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cosa sta succedendo a IKB?
forse la risposta è questa (tratto dal 2012 Earnings: Second Quarter della mitica GOLDMAN SACHS) :
Mortgage Securities and the S.E.C.
As the housing wave was cresting, Goldman was one of many Wall Street firms that created complex mortgage securities — known as synthetic collateralized debt obligations. In 2007 the firm created the security Abacus 2007-AC1. At the time, traders — like the prominent hedge fund manager John A. Paulson, as well as those within Goldman — were looking for ways to short the overheated market.
Such investments consisted of insurance-like policies written on mortgage bonds. If the mortgage market held up and those bonds did well, investors who bought the notes would have made money from the insurance premiums paid by investors like Mr. Paulson, who were negative on housing and had bought insurance on mortgage bonds. Instead, defaults spread and the bonds plunged, generating billions of dollars in losses for Abacus investors and billions in profits for Mr. Paulson.
The S.E.C. filed a civil suit against Goldman, stating that it structured the Abacus deals with a sharp eye on the credit ratings assigned to the mortgage bonds associated with the instrument. According to the S.E.C. complaint, Mr. Paulson pinpointed those mortgage bonds that he believed carried higher ratings than the underlying loans deserved. Goldman placed insurance on those bonds — called credit-default swaps — inside Abacus, allowing Mr. Paulson to short them while clients on the other side of the trade wagered that they would not fail.
But when Goldman sold shares in Abacus to investors, the bank only disclosed the ratings of those bonds and did not reveal that Mr. Paulson was on other side, betting those ratings were wrong. As the deals plunged in value, the firm and certain hedge funds made money on their negative bets, while the Goldman clients who bought the $10.9 billion in investments lost billions of dollars.
The S.E.C.’s suit focused on Abacus 2007-AC1 just as cracks appeared in the housing market. The commission contended that Goldman misled investors, who were making a positive bet on housing, because Mr. Paulson’s involvement in creating the deal was not made known. Mr. Paulson was not accused of wrongdoing.
Though Goldman did not formally admit to wrongdoing, it agreed to a judicial order barring it from committing intentional fraud in the future under federal securities laws. The firm also acknowledged that the marketing materials for Abacus “contained incomplete information” and that it was “a mistake” not to have disclosed Mr. Paulson’s role.
Under the settlement, Goldman paid back the profit made from the Abacus deal and also paid a civil penalty. Money went to the two banks with losses on the deal — IKB Deutsche Industriebank and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group — with the rest going to the United States Treasury as a fine. The firm’s settlement also requires it to make changes in how it reviews and approves offerings of certain mortgage securities.
Goldman was not the only Wall Street firm to create complex mortgage securities that allowed investors to make negative bets, and the S.E.C. continues to look at other deals from across the industry.
forse la risposta è questa (tratto dal 2012 Earnings: Second Quarter della mitica GOLDMAN SACHS) :
Mortgage Securities and the S.E.C.
As the housing wave was cresting, Goldman was one of many Wall Street firms that created complex mortgage securities — known as synthetic collateralized debt obligations. In 2007 the firm created the security Abacus 2007-AC1. At the time, traders — like the prominent hedge fund manager John A. Paulson, as well as those within Goldman — were looking for ways to short the overheated market.
Such investments consisted of insurance-like policies written on mortgage bonds. If the mortgage market held up and those bonds did well, investors who bought the notes would have made money from the insurance premiums paid by investors like Mr. Paulson, who were negative on housing and had bought insurance on mortgage bonds. Instead, defaults spread and the bonds plunged, generating billions of dollars in losses for Abacus investors and billions in profits for Mr. Paulson.
The S.E.C. filed a civil suit against Goldman, stating that it structured the Abacus deals with a sharp eye on the credit ratings assigned to the mortgage bonds associated with the instrument. According to the S.E.C. complaint, Mr. Paulson pinpointed those mortgage bonds that he believed carried higher ratings than the underlying loans deserved. Goldman placed insurance on those bonds — called credit-default swaps — inside Abacus, allowing Mr. Paulson to short them while clients on the other side of the trade wagered that they would not fail.
But when Goldman sold shares in Abacus to investors, the bank only disclosed the ratings of those bonds and did not reveal that Mr. Paulson was on other side, betting those ratings were wrong. As the deals plunged in value, the firm and certain hedge funds made money on their negative bets, while the Goldman clients who bought the $10.9 billion in investments lost billions of dollars.
The S.E.C.’s suit focused on Abacus 2007-AC1 just as cracks appeared in the housing market. The commission contended that Goldman misled investors, who were making a positive bet on housing, because Mr. Paulson’s involvement in creating the deal was not made known. Mr. Paulson was not accused of wrongdoing.
Though Goldman did not formally admit to wrongdoing, it agreed to a judicial order barring it from committing intentional fraud in the future under federal securities laws. The firm also acknowledged that the marketing materials for Abacus “contained incomplete information” and that it was “a mistake” not to have disclosed Mr. Paulson’s role.
Under the settlement, Goldman paid back the profit made from the Abacus deal and also paid a civil penalty. Money went to the two banks with losses on the deal — IKB Deutsche Industriebank and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group — with the rest going to the United States Treasury as a fine. The firm’s settlement also requires it to make changes in how it reviews and approves offerings of certain mortgage securities.
Goldman was not the only Wall Street firm to create complex mortgage securities that allowed investors to make negative bets, and the S.E.C. continues to look at other deals from across the industry.
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