Obbligazioni societarie GM, Ford, Chrysler: il 3D dell'automotive USA

[paologorgo]

By JOHN D. STOLL

General Motors Corp.'s strategy for a quick trip through bankruptcy court is likely to spark legal challenges from bondholders worried about getting steamrolled.
Key members of an ad hoc committee representing GM bondholders have begun preparing arguments against the auto maker's bankruptcy plan, according to people familiar with the strategy.
GM's leading bankruptcy plan would break the company into two parts: a good GM made up of strong assets, such as Chevrolet and the auto maker's Chinese operations; and a bad GM of underperforming assets and billions of dollars in obligations that essentially would be wound down in bankruptcy court.
Proceeds from the government's eventual sale of equity in the good company in part would go toward paying parties that have leverage over the auto maker. Those include the United Auto Workers union, which is owed tens of billions in health-care payments; and unsecured bondholders, who hold $29 billion in GM debt.
Even though unsecured bondholders would get stock in the good GM, the people familiar with the matter said bondholders are concerned that GM's so-called 363 sale unnecessarily pushes bondholders to accept hefty losses on their investments.
The threat of legal opposition is one reason GM management had resisted filing in bankruptcy court for protection from creditors. GM and the government have a handful of different game plans to emerge from bankruptcy court within a few months, rather than the typical stay of at least a year. But all those plans are subject to the discretion of a bankruptcy judge and the cooperation of stakeholders. "It's the ultimate democratic process," a GM executive said, summing up the complications that can arise in bankruptcy court.
Some bondholders fear GM's fast-track reorganization inappropriately mirrors what was done last fall when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection as the U.S. financial system seized up. They draw a contrast to the dire situation at Lehman, which was believed to be melting so quickly that it required a quick sale of its trading operations to Barclay's Capital.
"Neither GM nor any of its brands are melting ice cubes, so creditors would be very concerned if any action by the automotive task force or GM tried to use the Lehman decision as an example," said one of the people familiar with the bondholder group's position.
Members of the bondholders' committee have begun expressing their concerns to the Obama administration's task force. The task force has said it plans to meet with the bondholders, but it was unclear when such a discussion might take place. The Treasury Department declined to comment.
Bob Gordon, a bankruptcy lawyer with Clark Hill PLC in Detroit who isn't involved with the GM case, said bondholders may have a difficult time standing in the way of GM's plan. Under Section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, plans such as GM's "are done quite frequently when there is someone who wants to acquire assets but wants to make sure certain claims stay with the bankrupt estate," he said. The question for the court is whether the debtor used reasonable business judgment in crafting an exit strategy, and bankruptcy judges often side with the debtor, Mr. Gordon said.
Some bondholders' committee members fear there is little they can do to slow momentum on GM's 363 plans, given the $13.4 billion in taxpayer money invested in the auto maker and the enthusiasm within the administration for the 363 route.
Yet even if they don't prevail, bondholders say a legal challenge could discourage similar fast-track efforts down the line. "Many people in the distressed-investment business would be concerned about the long-term impact on the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which many people would want to protect [even] after the fact," said one of the people familiar with the bondholders' group.
Write to John D. Stoll at [email protected]


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123957652811811897.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs

 

[paologorgo]

WASHINGTON, April 12 (Reuters ) - The U.S. Treasury Department is directing General Motors (GM.N) to lay the groundwork for a bankruptcy filing by June 1, even though the automaker has publicly stated it could reorganize outside of court, The New York Times reported on Sunday.
GM is operating under emergency U.S. government loans. It has been told by the Obama administration's task force overseeing its bailout that it must cut costs and reduce its debts in order to continue to receive aid.
The White House-appointed autos task force has given GM 60 days to come up with a restructuring plan and it is trying to determine whether the automaker can be a viable company.
Quoting sources who had been briefed on the GM plans, the Times said the goal was to prepare for a fast "surgical" bankruptcy.
The newspaper said preparations are aimed at assuring a GM bankruptcy filing is ready if the company is unable to reach agreement with bondholders to exchange roughly $28 billion in debt into equity in GM and with the United Automobile Workers union.
A plan under consideration would create a new company that would buy the "good" assets of GM after the carmaker files for bankruptcy, the Times said.
Less desirable assets, including unwanted brands, factories and health care obligations, would be left in the old company, which could be liquidated over several years, according to the paper.
Treasury officials are examining one potential outcome in which the viable GM enters and exits bankruptcy protection in as little as two weeks, using $5 billion to $7 billion in federal financing, a person briefed on the matter told the Times.
The Times sources declined to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the process. Both GM and Treasury Department officials declined to comment, the newspaper said.
Last week, GM's chief executive said the automaker wanted to restructure out of court, but also preparing for a bankruptcy filing.



