Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3

[fabriziof]

Mi piacerebbe il downgrade di s&p su Carige,se a qualcuno capita il testo...

 

[Myskin]

Mi piacerebbe il downgrade di s&p su Carige,se a qualcuno capita il testo...

On Nov. 11, 2013, Banca Carige (Carige) announced its third-quarter
results, which were affected by a sizable amortization of goodwill and a
sharp increase in nonperforming assets (NPAs).
The increase in NPAs was largely driven by the reclassifications the Bank
of Italy required after it concluded its inspection of Carige in June
2013, which Carige's management had initially decided not to recognize.
We consider Carige increasingly unlikely to improve its liquidity
position significantly or to raise sufficient capital from the market to
meet regulatory solvency requirements. Despite this, and contrary to our
previous expectations, there has been no public communication on either a
market-based solution or a regulatory intervention to allow Carige to
strengthen its capital position.
We have therefore lowered our long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on Carige to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B', while keeping the long-term
rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that we could lower
the ratings on Carige if we consider it is likely that its business or
financial profiles will deteriorate further in the short term.
NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) Nov. 20, 2013--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
today lowered its long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Italy-based Banca Carige SpA (Carige or the bank) to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B'. The
long-term rating remains on CreditWatch with negative implications, where we
placed it on March 22, 2013.

On Nov. 11, 2013, Carige announced its third-quarter results. It reported a
net loss of €1.3 billion, mainly as a result of an impairment of the bank's
goodwill by €1.65 billion. Carige also reported that nonperforming assets
(NPAs) had increased sharply, by €865 million or 3.3% of reported gross loans
in the third quarter. Most of the increase stems from the reclassification of
about €600 million performing loans to "nonperforming," in addition to those
already recognized in the bank's second-quarter results. In Bank of Italy's
regulatory inspection concluding in June 2013, it had identified the need for
Carige to reclassify a total of €1.2 billion in loans as nonperforming.

In our view, the amount of the reclassification, combined with the timing of
its recognition relative to the regulator's inspection, reflects the
significant weaknesses we see in Carige's risk management and internal
controls. We also note that Carige was fairly aggressive in its accounting
practices. Specifically, it was significantly less conservative than many of
its Italian peers, which had already undertaken similar goodwill amortization
exercises in the past.

The deterioration of Carige's business and financial profile and the
weaknesses in risk management and internal controls are likely, in our view,
to make it more difficult for it to implement the €800 million capital
strengthening required by the Bank of Italy. Despite this, and contrary to our
previous expectations, there has been no public communication on either a
market-based solution or a regulatory intervention to allow Carige to
strengthen its capital position. As a result, we have removed one notch of the
short-term support we previously incorporated into our ratings on Carige to
reflect our expectation that it was likely to strengthen its capital in the
short term, either by raising capital on its own or through an alternative
recapitalization solution.

We also think Carige is likely to find it increasing difficult to implement a
credible plan to rebalance its funding profile and achieve an "adequate"
liquidity position. Among other things, we expect Carige may not benefit from
ongoing affordable access to wholesale funding and may therefore face the
challenge of significantly reducing the gap between loans and deposits.

We no longer expect Carige to redress its funding imbalances--specifically,
its reliance on central bank funding--before the European Central Bank's (ECB)
long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) expire. As a consequence, we have
removed the short-term support we were previously incorporating in our ratings
on Carige based our expectation that it would use its ongoing access to ECB
funding facilities, particularly the LTROs, to rebalance its liquidity profile
to a more sustainable position.

As a result of our change in expectations for capital and liquidity
strengthening in the short-term, we have lowered our long and short-term
ratings on Carige to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B'.

Our ratings continue to incorporate a one-notch uplift to reflect our view of
the likelihood that Carige would receive extraordinary financial support from
the Italian government if needed. This view is based on our assessment of
Carige's "moderate" systemic importance and Italy's "supportive" stance toward
its banking system.

The CreditWatch reflects our view of the likely implications of Carige's
deteriorating business and financial profile.

In particular, we could lower the long-term rating on Carige if we were to
consider that:
The ongoing deterioration of the bank's financial profile weakens its
franchise and undermines its business stability.
Carige's asset quality could deteriorate fast enough to further weaken
its solvency position, which could result in the bank needing to
strengthen its capital by more than the €800 million currently required
by the Bank of Italy, and no alternative recapitalization solution is
likely to materialize.
As a consequence of what we see as a deteriorating business and financial
position, Carige faced heightened pressure on its liquidity profile,
particularly if it was likely to further increase its reliance on funding
from the ECB.
We could affirm our long-term rating on Carige if we expected an easing of the
pressure on both its business and financial profile.

If there were to be steps toward setting a plan for a strengthening of
Carige's solvency thorough either a market-based solution or regulatory
actions, we would consider the potential impact on our assessment of Carige's
capital and the extent to which this could have a positive impact on our
long-term rating.

