Obbligazioni bancarie Obbligazioni Banca Popolare di Vicenza e Veneto Banca (8 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione darkog
- Data di Inizio
State Aid to Italian Bank Senior Bondholders Is Not a Conclusive Precedent
The use of state aid Monday in the resolutions of failed Italian banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (BP Vicenza, unrated) and Veneto Banca S.p.A. (unrated) sought to ensure that senior creditors of those banks remain protected from losses. The bailout of these banks’ senior creditors demonstrates that state aid may still flow to European banks when national political concerns override enforcement of the European Union’s (EU) Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). However, these bailouts do not set a conclusive precedent for other failing banks. The decision to wind down BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca outside of the EU’s resolution regime and inject government funds to protect senior creditors from losses deviates from BRRD provisions that prohibit such use of taxpayers’ money without a broader bail-in of the insolvent bank’s liabilities. Rather than protecting taxpayers from funding bank failures, the 25 June decision by European and Italian authorities to bail out two small regional Italian banks using insolvency, rather than the resolution toolkit, circumvented the stricter BRRD requirements on bailing in senior creditors. However, we doubt these actions will set a long-term precedent for other failing banks. The continued use of capital injections by governments may be symptomatic of an informal transition period between the introduction of the BRRD and banks’ establishment of sufficient loss-absorbing capacity in the form of subordinated instruments, including a new senior non-preferred debt class. Once these buffers are sufficiently built up, it is more likely that these junior liabilities will be able to absorb sufficient losses on their own, or in concert with a bailout under the BRRD, to sufficiently recapitalise a failing bank. This would remove some the constraints on authorities’ ability to make full use of the tools available under the EU resolution framework, which were successfully applied to Spain’s Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular, Ba1/Ba1 review for upgrade, ca1 ) earlier this month. Last Friday, the European Central Bank (ECB) declared that BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca had failed, or were likely to fail, because the two banks had repeatedly breached their supervisory capital requirements. Unlike the Popular case, the EU’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) did not place the banks into resolution under the BRRD, on the grounds that their failure would not be systemically important and that depositors would be protected under the normal Italian insolvency process. What will now follow, however, is not a normal insolvency. On Sunday, the Italian authorities transferred the performing loans and senior liabilities of the two banks (including deposits and senior debt), accompanied by a capital injection of €4.8 billion, to larger Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (A3 negative/Baa1 stable, baa3). The Italian government will fund the wind-down of nonperforming loans retained in the liquidation by providing Intesa with government guarantees of up to €12 billion. The approach taken with Veneto Banca and BP Vicenza differs from the recent resolution of Popular and the bailout of Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (B2/B3 review direction uncertain, ca review for upgrade). Although the authorities’ actions in the case of the three Italian banks indicate greater freedom to provide capital support than we had previously expected under the BRRD, as well as a willingness to do so when political considerations dictate, the approaches taken delivered similar loss rates for creditors as those under the resolution of Popular: junior creditors have absorbed losses, but more senior creditors have been fully protected.