http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idINN1235687020090413?rpc=44

 

[paologorgo]

incominciano le cause tese ad accertare se la strategia perseguita dal management di rinforzare il bilancio in USA, depauperando le operazioni estere, sia stato rispettosa dei termini di emissione di certi debiti:

As General Motors Corp.'s bondholders prepare to challenge a potential bankruptcy, GM faces a separate lawsuit in Canada. The litigation stems from unsecured bondholders alleging that GM wrongfully pulled about $600 million from a Canadian subsidiary last year to address an increasing liquidity problem in the U.S.
The plaintiffs are demanding repayment to the subsidiary just as the company is subsisting on U.S. government loans. The issue isn't expected to be resolved in the near future, given the amount of discovery required and since a bankruptcy filing by GM could bring an array of disenchanted investors to the surface.
The Canada complaint was filed in Halifax, Nova Scotia, last month by investment funds including Aurelius Capital Partners LP, Drawbridge DSO Securities LLC and Appaloosa Investment Ltd. The funds say they own more than 60% of the approximately $1 billion in notes that were issued in 2003 out of GM's little-known Nova Scotia Finance Co. subsidiary.
At issue are dividends that GM paid from the Nova Scotia unit last May to its flagging U.S. operation. These payments were made just as GM Chief Financial Officer Ray Young began to publicly acknowledge a potential need to raise cash.
The suit says that GM's move to tap the Nova Scotia unit for a dividend potentially broke Canadian law because company officials should have known the U.S. operations were "either insolvent or on the brink of insolvency." By robbing Peter to pay Paul, the plaintiffs say, GM illegally placed the Nova Scotia unit's debt holders at a heightened risk of never being repaid.
In documents filed about two weeks ago in Nova Scotia Supreme Court, GM said the allegations are false and said that the plaintiff firms are sophisticated investors who knew there would be risk related to buying bonds. The company says it acted within its rights when it paid itself the dividends.
The bondholders also have complained about GM's move to refinance a $4.5 billion revolving credit line in 2006 and use assets in Canada, including Nova Scotia Finance Company, as collateral for the loans. GM drew on the revolving loan last fall as its liquidity concerns were mounting. These moves, the investors claim, subordinated them to the banks extending the revolving credit line and made repayment of the loans less likely.
GM says it had the right to offer the property as collateral for loans.


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123957716241411965.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs

 

[troppidebiti]

WASHINGTON, 13 APR (awp/ats/ansa) Una bancarotta rapida e 'chirurgica'. Sarebbe questa, secondo il New York Times, la strada verso cui il Tesoro americano spingerebbe la General Motors, alle prese con una crisi senza precedenti.

I componenti dalla task force istituita da Barack Obama per affrontare l'emergenza del settore auto, ha rivelato al quotidiano una fonte vicina al dossier, hanno avuto lunghi contatti la scorsa settimana con i rappresentanti di Detroit e i colloqui dovrebbero proseguire anche questa settimana.

L'obiettivo, scrive il NYT, è quello di preparare la società ad una "rapida e chirurgica bancarotta" nel caso in cui, entro la scadenza del primo giugno, GM non riuscisse a trovare un accordo con gli obbligazionisti per trasformare i 28 miliardi di dollari di debito in equity e con il sindacato, non disposto a trattare alcuna concessione da parte dei dipendenti senza un analogo sacrificio da parte degli obbligazionisti.

Una delle ipotesi allo studio è quella di creare, non appena GM dichiarasse fallimento, una nuova società in grado di acquistare solo le attività ancora redditizie. Quelle a rischio e meno appetibili resterebbero invece all'interno della vecchia compagnia, che sarebbe liquidata nel corso di qualche anno. Gli esperti del Tesoro stanno esaminando la possibilità per la 'buona GM' di entrare e uscire dalla bancarotta protetta nell'arco di due settimane, utilizzando tra i 5 e i 7 miliardi di dollari di finanziamento pubblico. Il resto della GM potrebbe invece aver bisogno di 70 miliardi di risorse governative per liquidare le fabbriche e per sanare i costi sanitari.

Al contrario del suo predecessore Rick Wagoner, che ha sempre escluso l'eventualità della bancarotta, l'attuale amministratore delegato di GM, Fritz Henderson, ha più volte indicato di prepararsi a questa eventualità.

 

[paologorgo]

The NYT is reporting that Treasury Department officials have directed General Motors (GM) to begin laying the groundwork for a bankruptcy proceeding by June 1. According to the Times, they want to be prepared to go through a “surgical” bankruptcy. One plan under consideration would create a new company that would buy the “good” assets of G.M. almost immediately after the carmaker files for bankruptcy.

