giub
New Membro
mi fa piacere...un politico che ha avuto importantissime cariche governative fa sempre comodo per leggere la politica grecaGrazie.Resto e mi impegnerò ad essere più paziente
Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 3 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione mago gambamerlo
- Data di Inizio
tommy271
Forumer storico
Ulteriore peggioramento in obbligazioni e CDS - I 2 anni a 25.60% da 24.20% e CDS a 3560 bps da 3239 bps
2015/04/27 - 11:29
Obbligazioni greche e CDS premuti oggi il risultato delle preoccupazioni che l'accordo sarà in ritardo tra la Grecia e l'Unione europea e gli scenari per il piano B del ministro delle Finanze tedesco Schaeuble e le minacce di un referendum su funzionari governativi offuscano il paesaggio e mitigare la visibilità di investimento.
Dopo i mercati che si sono verificati oggi in obbligazioni e CDS prevalenti sentimento negativo.
Il greco 10 anni 2025 è compreso tra 49-50,5 punti base a rendimento di mercato 12,83% e 12,41% performance di vendita.
I greci 10 anni registrati alto anno resa 13,41% il 21 aprile 2015.
L'età bassa è al 5,47% di giugno e la fine di agosto 2014.
Lo spread, il differenziale tra titoli greci e tedeschi a 10 anni formata a 1247 punti base rispetto 1223 bps che era un record dopo l'PSI +.
I CDS greci cinque anni in cui è il punto di riferimento formata a 3560 bps da 3269 bps ad un recente record di 4.280 punti base ..
I CDS funziona come segue.
Per ogni 10 milioni di dollari l'esposizione al debito greco, un investitore che vuole a copertura del rischio paese di acquistare un derivato del CDS e paga ad esempio per la Grecia resa oggi 35,60% o 3,56 milioni di dollari premio per 10 milioni di dollari. posizione patrimoniale in debito greco.
Nei nuovi greche di 5 anni registrato un deterioramento marginale.
Il cinque anni prestito obbligazionario 2.019 maturità emesso a 99,13 punti base e si trova ora a 65 punti base su una resa media o media 17,78%.
Si noti che il legame a 5 anni emesse al 4,95%.
I 2 anni fine del 2017 (in precedenza 3 anni bond) emesse a 99,65 punti base situati a 66 bps con un rendimento medio del 25,16% e il 25,60% di ritorno del mercato .... 3,5% se rilasciata e 24,20% il 24 Aprile 2015.
L'alto anno al 30,10% in 2 anni e si è verificato il 22 aprile il 2015.
Per quanto riguarda le obbligazioni di oggi dell'Europa meridionale contrassegnati liquidazioni limite.
Lega Generalmente Euroregione hanno registrato un buon comportamento e generalmente differenziato dalla crisi greca.
Gli irlandesi 10 anni fine 2025 mostra resa 0,71% in obbligazioni portoghesi a 10 anni 2,03%, Spagna 1,43% e l'Italia 1,48%.
Germania mostra il rendimento a 10 anni legame al 0,14% (sulla base del febbraio 2025 legame maturità) si trova vicino al minimo storico del 0,06% registrato in 10 Aprile 2015.
Vale la pena ricordare che, se nessun accordo le prestazioni di 10 anni obbligazionario tedesco salirà ulteriormente nella zona del 0,30%.
?????? - bankingnews.gr - online ?????????? ?????????
2015/04/27 - 11:29
Obbligazioni greche e CDS premuti oggi il risultato delle preoccupazioni che l'accordo sarà in ritardo tra la Grecia e l'Unione europea e gli scenari per il piano B del ministro delle Finanze tedesco Schaeuble e le minacce di un referendum su funzionari governativi offuscano il paesaggio e mitigare la visibilità di investimento.
Dopo i mercati che si sono verificati oggi in obbligazioni e CDS prevalenti sentimento negativo.
Il greco 10 anni 2025 è compreso tra 49-50,5 punti base a rendimento di mercato 12,83% e 12,41% performance di vendita.
I greci 10 anni registrati alto anno resa 13,41% il 21 aprile 2015.
L'età bassa è al 5,47% di giugno e la fine di agosto 2014.
Lo spread, il differenziale tra titoli greci e tedeschi a 10 anni formata a 1247 punti base rispetto 1223 bps che era un record dopo l'PSI +.
I CDS greci cinque anni in cui è il punto di riferimento formata a 3560 bps da 3269 bps ad un recente record di 4.280 punti base ..
I CDS funziona come segue.
Per ogni 10 milioni di dollari l'esposizione al debito greco, un investitore che vuole a copertura del rischio paese di acquistare un derivato del CDS e paga ad esempio per la Grecia resa oggi 35,60% o 3,56 milioni di dollari premio per 10 milioni di dollari. posizione patrimoniale in debito greco.
Nei nuovi greche di 5 anni registrato un deterioramento marginale.
Il cinque anni prestito obbligazionario 2.019 maturità emesso a 99,13 punti base e si trova ora a 65 punti base su una resa media o media 17,78%.
Si noti che il legame a 5 anni emesse al 4,95%.
I 2 anni fine del 2017 (in precedenza 3 anni bond) emesse a 99,65 punti base situati a 66 bps con un rendimento medio del 25,16% e il 25,60% di ritorno del mercato .... 3,5% se rilasciata e 24,20% il 24 Aprile 2015.
L'alto anno al 30,10% in 2 anni e si è verificato il 22 aprile il 2015.
Per quanto riguarda le obbligazioni di oggi dell'Europa meridionale contrassegnati liquidazioni limite.
Lega Generalmente Euroregione hanno registrato un buon comportamento e generalmente differenziato dalla crisi greca.
Gli irlandesi 10 anni fine 2025 mostra resa 0,71% in obbligazioni portoghesi a 10 anni 2,03%, Spagna 1,43% e l'Italia 1,48%.
Germania mostra il rendimento a 10 anni legame al 0,14% (sulla base del febbraio 2025 legame maturità) si trova vicino al minimo storico del 0,06% registrato in 10 Aprile 2015.
