Obbligazioni societarie Monitor bond Utilities Europa II (agosto - dicembre 2009)
Imark
Forumer storico
C'è molto lavoro di aggiornamento da fare sul newsflow del comparto... si fa senza troppa soddisfazione, stante l'impressione che le caratteristiche del comparto, ed in particolare la rilevanza strategica di molti emittenti per gli stati nazionali, li rendano piuttosto insensibili a situazioni riguardanti deterioramento/miglioramento del loro business risk profile o financial risk profile.
Anche per questo nelle ultime settimane ho trascurato un po': le notizie qui spostano poco sui prezzi anche quando hanno diretta attinenza con i rating...
Ad ogni buon conto, posto qui questa rating action su Centrica, la principale utility energetica dell'UK non acquisita da società di altri paesi, che di recente ha emesso in euro, per cui ci sta che sia un domani integrata nel monitor.
Nonostante la campagna di acquisizioni promossa da Centrica per integrare il ciclo energetico, dall'acquisizioni di fonti di materie prime per la generazione energetica alla distribuzione e alla commercializzazione abbia portato ad un deterioramento del leverage, (calcolato qui come net debt/EBITDAR) questo resterà in assoluto su livelli assolutamente contenuti, attorno ad un 1,2x, ed anzi fitch reputa che il livello di integrazione delle attività gestite rafforzi il profilo di business di Centrica al punto da upgradare i suoi bond senior unsecured.
Il recente andamento dell'attività ha visto nel H1/2009 l'EBIT calare del 5,4%, per effetto del calo del prezzo del gas e della circostanza che, ai prezzi attuali, Centrica abbia preferito ridurre la quantità di gas estratto dalle proprie riserve ed acquistarne quantitativi sul mercato.
Molto forte la posizione di liquidità, con la disponibilità di cash che sopravanza largamente la copertura del debito a breve, e con l'emittente che non ha avuto problemi di accesso ai mercati dei capitali anche nella fase più critica del flight to quality verificatosi nel post-Lehman.
Fitch Affirms Centrica's IDR at 'A'; Upgrades Senior Unsecured to 'A+'
23 Oct 2009 12:36 PM (EDT)
Fitch Ratings-London-23 October 2009: Fitch Ratings has today affirmed Centrica Plc's Long-term Issuer Default rating (IDR) at 'A' and its Short-term IDR at 'F1'. At the same time, Centrica's senior unsecured debt has been upgraded to 'A+' from 'A' and the Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.
Centrica has made several strategic acquisitions to improve its business profile. During FY09 it has announced the purchase of a 20% stake in Lake Acquisitions (EDF's British Energy acquisition vehicle), acquired Venture Production plc (Venture) and doubled its stake in SPE to 51% only to sell off this interest as part of the Lake Acquisitions transaction. An equity rights issue in December 2008 raised GBP2.2bn and the sale of SPE provided funds for the acquisitions, limiting the impact on Centrica's financial profile.
In the near-term Fitch expects credit metrics to deteriorate following the acquisitions. Adjusted net debt/operating EBITDAR is expected to more than double from the 0.6x level of the past two years although it is expected to remain compatible with the current rating level.
Centrica's senior unsecured debt has been upgraded in accordance with Fitch's criteria for rating senior unsecured debt titled 'EMEA Energy and Utilities - IDR and Recovery Ratings', available on the agency's public website). Fitch views that the recent changes to its business profile have now met its criteria for enhanced recovery for vertically integrated utilities, due primarily to an increase in its energy hedges from own production. Centrica's gas hedge has benefited from the Venture acquisition and the electricity hedge has improved due to the 20% stake in Lake Acquisitions and power contracts with Drax maturing in 2012.
Centrica has agreed to purchase 20% of Lake Acquisitions, for GBP1.1bn in cash together with its 51% stake in SPE valued at GBP1.2bn. Centrica is entitled to 20% of the offtake from British Energy and an additional 18TWh of power between 2011 and 2015. This provides diversification to Centrica's historically gas-heavy power generation portfolio.
Centrica also has the option to invest in nuclear new build with EDF although a final decision on investment is not expected until 2011. The sale of SPE, which has not yet received regulatory approval, is expected to close in Q409.
In H209 Centrica announced a hostile takeover for Venture, valuing the company at GBP1.3bn. The acquisition bolsters Centrica's gas hedge and nearly doubles its net proven and probable reserves. Centrica has struggled with a low reserve life for several years while Venture has a strong reserve life of more than 13 years and a three-year average reserve replacement ratio of 185%.
In H109 Group Operating Profit declined 5.4% y-o-y, primarily due to a 46% decline in earnings from the gas production and development segment to GBP346m. The decline was caused by a fall in the market price of gas and lower gas production as Centrica chose to purchase cheap gas in the wholesale market instead of producing from its reserves.
Earnings, however, benefited from the forward sale of gas production at higher prices. The decline was largely offset by a stronger performance in the British gas businesses which saw earnings increase 56% to GBP476m.
At H109 Centrica had cash and cash equivalents of GBP2659m against short term debt of GBP180m.
At H109 Centrica had undrawn committed facilities of 1) GBP1250m 2) USD275m and a committed letter of credit facility for CAD200m made available to the direct energy business of which CAD83m had been drawn. GBP150m of the facilities mature in July 2010 with the remainder in April 2012.
Fitch views Centrica's liquidity position as strong. Centrica has been able to access capital markets during the past year as evidenced by its GBP2.2bn equity rights issue in December of 2008 and bond issuances totalling GBP1270m in H109.
Anche per questo nelle ultime settimane ho trascurato un po': le notizie qui spostano poco sui prezzi anche quando hanno diretta attinenza con i rating...
Ad ogni buon conto, posto qui questa rating action su Centrica, la principale utility energetica dell'UK non acquisita da società di altri paesi, che di recente ha emesso in euro, per cui ci sta che sia un domani integrata nel monitor.
Nonostante la campagna di acquisizioni promossa da Centrica per integrare il ciclo energetico, dall'acquisizioni di fonti di materie prime per la generazione energetica alla distribuzione e alla commercializzazione abbia portato ad un deterioramento del leverage, (calcolato qui come net debt/EBITDAR) questo resterà in assoluto su livelli assolutamente contenuti, attorno ad un 1,2x, ed anzi fitch reputa che il livello di integrazione delle attività gestite rafforzi il profilo di business di Centrica al punto da upgradare i suoi bond senior unsecured.
Il recente andamento dell'attività ha visto nel H1/2009 l'EBIT calare del 5,4%, per effetto del calo del prezzo del gas e della circostanza che, ai prezzi attuali, Centrica abbia preferito ridurre la quantità di gas estratto dalle proprie riserve ed acquistarne quantitativi sul mercato.