Less desirable assets, including unwanted brands, factories and health care obligations, would be left in the old company, which could be liquidated over several years.
Treasury officials are examining one potential outcome in which the “good G.M.” enters and exits bankruptcy protection in as little as two weeks, using $5 billion to $7 billion in federal financing, a person who had been briefed on the prospect said last week.
The rest of G.M. may require as much as $70 billion in government financing, and possibly more to resolve the health care obligations and the liquidation of the factories, according to legal experts and federal officials.
​

All of that may look good on paper but the reality is that once the case enters the court, the administration, the company and the creditors are subject to the dictates of the judiciary. I suspect that any trustee is going to feel more than a little political pressure to watch out for the interests of the government. That same trustee is also going to be sensitive to any charges that he or she is acting in less than an impartial manner so the eventual outcome is highly uncertain regardless of how well planned.
The article also contains an interesting aside concerning GM’s pension plan.
One delicate issue for federal officials is the fate of G.M.’s employee pension plans, which could become the responsibility of the federal pension agency if G.M. seeks their termination.

G.M. faces an unfunded liability of about $13.5 billion for its plans, which had $84.5 billion in assets and $98 billion in liabilities as of Dec. 31. That amount could sink the pension agency, requiring its own bailout before a G.M. case could be resolved.
The White House has at least one option to protect the plan.
The Supreme Court, in a landmark 1990 case, ordered the LTV Corporation, a steel maker, to take back responsibility for its pension plans after it emerged from bankruptcy protection.
​

That illustrates beautifully how complex this issue has become. Were it only the bankruptcy of a very large company it would be difficult enough but the political ramifications are enormous. If the UAW does see pension benefits reduced substantially and permanently, they are going to feel as if their friends sold them out. Should the administration opt for some ad hoc solution that preserves benefits at the expense of normal procedure then it is certain to run into severe criticism.
GM can become a nightmare for the Obama administration. They cannot abandon the company and the unions entirely to the tender mercies of the bankruptcy courts but anything they do to mitigate the damage is going to entail collateral damage to some other constituency. I rather suspect they wish that the Bush administration had done the dirty work for them. At the same time, the Bush administration might very well have game planned this from the outset.


http://seekingalpha.com/article/130665-treasury-directs-gm-to-get-ready-for-bankruptcy

 

[mb1]

In caso di bancarotta "pilotata" di Gm, come potrebbero comportarsi le quotazioni dei bond Gmac? Ps. Giugno 2009 Grazie e saluti

 

[Capirex85]

In caso di bancarotta "pilotata" di Gm, come potrebbero comportarsi le quotazioni dei bond Gmac? Ps. Giugno 2009 Grazie e saluti

Si riallinerebbero al recovery rate atteso, che in questo caso è vicino a 0.

 

[paologorgo]

Si riallinerebbero al recovery rate atteso, che in questo caso è vicino a 0.

mb1 è preoccupato per i suoi bond Gmac, ed è un discorso un po' più complesso. Su GM sono d'accordo. La scadenza è fortunatamente vicina, ma non conoscendo bene Gmac evito di aggiungere commenti inutili.

 

[paologorgo]

One of the real beneficial experiences of my life was working closely with Dwight Schar, who is best know as Chairman and former/founding CEO of NVR, Inc. (NVR), one of the nation’s largest and the most profitable home building companies. In the summer of 1986, when I went to work for him, as VP, Corporate Affairs (mostly investor relations, until 1991 when I continued the relationship for two more years on a retained basis), he had recently taken NVHomes public. It was a small home building company active in the Greater Washington area, primarily Northern Virginia. Schar co-founded it with some friends and business associates; he was clearly the leader.

The company went public as a Master Limited Partnership (MLP), which meant that rather than paying taxes at the corporate level, the individual equity investors (who owned membership interests rather than shares of stock) were allocated their share of the profits, and they would have to pay taxes on that. The company paid distributions of profit that would minimally be great enough to cover investors’ tax obligations. In addition to that, at the time, MLPs were also considered to be PIGs (Passive Income Generators). That meant that if the NVHomes investor had passive losses (e.g., from an ownership interest in an apartment building), they could balance that against the NVHomes profit and thus as much as 100 percent of the distribution they received from NVHomes could be pocketed.

Shortly after taking the company public, Schar launched what must be the greatest ever minnow-swallowing-the-whale case history. He made an attempt to buy Ryan Homes, which was based in Pittsburgh, and at the time either the number one or two homebuilder in the country. The logic was that Ryan could be converted to MLP status and made into a compelling investment. In addition, Ryan had become a tired company selling outdated models to too small a range of market segments. So, if Ryan could extend its reach to include the market of move-up buyers, growth could be dramatic. Schar was brilliant at marketing new homes, so that was considered a virtual “automatic.”