Vale la pena ricordare che, se nessun accordo le prestazioni di 10 anni obbligazionario tedesco salirà ulteriormente nella zona del 0,30%.
?????? - bankingnews.gr - online ?????????? ?????????
giub
New Membro
3 Tough Choices for ECB on Greece
Apr 27, 2015 2:00 AM EDT By Mohamed A. El-Erian
As another meeting of euro area finance ministers ended in acrimony Friday, the focus this week will turn to the resumption of -- it is to be hoped -- more constructive technical discussions between Greece and its European partners. Yet the most potentially decisive discussions will be taking place in a different venue: Decision makers at the European Central Bank’s will hold their weekly consideration of how much “emergency liquidity” they should extend to Greek banks and on what terms.
Greece's Fiscal Odyssey
At its weekly meeting, on April 29, the ECB will be under tremendous pressure to keep Greece on its life support system. But without progress elsewhere, this powerful monetary institution is at risk of joining other actors in the Greek drama that are unintentionally transitioning from being a major part of the solution to a big part of the problem now and in the future. This risk is symptomatic of the much larger dysfunctions undermining a comprehensive and sustainable outlook for Greece within the euro zone.
The ECB decision will involve some variant of three basic alternatives:
1. Pretend and extend. The ECB, through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance operated by its network of national central banks, would continue to extend exceptional funding to Greece. This would be done under the pretense that it is helping Greece deal with a liquidity problem instead of acknowledging the country's true predicament, deep economic and solvency deficiencies. This approach has the advantage of keeping options open in the hope that Greece and its creditors will finally break through to decisive policy and financial solutions. The downside is that it would increase the ECB's financial exposure to a problem case that, at least so far, has shown little chance of resolving itself in an orderly fashion. It would also raise concerns about burden-sharing as the ECB would act even as other creditors, not only from the private sector but also public institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, are scheduled to get repaid.
2. Pull the plug. Under this scenario, the ECB would be forthright. It would limit any further financing to Greece, raising not only the legitimate burden-sharing issues but also rightly noting that liquidity support would continue to prove ineffective without accompanying measures to improve growth and financial solvency. It would make further assistance conditional both on policy progress and new money to Greece from other sources, along with debt reduction. If such conditions failed to be met, the ECB decision would likely lead to even greater capital and deposit flight from Greece. And this, under most realistic scenarios, would prompt the Greek government to impose capital controls, default on payments and take even more draconian steps to gain control of any idle cash balances in the country. All of these developments would increase the risk of Greece exiting the euro zone.
3. Pull the plug as part of a comprehensive Plan B. In this case, the ECB’s refusal to extend additional liquidity support would be part of an attempt (albeit a risky one) at an orderly pivot for both the euro zone and Greece. The ECB would seek to minimize the risk of Greek contagion and disorderly spillovers to other economies (such as Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Spain) by expanding its funding windows for both governments and financial institutions. It would also step up its large-scale program of security purchases (known as quantitative easing). Meanwhile, work would proceed on some sort of interim European arrangement for Greece, including the possibility of an association agreement with the European Union or, even, remaining in the EU but outside the euro zone, like the U.K.
One of the big lessons of the last few years is that, regardless of the facts on the ground, no one -- whether on the Greek side or among its official national, regional and international creditors -- wishes to go down in history as the cause of the first exit from the single currency. For that reason, the ECB would most likely opt again for the first option -- extending the ELA and pretending that a durable solution is around the corner -- and it would hope that its involvement wouldn't be overwhelmed by funding demands caused by accelerated deposit flight from Greek banks.
All this speaks to what is perhaps the greatest tragedy of all. For several years, very few people -- whether in Greece, among its European partners or in the ECB, EU and IMF -- have stepped up to the challenge of a lifetime: that of either taking decisive breakthrough policy actions or properly pressing the reset button. Instead, the decision has been to engage in a collective muddle-through, hoping some perfect -- indeed, immaculate -- solution would appear down the road.
Such a solution is hard to come by. And the wait for one is far from cost-free.
Millions of Greeks, including an alarming portion of the country's youth, have become mired in devastating unemployment and spreading poverty. And with hundreds of millions of euros of debt obligations having been transferred from the private sector to European taxpayers, the would-be solvers of this Greek tragedy have become a growing part of the problem.
Apr 27, 2015 2:00 AM EDT By Mohamed A. El-Erian
As another meeting of euro area finance ministers ended in acrimony Friday, the focus this week will turn to the resumption of -- it is to be hoped -- more constructive technical discussions between Greece and its European partners. Yet the most potentially decisive discussions will be taking place in a different venue: Decision makers at the European Central Bank’s will hold their weekly consideration of how much “emergency liquidity” they should extend to Greek banks and on what terms.
Greece's Fiscal Odyssey
At its weekly meeting, on April 29, the ECB will be under tremendous pressure to keep Greece on its life support system. But without progress elsewhere, this powerful monetary institution is at risk of joining other actors in the Greek drama that are unintentionally transitioning from being a major part of the solution to a big part of the problem now and in the future. This risk is symptomatic of the much larger dysfunctions undermining a comprehensive and sustainable outlook for Greece within the euro zone.
The ECB decision will involve some variant of three basic alternatives:
1. Pretend and extend. The ECB, through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance operated by its network of national central banks, would continue to extend exceptional funding to Greece. This would be done under the pretense that it is helping Greece deal with a liquidity problem instead of acknowledging the country's true predicament, deep economic and solvency deficiencies. This approach has the advantage of keeping options open in the hope that Greece and its creditors will finally break through to decisive policy and financial solutions. The downside is that it would increase the ECB's financial exposure to a problem case that, at least so far, has shown little chance of resolving itself in an orderly fashion. It would also raise concerns about burden-sharing as the ECB would act even as other creditors, not only from the private sector but also public institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, are scheduled to get repaid.