Molto forte la posizione di liquidità, con la disponibilità di cash che sopravanza largamente la copertura del debito a breve, e con l'emittente che non ha avuto problemi di accesso ai mercati dei capitali anche nella fase più critica del flight to quality verificatosi nel post-Lehman.
Fitch Affirms Centrica's IDR at 'A'; Upgrades Senior Unsecured to 'A+'
23 Oct 2009 12:36 PM (EDT)
Fitch Ratings-London-23 October 2009: Fitch Ratings has today affirmed Centrica Plc's Long-term Issuer Default rating (IDR) at 'A' and its Short-term IDR at 'F1'. At the same time, Centrica's senior unsecured debt has been upgraded to 'A+' from 'A' and the Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.
Centrica has made several strategic acquisitions to improve its business profile. During FY09 it has announced the purchase of a 20% stake in Lake Acquisitions (EDF's British Energy acquisition vehicle), acquired Venture Production plc (Venture) and doubled its stake in SPE to 51% only to sell off this interest as part of the Lake Acquisitions transaction. An equity rights issue in December 2008 raised GBP2.2bn and the sale of SPE provided funds for the acquisitions, limiting the impact on Centrica's financial profile.
In the near-term Fitch expects credit metrics to deteriorate following the acquisitions. Adjusted net debt/operating EBITDAR is expected to more than double from the 0.6x level of the past two years although it is expected to remain compatible with the current rating level.
Centrica's senior unsecured debt has been upgraded in accordance with Fitch's criteria for rating senior unsecured debt titled 'EMEA Energy and Utilities - IDR and Recovery Ratings', available on the agency's public website). Fitch views that the recent changes to its business profile have now met its criteria for enhanced recovery for vertically integrated utilities, due primarily to an increase in its energy hedges from own production. Centrica's gas hedge has benefited from the Venture acquisition and the electricity hedge has improved due to the 20% stake in Lake Acquisitions and power contracts with Drax maturing in 2012.
Centrica has agreed to purchase 20% of Lake Acquisitions, for GBP1.1bn in cash together with its 51% stake in SPE valued at GBP1.2bn. Centrica is entitled to 20% of the offtake from British Energy and an additional 18TWh of power between 2011 and 2015. This provides diversification to Centrica's historically gas-heavy power generation portfolio.
Centrica also has the option to invest in nuclear new build with EDF although a final decision on investment is not expected until 2011. The sale of SPE, which has not yet received regulatory approval, is expected to close in Q409.
In H209 Centrica announced a hostile takeover for Venture, valuing the company at GBP1.3bn. The acquisition bolsters Centrica's gas hedge and nearly doubles its net proven and probable reserves. Centrica has struggled with a low reserve life for several years while Venture has a strong reserve life of more than 13 years and a three-year average reserve replacement ratio of 185%.
In H109 Group Operating Profit declined 5.4% y-o-y, primarily due to a 46% decline in earnings from the gas production and development segment to GBP346m. The decline was caused by a fall in the market price of gas and lower gas production as Centrica chose to purchase cheap gas in the wholesale market instead of producing from its reserves.
Earnings, however, benefited from the forward sale of gas production at higher prices. The decline was largely offset by a stronger performance in the British gas businesses which saw earnings increase 56% to GBP476m.
At H109 Centrica had cash and cash equivalents of GBP2659m against short term debt of GBP180m.
At H109 Centrica had undrawn committed facilities of 1) GBP1250m 2) USD275m and a committed letter of credit facility for CAD200m made available to the direct energy business of which CAD83m had been drawn. GBP150m of the facilities mature in July 2010 with the remainder in April 2012.
Fitch views Centrica's liquidity position as strong. Centrica has been able to access capital markets during the past year as evidenced by its GBP2.2bn equity rights issue in December of 2008 and bond issuances totalling GBP1270m in H109.
Ultima modifica:
Imark
Forumer storico
Fra gli altri accadimenti recenti del comparto, il creditwatch negativo da parte di tutte le agenzie su EDF Energy, la controllata UK di EDF France, a seguito della decisione della controllante di cedere la rete di distribuzione energetica della controllata.
Le attività distributive, come forse chi segue il 3D rammenta, sono considerate la parte più stabile del business di una utility, anche perché sono attività regolamentate e quindi meno esposte di altre (come ad. es. la generazione energetica) a pressioni competitive.
Nel caso di EDF Energy, la società acquisisce capacità generativa nel settore nucleare (in essa andranno integrate le attività nel nucleare di British Energy recentemente acquisite da EDF in UK) quindi attività non regolamentate, mentre dovrebbe cedere, con modalità non ancora chiarite, una serie di 3 reti distributive che servono complessivamente 7,9 mln di utenti in UK, e dalla quale peraltro proviene anche una cospicua fetta del fatturato di EDF Energy prima della incorporazione delle attività di BE.
Obiettivo finale è la riduzione del debito netto di EDF Energy per un valore di 5 mld euro entro il 2010.
L'uscita dalla società di attività regolamentate genera dunque un indebolimento del business profile di EDF Energy.
La riduzione del rating avverà nella misura che conseguirà al chiarimento sui termini della cessione. Nullo invece l'impatto sui rating di EDF casa madre, dato che in ogni caso queste attività generavano in totale il 4% dell'EBITDA del gruppo energetico EDF nella prima metà del 2009.
Eventuali ulteriori decisioni che riducano la quota di fatturato generata da attività regolamentate potrebbe spingere Moody's (della quale post il report, il più completo fra quelli delle 3 agenzie) ad intervenire anche sul rating di EDF.
Moody's reviews for downgrade ratings of EDF Energy and its subsidiaries; affirms ratings of EDF
Approximately EUR30 billion of debt securities affected
London, 06 October 2009 -- Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible downgrade the A3 long-term senior unsecured debt ratings of EDF Energy plc (EDF Energy), the wholly owned subsidiary of Electricite de France SA (EDF; together with subsidiaries, the EDF Group).
Also placed on review for possible downgrade were the senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings of its three regulated network subsidiaries -- the A2/Prime-1 ratings of EDF Energy Networks (LPN) plc and EDF Energy Networks (EPN) plc, and the A3 ratings of EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- as well as the A3 ratings of certain other of its subsidiaries. The Aa3/Prime-1 ratings of EDF SA, and the Prime-2 short-term debt ratings of EDF Energy and certain of its subsidiaries were affirmed.
The rating actions follow the announcement by the EDF Group that it had initiated a process to evaluate ownership options for its electricity distribution business in the United Kingdom, owned by EDF Energy, including the potential disposal of its three regulated electricity distribution networks, in line with its earlier announced intention to reduce net financial debt by at least EUR5 billion by the end of 2010.