The use of state aid Monday in the resolutions of failed Italian banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (BP Vicenza, unrated) and Veneto Banca S.p.A. (unrated) sought to ensure that senior creditors of those banks remain protected from losses. The bailout of these banks’ senior creditors demonstrates that state aid may still flow to European banks when national political concerns override enforcement of the European Union’s (EU) Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). However, these bailouts do not set a conclusive precedent for other failing banks. The decision to wind down BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca outside of the EU’s resolution regime and inject government funds to protect senior creditors from losses deviates from BRRD provisions that prohibit such use of taxpayers’ money without a broader bail-in of the insolvent bank’s liabilities. Rather than protecting taxpayers from funding bank failures, the 25 June decision by European and Italian authorities to bail out two small regional Italian banks using insolvency, rather than the resolution toolkit, circumvented the stricter BRRD requirements on bailing in senior creditors. However, we doubt these actions will set a long-term precedent for other failing banks. The continued use of capital injections by governments may be symptomatic of an informal transition period between the introduction of the BRRD and banks’ establishment of sufficient loss-absorbing capacity in the form of subordinated instruments, including a new senior non-preferred debt class. Once these buffers are sufficiently built up, it is more likely that these junior liabilities will be able to absorb sufficient losses on their own, or in concert with a bailout under the BRRD, to sufficiently recapitalise a failing bank. This would remove some the constraints on authorities’ ability to make full use of the tools available under the EU resolution framework, which were successfully applied to Spain’s Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular, Ba1/Ba1 review for upgrade, ca1 ) earlier this month. Last Friday, the European Central Bank (ECB) declared that BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca had failed, or were likely to fail, because the two banks had repeatedly breached their supervisory capital requirements. Unlike the Popular case, the EU’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) did not place the banks into resolution under the BRRD, on the grounds that their failure would not be systemically important and that depositors would be protected under the normal Italian insolvency process. What will now follow, however, is not a normal insolvency. On Sunday, the Italian authorities transferred the performing loans and senior liabilities of the two banks (including deposits and senior debt), accompanied by a capital injection of €4.8 billion, to larger Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (A3 negative/Baa1 stable, baa3). The Italian government will fund the wind-down of nonperforming loans retained in the liquidation by providing Intesa with government guarantees of up to €12 billion. The approach taken with Veneto Banca and BP Vicenza differs from the recent resolution of Popular and the bailout of Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (B2/B3 review direction uncertain, ca review for upgrade). Although the authorities’ actions in the case of the three Italian banks indicate greater freedom to provide capital support than we had previously expected under the BRRD, as well as a willingness to do so when political considerations dictate, the approaches taken delivered similar loss rates for creditors as those under the resolution of Popular: junior creditors have absorbed losses, but more senior creditors have been fully protected.
Intesa Sanpaolo’s Acquisition of Good Assets from Failed Italian Banks Is Credit Positive
On Monday, Italian lender Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (A3 negative/Baa1 stable, baa32 ) acquired most of the assets and liabilities of failed banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (BP Vicenza, unrated) and Veneto Banca S.p.A. (unrated). The acquisitions are credit positive for Intesa because they will increase the bank’s current client base and increase economies of scale. The acquisitions will add between one and two percentage points to Intesa’s 16% share of the Italian lending market, and to its 17% share of the country’s deposit base. Intesa’s asset quality will slightly improve, given that it is not acquiring any of the two smaller banks’ problem loans, and a cash contribution from the Italian government will ensure that its capital ratios are unaffected. The transaction also is credit positive for Italian banks generally because it reduces the risk of contagion and shores up retail investors’ confidence. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s depositors, senior bondholders and retail subordinated bondholders will not bear losses, and the banks’ branches will continue operating for now. The European Central Bank (ECB) last Friday deemed BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca as failing or likely to fail because neither bank had met capital requirements nor submitted credible remedial action plans. Following the ECB decision, the European Union’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) decided that the banks would be wound down under Italian law, and would not be resolved under the European Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The ECB and SRB decisions allowed the Italian government to intervene without imposing losses on creditors equal to at least 8% of the banks’ assets, as required under the BRRD in a resolution scenario. However, European Union state aid restrictions still apply and as a result, BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s equity and subordinated debt will be required to bear losses. The Italian government, Intesa and the Italian banking system will reimburse retail subordinated bondholders at a later date. Under the transaction, Intesa acquired all of BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s assets and liabilities, with the exception of the banks’ problem loans, some subsidiaries and equity stakes inconsistent with Intesa’s strategy (e.g., Veneto Banca’s private banking company Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni S.p.A., unrated), and the two banks’ subordinated bonds. The assets Intesa acquired include high-risk performing loans worth €4 billion. Under the agreement, if these loans become problem loans by the end of 2020, Intesa will be able to transfer them to a newly created bad bank that will manage BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s problem loans. All assets not acquired by Intesa will be wound up under Italian insolvency procedures. The Italian government will provide a €4.8 billion tax-exempt cash contribution to Intesa to maintain the bank’s common equity Tier 1 ratio at 12.5%. The cash will also finance a restructuring of the acquired operations, and fund some severance payments that the bank will need to make following the acquisition. The Italian government will also provide Intesa with €1.5 billion in guarantees to protect the bank from risks arising from past decisions by BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca management. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s deposits and senior bonds will be transferred to Intesa without losses, while equity and subordinated debt issued by the two failed banks will be written off. The banks’ equity was mostly owned by bank rescue fund Atlante, whose main shareholders, Italian banks, significantly wrote down the value of their stakes in 2016 and first-quarter 2017. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s retail subordinated bondholders, which between them hold around €200 million in bonds, will be reimbursed in full. Most of the bonds’ notional amount will be provided by the Italian government, with the rest covered by Intesa and other Italian banks
E' positivo si....a sto prezzo...