I was hired just after acquisition terms were agreed to. All that was left was for NVHomes to raise the capital to fund the acquisition of the Ryan stock they had not yet acquired, and to be renamed NVRyan, which ultimately was changed to NVR. Although I forget the exact amount of capital we needed to raise, I do remember it was a prodigious amount by any standard. The higher the value of NVR units, the less equity would have to be sold to conclude the deal. I was hired to build investor interest in the company with the goal of seeing that drive unit value higher. The strategy was sound.

The company had been basically ignored by the Street. As soon as we brought the story to analysts, the company began to be followed by just about every major Wall Street firm. The unit price increased from around $4.00 or so to in excess of $40.00.

That ended with the crash of the residential real estate market starting around 1990. Ultimately, NVR had to file for Chapter 11 protection. At the time that happened, among our most important operating concerns was the cancellation rate. If customers who had paid us a deposit and contracted for us to build a house for them decided to back-out of the deal, as they legally could, we would have houses under construction move out of the revenue pipeline into speculative unsold inventory. That could have been a disaster. We needed to reassure our customers that they could buy a house from us with confidence. At the same time, we relied on material suppliers and construction trades subcontractors for much of the actual construction of the house - we also had to reassure them. We had to convince realtors that they could bring their customers to us and the deal would close without hassle. To say nothing about our own employees.

Sound familiar? General Motors (GM) asserts a very similar concern. They have said that Chapter 11 would be wrong for them because people would not buy new cars due to their concern about the loss of their car’s warranty. In the case of NVR’s chapter 11 filing, homes last longer, cost more and buying one is an even more emotional consumer act than buying a car. So I think the lessons learned from NVR are relevant.

The month we announced the filing of Chapter 11, we also experienced one of the lowest cancellation rates in our history. I was intimately involved with the communications process that made that possible. Here’s what we did - and what GM should do when they file Chapter 11. This isn’t an extensive list. If you see GM drifting away from this approach, you should probably start worrying about them.

1. Treat your customers with respect. Don’t blare at them. Help them understand what is happening. At NVR we said plainly that we had a financial problem, not an operating problem. We explained that the best way to fix that problem was to file Chapter 11, and noted how at the same time that would actually provide more safety to the customers. That’s really what the customer wants to know. Just say it.

2. Educate your middle management. Our news release announcing the filing was held until late Sunday night so that the Washington Post would be first to break the story in their edition dated Monday morning. On the preceding Friday we brought together all the middle managers from the several markets where we were then doing business. The first thing we did was have them listen to a legal presentation about what “insider information” was and how they had to treat it, and then had them sign a statement acknowledging that they understood it. Then we told them about the forthcoming news. They learned about what it meant to their suppliers, and their customers and to their own jobs and the jobs of the people who worked with them. They also were media trained so they’d know how to explain it to local reporters as well as anyone who asked them about it. I think that was the single best thing we did. Here’s the lesson for GM: Your customers will not believe faceless, unknown and suspicious corporate management, but they will believe the guy at the service bay or the salesperson, especially if they exude confidence that they know what they are talking about. That sort of knowledge gets to them over coffee during chats with their immediate boss, the middle management. So, you have to educate middle management as a top priority.

3. Stay on point & keep it simple. There will be plenty of time to get across information about Chevrolet’s next new car or some new type of innovation. When it comes time to announce Chapter 11, keep focused on just that issue. Explain it. Build credibility for your candor and simplicity. Get it behind you. Then let it die to become a non-event (which is what will happen if it’s done right) and move-on.

Oh, and know this: you’ll get over it. Just take a look at the NVR stock chart since it came out of Chapter 11 in 1993.


http://seekingalpha.com/article/130690-what-gm-can-learn-from-nvr-s-chapter-11?source=yahoo

 

[Researcher]

Ritornando a Ford (che mi sembra decisamente interessante da seguire, anche in prospettiva investimento speculativo, molto + che GM e Chrysler che sono, da un pezzo, cadaveri che camminano).......dall'andamento di GM e Ford sembra che il mercato sia del parere che se GM va in bancarotta (pilotata o non) Ford non ne risentirebbe più di tanto....anzi.....
Il rischio di default a catena dei fornitori è stato scongiurato dal programma di protezione del governo (a cui solo GM e Chrysler hanno aderito)....anzi, Ford ha partecipato ad un proprio programma di "garanzia" per i clienti che hanno difficoltà di pagamento

Sempre più interessante.....