The following ratings were placed on review for possible downgrade:
EDF Energy plc -- the A3 senior unsecured debt ratings
EDF Energy Networks (LPN) plc -- the A2/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Energy Networks (EPN) plc -- the A2/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt ratings
EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- the A3 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Energy (South East) plc -- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
EDF Energy Customers plc- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
SEEBOARD Energy Ltd -- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
The following ratings were affirmed:
EDF SA -- the Aa3/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Trading Limited -- A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
EDF Energy plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term debt rating
EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term debt rating
EDF Energy (South East) plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term issuer rating
Moody's says that the review for possible downgrade of EDF Energy's A3 ratings reflects the negative pressure exerted by the planned disposals of its distribution assets on its business risk profile. This currently balances generation and supply revenues with the more predictable earnings from its distribution networks, which during the first six months of 2009 accounted for 27% of the EUR1.6 billion EBITDA generated by the EDF Group in the United Kingdom (including the results of British Energy).
While recognising that EDF Energy now benefits from a better balance between generation and supply following EDF's acquisition of British Energy, Moody's considers nevertheless that disposal of these regulated earnings would increase materially its dependence on earnings from more volatile markets.
Moody's says that the review process will evaluate the impact of the potential disposal on the business risk profile of EDF Energy, taking account also of the wider strategic context and capital investment plans following any disposals, as well as on its financial risk profile. It will also factor in EDF Energy's position within the wider EDF Group, and its plans for developing Nuclear New Build in the United Kingdom.
The reviews for downgrade of the three distribution networks are prompted by uncertainty around the potential impact on their capital structure in the event that they were to be sold by EDF Energy. The affirmation of EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc's Prime-2 rating reflects Moody's view of potential maximum credit migration based upon precedents and regulatory considerations.
Moody's adds that it sees no impact from the potential disposal of the UK networks on the Aa3/Prime-1 ratings of EDF SA, which have been affirmed with a stable outlook. In the first half of 2009 the UK networks represented just over 4% of the EDF Group's EBITDA.
Moody's nevertheless notes that their disposal would reduce the proportion of earnings which the EDF Group derives from regulated network assets, thereby raising the Group's business risk profile proportionally, although this is to an extent balanced by the positive impact on Group free cash-flow and the intention to use proceeds from the potential sale to reduce debt.
Moody's cautions that were the proportion of earnings from regulated networks to decline further in the future, it would look to evaluate the impact of any such reduction on the Group's business risk profile and, potentially, ratings, considering also the implications of the evolving regulatory framework in France.
Moody's last rating action on the EDF Group was on 14 January 2009, when EDF SA's rating was downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1 following the acquisition of British Energy, and the ratings of EDF Energy plc and its subsidiaries were confirmed.
The principal methodologies used in rating these entities were The Application of Joint Default Analysis to Government Related Issuers, published in April 2005, and Moody's rating methodologies for Unregulated Utilities and Power Companies, and for Regulated Electric and Gas Networks published in August 2009 and available on OpenDNS in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the Research & Ratings tab. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.
Electricite de France (EDF) SA is an integrated provider of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and supply services, and the leader in its domestic French market. The company also has a major presence in the international markets through ownership interests in power utility operations in Europe (primarily Italy, UK and Germany) and globally. In the six months ended 30 June 2009, the EDF Group recorded revenues of EUR34.9 billion.
[FONT="]EDF Energy plc is an integrated electricity generation, distribution and supply company, and is the largest UK regulated network owner, serving London, the South-East and East of England which account for 40% of the UK's GDP. At 28 December 2008 the company has approximately 5.6 million customer accounts. In the year ended 31 December 2008, the company reported revenues of GBP6.6 billion and operating profit of GBP465 million[/FONT]
Le attività distributive, come forse chi segue il 3D rammenta, sono considerate la parte più stabile del business di una utility, anche perché sono attività regolamentate e quindi meno esposte di altre (come ad. es. la generazione energetica) a pressioni competitive.
Nel caso di EDF Energy, la società acquisisce capacità generativa nel settore nucleare (in essa andranno integrate le attività nel nucleare di British Energy recentemente acquisite da EDF in UK) quindi attività non regolamentate, mentre dovrebbe cedere, con modalità non ancora chiarite, una serie di 3 reti distributive che servono complessivamente 7,9 mln di utenti in UK, e dalla quale peraltro proviene anche una cospicua fetta del fatturato di EDF Energy prima della incorporazione delle attività di BE.
Obiettivo finale è la riduzione del debito netto di EDF Energy per un valore di 5 mld euro entro il 2010.
L'uscita dalla società di attività regolamentate genera dunque un indebolimento del business profile di EDF Energy.
La riduzione del rating avverà nella misura che conseguirà al chiarimento sui termini della cessione. Nullo invece l'impatto sui rating di EDF casa madre, dato che in ogni caso queste attività generavano in totale il 4% dell'EBITDA del gruppo energetico EDF nella prima metà del 2009.
Eventuali ulteriori decisioni che riducano la quota di fatturato generata da attività regolamentate potrebbe spingere Moody's (della quale post il report, il più completo fra quelli delle 3 agenzie) ad intervenire anche sul rating di EDF.
Moody's reviews for downgrade ratings of EDF Energy and its subsidiaries; affirms ratings of EDF
Approximately EUR30 billion of debt securities affected
London, 06 October 2009 -- Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible downgrade the A3 long-term senior unsecured debt ratings of EDF Energy plc (EDF Energy), the wholly owned subsidiary of Electricite de France SA (EDF; together with subsidiaries, the EDF Group).
Also placed on review for possible downgrade were the senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings of its three regulated network subsidiaries -- the A2/Prime-1 ratings of EDF Energy Networks (LPN) plc and EDF Energy Networks (EPN) plc, and the A3 ratings of EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- as well as the A3 ratings of certain other of its subsidiaries. The Aa3/Prime-1 ratings of EDF SA, and the Prime-2 short-term debt ratings of EDF Energy and certain of its subsidiaries were affirmed.
The rating actions follow the announcement by the EDF Group that it had initiated a process to evaluate ownership options for its electricity distribution business in the United Kingdom, owned by EDF Energy, including the potential disposal of its three regulated electricity distribution networks, in line with its earlier announced intention to reduce net financial debt by at least EUR5 billion by the end of 2010.
The following ratings were placed on review for possible downgrade:
EDF Energy plc -- the A3 senior unsecured debt ratings
EDF Energy Networks (LPN) plc -- the A2/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Energy Networks (EPN) plc -- the A2/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt ratings
EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- the A3 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Energy (South East) plc -- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
EDF Energy Customers plc- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
SEEBOARD Energy Ltd -- the A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
The following ratings were affirmed:
EDF SA -- the Aa3/Prime-1 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings
EDF Trading Limited -- A3 senior unsecured issuer rating
EDF Energy plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term debt rating
EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term debt rating
EDF Energy (South East) plc -- the Prime-2 senior unsecured short-term issuer rating
Moody's says that the review for possible downgrade of EDF Energy's A3 ratings reflects the negative pressure exerted by the planned disposals of its distribution assets on its business risk profile. This currently balances generation and supply revenues with the more predictable earnings from its distribution networks, which during the first six months of 2009 accounted for 27% of the EUR1.6 billion EBITDA generated by the EDF Group in the United Kingdom (including the results of British Energy).