On Monday, Italian lender Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (A3 negative/Baa1 stable, baa32 ) acquired most of the assets and liabilities of failed banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. (BP Vicenza, unrated) and Veneto Banca S.p.A. (unrated). The acquisitions are credit positive for Intesa because they will increase the bank’s current client base and increase economies of scale. The acquisitions will add between one and two percentage points to Intesa’s 16% share of the Italian lending market, and to its 17% share of the country’s deposit base. Intesa’s asset quality will slightly improve, given that it is not acquiring any of the two smaller banks’ problem loans, and a cash contribution from the Italian government will ensure that its capital ratios are unaffected. The transaction also is credit positive for Italian banks generally because it reduces the risk of contagion and shores up retail investors’ confidence. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s depositors, senior bondholders and retail subordinated bondholders will not bear losses, and the banks’ branches will continue operating for now. The European Central Bank (ECB) last Friday deemed BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca as failing or likely to fail because neither bank had met capital requirements nor submitted credible remedial action plans. Following the ECB decision, the European Union’s Single Resolution Board (SRB) decided that the banks would be wound down under Italian law, and would not be resolved under the European Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The ECB and SRB decisions allowed the Italian government to intervene without imposing losses on creditors equal to at least 8% of the banks’ assets, as required under the BRRD in a resolution scenario. However, European Union state aid restrictions still apply and as a result, BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s equity and subordinated debt will be required to bear losses. The Italian government, Intesa and the Italian banking system will reimburse retail subordinated bondholders at a later date. Under the transaction, Intesa acquired all of BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s assets and liabilities, with the exception of the banks’ problem loans, some subsidiaries and equity stakes inconsistent with Intesa’s strategy (e.g., Veneto Banca’s private banking company Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni S.p.A., unrated), and the two banks’ subordinated bonds. The assets Intesa acquired include high-risk performing loans worth €4 billion. Under the agreement, if these loans become problem loans by the end of 2020, Intesa will be able to transfer them to a newly created bad bank that will manage BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s problem loans. All assets not acquired by Intesa will be wound up under Italian insolvency procedures. The Italian government will provide a €4.8 billion tax-exempt cash contribution to Intesa to maintain the bank’s common equity Tier 1 ratio at 12.5%. The cash will also finance a restructuring of the acquired operations, and fund some severance payments that the bank will need to make following the acquisition. The Italian government will also provide Intesa with €1.5 billion in guarantees to protect the bank from risks arising from past decisions by BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca management. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s deposits and senior bonds will be transferred to Intesa without losses, while equity and subordinated debt issued by the two failed banks will be written off. The banks’ equity was mostly owned by bank rescue fund Atlante, whose main shareholders, Italian banks, significantly wrote down the value of their stakes in 2016 and first-quarter 2017. BP Vicenza’s and Veneto Banca’s retail subordinated bondholders, which between them hold around €200 million in bonds, will be reimbursed in full. Most of the bonds’ notional amount will be provided by the Italian government, with the rest covered by Intesa and other Italian banks
E' positivo si....a sto prezzo...
bosmeld
Forumer storico
Banche venete: Governo accelera su ok a decreto 25/7 (Mess)
ROMA (MF-DJ)--Il Governo accelera per approvare il decreto salva banche
venete prima della fine di luglio. Il Messaggero scrive che il maxi-decreto contenente garanzie e contributi pubblici per 17 miliardi complessivi dovrebbe atterrare in Aula a Montecitorio probabilmente lunedi' 10 luglio in modo da essere votato entro la fine di quella settimana. Il calendario prevede che possa essere trasferito al Senato venerdi' 14 o al massimo lunedi' 17 per ottenere la conversione definitiva martedi' 25 luglio, diventando legge. In questo modo si disinnesca la condizione risolutiva posta da Intesa Sanpaolo di tirarsi fuori dal salvataggio in caso di mancata approvazione del provvedimento o di modifiche sostanziali che dovessero rendere onerosa l'operazione.
