loss? No, Thanks!!!
S&P raises Ford's rating but warns of cash squeeze
Mon Apr 13, 2009 3:57pm EDT
NEW YORK, April 13 (Reuters) - Standard & Poor's on Monday raised its ratings on Ford Motor Co (F.N) after the automaker cut debt by nearly $10 billion, but the agency warned that Ford still risks running short of cash.
Ford's credit profile is better than those of its U.S. competitors, but it faces heavy cash losses for at least another year, S&P said in a statement.
"Our ratings reflect the possibility that the multiple problems Ford faces in stemming cash use could overwhelm its cash and liquidity during the next year," S&P said.
A spokesman for Ford declined comment.
S&P raised Ford's corporate credit rating to CCC-plus, seven steps below investment grade, from SD, or selective default. The rating had been lowered to SD because S&P considered Ford's recent debt exchange a "distressed debt exchange," meaning bondholders received less than the par value of their bonds.
The debt exchange has improved Ford's capital structure and reduced automotive debt by $9.9 billion, S&P said. "Still, Ford estimates that annual cash interest savings will be less than $600 million, a fraction of the company's automotive cash outflows in 2008," the agency said.
S&P assigned a negative outlook to Ford's rating, indicating a downgrade is likely over the next two years.
Ford may have to revisit its informal request for $9 billion of government loans unless sales begin to recover this year, S&P said.
"Even if the government were to eventually provide funding, we stress that we would likely view such assistance as buying more time rather than as a solution to the automaker's fundamental business risks, especially deteriorating global demand."
Ford could run short of cash if its automotive operations use more than $14 billion this year, including restructuring charges, or if auto sales remain weak in 2010, the agency said.
The failure of one or more of Ford's competitors could hurt many of Ford's suppliers, and the resulting turmoil could pressure Ford's liquidity further, S&P said.
Ford rivals General Motors Corp (GM.N) and Chrysler Holding LLC [CCMLPD.UL] are operating under emergency U.S. government loans and face bankruptcy if they cannot reach cost-cutting agreements with lenders and unions. (Reporting by Dena Aubin; Editing by James Dalgleish
Mon Apr 13, 2009 3:57pm EDT
NEW YORK, April 13 (Reuters) - Standard & Poor's on Monday raised its ratings on Ford Motor Co (F.N) after the automaker cut debt by nearly $10 billion, but the agency warned that Ford still risks running short of cash.
Ford's credit profile is better than those of its U.S. competitors, but it faces heavy cash losses for at least another year, S&P said in a statement.
"Our ratings reflect the possibility that the multiple problems Ford faces in stemming cash use could overwhelm its cash and liquidity during the next year," S&P said.
A spokesman for Ford declined comment.
S&P raised Ford's corporate credit rating to CCC-plus, seven steps below investment grade, from SD, or selective default. The rating had been lowered to SD because S&P considered Ford's recent debt exchange a "distressed debt exchange," meaning bondholders received less than the par value of their bonds.
The debt exchange has improved Ford's capital structure and reduced automotive debt by $9.9 billion, S&P said. "Still, Ford estimates that annual cash interest savings will be less than $600 million, a fraction of the company's automotive cash outflows in 2008," the agency said.
S&P assigned a negative outlook to Ford's rating, indicating a downgrade is likely over the next two years.
Ford may have to revisit its informal request for $9 billion of government loans unless sales begin to recover this year, S&P said.
"Even if the government were to eventually provide funding, we stress that we would likely view such assistance as buying more time rather than as a solution to the automaker's fundamental business risks, especially deteriorating global demand."
Ford could run short of cash if its automotive operations use more than $14 billion this year, including restructuring charges, or if auto sales remain weak in 2010, the agency said.
The failure of one or more of Ford's competitors could hurt many of Ford's suppliers, and the resulting turmoil could pressure Ford's liquidity further, S&P said.
Ford rivals General Motors Corp (GM.N) and Chrysler Holding LLC [CCMLPD.UL] are operating under emergency U.S. government loans and face bankruptcy if they cannot reach cost-cutting agreements with lenders and unions. (Reporting by Dena Aubin; Editing by James Dalgleish
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Altra cosa very interesting: in bancarotta i contratti UAW di GM sarebbero carta straccia, giusto? Mettiamo il caso che a UAW "sia imposto" di accettare condizioni più favorevoli per GM (+ penalizzanti per i dipendenti di GM), rispetto a quelle che UAW ha con Ford "outside bankruptcy"....che succede, Ford avrebbe diritto alle condizioni di GM?
Altra cosa interessante da seguire
In Chapter 11 è consentito di chiedere al giudice di dichiarare nulli contratti divenuti onerosi per l'azienda (e in senso lato quindi ostativi alla ristrutturazione). Un potere non indifferente, e contrario al diritto (i contratti devono essere rispettati, a meno di nuovi accordi tra le parti).