While recognising that EDF Energy now benefits from a better balance between generation and supply following EDF's acquisition of British Energy, Moody's considers nevertheless that disposal of these regulated earnings would increase materially its dependence on earnings from more volatile markets.
Moody's says that the review process will evaluate the impact of the potential disposal on the business risk profile of EDF Energy, taking account also of the wider strategic context and capital investment plans following any disposals, as well as on its financial risk profile. It will also factor in EDF Energy's position within the wider EDF Group, and its plans for developing Nuclear New Build in the United Kingdom.
The reviews for downgrade of the three distribution networks are prompted by uncertainty around the potential impact on their capital structure in the event that they were to be sold by EDF Energy. The affirmation of EDF Energy Networks (SPN) plc's Prime-2 rating reflects Moody's view of potential maximum credit migration based upon precedents and regulatory considerations.
Moody's adds that it sees no impact from the potential disposal of the UK networks on the Aa3/Prime-1 ratings of EDF SA, which have been affirmed with a stable outlook. In the first half of 2009 the UK networks represented just over 4% of the EDF Group's EBITDA.
Moody's nevertheless notes that their disposal would reduce the proportion of earnings which the EDF Group derives from regulated network assets, thereby raising the Group's business risk profile proportionally, although this is to an extent balanced by the positive impact on Group free cash-flow and the intention to use proceeds from the potential sale to reduce debt.
Moody's cautions that were the proportion of earnings from regulated networks to decline further in the future, it would look to evaluate the impact of any such reduction on the Group's business risk profile and, potentially, ratings, considering also the implications of the evolving regulatory framework in France.
Moody's last rating action on the EDF Group was on 14 January 2009, when EDF SA's rating was downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1 following the acquisition of British Energy, and the ratings of EDF Energy plc and its subsidiaries were confirmed.
The principal methodologies used in rating these entities were The Application of Joint Default Analysis to Government Related Issuers, published in April 2005, and Moody's rating methodologies for Unregulated Utilities and Power Companies, and for Regulated Electric and Gas Networks published in August 2009 and available on OpenDNS in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the Research & Ratings tab. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.
Electricite de France (EDF) SA is an integrated provider of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and supply services, and the leader in its domestic French market. The company also has a major presence in the international markets through ownership interests in power utility operations in Europe (primarily Italy, UK and Germany) and globally. In the six months ended 30 June 2009, the EDF Group recorded revenues of EUR34.9 billion.
[FONT="]EDF Energy plc is an integrated electricity generation, distribution and supply company, and is the largest UK regulated network owner, serving London, the South-East and East of England which account for 40% of the UK's GDP. At 28 December 2008 the company has approximately 5.6 million customer accounts. In the year ended 31 December 2008, the company reported revenues of GBP6.6 billion and operating profit of GBP465 million[/FONT]
Imark
Forumer storico
Ancora, fra i materiali da recuperare, il creditwatch negativo che permane sulla tedesca EWE Ag da parte di S&P in considerazione delle 3 operazioni di merger & acquisition che la vedono coinvolta contemporaneamente, ed il cui impatto sia sul business che sul financial profile è da valutare alla luce degli esiti finali, non ancora del tutto definiti.
EWE ha varato un aumento di capitale riservato a EnBW (altra utility anch'essa "a monitor") ricavando 1,38 mld euro a fronte di una partecipazione pari al 26% del capitale sociale che sancisce un partenariato tra le due utility.
Ha poi venduto a EnBW l'utility Verbundnetz Gas, sebbene questa cessione sia ancora in itinere, essendo soggetta ad alcuni condizionamenti, di cui dà contro S&P, incluso il consenso del CdA della società ceduta. Se essa dovesse andare in porto EWE riceverà ancora 1,3 mld euro.
La terza operazione consiste nel salire al 100% (dall'attuale 49%) del capitale in una terza utility,SWB, con un'operazione che per S&P impatta in negativo il profilo di merito finanziario di EWE in quanto SWB è ad alto leverage e genera un modesto cash flow operativo.
S&P ritiene di poter confermare il rating di EWE solo se la cessione di Verbundnetz Gas va in porto contestualmente all'acquisizione di SWB e non ci sono ulteriori acquisizioni in vista, reputando in questo caso che il merito di credito di EWE sotto il profilo del rischio finanziario rimarrebbe compatibile con il rating attuale.
Germany-Based EWE 'A-' Ratings Remain On CreditWatch Negative Pending Clarity On SWB Acquisition And VNG Disposal
-- EWE has received proceeds from its share sale to EnBW and is considering selling its holding in VNG, while increasing its stake in SWB. -- We are keeping our ratings on the Germany-based utility on CreditWatch with negative implications. -- The CreditWatch reflects uncertainties on EWE's strategy and pro forma credit profile following the three transactions. LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Oct. 5, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that its 'A-' long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Germany-based utility EWE AG remain on CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on April 17, 2009.
The ratings were originally placed on CreditWatch negative due to EWE's announced intention to increase its shareholding in German utility Stadtwerke Bremen (SWB; not rated) to 74.9% from 49%, thereby fully consolidating SWB's debt.
"The continued CreditWatch placement reflects uncertainty regarding the combined effect of three major transactions on EWE's business and financial risk profile," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Mark Davidson.
On July 21, 2009, EWE received €1.38 billion from a capital increase and the sale of 26% of its shares to EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG (EnBW, A-/Watch Neg/A-2), sealing a strategic partnership between the two companies. The sale will have significantly strengthened EWE's balance sheet in the short term, although we expect part of the proceeds to be applied to new investments.
On Aug. 24, 2009, the German cartel office approved EWE's sale of its 47.9% holding in Verbundnetz Gas AG (VNG, not rated), which operates in eastern Germany, to EnBW. This transaction still requires the consent of VNG at its next general meeting, and the disposal by EnBW of its fully owned subsidiary GESO AG (not rated). If this transaction were to be completed, we estimate that EWE would receive an additional cash inflow of about €1.3 billion.
Partly offsetting these transactions is EWE's proposed increase in its holding in German utility SWB to 100% minus one share, from 49% currently. We believe the acquisition, in isolation, would be credit dilutive for EWE due to the full consolidation of SWB, which has relatively high financial leverage and generates only moderate operating cash flows, in our view.