2. Pull the plug. Under this scenario, the ECB would be forthright. It would limit any further financing to Greece, raising not only the legitimate burden-sharing issues but also rightly noting that liquidity support would continue to prove ineffective without accompanying measures to improve growth and financial solvency. It would make further assistance conditional both on policy progress and new money to Greece from other sources, along with debt reduction. If such conditions failed to be met, the ECB decision would likely lead to even greater capital and deposit flight from Greece. And this, under most realistic scenarios, would prompt the Greek government to impose capital controls, default on payments and take even more draconian steps to gain control of any idle cash balances in the country. All of these developments would increase the risk of Greece exiting the euro zone.
3. Pull the plug as part of a comprehensive Plan B. In this case, the ECB’s refusal to extend additional liquidity support would be part of an attempt (albeit a risky one) at an orderly pivot for both the euro zone and Greece. The ECB would seek to minimize the risk of Greek contagion and disorderly spillovers to other economies (such as Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Spain) by expanding its funding windows for both governments and financial institutions. It would also step up its large-scale program of security purchases (known as quantitative easing). Meanwhile, work would proceed on some sort of interim European arrangement for Greece, including the possibility of an association agreement with the European Union or, even, remaining in the EU but outside the euro zone, like the U.K.
One of the big lessons of the last few years is that, regardless of the facts on the ground, no one -- whether on the Greek side or among its official national, regional and international creditors -- wishes to go down in history as the cause of the first exit from the single currency. For that reason, the ECB would most likely opt again for the first option -- extending the ELA and pretending that a durable solution is around the corner -- and it would hope that its involvement wouldn't be overwhelmed by funding demands caused by accelerated deposit flight from Greek banks.
All this speaks to what is perhaps the greatest tragedy of all. For several years, very few people -- whether in Greece, among its European partners or in the ECB, EU and IMF -- have stepped up to the challenge of a lifetime: that of either taking decisive breakthrough policy actions or properly pressing the reset button. Instead, the decision has been to engage in a collective muddle-through, hoping some perfect -- indeed, immaculate -- solution would appear down the road.
Such a solution is hard to come by. And the wait for one is far from cost-free.
Millions of Greeks, including an alarming portion of the country's youth, have become mired in devastating unemployment and spreading poverty. And with hundreds of millions of euros of debt obligations having been transferred from the private sector to European taxpayers, the would-be solvers of this Greek tragedy have become a growing part of the problem.
giub
New Membro
What happens if Greece can’t pay its debts?
The standoff between a leftwing government and the financial powers of the EU is near to breaking point. What if the worst happens?
This time it’s real: Greece has wriggled out of looming national bankruptcy on numerous occasions over the past five years, but now it has just a few weeks left before it must sign a new debt deal with its eurozone partners and the IMF – or find itself heading for an exit door that leads back to the drachma.
Greeks’ view of the debt crisis: ‘What lies ahead is great, great hardship’
On Friday, after a meeting of eurozone finance ministers in the Latvian capital Riga, the signs were ominous. Malta’s finance minister Edward Scicluna, said: “I would describe today’s meeting as a complete breakdown in communication with Greece.”
The Dutch finance minister and chair of the 19-member eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, warned that it was very hard to consider a new programme for Greece to cover its funding needs beyond June, given the lack of recent progress. Time was running out, he said, again ruling out giving Greece a slice of the €7.2bn (£5.1bn) of previously agreed bailout cash being held back until a series of self-help economic reforms, ranging from a privatisation programme to pension changes, were agreed.
Since January the newly elected radical-left government in Athens has fought for a complete overhaul of a £180bn rescue package that was due to end in February but was extended until June while new terms were discussed.
The last three months have produced a series of meetings characterised by increasing frustration on both sides. Officials in Brussels have become tetchy and irritated at the lack of detail from Athens about planned reforms. A series of speeches by finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, which have been highly critical of “orthodox” and “failed” policies championed by Brussels, has also driven a wedge between them.
Greek disappointment has mounted at the perceived disrespect shown for its democratic independence and the general election vote that shocked Europe, ushering in as it did the Syriza-led government of leftists and Marxists, many opposed to any deal with Brussels. Syriza supporters argue that the election revealed the depth of feeling against austerity and should force the euro elite to consider the failure of past policies.
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In the tug-of-war over a deal, recent weeks have seen Brussels gain the upper hand. Even countries that began talks offering Varoufakis a sympathetic ear – the French, Italians and Dutch – have wearied of his lectures on Keynesian economics and how he would have handled the post-2008 banking crash differently. While not as hardline as the Germans, the Finns and the Spanish, all of which have finance ministers who would gladly see the back of Greece, the rest now talk privately of a post-Greece eurozone.
Athens is convinced it can hold out for a fresh deal - one way or another - until at least the end of June. The government of Alexis Tsipras has been using all means possible to make required repayments to its lenders, meet welfare bills and pay wages to civil servants, from sequestering cash from state-owned bodies to delaying paying bills for medical supplies. Officials insist they can lay their hands on enough cash to refinance outstanding loans due in the next two months while honouring welfare payments and public sector salary cheques. During this time a new negotiated settlement can be forged.
On Friday, Varoufakis said: “Greece is willing to make compromises to reach a deal on its debt. We want an agreement and we are willing to make compromises to achieve this. The cost of not having a solution would be huge for all of us, Greece and the eurozone.”
Varoufakis, who described himself as a “bad politician” last week for his need to say what he believed, admitted achieving to a deal was difficult but that “we will have a solution in the end”.
But can Greece make it to the end of June? Time is running out, there are huge doubts about the money available to Varoufakis and willingness on both sides is weaker than at any time in the last four years.
What if the government fails to pay £2bn of public sector wages on 1 May?
This prospect is unlikely after the coalition administration defeated rightwing opposition groups to force through a decree on Friday that now obliges state bodies and local authorities to transfer their cash reserves to the Bank of Greece.
Deputy finance minister Dimitris Mardas said he could find €2.5bn in loans from state enterprises: “I want this to cover any needs that may occur… taking into account the worst-case scenarios and the needs for May.”