Non è detto che l'azienda richieda di ridiscutere tutti i contratti, non è detto che il giudice acconsenta ad ogni richiesta. Esiste quindi un margine di trattativa (tra UAW e management GM, per capirci, al di fuori della procedura).
Interessante il commento su Ford, credo anch'io che sarebbe difficile che non tragga un beneficio indiretto da concessioni ulteriori strappate da Gm, alla fine i contratti sono sempre stati "simili", anche se non uguali.
paologorgo
Chapter 11
The Good, Bad And Ugly of GM
Bankruptcy-Court Sale Of Assets May Be Tough, Stalking Horse or Not
By HEIDI N. MOORE
General Motors is likely to have an equally difficult time inside bankruptcy court as outside it.
The government favors a plan to push GM into bankruptcy in order to divide the auto maker into a "good GM" that includes brands like Chevrolet and Cadillac and a "bad" GM of brands like Saturn and Hummer, and labor obligations that would be sold through bankruptcy court.
To find out how General Motors would fare in selling those brands, Deal Journal spoke with Daniel Glosband, a partner who specializes in financial restructuring for law firm Goodwin Procter, about asset sales, dubbed 363 deals, named after a section of the bankruptcy code.
Deal Journal: How does a 363 sale work?
Daniel Glosband: [Section] 363 sales typically start with what's always called a stalking horse, which is someone who has agreed to buy the assets on particular terms for a particular price. In exchange for the chance that it may get outbid, the stalking horse gets a breakup fee and gets paid all of the expenses incurred in getting to the table first. These sales have become much more common in large part because of the credit markets.
Deal Journal: The fear many people have is that GM could end up in bankruptcy court forever.
Mr. Glosband: What the government thinks they should do is draw a line around what could be a viable part of the business and sell it. I have a little trouble envisioning how they will do that. I have seen reports that the government will take assets and put them in a separate entity and issue equity in that entity back to GM. That's not a structure that I could see implemented in a 363.
Deal Journal: GM already has had very few bites on its attempts to sell some brands, so there doesn't seem to be any guarantee that Chapter 11 will make that easier. Could they aim to have a 363 sale and not have a stalking horse, which could set them up to get no bids at all?
Mr. Glosband: It is possible, but it's not pretty. It's only a last-resort kind of filing where you go in with a 363 sale and have no stalking horse.
Deal Journal: What else is unusual about the plan to sell GM through 363?
Mr. Glosband: I'm not quite sure how they're going to deal with the labor component of the parts of the business GM is selling. All of the airlines blew up the collective bargaining agreements, blew up their pension plans, and modified or cut off their retirement benefit. You can't do that in a 363 sale. All the obligations in terms of labor and retirement and pensions would be left behind at the old company, but how do you deal with the fact that you need to pay for employees at the good company? That's going to be a huge issue.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123968044595416297.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs
Bankruptcy-Court Sale Of Assets May Be Tough, Stalking Horse or Not
By HEIDI N. MOORE
General Motors is likely to have an equally difficult time inside bankruptcy court as outside it.
The government favors a plan to push GM into bankruptcy in order to divide the auto maker into a "good GM" that includes brands like Chevrolet and Cadillac and a "bad" GM of brands like Saturn and Hummer, and labor obligations that would be sold through bankruptcy court.
To find out how General Motors would fare in selling those brands, Deal Journal spoke with Daniel Glosband, a partner who specializes in financial restructuring for law firm Goodwin Procter, about asset sales, dubbed 363 deals, named after a section of the bankruptcy code.
Deal Journal: How does a 363 sale work?
Daniel Glosband: [Section] 363 sales typically start with what's always called a stalking horse, which is someone who has agreed to buy the assets on particular terms for a particular price. In exchange for the chance that it may get outbid, the stalking horse gets a breakup fee and gets paid all of the expenses incurred in getting to the table first. These sales have become much more common in large part because of the credit markets.
Deal Journal: The fear many people have is that GM could end up in bankruptcy court forever.
Mr. Glosband: What the government thinks they should do is draw a line around what could be a viable part of the business and sell it. I have a little trouble envisioning how they will do that. I have seen reports that the government will take assets and put them in a separate entity and issue equity in that entity back to GM. That's not a structure that I could see implemented in a 363.
Deal Journal: GM already has had very few bites on its attempts to sell some brands, so there doesn't seem to be any guarantee that Chapter 11 will make that easier. Could they aim to have a 363 sale and not have a stalking horse, which could set them up to get no bids at all?
Mr. Glosband: It is possible, but it's not pretty. It's only a last-resort kind of filing where you go in with a 363 sale and have no stalking horse.
Deal Journal: What else is unusual about the plan to sell GM through 363?