The transaction is conditional on the completion of the acquisition by RWE AG (A/Negative/A-1) of Essent N.V. (A/Watch Neg/A-1), which closed on Sept. 30, 2009. We therefore expect EWE's purchase of the SWB stake to occur shortly.
"We aim to review the CreditWatch by the end of 2009," said Mr. Davidson. "At that point, we anticipate that we will be in a position to assess EWE's financial and business risk profiles, incorporating the share sale to EnBW, the disposal of VNG, and the consolidation of SWB.
Our analysis will focus on the consolidated entity's financial metrics and EWE's plans for the medium term, in particular its investment program." We could affirm the ratings on EWE at 'A-' if we believe the share sale to EnBW and the sale of VNG broadly offset the acquisition and full consolidation of SWB, with no other material acquisitions on the horizon.
Conversely, we could lower the ratings if the VNG disposal does not go through, or if the impact of the consolidation of SWB is more detrimental than [FONT="]we currently anticipate.[/FONT]
EWE ha varato un aumento di capitale riservato a EnBW (altra utility anch'essa "a monitor") ricavando 1,38 mld euro a fronte di una partecipazione pari al 26% del capitale sociale che sancisce un partenariato tra le due utility.
Ha poi venduto a EnBW l'utility Verbundnetz Gas, sebbene questa cessione sia ancora in itinere, essendo soggetta ad alcuni condizionamenti, di cui dà contro S&P, incluso il consenso del CdA della società ceduta. Se essa dovesse andare in porto EWE riceverà ancora 1,3 mld euro.
La terza operazione consiste nel salire al 100% (dall'attuale 49%) del capitale in una terza utility,SWB, con un'operazione che per S&P impatta in negativo il profilo di merito finanziario di EWE in quanto SWB è ad alto leverage e genera un modesto cash flow operativo.
S&P ritiene di poter confermare il rating di EWE solo se la cessione di Verbundnetz Gas va in porto contestualmente all'acquisizione di SWB e non ci sono ulteriori acquisizioni in vista, reputando in questo caso che il merito di credito di EWE sotto il profilo del rischio finanziario rimarrebbe compatibile con il rating attuale.
Germany-Based EWE 'A-' Ratings Remain On CreditWatch Negative Pending Clarity On SWB Acquisition And VNG Disposal
-- EWE has received proceeds from its share sale to EnBW and is considering selling its holding in VNG, while increasing its stake in SWB. -- We are keeping our ratings on the Germany-based utility on CreditWatch with negative implications. -- The CreditWatch reflects uncertainties on EWE's strategy and pro forma credit profile following the three transactions. LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Oct. 5, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that its 'A-' long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Germany-based utility EWE AG remain on CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on April 17, 2009.
The ratings were originally placed on CreditWatch negative due to EWE's announced intention to increase its shareholding in German utility Stadtwerke Bremen (SWB; not rated) to 74.9% from 49%, thereby fully consolidating SWB's debt.
"The continued CreditWatch placement reflects uncertainty regarding the combined effect of three major transactions on EWE's business and financial risk profile," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Mark Davidson.
On July 21, 2009, EWE received €1.38 billion from a capital increase and the sale of 26% of its shares to EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG (EnBW, A-/Watch Neg/A-2), sealing a strategic partnership between the two companies. The sale will have significantly strengthened EWE's balance sheet in the short term, although we expect part of the proceeds to be applied to new investments.
On Aug. 24, 2009, the German cartel office approved EWE's sale of its 47.9% holding in Verbundnetz Gas AG (VNG, not rated), which operates in eastern Germany, to EnBW. This transaction still requires the consent of VNG at its next general meeting, and the disposal by EnBW of its fully owned subsidiary GESO AG (not rated). If this transaction were to be completed, we estimate that EWE would receive an additional cash inflow of about €1.3 billion.
Partly offsetting these transactions is EWE's proposed increase in its holding in German utility SWB to 100% minus one share, from 49% currently. We believe the acquisition, in isolation, would be credit dilutive for EWE due to the full consolidation of SWB, which has relatively high financial leverage and generates only moderate operating cash flows, in our view.
The transaction is conditional on the completion of the acquisition by RWE AG (A/Negative/A-1) of Essent N.V. (A/Watch Neg/A-1), which closed on Sept. 30, 2009. We therefore expect EWE's purchase of the SWB stake to occur shortly.
"We aim to review the CreditWatch by the end of 2009," said Mr. Davidson. "At that point, we anticipate that we will be in a position to assess EWE's financial and business risk profiles, incorporating the share sale to EnBW, the disposal of VNG, and the consolidation of SWB.
Our analysis will focus on the consolidated entity's financial metrics and EWE's plans for the medium term, in particular its investment program." We could affirm the ratings on EWE at 'A-' if we believe the share sale to EnBW and the sale of VNG broadly offset the acquisition and full consolidation of SWB, with no other material acquisitions on the horizon.
Conversely, we could lower the ratings if the VNG disposal does not go through, or if the impact of the consolidation of SWB is more detrimental than [FONT="]we currently anticipate.[/FONT]
Imark
Forumer storico
La norvegese Statkraft è un'altra utility che potremmo inserire a monitor, avendo bond emessi in euro. E' stata recentemente upgradata da S&P sull'assunto che il governo norvegese sosterrebbe Statkraft in caso di distress finanziario.
Il rating "stand alone" di S&P, al netto del supporto statale, un modesto BBB è dovuto non al profilo di business dell'emittente (valutato "strong"), anche per via della alla proprietà statale al 100%, ma ad una serie di vincoli di ordine gestionale e finanziario, in specie l'onere di devolvere in dividendi allo stato fra il 75% ed il 100% dell'utile netto, al punto che la società ha chiesto all'azionista di ridurre questa quota ad un 50%-75% e di ricevere un apporto di capitale pubblico, misure che serviranno (ove accordate) a sostenere la strategia di espansione all'estero, diretta all'acquisizione di asset a più elevato profilo di rischio rispetto a quelli di cui dispone sul mercato domestico.
Per ora, la revisione dei criteri metodologici di recente varati da S&P per tenere conto del supporto statale che è lecito attendersi verso entità corporate soggette a controllo o partecipate dallo Stato o da altri enti territoriali ha portato ad una revisione al rialzo del rating sull'assunto del pieno controllo statale e del ruolo strategico di Statkraft nella gestione delle risorse idroelettriche nazionali nonché nello sviluppo di know how nel settore delle energie rinnovabili.
Statkraft AS Upgraded To 'A-', Off CreditWatch On Likelihood Of Government Support; Outlook Negative
·We recently revised our methodology for rating government-related entities.
·We are raising our long-term corporate credit rating on Norway-based utility Statkraft AS to 'A-' from 'BBB+', and removing it from CreditWatch, where it was previously placed with positive implications.