Ieri all'ora di pranzo, Pier Paolo Baretta, sottosegretario al Tesoro, sarebbe intervenuto ai lavori della 6* Commissione finanze della Camera dando il via libera del governo alla riunificazione dei due decreti riguardanti le banche venete in uno solo. In particolare il decreto che ha congelato il pagamento del bond da 85 milioni di Veneto Banca confluira' nel provvedimento emanato domenica 25 giugno con il quale e' stato il supportato il salvataggio da parte di Intesa Sanpaolo. La commissione ha stabilito il calendario dei lavori: entro le ore 18 di lunedi' 3 luglio sarebbe fissato il termine per presentare gli emendamenti.
Sul piano operativo procede speditamente l'integrazione degli oltre 900 sportelli delle due venete e delle altre attivita' e passivita' rilevate. Di questi sportelli 600 saranno chiusi entro il 30 giugno 2019: e' uno degli impegni assunti con la DgComp della Ue in cambio del via libera. I 600 sportelli saranno scelti all'interno del perimetro allargato, cioe'
considerando anche le filiali targate Intesa Sp nel triveneto. La
scelta avverra' dopo un'attenta analisi riguardante la convenienza
economica. Si guardera' infatti ai rapporti giuridici sottostanti le filiali, se cioe' sono di proprieta' o in locazione e in quest'ultimo caso i canoni e le scadenze in funzione comunque della posizione geografica.
Intanto Bper rimette in discussione la possibile acquisizione
di parte delle quote del 39,8% complessivo di Arca, rimaste in pancia alle vecchie banche in liquidazione.
ROMA (MF-DJ)--Il Governo accelera per approvare il decreto salva banche
venete prima della fine di luglio. Il Messaggero scrive che il maxi-decreto contenente garanzie e contributi pubblici per 17 miliardi complessivi dovrebbe atterrare in Aula a Montecitorio probabilmente lunedi' 10 luglio in modo da essere votato entro la fine di quella settimana. Il calendario prevede che possa essere trasferito al Senato venerdi' 14 o al massimo lunedi' 17 per ottenere la conversione definitiva martedi' 25 luglio, diventando legge. In questo modo si disinnesca la condizione risolutiva posta da Intesa Sanpaolo di tirarsi fuori dal salvataggio in caso di mancata approvazione del provvedimento o di modifiche sostanziali che dovessero rendere onerosa l'operazione.
Ieri all'ora di pranzo, Pier Paolo Baretta, sottosegretario al Tesoro, sarebbe intervenuto ai lavori della 6* Commissione finanze della Camera dando il via libera del governo alla riunificazione dei due decreti riguardanti le banche venete in uno solo. In particolare il decreto che ha congelato il pagamento del bond da 85 milioni di Veneto Banca confluira' nel provvedimento emanato domenica 25 giugno con il quale e' stato il supportato il salvataggio da parte di Intesa Sanpaolo. La commissione ha stabilito il calendario dei lavori: entro le ore 18 di lunedi' 3 luglio sarebbe fissato il termine per presentare gli emendamenti.
Sul piano operativo procede speditamente l'integrazione degli oltre 900 sportelli delle due venete e delle altre attivita' e passivita' rilevate. Di questi sportelli 600 saranno chiusi entro il 30 giugno 2019: e' uno degli impegni assunti con la DgComp della Ue in cambio del via libera. I 600 sportelli saranno scelti all'interno del perimetro allargato, cioe'
considerando anche le filiali targate Intesa Sp nel triveneto. La
scelta avverra' dopo un'attenta analisi riguardante la convenienza
economica. Si guardera' infatti ai rapporti giuridici sottostanti le filiali, se cioe' sono di proprieta' o in locazione e in quest'ultimo caso i canoni e le scadenze in funzione comunque della posizione geografica.
Intanto Bper rimette in discussione la possibile acquisizione
di parte delle quote del 39,8% complessivo di Arca, rimaste in pancia alle vecchie banche in liquidazione.