On the same day the ministry must repay €200m of interest on a loan from the International Monetary Fund and a further €760m loan repayment is due on 12 May.
The European Central Bank is allowing the Greek central bank to borrow, but only to roll over loans from foreign banks. The ECB is determined that the Greek central bank does not hand ECB cash to the government.
Several big payments from the Greek central bank to private lenders are due in May. Last week the ECB raised the cap on its loan facility to keep Greece alive and talking. However, on Friday ECB president Mario Draghi raised the prospect of changing the amount, warning that the ECB could potentially impose tougher conditions in return for keeping Greek banks afloat. Another €1.5bn of IMF loan repayments is due in June.
What about more drastic measures?
If the cash runs out, Tsipras could pay workers and welfare payments and delay IMF payments. He has already asked for the IMF to accept a delay and been rebuffed. The IMF pointed out during its recent spring conference that any such delays will not be countenanced: it has not happened in 30 years, and prior to that only to the poorest of central African nations.
Without a deal, the opposition will demand fresh elections rather than see Greece crash out of the euro. The Syriza/Anel coalition remains strong, but Tsipras could be forced to go down this route or offer a referendum. Deputy prime minister Yannis Dragasakis said these alternatives are “at the back of our mind, as options to seek a solution, in case of deadlock”.
These routes are strewn with mines ready to explode, in particular, the consistent support for remaining inside the euro area. There are plenty of MPs in Syriza and the populist Anel in favour of monetary independence, but this is a minority view among voters.
What happens when the exchequer runs dry?
A chess player, thinking a few moves ahead, would advise against missing any IMF payments because the lender of last resort to bankrupt nations would be the only institution capable of rescuing Greece if a Brussels deal fails.
If the cash runs out Tsipras will be forced to impose capital controls to prevent a flight of funds out of the Greek banks and into neighbouring countries as ATMs run dry.
Cyprus showed what can happen when capital controls are imposed – and that it solves only one problem. It cannot provide the government with fresh funds. In the case of the Mediterranean island, that came from seizing the savings of bank account holders. Cyprus also turned to the IMF and Russia for loans. Tsipras is due to visit Moscow, at the invitation of Vladimir Putin, on 9 May for the second world war victory celebrations.
If the Greek government also set in motion printing a new currency, something it is many months from putting in place, euros seized by the state could prove valuable foreign currency. However, before such a drastic move, Greeks could take to the streets. The far-right Golden Dawn party , which came joint third in the January election, has seen its poll ratings jump as the Syriza negotiating position has failed to make headway.
Varoufakis ended Friday saying his ministry was not bluffing when it said Brussels must support an agenda of reform without demands for further spending cuts and a regime of monitoring that he previously likened to waterboarding. German chancellor Angela Merkel also agreed – as usual – that a deal with Greece was the best result. It’s unfortunate for both that negotiators remain so far apart.
The main players and where they stand
ALEXIS TSIPRAS
The Greek prime minister leads a government that fell just short of a majority in January elections after winning 36% of the vote. His Syriza party, which rules with the populist Independent Greeks party, draws strength from its own and supporters’ strong conviction that the country was badly treated by fellow euro members hell bent on making it pay back every cent of every loan. But conviction may not be enough to win the battle. Hardliners such as Panagiotis Lafazanis, the minister for productive recovery, energy and the environment, have cast themselves as enemies of capitalism and are reluctant to agree a deal at any price. Tsipras’s implied threat of a euro exit is undermined by a consistent majority of voters wanting to keep the currency, which may encourage Brussels to call his bluff.
YANIS VAROUFAKIS
The former economics professor, now finance minister, went into Friday’s meeting of eurozone colleagues in Riga repeating his demand that his counterparts admit that their policies towards Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the rest have failed. It is not a message that wins many friends. In Riga he faced a volley of criticism for his repeated expounding of Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on government spending. His opposite numbers find it childish and patronising. They understand Keynesianism, but don’t think it works. Varoufakis admits he is adverse to the compromises familiar to diplomats and politicians, and many think that rather than be responsible for a fudge he would prefer to go down in flames.
JEROEN DIJSSELBLOEM
The Dutch finance minister is a Labour party MP under pressure at home from falling poll ratings. He rushed to Athens soon after Tsipras took office to offer his hand in friendship, only to be told he was part of the eurozone’s failed austerity project. As chair of the eurogroup of 19 finance ministers, he was a potentially powerful ally, but a meeting with Varoufakis was famously short and ended with a press conference during which the new Greek finance chief said: “We respect institutions but don’t plan to cooperate with that committee.” A member of a coalition government led by the right-of-centre WD party, Dijsselbloem is now understood to be light on sympathy for the Syriza government and frustrated at its posturing and a lack of detail on proposed reforms. But he is against a cheap stitch-up to prevent the Greeks dropping out of the euro, fearing it will prove to be the beginning of a break-up of the single currency.
WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE
An architect of German reunification, in the 1990s, the veteran Christian Democrat is a venerable eurocrat. That hasn’t stopped him standing in the opposite corner to Varoufakis from the moment Syriza came to power. In recent weeks he has begun to smile much more and appear more relaxed as Varoufakis has upset one euro finance minister after another, consolidating the German position that Greece must stick to the austerity plan. Unlike those at the International Monetary Fund, Schäuble is an advocate of the previous Greek bailouts, which did not so much fix Athens’ debt problems as rescue German and French banks faced with Greek liabilities. He has the support of prime minister Angela Merkel, but she may force him to accept a compromise if one becomes possible.
CHRISTINE LAGARDE
Like most players in the crisis, the boss of the International Monetary Fund is a rightwing politician more susceptible to arguments in favour of restraining public spending and cutting debt than the hell-for-leather growth promotion the radical left Syriza government wants to pursue. The Washington-based IMF is a major lender to Greece and has played a cautious game that involves forcing Athens to adopt the usual neo-liberal policies of labour market reform and privatisations. Lagarde has supported a scaling-down of the demands made on Athens and an extension of the current bailout, though a large gap has still to be bridged.