·The negative outlook reflects our expectation of a weakening of Statkraft's business and financial risk profile over the near to medium term, due to the company's expanded investment program.
STOCKHOLM (Standard & Poor's) Oct. 22, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it had raised its long-term corporate credit rating on Norway-based utility Statkraft AS to 'A-' from 'BBB+', and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed on June 30, 2009, with positive implications. At the same time, the short-term credit rating was affirmed at 'A-2'. The outlook is negative.
"The upgrade reflects our revised methodology for rating government-related entities and our opinion that there is a "moderately high" likelihood that the Norwegian government will provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to Statkraft in the event of financial distress, said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Mark Schindele.
This is based on our assessment of Statkraft's:
·"Important" role, based on the company's vast domestic hydropower resources, which are viewed as highly strategic to Norway's power supply. ·Another strategic objective for Statkraft is to secure, and develop, Norway's competencies within renewable energy.
·"Strong" link, based on the full state ownership of Statkraft, and in our view remote risk of privatization. Although Statkraft's board of directors is formally independent, and the management is relatively autonomous, we believe that the government retains a strong influence over high-level strategic decision making.
We consider Statkraft's business risk profile to be strong, reflecting the group's position as the third-largest Nordic power generator; its competitive, low-cost hydropower generation; its holdings in downstream electric utilities; and its 100% state ownership.
These factors are offset by Statkraft's significant financial risk profile resulting from the inherent volatility in the company's generation earnings and an aggressive dividend policy; a significant investment program, partly directed into higher-risk countries; and large minority stakes in electric utilities, which limit access to cash flow.
Statkraft has asked its shareholder, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, for a Norwegian krone (NOK) 8 billion capital injection, alongside a request for a less aggressive dividend policy, targeting dividends between 50%-75% of net profit (from the current 75%-100%).
We expect these measures, if implemented, to strengthen Statkraft's equity by about NOK27 billion until 2015, partly offsetting the negative effects of the company's expanded investment program, which will be partly debt-funded.
As indicated in the draft state budget for 2010, a pending review of Statkraft's proposal appears to be linked to a review of the company's strategy, which is being simultaneously undertaken by the ministry. At this point, the extent to which the government is prepared to support Statkraft through the proposed measures remains unclear, as well as any strategic implications from the review.
We will closely monitor related developments and their ultimate impact on Statkraft's stand-alone credit profile, which is currently assessed at 'BBB'. The negative outlook reflects our anticipation of a weakening of Statkraft's business and financial risk profile over the near to medium term, due to the company's expanded investment program, which will be partly debt funded, and which is partly directed to higher-risk countries.
Il rating "stand alone" di S&P, al netto del supporto statale, un modesto BBB è dovuto non al profilo di business dell'emittente (valutato "strong"), anche per via della alla proprietà statale al 100%, ma ad una serie di vincoli di ordine gestionale e finanziario, in specie l'onere di devolvere in dividendi allo stato fra il 75% ed il 100% dell'utile netto, al punto che la società ha chiesto all'azionista di ridurre questa quota ad un 50%-75% e di ricevere un apporto di capitale pubblico, misure che serviranno (ove accordate) a sostenere la strategia di espansione all'estero, diretta all'acquisizione di asset a più elevato profilo di rischio rispetto a quelli di cui dispone sul mercato domestico.
Per ora, la revisione dei criteri metodologici di recente varati da S&P per tenere conto del supporto statale che è lecito attendersi verso entità corporate soggette a controllo o partecipate dallo Stato o da altri enti territoriali ha portato ad una revisione al rialzo del rating sull'assunto del pieno controllo statale e del ruolo strategico di Statkraft nella gestione delle risorse idroelettriche nazionali nonché nello sviluppo di know how nel settore delle energie rinnovabili.
Statkraft AS Upgraded To 'A-', Off CreditWatch On Likelihood Of Government Support; Outlook Negative
·We recently revised our methodology for rating government-related entities.
·We are raising our long-term corporate credit rating on Norway-based utility Statkraft AS to 'A-' from 'BBB+', and removing it from CreditWatch, where it was previously placed with positive implications.
·The negative outlook reflects our expectation of a weakening of Statkraft's business and financial risk profile over the near to medium term, due to the company's expanded investment program.
STOCKHOLM (Standard & Poor's) Oct. 22, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it had raised its long-term corporate credit rating on Norway-based utility Statkraft AS to 'A-' from 'BBB+', and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed on June 30, 2009, with positive implications. At the same time, the short-term credit rating was affirmed at 'A-2'. The outlook is negative.
"The upgrade reflects our revised methodology for rating government-related entities and our opinion that there is a "moderately high" likelihood that the Norwegian government will provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to Statkraft in the event of financial distress, said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Mark Schindele.
This is based on our assessment of Statkraft's:
·"Important" role, based on the company's vast domestic hydropower resources, which are viewed as highly strategic to Norway's power supply. ·Another strategic objective for Statkraft is to secure, and develop, Norway's competencies within renewable energy.
·"Strong" link, based on the full state ownership of Statkraft, and in our view remote risk of privatization. Although Statkraft's board of directors is formally independent, and the management is relatively autonomous, we believe that the government retains a strong influence over high-level strategic decision making.
We consider Statkraft's business risk profile to be strong, reflecting the group's position as the third-largest Nordic power generator; its competitive, low-cost hydropower generation; its holdings in downstream electric utilities; and its 100% state ownership.
These factors are offset by Statkraft's significant financial risk profile resulting from the inherent volatility in the company's generation earnings and an aggressive dividend policy; a significant investment program, partly directed into higher-risk countries; and large minority stakes in electric utilities, which limit access to cash flow.
Statkraft has asked its shareholder, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, for a Norwegian krone (NOK) 8 billion capital injection, alongside a request for a less aggressive dividend policy, targeting dividends between 50%-75% of net profit (from the current 75%-100%).
We expect these measures, if implemented, to strengthen Statkraft's equity by about NOK27 billion until 2015, partly offsetting the negative effects of the company's expanded investment program, which will be partly debt-funded.
As indicated in the draft state budget for 2010, a pending review of Statkraft's proposal appears to be linked to a review of the company's strategy, which is being simultaneously undertaken by the ministry. At this point, the extent to which the government is prepared to support Statkraft through the proposed measures remains unclear, as well as any strategic implications from the review.
We will closely monitor related developments and their ultimate impact on Statkraft's stand-alone credit profile, which is currently assessed at 'BBB'. The negative outlook reflects our anticipation of a weakening of Statkraft's business and financial risk profile over the near to medium term, due to the company's expanded investment program, which will be partly debt funded, and which is partly directed to higher-risk countries.