Bond&co
Nuovo forumer
Alcune cause contro Banche o Stato sono finite senza nessun vincitore, lo sapevate?
Si finisce con una transazione fifty-fifty se va bene, ma spesso con un ristoro minore.
Pertanto intanto lavoriamo sui politici, invece di perderci in chiacchere e distintivo perché il tempo è contro di noi.
Quando avremo il testo della legge, valuteremo la situazione e contatteremo i migliori studi legali. Se ci facciamo scappare anche una sola occasione, sia di pressione politica sia di azione legale, sarà peggio per noi, ma ogni cosa a suo tempo, basta con le chiacchere!
Si finisce con una transazione fifty-fifty se va bene, ma spesso con un ristoro minore.
Pertanto intanto lavoriamo sui politici, invece di perderci in chiacchere e distintivo perché il tempo è contro di noi.
Quando avremo il testo della legge, valuteremo la situazione e contatteremo i migliori studi legali. Se ci facciamo scappare anche una sola occasione, sia di pressione politica sia di azione legale, sarà peggio per noi, ma ogni cosa a suo tempo, basta con le chiacchere!
070162
Bond..... solo BOND
posto anche qui....
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allora... veniamo a noi...
da quel poco che ci ho capito
siamo finiti TUTTI nella bad bank... e... il Governo (ladro
)...
ha posto dei paletti sicchè chiunque voglia rivalersi può farlo SOLO sulla Bad Bank...
bene... in tale compagine è creditore privilegiato lo Stato (sempre il governo Ladro
)... di conseguenza mettendoci in coda, dai conteggi fatti a spanne... non ci tocca un kazz
la domanda quindi da rivolgere ai legali è :
possiamo scardinare questo privilegio che ha lo Stato ed aggredire la ciccia che è presente nalla bad bank se riusciamo a dimostrare nelle aule di tribunale che siamo stati truffati con bilanci falsi e compagnia bella ?
seconda domanda
visto che i regolatori/controllori non hanno regolato/controllato alcunchè... sono aggredibbili/solvibili...? se dimostriamo nella aule di tribunale quanto sopra ?
queste le domande a cui dobbiamo avere risposta perchè di azioni di principio o vendicative a me non frega una beata cippa... ivi compreso le azioni penali (a meno che non ci facciano recuperare soldi)
in altre parole dobbiamo trovare ...chi ci paga... il resto sono "chiacchiere e distintivo"
aspetto ... anche qui sul thread una risposta...
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
allora... veniamo a noi...
da quel poco che ci ho capito
siamo finiti TUTTI nella bad bank... e... il Governo (ladro
ha posto dei paletti sicchè chiunque voglia rivalersi può farlo SOLO sulla Bad Bank...
bene... in tale compagine è creditore privilegiato lo Stato (sempre il governo Ladro
la domanda quindi da rivolgere ai legali è :
possiamo scardinare questo privilegio che ha lo Stato ed aggredire la ciccia che è presente nalla bad bank se riusciamo a dimostrare nelle aule di tribunale che siamo stati truffati con bilanci falsi e compagnia bella ?
seconda domanda
visto che i regolatori/controllori non hanno regolato/controllato alcunchè... sono aggredibbili/solvibili...? se dimostriamo nella aule di tribunale quanto sopra ?
queste le domande a cui dobbiamo avere risposta perchè di azioni di principio o vendicative a me non frega una beata cippa... ivi compreso le azioni penali (a meno che non ci facciano recuperare soldi)
in altre parole dobbiamo trovare ...chi ci paga... il resto sono "chiacchiere e distintivo"
aspetto ... anche qui sul thread una risposta...
Ultima modifica:
idomeneo1966
Forumer attivo
C'è almeno la possibilità di recuperare la minus?
RIDOPOCO
Nuovo forumer
bisogna fare casino scrivendo a senatori e opposizione che presentino emendamenti ai decreti credo sia l'unica speranza concreta, quella di fare leva sul disastro elettorale al quale vanno incontro e che sperano di evitare rimandando le elezioni il piu tardi possibile
DOBBIAMO FARE CASINO
DOBBIAMO FARE CASINO