VLADIMIR PUTIN
Unrest inside the eurozone is an opportunity the Russian president is unlikely to miss. He welcomed Tsipras to Moscow a few weeks ago and hinted at aid for Greece should it leave the currency union. He has a war chest from years of oil tax receipts and would be happy to offer guarantees and loans for a deal that would upset Berlin and Washington, despite a domestic recession and the clamour from struggling state enterprises for extra cash. Greece is also a key Nato member and has a large army, which Putin would enjoy drawing closer to his sphere of influence.
The standoff between a leftwing government and the financial powers of the EU is near to breaking point. What if the worst happens?
This time it’s real: Greece has wriggled out of looming national bankruptcy on numerous occasions over the past five years, but now it has just a few weeks left before it must sign a new debt deal with its eurozone partners and the IMF – or find itself heading for an exit door that leads back to the drachma.
Greeks’ view of the debt crisis: ‘What lies ahead is great, great hardship’
On Friday, after a meeting of eurozone finance ministers in the Latvian capital Riga, the signs were ominous. Malta’s finance minister Edward Scicluna, said: “I would describe today’s meeting as a complete breakdown in communication with Greece.”
The Dutch finance minister and chair of the 19-member eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, warned that it was very hard to consider a new programme for Greece to cover its funding needs beyond June, given the lack of recent progress. Time was running out, he said, again ruling out giving Greece a slice of the €7.2bn (£5.1bn) of previously agreed bailout cash being held back until a series of self-help economic reforms, ranging from a privatisation programme to pension changes, were agreed.
Since January the newly elected radical-left government in Athens has fought for a complete overhaul of a £180bn rescue package that was due to end in February but was extended until June while new terms were discussed.
The last three months have produced a series of meetings characterised by increasing frustration on both sides. Officials in Brussels have become tetchy and irritated at the lack of detail from Athens about planned reforms. A series of speeches by finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, which have been highly critical of “orthodox” and “failed” policies championed by Brussels, has also driven a wedge between them.
Greek disappointment has mounted at the perceived disrespect shown for its democratic independence and the general election vote that shocked Europe, ushering in as it did the Syriza-led government of leftists and Marxists, many opposed to any deal with Brussels. Syriza supporters argue that the election revealed the depth of feeling against austerity and should force the euro elite to consider the failure of past policies.
Advertisement
In the tug-of-war over a deal, recent weeks have seen Brussels gain the upper hand. Even countries that began talks offering Varoufakis a sympathetic ear – the French, Italians and Dutch – have wearied of his lectures on Keynesian economics and how he would have handled the post-2008 banking crash differently. While not as hardline as the Germans, the Finns and the Spanish, all of which have finance ministers who would gladly see the back of Greece, the rest now talk privately of a post-Greece eurozone.
Athens is convinced it can hold out for a fresh deal - one way or another - until at least the end of June. The government of Alexis Tsipras has been using all means possible to make required repayments to its lenders, meet welfare bills and pay wages to civil servants, from sequestering cash from state-owned bodies to delaying paying bills for medical supplies. Officials insist they can lay their hands on enough cash to refinance outstanding loans due in the next two months while honouring welfare payments and public sector salary cheques. During this time a new negotiated settlement can be forged.
On Friday, Varoufakis said: “Greece is willing to make compromises to reach a deal on its debt. We want an agreement and we are willing to make compromises to achieve this. The cost of not having a solution would be huge for all of us, Greece and the eurozone.”
Varoufakis, who described himself as a “bad politician” last week for his need to say what he believed, admitted achieving to a deal was difficult but that “we will have a solution in the end”.
But can Greece make it to the end of June? Time is running out, there are huge doubts about the money available to Varoufakis and willingness on both sides is weaker than at any time in the last four years.
What if the government fails to pay £2bn of public sector wages on 1 May?
This prospect is unlikely after the coalition administration defeated rightwing opposition groups to force through a decree on Friday that now obliges state bodies and local authorities to transfer their cash reserves to the Bank of Greece.
Deputy finance minister Dimitris Mardas said he could find €2.5bn in loans from state enterprises: “I want this to cover any needs that may occur… taking into account the worst-case scenarios and the needs for May.”
On the same day the ministry must repay €200m of interest on a loan from the International Monetary Fund and a further €760m loan repayment is due on 12 May.
The European Central Bank is allowing the Greek central bank to borrow, but only to roll over loans from foreign banks. The ECB is determined that the Greek central bank does not hand ECB cash to the government.
Several big payments from the Greek central bank to private lenders are due in May. Last week the ECB raised the cap on its loan facility to keep Greece alive and talking. However, on Friday ECB president Mario Draghi raised the prospect of changing the amount, warning that the ECB could potentially impose tougher conditions in return for keeping Greek banks afloat. Another €1.5bn of IMF loan repayments is due in June.
What about more drastic measures?
If the cash runs out, Tsipras could pay workers and welfare payments and delay IMF payments. He has already asked for the IMF to accept a delay and been rebuffed. The IMF pointed out during its recent spring conference that any such delays will not be countenanced: it has not happened in 30 years, and prior to that only to the poorest of central African nations.
Without a deal, the opposition will demand fresh elections rather than see Greece crash out of the euro. The Syriza/Anel coalition remains strong, but Tsipras could be forced to go down this route or offer a referendum. Deputy prime minister Yannis Dragasakis said these alternatives are “at the back of our mind, as options to seek a solution, in case of deadlock”.
These routes are strewn with mines ready to explode, in particular, the consistent support for remaining inside the euro area. There are plenty of MPs in Syriza and the populist Anel in favour of monetary independence, but this is a minority view among voters.
What happens when the exchequer runs dry?
A chess player, thinking a few moves ahead, would advise against missing any IMF payments because the lender of last resort to bankrupt nations would be the only institution capable of rescuing Greece if a Brussels deal fails.
If the cash runs out Tsipras will be forced to impose capital controls to prevent a flight of funds out of the Greek banks and into neighbouring countries as ATMs run dry.