Imark
Forumer storico
URENCO, la società che arricchisce l'uranio per Germania, UK e Olanda oltre ad altri paesi, e si accinge ad espandersi negli USA. Anche qui bond in euro. Chi desiderasse capire di cosa si tratta... 
Fitch Rates URENCO Limited 'A+'; Outlook Stable
06 Oct 2009 5:19 AM (EDT)
Fitch Ratings-London-06 October 2009: Fitch Ratings has today assigned URENCO Limited (URENCO) a Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default rating (IDR) of 'A+' and a Short-term IDR of 'F1'. The Outlook for the Long-term foreign currency IDR is Stable.
The ratings reflect URENCO's strong position in the global uranium enrichment sector with a market share of 25% in 2008, enabling it to capitalise on the expected revival of the nuclear power industry. As the company is expected to expand its capacity earlier than its peers, Fitch believes it is also better positioned to capture future increased demand.
URENCO's ratings factor in a large order book with most of the group's projected capacity over the next five years being contracted at fixed prices (with an escalation element) and no direct exposure to feedstock prices, which underpins the visibility of future revenue and stability of cash flow. The company also benefits from diversification of sales and operations across geographic regions, customer bases and multiple enrichment sites, including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the US in the near future.
In addition, the ratings take into account URENCO's solid credit metrics. Based on a FY08 EBITDAR margin of 58.1% and a FY08 cash flow from operations interest coverage ratio of 10.2x, the company's credit metrics compare favourably with its uranium enrichment peers.
URENCO's ratings further recognise that the growth strategy aimed at uranium enrichment capacity expansion implies an intensive investment programme of EUR3.5bn over 2009-2013, which is likely to result in a higher leverage level.
Fitch expects gross leverage, measured as total adjusted debt to EBITDAR, to rise to about 2.9x in 2009 (2.4x in 2008) with a gradual de-leveraging in subsequent years. This will limit the group's financial flexibility at the current rating level. At the same time, the agency believes that the group's strong business profile serves as a mitigating factor for the anticipated short-term deterioration of its credit metrics.
Fitch also notes that any significant interruptions or delays in the supply of centrifuges and/or cost overruns or delays in the US plant construction could have an adverse impact on the company's enrichment operations and thus cash flow generation. The agency nonetheless gains comfort from the good progress of the US project to date, URENCO's track record of successful capacity expansion at the European sites, and the fact that the construction process at the US facility is not technically complex.
The ratings also consider URENCO's exposure to currency risk, which is partly mitigated by the hedging policy employed by the company, and regulatory risk pertaining to any changes in licensing, regulations regarding non-proliferation and environmental issues, and/or intergovernmental agreements on export.
The Stable Outlook reflects the good visibility of the company's revenue and cash flow generation and Fitch's expectations that planned expansion will be carried out largely on time and within budget.
URENCO was established in 1971 following the conclusion of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The group is one-third owned by the UK government, one-third by the Dutch government and one-third by two German utilities - RWE AG ('A+'/Negative) and E.ON AG ('A'/Stable).
Given the specifics of the industry, the Treaty of Almelo governs issues related to non-proliferation, such as dissemination of technological information, and thus limits the transfer of gas centrifuge technology outside of the parties to the agreement, ultimately protecting the technology rights.
[FONT="]
According to Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology, URENCO is rated on a standalone basis as the linkage between the parent (the main shareholders) and the company, which is run as a commercial enterprise, is perceived to be limited. [/FONT]
Fitch Rates URENCO Limited 'A+'; Outlook Stable
06 Oct 2009 5:19 AM (EDT)
Fitch Ratings-London-06 October 2009: Fitch Ratings has today assigned URENCO Limited (URENCO) a Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default rating (IDR) of 'A+' and a Short-term IDR of 'F1'. The Outlook for the Long-term foreign currency IDR is Stable.
The ratings reflect URENCO's strong position in the global uranium enrichment sector with a market share of 25% in 2008, enabling it to capitalise on the expected revival of the nuclear power industry. As the company is expected to expand its capacity earlier than its peers, Fitch believes it is also better positioned to capture future increased demand.
URENCO's ratings factor in a large order book with most of the group's projected capacity over the next five years being contracted at fixed prices (with an escalation element) and no direct exposure to feedstock prices, which underpins the visibility of future revenue and stability of cash flow. The company also benefits from diversification of sales and operations across geographic regions, customer bases and multiple enrichment sites, including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the US in the near future.
In addition, the ratings take into account URENCO's solid credit metrics. Based on a FY08 EBITDAR margin of 58.1% and a FY08 cash flow from operations interest coverage ratio of 10.2x, the company's credit metrics compare favourably with its uranium enrichment peers.
URENCO's ratings further recognise that the growth strategy aimed at uranium enrichment capacity expansion implies an intensive investment programme of EUR3.5bn over 2009-2013, which is likely to result in a higher leverage level.
Fitch expects gross leverage, measured as total adjusted debt to EBITDAR, to rise to about 2.9x in 2009 (2.4x in 2008) with a gradual de-leveraging in subsequent years. This will limit the group's financial flexibility at the current rating level. At the same time, the agency believes that the group's strong business profile serves as a mitigating factor for the anticipated short-term deterioration of its credit metrics.
Fitch also notes that any significant interruptions or delays in the supply of centrifuges and/or cost overruns or delays in the US plant construction could have an adverse impact on the company's enrichment operations and thus cash flow generation. The agency nonetheless gains comfort from the good progress of the US project to date, URENCO's track record of successful capacity expansion at the European sites, and the fact that the construction process at the US facility is not technically complex.
The ratings also consider URENCO's exposure to currency risk, which is partly mitigated by the hedging policy employed by the company, and regulatory risk pertaining to any changes in licensing, regulations regarding non-proliferation and environmental issues, and/or intergovernmental agreements on export.
The Stable Outlook reflects the good visibility of the company's revenue and cash flow generation and Fitch's expectations that planned expansion will be carried out largely on time and within budget.
URENCO was established in 1971 following the conclusion of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The group is one-third owned by the UK government, one-third by the Dutch government and one-third by two German utilities - RWE AG ('A+'/Negative) and E.ON AG ('A'/Stable).
Given the specifics of the industry, the Treaty of Almelo governs issues related to non-proliferation, such as dissemination of technological information, and thus limits the transfer of gas centrifuge technology outside of the parties to the agreement, ultimately protecting the technology rights.
[FONT="]
According to Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology, URENCO is rated on a standalone basis as the linkage between the parent (the main shareholders) and the company, which is run as a commercial enterprise, is perceived to be limited. [/FONT]
Imark
Forumer storico
Monitor bond Utilities (gruppo di lavoro: Alobar, I98mark).