Mr. Glosband: I'm not quite sure how they're going to deal with the labor component of the parts of the business GM is selling. All of the airlines blew up the collective bargaining agreements, blew up their pension plans, and modified or cut off their retirement benefit. You can't do that in a 363 sale. All the obligations in terms of labor and retirement and pensions would be left behind at the old company, but how do you deal with the fact that you need to pay for employees at the good company? That's going to be a huge issue.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123968044595416297.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Chrysler LLC's creditors are planning to make a counteroffer this week to the U.S. Treasury, which originally asked lenders owed about $6.9 billion to accept just $1 billion to keep the auto maker from liquidating.
The lending group is now weighing whether to ask for equity in a company combining Chrysler with potential partner Fiat SpA in exchange for concessions, say people familiar with the matter.
The government's current proposal doesn't include any equity and asks lenders to give up 85% of what is owed them.
Late Sunday night, the lenders received 20 to 30 pages of data and financial models from the Treasury. These documents show government assumptions on Chrysler's cost structure, its internal operating results, information on new union contracts and details on Fiat's contributions to a joint company.
The government has demanded that a deal be completed by April 30. Representatives for Chrysler and the Treasure declined to comment.
The secured-debt holders had also been waiting for information about the liquidation value of some Chrysler assets and the structure of Chrysler's partnership with Italian car maker Fiat before providing Treasury with a counteroffer, said one bank-debt holder.
A counteroffer is "now just days away, certainly coming this week," said one person familiar with the talks.
The lenders' steering committee has been largely controlled by big banks including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley.
This weekend it was expanded to include three other debt holders: Oppenheimer & Co., distressed investor Stairway Capital Management and advisory and asset management firm Perella Weinberg Partners, all of which hold pieces of Chrysler bank debt, according to several people familiar with the talks.
The three funds didn't return calls or declined to comment.
The decision to expand the committee's ranks was made late Friday, after several of the nonbank creditors had taken steps to set up an alternative committee of creditors, according to a person familiar with the situation.
The nonbank creditors have grown wary of banks who are receiving federal backing via the Troubled Assets Relief Program, say people familiar with the matter.
They fear that the government could apply pressure to the TARP-recipients that wouldn't serve their interests, the person said.
Write to Jeffrey McCracken at [email protected] and Kate Linebaugh at [email protected]
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123966464887115105.html
The lending group is now weighing whether to ask for equity in a company combining Chrysler with potential partner Fiat SpA in exchange for concessions, say people familiar with the matter.
The government's current proposal doesn't include any equity and asks lenders to give up 85% of what is owed them.
Late Sunday night, the lenders received 20 to 30 pages of data and financial models from the Treasury. These documents show government assumptions on Chrysler's cost structure, its internal operating results, information on new union contracts and details on Fiat's contributions to a joint company.
The government has demanded that a deal be completed by April 30. Representatives for Chrysler and the Treasure declined to comment.
The secured-debt holders had also been waiting for information about the liquidation value of some Chrysler assets and the structure of Chrysler's partnership with Italian car maker Fiat before providing Treasury with a counteroffer, said one bank-debt holder.
A counteroffer is "now just days away, certainly coming this week," said one person familiar with the talks.
The lenders' steering committee has been largely controlled by big banks including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley.
This weekend it was expanded to include three other debt holders: Oppenheimer & Co., distressed investor Stairway Capital Management and advisory and asset management firm Perella Weinberg Partners, all of which hold pieces of Chrysler bank debt, according to several people familiar with the talks.
The three funds didn't return calls or declined to comment.
The decision to expand the committee's ranks was made late Friday, after several of the nonbank creditors had taken steps to set up an alternative committee of creditors, according to a person familiar with the situation.
The nonbank creditors have grown wary of banks who are receiving federal backing via the Troubled Assets Relief Program, say people familiar with the matter.
They fear that the government could apply pressure to the TARP-recipients that wouldn't serve their interests, the person said.
Write to Jeffrey McCracken at [email protected] and Kate Linebaugh at [email protected]
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123966464887115105.html
Gaudente
Forumer storico
Quattro chiacchiere sul bilancio Ford
La prima cosa che salta all'occhio leggendo lo stato patrimoniale (pag.68 dell'annual report 2008) e' che per la prima volta l'equity di Ford e' diventata negativa passando da 5.628 milioni a -17.311 . La seconda e' che la differenza tra i due valori e' quasi 23 miliardi, una cifra ben superiore alla perdita dichiarata per l'esercizio di 14,7 miliardi.
Qualche posta pertanto e' stata addebitata direttamente allo stato patrimoniale senza passare per il conto economico.
Il patrimonio netto negativo implica che salvo ricapitalizzazioni o accantonamenti di utili futuri ovviamente i debiti non potranno essere ripagati per intero.
Stimare la percentuale di recupero e' ovviamente impresa ardua.
Il totale dell'attivo e' 218 miliardi, il passivo 234.