Cyprus showed what can happen when capital controls are imposed – and that it solves only one problem. It cannot provide the government with fresh funds. In the case of the Mediterranean island, that came from seizing the savings of bank account holders. Cyprus also turned to the IMF and Russia for loans. Tsipras is due to visit Moscow, at the invitation of Vladimir Putin, on 9 May for the second world war victory celebrations.
If the Greek government also set in motion printing a new currency, something it is many months from putting in place, euros seized by the state could prove valuable foreign currency. However, before such a drastic move, Greeks could take to the streets. The far-right Golden Dawn party , which came joint third in the January election, has seen its poll ratings jump as the Syriza negotiating position has failed to make headway.
Varoufakis ended Friday saying his ministry was not bluffing when it said Brussels must support an agenda of reform without demands for further spending cuts and a regime of monitoring that he previously likened to waterboarding. German chancellor Angela Merkel also agreed – as usual – that a deal with Greece was the best result. It’s unfortunate for both that negotiators remain so far apart.
The main players and where they stand
ALEXIS TSIPRAS
The Greek prime minister leads a government that fell just short of a majority in January elections after winning 36% of the vote. His Syriza party, which rules with the populist Independent Greeks party, draws strength from its own and supporters’ strong conviction that the country was badly treated by fellow euro members hell bent on making it pay back every cent of every loan. But conviction may not be enough to win the battle. Hardliners such as Panagiotis Lafazanis, the minister for productive recovery, energy and the environment, have cast themselves as enemies of capitalism and are reluctant to agree a deal at any price. Tsipras’s implied threat of a euro exit is undermined by a consistent majority of voters wanting to keep the currency, which may encourage Brussels to call his bluff.
YANIS VAROUFAKIS
The former economics professor, now finance minister, went into Friday’s meeting of eurozone colleagues in Riga repeating his demand that his counterparts admit that their policies towards Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the rest have failed. It is not a message that wins many friends. In Riga he faced a volley of criticism for his repeated expounding of Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on government spending. His opposite numbers find it childish and patronising. They understand Keynesianism, but don’t think it works. Varoufakis admits he is adverse to the compromises familiar to diplomats and politicians, and many think that rather than be responsible for a fudge he would prefer to go down in flames.
JEROEN DIJSSELBLOEM
The Dutch finance minister is a Labour party MP under pressure at home from falling poll ratings. He rushed to Athens soon after Tsipras took office to offer his hand in friendship, only to be told he was part of the eurozone’s failed austerity project. As chair of the eurogroup of 19 finance ministers, he was a potentially powerful ally, but a meeting with Varoufakis was famously short and ended with a press conference during which the new Greek finance chief said: “We respect institutions but don’t plan to cooperate with that committee.” A member of a coalition government led by the right-of-centre WD party, Dijsselbloem is now understood to be light on sympathy for the Syriza government and frustrated at its posturing and a lack of detail on proposed reforms. But he is against a cheap stitch-up to prevent the Greeks dropping out of the euro, fearing it will prove to be the beginning of a break-up of the single currency.
WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE
An architect of German reunification, in the 1990s, the veteran Christian Democrat is a venerable eurocrat. That hasn’t stopped him standing in the opposite corner to Varoufakis from the moment Syriza came to power. In recent weeks he has begun to smile much more and appear more relaxed as Varoufakis has upset one euro finance minister after another, consolidating the German position that Greece must stick to the austerity plan. Unlike those at the International Monetary Fund, Schäuble is an advocate of the previous Greek bailouts, which did not so much fix Athens’ debt problems as rescue German and French banks faced with Greek liabilities. He has the support of prime minister Angela Merkel, but she may force him to accept a compromise if one becomes possible.
CHRISTINE LAGARDE
Like most players in the crisis, the boss of the International Monetary Fund is a rightwing politician more susceptible to arguments in favour of restraining public spending and cutting debt than the hell-for-leather growth promotion the radical left Syriza government wants to pursue. The Washington-based IMF is a major lender to Greece and has played a cautious game that involves forcing Athens to adopt the usual neo-liberal policies of labour market reform and privatisations. Lagarde has supported a scaling-down of the demands made on Athens and an extension of the current bailout, though a large gap has still to be bridged.
VLADIMIR PUTIN
Unrest inside the eurozone is an opportunity the Russian president is unlikely to miss. He welcomed Tsipras to Moscow a few weeks ago and hinted at aid for Greece should it leave the currency union. He has a war chest from years of oil tax receipts and would be happy to offer guarantees and loans for a deal that would upset Berlin and Washington, despite a domestic recession and the clamour from struggling state enterprises for extra cash. Greece is also a key Nato member and has a large army, which Putin would enjoy drawing closer to his sphere of influence.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Moskovisi: Faremo tutto il possibile per raggiungere un accordo
"Messaggio duro ma decisivo di Riga"
Lunedi, April 27, 2015 11:53
UPD: 11: 56
La convinzione che il messaggio dell'Eurogruppo a Riga in Lettonia, "è stato difficile, ma decisivo" è sentito, espressa dal Commissario per gli affari economici e monetari dell'Unione europea Pierre Moskovisi.
Parlando alla Domenica mostrano tre strumenti (RTL, Figaro, LCI), Mr. Moskovisi ha osservato che "è impossibile non essere d'accordo", nel mese di giugno. "Ognuno farà tutto il possibile per raggiungere un accordo (...) C'è anche dell'Eurogruppo l'11 maggio, che è molto importante. Potremo accelerare il processo, sono convinto ", ha detto.
Circa la volontà del governo greco di accelerare i suoi sforzi, Pierre Moskovisi ha detto: "Tutti i miei contatti con il governo greco nei giorni scorsi, nelle ultime settimane, che indica che il messaggio di Riga era difficile, in ogni caso decisiva , ascoltato. "
Alla domanda se ci può essere un "incidente", lasciando l'euro, il commissario europeo ha assicurato che la Commissione e le istituzioni europee a lavorare con lei, tutti vogliono evitare un caso del genere. Egli ha osservato, tuttavia, che il tempo è breve e che dobbiamo trovare i soldi per pagare le scadenze importanti.