AVVERTENZE
Sul fronte della liquidità, ancora tensioni sui mercati retail tedeschi per le utility non tedesche, che peraltro incontrano anche il problema ulteriore di scambiare decisamente poco su tali mercati. Certo, la situazione è un filo migliorata rispetto alla precedente rilevazione, che data esattamente un mese fa, ma ci sono ancora non poche difficoltà.
Rispetto alle telecom, comparto anch'esso difensivo ma tradizionalmente vissuto come "meno forte" delle utility, chi opera sui mercati retail tedeschi ha invece molte più ritrosie quando si tratta di acquistare un bond di una utility estera quale Vattenfall o Iberdrola piuttosto che non un titolo di una telecom estera quale TeliaSonera o Telefonica.
Sui mercati professionali invece non vi sono remore di sorta, ed i titoli delle ns utility tradano con spread bid ask decisamente contenuti.
E' sempre grazie a Massimo S. che si rendono disponibili, per i bond illiquidi, i prezzi realizzati sui mercati professionali: fra quelli in tabella, sono di fonte Xtrakter (ex ICMA) i prezzi dei seguenti titoli.
Vattenfall 2018; EWE 2019; National Grid 2020; Veolia 2022; Gruppo Suez 2010, 2012, 2015; International Endesa 2013; Iberdrola 05/2013, 2015, 2018; Hera 2016; Fortum 2010;
Per i bond EnBW 2025; Vattenfall 2024; Veolia 2033; Gruppo Suez 2023 e Nederlandese Gasunie 2021 si è reso necessario riprendere il prezzo Bloomberg (BBML).
I prezzi Xtrakter e Bloomberg risalgono a venerdì scorso.
------------------------------
Il periodo monitorato
Stante la forza del comparto e la sua parziale "indifferenza" al newsflow, ed altresì stanti le difficoltà a rilevare ed a comporre i prezzi, l'aggiornamento fa seguito a quattro settimane dal precedente, nel tentativo di verificare se su di una maggiore lunghezza si potessero cogliere spunti di riflessione aggiuntivi rispetto a quelli offerti da altri comparti.
In realtà, alla prova dei fatti, ciò che viene fuori è una conferma di quanto visto "settimana per settimana" sulle telecom IG: sull'arco di tempo mensile, si indeboliscono i bond corti (fino al 2012) per i quali la compressione dei rendimenti era arrivata a livelli davvero estremi, mentre si cerca l'extrarendimento sulla parte lunga della curva, facendosi carico di un rischio tassi che è ancora vissuto come sostanzialmente "teorico", attesa la modestia delle pressioni inflazionistiche emerse nelle ultime settimane.
Sono andati bene indiscriminatamente tutti i bond lunghi e medio lunghi, a prescindere dalla maggiore o minore forza degli emittenti.
Qualcuno di voi avrà notato, guardando al newsflow aggiornato di recente, come pendano non rari i creditwatch negativi, specie sulle utilities minori. E' da vedere se questo fattore, nel medio periodo, porterà ad una maggiore articolazione dei rendimenti, che oggi sono invece, come detto, alquanto compressi.
Tovate il file allegato qui, non per ora sul sito ventimaggio gestito da Maino, che comunque torna utile continuare a segnalare, per quando Maino dovesse riprendere ad aggiornare ...
http://digilander.libero.it/ventimag...i%20files.html
La tabella dei prezzi, divisa in tre parti. Parte prima:
AVVERTENZE
Sul fronte della liquidità, ancora tensioni sui mercati retail tedeschi per le utility non tedesche, che peraltro incontrano anche il problema ulteriore di scambiare decisamente poco su tali mercati. Certo, la situazione è un filo migliorata rispetto alla precedente rilevazione, che data esattamente un mese fa, ma ci sono ancora non poche difficoltà.
Rispetto alle telecom, comparto anch'esso difensivo ma tradizionalmente vissuto come "meno forte" delle utility, chi opera sui mercati retail tedeschi ha invece molte più ritrosie quando si tratta di acquistare un bond di una utility estera quale Vattenfall o Iberdrola piuttosto che non un titolo di una telecom estera quale TeliaSonera o Telefonica.
Sui mercati professionali invece non vi sono remore di sorta, ed i titoli delle ns utility tradano con spread bid ask decisamente contenuti.
E' sempre grazie a Massimo S. che si rendono disponibili, per i bond illiquidi, i prezzi realizzati sui mercati professionali: fra quelli in tabella, sono di fonte Xtrakter (ex ICMA) i prezzi dei seguenti titoli.
Vattenfall 2018; EWE 2019; National Grid 2020; Veolia 2022; Gruppo Suez 2010, 2012, 2015; International Endesa 2013; Iberdrola 05/2013, 2015, 2018; Hera 2016; Fortum 2010;
Per i bond EnBW 2025; Vattenfall 2024; Veolia 2033; Gruppo Suez 2023 e Nederlandese Gasunie 2021 si è reso necessario riprendere il prezzo Bloomberg (BBML).
I prezzi Xtrakter e Bloomberg risalgono a venerdì scorso.
------------------------------
Il periodo monitorato
Stante la forza del comparto e la sua parziale "indifferenza" al newsflow, ed altresì stanti le difficoltà a rilevare ed a comporre i prezzi, l'aggiornamento fa seguito a quattro settimane dal precedente, nel tentativo di verificare se su di una maggiore lunghezza si potessero cogliere spunti di riflessione aggiuntivi rispetto a quelli offerti da altri comparti.
In realtà, alla prova dei fatti, ciò che viene fuori è una conferma di quanto visto "settimana per settimana" sulle telecom IG: sull'arco di tempo mensile, si indeboliscono i bond corti (fino al 2012) per i quali la compressione dei rendimenti era arrivata a livelli davvero estremi, mentre si cerca l'extrarendimento sulla parte lunga della curva, facendosi carico di un rischio tassi che è ancora vissuto come sostanzialmente "teorico", attesa la modestia delle pressioni inflazionistiche emerse nelle ultime settimane.
Sono andati bene indiscriminatamente tutti i bond lunghi e medio lunghi, a prescindere dalla maggiore o minore forza degli emittenti.
Qualcuno di voi avrà notato, guardando al newsflow aggiornato di recente, come pendano non rari i creditwatch negativi, specie sulle utilities minori. E' da vedere se questo fattore, nel medio periodo, porterà ad una maggiore articolazione dei rendimenti, che oggi sono invece, come detto, alquanto compressi.
Tovate il file allegato qui, non per ora sul sito ventimaggio gestito da Maino, che comunque torna utile continuare a segnalare, per quando Maino dovesse riprendere ad aggiornare ...
http://digilander.libero.it/ventimag...i%20files.html
La tabella dei prezzi, divisa in tre parti. Parte prima:
Allegati
Similar threads
Obbligazioni societarie
Monitor bond Utilities Europa III (gennaio - dicembre 2010)