Se tutto l'attivo fosse realizzabile e tutte le passivita' avessero lo stesso privilegio basterebbe fare 218/234 e si avrebbe un recovery del 93%.
Ma questo vale solo nel mondo dei sogni.
Scrutando l'attivo in cerca delle inevitabili magagne si nota subito che Ford - diversamente da GM - possiede ancora il braccio finanziario dell'attivita' , avendo 93 miliardi di finance receivables e altri 27 di operative leases. Questi importi sono ovviamente a rischio data la crisi finanziaria, e fanno si' che Ford subisca l'effetto negativo di essere di fatto una societa' finanziaria come GE o GMAC.
Oltre a essere a rischio insolvenza, la maggior parte di questi importi sono vincolati al pagamento di asset backed securities, per un nominale di 74 miliardi(nota 4 a pag.88). Agli obbligazionisti unsecured pertanto resta solo la differenza , e dopo altri creditori privilegiati.
A tale riguardo vale la pena di rilevare che dei 234 miliardi di passivo ben 63 sono alla voce "Accrued Liabilities". Alla nota 15 a pag 101 il dettaglio di tale voce e' prevalentemente costituito da pensioni ed altri "post retirement benefits" sicuramente privilegiati rispetto ai bondisti, anche se a onor del vero ignoro se i "dealers and customers advances and claims" lo siano anch'essi o no.
L'impressione comunque e' a che a contendersi i 218 miliardi di attivo gli obbligazionisti unsecured si troverebbero davanti 74+63= 137 miliardi di crediti privilegiati, il che fa temere che per loro restino a malapena le briciole.
Chi ha bond a breve scadenza puo' consolarsi col fatto che in cassa Ford ha 22 miliardi di cash e 17 di "marketable securities" , sufficienti a pagare almeno le prime scadenze di quest'anno che ammontano (nota 16 pag.103) a 63 miliardi.
Considerazione finale: quest'analisi non tiene conto dello swap fatto da Ford nel 2009 , del quale non conosco l'entita'.
La prima cosa che salta all'occhio leggendo lo stato patrimoniale (pag.68 dell'annual report 2008) e' che per la prima volta l'equity di Ford e' diventata negativa passando da 5.628 milioni a -17.311 . La seconda e' che la differenza tra i due valori e' quasi 23 miliardi, una cifra ben superiore alla perdita dichiarata per l'esercizio di 14,7 miliardi.
Qualche posta pertanto e' stata addebitata direttamente allo stato patrimoniale senza passare per il conto economico.
Il patrimonio netto negativo implica che salvo ricapitalizzazioni o accantonamenti di utili futuri ovviamente i debiti non potranno essere ripagati per intero.
Stimare la percentuale di recupero e' ovviamente impresa ardua.
Il totale dell'attivo e' 218 miliardi, il passivo 234.
Se tutto l'attivo fosse realizzabile e tutte le passivita' avessero lo stesso privilegio basterebbe fare 218/234 e si avrebbe un recovery del 93%.
Ma questo vale solo nel mondo dei sogni.
Scrutando l'attivo in cerca delle inevitabili magagne si nota subito che Ford - diversamente da GM - possiede ancora il braccio finanziario dell'attivita' , avendo 93 miliardi di finance receivables e altri 27 di operative leases. Questi importi sono ovviamente a rischio data la crisi finanziaria, e fanno si' che Ford subisca l'effetto negativo di essere di fatto una societa' finanziaria come GE o GMAC.
Oltre a essere a rischio insolvenza, la maggior parte di questi importi sono vincolati al pagamento di asset backed securities, per un nominale di 74 miliardi(nota 4 a pag.88). Agli obbligazionisti unsecured pertanto resta solo la differenza , e dopo altri creditori privilegiati.
A tale riguardo vale la pena di rilevare che dei 234 miliardi di passivo ben 63 sono alla voce "Accrued Liabilities". Alla nota 15 a pag 101 il dettaglio di tale voce e' prevalentemente costituito da pensioni ed altri "post retirement benefits" sicuramente privilegiati rispetto ai bondisti, anche se a onor del vero ignoro se i "dealers and customers advances and claims" lo siano anch'essi o no.
L'impressione comunque e' a che a contendersi i 218 miliardi di attivo gli obbligazionisti unsecured si troverebbero davanti 74+63= 137 miliardi di crediti privilegiati, il che fa temere che per loro restino a malapena le briciole.
Chi ha bond a breve scadenza puo' consolarsi col fatto che in cassa Ford ha 22 miliardi di cash e 17 di "marketable securities" , sufficienti a pagare almeno le prime scadenze di quest'anno che ammontano (nota 16 pag.103) a 63 miliardi.
Considerazione finale: quest'analisi non tiene conto dello swap fatto da Ford nel 2009 , del quale non conosco l'entita'.
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