"Per esempio, il 12 maggio c'è un pagamento di 750 milioni. Per il Fondo monetario internazionale (...) che non dà il tempo supplementare. Inoltre, abbiamo anche le scadenze più importanti nel mese di giugno. (...) Ecco perché dico che il tempo è breve e che dobbiamo trovare soluzioni sostenibili e le soluzioni praticabili passiamo richiesti dalle riforme. Le riforme sono necessarie per consentire alla Grecia di rispettare i suoi impegni nei confronti dei suoi creditori per legare un accordo ", ha detto.
"Non è il mio lavoro per preparare l'uscita della Grecia dall'euro non è quello di preparare un fallimento. Il mio lavoro è quello di evitare tutto questo. Sono assolutamente auguro che la Grecia rimanga nell'euro. La posizione della Grecia è nell'euro ", ha aggiunto.
Linea dura contro la Grecia dall'Eurogruppo
Per quanto riguarda i rapporti con il ministro delle finanze greco Yanis Varoufakis, Pierre Moskovisi ha detto: "E 'difficile, ma non è mio compito giudicare i miei interlocutori ... prendo quello che mi danno. E 'un ragazzo intelligente, non è sempre facile, ma intelligente. Siamo in grado di trovare un linguaggio comune e, in ogni caso, quello che voglio. "
Su come "inaccettabile o incompleta" è l'elenco delle riforme del governo greco, il signor Moskovisi sottolineato la lentezza dei progressi per accelerare. "Per tre mesi e mezzo al potere questo governo, è vero che all'inizio eravamo troppo distanti in termini di ideologia, il modo di vedere le cose. A poco a poco abbiamo imparato l'altro, abbiamo imparato a parlare, c'è una procedura di lavoro applicabile, (...) e abbiamo fatto progressi, "ha detto.
Egli ha sottolineato, tuttavia, che questo progresso è insufficiente e troppo lento. "Penso che sia una cosa che deve essere risolto, perché se andiamo passo - passo, mentre il tempo è breve, non è un problema. Per questo Eurogruppo Venerdì è stato molto chiaro e ha affrontato i greci dicendo loro, si ha la responsabilità di presentare un approccio globale, riforme quadro coerente per il quale si impegnavano il 20 febbraio. Si deve fare in fretta. E 'essenziale e dovrebbe accelerare ", ha dichiarato il commissario europeo.
(Naftemporiki)
"Messaggio duro ma decisivo di Riga"
Lunedi, April 27, 2015 11:53
UPD: 11: 56
La convinzione che il messaggio dell'Eurogruppo a Riga in Lettonia, "è stato difficile, ma decisivo" è sentito, espressa dal Commissario per gli affari economici e monetari dell'Unione europea Pierre Moskovisi.
Parlando alla Domenica mostrano tre strumenti (RTL, Figaro, LCI), Mr. Moskovisi ha osservato che "è impossibile non essere d'accordo", nel mese di giugno. "Ognuno farà tutto il possibile per raggiungere un accordo (...) C'è anche dell'Eurogruppo l'11 maggio, che è molto importante. Potremo accelerare il processo, sono convinto ", ha detto.
Circa la volontà del governo greco di accelerare i suoi sforzi, Pierre Moskovisi ha detto: "Tutti i miei contatti con il governo greco nei giorni scorsi, nelle ultime settimane, che indica che il messaggio di Riga era difficile, in ogni caso decisiva , ascoltato. "
Alla domanda se ci può essere un "incidente", lasciando l'euro, il commissario europeo ha assicurato che la Commissione e le istituzioni europee a lavorare con lei, tutti vogliono evitare un caso del genere. Egli ha osservato, tuttavia, che il tempo è breve e che dobbiamo trovare i soldi per pagare le scadenze importanti.
"Per esempio, il 12 maggio c'è un pagamento di 750 milioni. Per il Fondo monetario internazionale (...) che non dà il tempo supplementare. Inoltre, abbiamo anche le scadenze più importanti nel mese di giugno. (...) Ecco perché dico che il tempo è breve e che dobbiamo trovare soluzioni sostenibili e le soluzioni praticabili passiamo richiesti dalle riforme. Le riforme sono necessarie per consentire alla Grecia di rispettare i suoi impegni nei confronti dei suoi creditori per legare un accordo ", ha detto.
"Non è il mio lavoro per preparare l'uscita della Grecia dall'euro non è quello di preparare un fallimento. Il mio lavoro è quello di evitare tutto questo. Sono assolutamente auguro che la Grecia rimanga nell'euro. La posizione della Grecia è nell'euro ", ha aggiunto.
Linea dura contro la Grecia dall'Eurogruppo
Per quanto riguarda i rapporti con il ministro delle finanze greco Yanis Varoufakis, Pierre Moskovisi ha detto: "E 'difficile, ma non è mio compito giudicare i miei interlocutori ... prendo quello che mi danno. E 'un ragazzo intelligente, non è sempre facile, ma intelligente. Siamo in grado di trovare un linguaggio comune e, in ogni caso, quello che voglio. "
Su come "inaccettabile o incompleta" è l'elenco delle riforme del governo greco, il signor Moskovisi sottolineato la lentezza dei progressi per accelerare. "Per tre mesi e mezzo al potere questo governo, è vero che all'inizio eravamo troppo distanti in termini di ideologia, il modo di vedere le cose. A poco a poco abbiamo imparato l'altro, abbiamo imparato a parlare, c'è una procedura di lavoro applicabile, (...) e abbiamo fatto progressi, "ha detto.
Egli ha sottolineato, tuttavia, che questo progresso è insufficiente e troppo lento. "Penso che sia una cosa che deve essere risolto, perché se andiamo passo - passo, mentre il tempo è breve, non è un problema. Per questo Eurogruppo Venerdì è stato molto chiaro e ha affrontato i greci dicendo loro, si ha la responsabilità di presentare un approccio globale, riforme quadro coerente per il quale si impegnavano il 20 febbraio. Si deve fare in fretta. E 'essenziale e dovrebbe accelerare ", ha dichiarato il commissario europeo.
(Naftemporiki)
g.ln
Triplo Panico: comprare
si va avanti lentamente per non uscire di strada
Buon inizio settimana a tutti, soprattutto a chi ha percentuali importanti di Grecia in ptf. Il colloquio Merkel Tsipras dimostra che si sta cercando una soluzione che salvi la faccia all'UE e alla Grecia: la strada è tracciata, ragione vuole che non si esca fuori strada, anche se è accidentata e stretta.
Ciao, Giuseppe
Buon inizio settimana a tutti, soprattutto a chi ha percentuali importanti di Grecia in ptf. Il colloquio Merkel Tsipras dimostra che si sta cercando una soluzione che salvi la faccia all'UE e alla Grecia: la strada è tracciata, ragione vuole che non si esca fuori strada, anche se è accidentata e stretta.
Ciao, Giuseppe
camaleonte
Forumer storico
PIRAEUS BANK SA AKTIE | Aktienkurs | Nachrichten | Kurs | (A1WZ93,,GRS014003008) | finanzen.net
A proposito di questa banca super svalutata, c'è qualcosa che mi sfugge confrontando la capitalizzazione delle banche greche con quelle italiane.
Vedo che Piraeus ha una capitalizzazione di quasi 2M di €, poco più di un mese fa oltre 4M, cioè come la PopMI che è ai massimi degli ultimi 4 anni, UBI capitalizza 6,5M, mentre la povera NBG ha una capitalizzazione di quasi 4M, cioè a marzo era oltre gli 8M di capitalizzazione.
Calcolando che la sola Lombardia ha un PIL superiore alla Grecia ....
Molte cose sfuggono anche a me. Come ho scritto in precedenza, mi basta sapere che ha attivi per 89 Mld. se non ricordo male, e ne capitalizza circa 2.
E' una scommessa che mi sento di correre...
tommy271
Forumer storico
N. Chountis: penso che prevarrà flessibilità politica
Lunedi, April 27, 2015 12:10
UPD: 12: 12
La responsabilità è ora da parte delle istituzioni, ha detto il vice ministro degli Affari esteri ed europei Nikos Chountis, convinto che vincerà flessibilità politica nei negoziati.
Parlando nel passaggio FM, ha notato che la nostra trattativa è a un punto critico di prova la volontà politica di ciascuno di noi:
"Abbiamo detto che non possiamo tornare a politiche del memorandum antisociali, recessione quindi inefficaci e dal punto di vista delle istituzioni politiche devono decidere cosa fare nei confronti del problema.
Si decide di aiutare la situazione e uscire da questa politica del memorandum difficile (il paese)?La responsabilità è ora da parte delle istituzioni. Le istituzioni possono applicare le modifiche al lavoro o di assicurazione. Per la privatizzazione è uno dei nostri particolare proposta applicabile ad altri paesi ".
"Spero di prevalere questa flessibilità politica delle istituzioni, perché qui sta il problema, ed è un grave problema per l'Europa", ha detto Giunta e ha aggiunto che "stiamo andando a un compromesso."
(Naftemporiki)
Lunedi, April 27, 2015 12:10
UPD: 12: 12
La responsabilità è ora da parte delle istituzioni, ha detto il vice ministro degli Affari esteri ed europei Nikos Chountis, convinto che vincerà flessibilità politica nei negoziati.
Parlando nel passaggio FM, ha notato che la nostra trattativa è a un punto critico di prova la volontà politica di ciascuno di noi:
"Abbiamo detto che non possiamo tornare a politiche del memorandum antisociali, recessione quindi inefficaci e dal punto di vista delle istituzioni politiche devono decidere cosa fare nei confronti del problema.
Si decide di aiutare la situazione e uscire da questa politica del memorandum difficile (il paese)?La responsabilità è ora da parte delle istituzioni. Le istituzioni possono applicare le modifiche al lavoro o di assicurazione. Per la privatizzazione è uno dei nostri particolare proposta applicabile ad altri paesi ".
"Spero di prevalere questa flessibilità politica delle istituzioni, perché qui sta il problema, ed è un grave problema per l'Europa", ha detto Giunta e ha aggiunto che "stiamo andando a un compromesso."
(Naftemporiki)
Ultima modifica:
camaleonte
Forumer storico
Grecia: gioco a due Tsipras-Varoufakis"
https://it.finance.yahoo.com/notizie/grecia-gioco-due-tsipras-varoufakis-091500209.html
"E con le proteste che montano nelle piazza greche e con l’insofferenza crescente nel resto d’Europa, rumors vogliono che Tsipras stia giocando per isolare il proprio ministro delle finanze per recuperare fiducia tra i partner europei e forse per rinsaldare l’accordo con il partito dell’ex premier Samaras per dare alla Repubblica ellenica un nuovo esecutivo di unità nazionale. La speranza è che il leader di Syriza abbia ampliato le proprie vedute dopo il gelido bagno di realtà a livello europeo e abbia maturato l’intenzione di diventare veramente il primo ministro greco, oltre che il leader del principale partito"
https://it.finance.yahoo.com/notizie/grecia-gioco-due-tsipras-varoufakis-091500209.html
"E con le proteste che montano nelle piazza greche e con l’insofferenza crescente nel resto d’Europa, rumors vogliono che Tsipras stia giocando per isolare il proprio ministro delle finanze per recuperare fiducia tra i partner europei e forse per rinsaldare l’accordo con il partito dell’ex premier Samaras per dare alla Repubblica ellenica un nuovo esecutivo di unità nazionale. La speranza è che il leader di Syriza abbia ampliato le proprie vedute dopo il gelido bagno di realtà a livello europeo e abbia maturato l’intenzione di diventare veramente il primo ministro greco, oltre che il leader del principale partito"