 

[fabriziof]

On Nov. 11, 2013, Banca Carige (Carige) announced its third-quarter
results, which were affected by a sizable amortization of goodwill and a
sharp increase in nonperforming assets (NPAs).
The increase in NPAs was largely driven by the reclassifications the Bank
of Italy required after it concluded its inspection of Carige in June
2013, which Carige's management had initially decided not to recognize.
We consider Carige increasingly unlikely to improve its liquidity
position significantly or to raise sufficient capital from the market to
meet regulatory solvency requirements. Despite this, and contrary to our
previous expectations, there has been no public communication on either a
market-based solution or a regulatory intervention to allow Carige to
strengthen its capital position.
We have therefore lowered our long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on Carige to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B', while keeping the long-term
rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that we could lower
the ratings on Carige if we consider it is likely that its business or
financial profiles will deteriorate further in the short term.
NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) Nov. 20, 2013--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
today lowered its long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Italy-based Banca Carige SpA (Carige or the bank) to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B'. The
long-term rating remains on CreditWatch with negative implications, where we
placed it on March 22, 2013.

On Nov. 11, 2013, Carige announced its third-quarter results. It reported a
net loss of €1.3 billion, mainly as a result of an impairment of the bank's
goodwill by €1.65 billion. Carige also reported that nonperforming assets
(NPAs) had increased sharply, by €865 million or 3.3% of reported gross loans
in the third quarter. Most of the increase stems from the reclassification of
about €600 million performing loans to "nonperforming," in addition to those
already recognized in the bank's second-quarter results. In Bank of Italy's
regulatory inspection concluding in June 2013, it had identified the need for
Carige to reclassify a total of €1.2 billion in loans as nonperforming.

In our view, the amount of the reclassification, combined with the timing of
its recognition relative to the regulator's inspection, reflects the
significant weaknesses we see in Carige's risk management and internal
controls. We also note that Carige was fairly aggressive in its accounting
practices. Specifically, it was significantly less conservative than many of
its Italian peers, which had already undertaken similar goodwill amortization
exercises in the past.

The deterioration of Carige's business and financial profile and the
weaknesses in risk management and internal controls are likely, in our view,
to make it more difficult for it to implement the €800 million capital
strengthening required by the Bank of Italy. Despite this, and contrary to our
previous expectations, there has been no public communication on either a
market-based solution or a regulatory intervention to allow Carige to
strengthen its capital position. As a result, we have removed one notch of the
short-term support we previously incorporated into our ratings on Carige to
reflect our expectation that it was likely to strengthen its capital in the
short term, either by raising capital on its own or through an alternative
recapitalization solution.

We also think Carige is likely to find it increasing difficult to implement a
credible plan to rebalance its funding profile and achieve an "adequate"
liquidity position. Among other things, we expect Carige may not benefit from
ongoing affordable access to wholesale funding and may therefore face the
challenge of significantly reducing the gap between loans and deposits.

We no longer expect Carige to redress its funding imbalances--specifically,
its reliance on central bank funding--before the European Central Bank's (ECB)
long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) expire. As a consequence, we have
removed the short-term support we were previously incorporating in our ratings
on Carige based our expectation that it would use its ongoing access to ECB
funding facilities, particularly the LTROs, to rebalance its liquidity profile
to a more sustainable position.

As a result of our change in expectations for capital and liquidity
strengthening in the short-term, we have lowered our long and short-term
ratings on Carige to 'B-/C' from 'B+/B'.

Our ratings continue to incorporate a one-notch uplift to reflect our view of
the likelihood that Carige would receive extraordinary financial support from
the Italian government if needed. This view is based on our assessment of
Carige's "moderate" systemic importance and Italy's "supportive" stance toward
its banking system.

The CreditWatch reflects our view of the likely implications of Carige's
deteriorating business and financial profile.

In particular, we could lower the long-term rating on Carige if we were to
consider that:
The ongoing deterioration of the bank's financial profile weakens its
franchise and undermines its business stability.
Carige's asset quality could deteriorate fast enough to further weaken
its solvency position, which could result in the bank needing to
strengthen its capital by more than the €800 million currently required
by the Bank of Italy, and no alternative recapitalization solution is
likely to materialize.
As a consequence of what we see as a deteriorating business and financial
position, Carige faced heightened pressure on its liquidity profile,
particularly if it was likely to further increase its reliance on funding
from the ECB.
We could affirm our long-term rating on Carige if we expected an easing of the
pressure on both its business and financial profile.

If there were to be steps toward setting a plan for a strengthening of
Carige's solvency thorough either a market-based solution or regulatory
actions, we would consider the potential impact on our assessment of Carige's
capital and the extent to which this could have a positive impact on our
long-term rating.

 

[capt.harlock]

grazie infinite.
è Co.co?

no
coco sarebbe dovuto uscire molto piu' alto di un 7%

 

[solovaloreaggiunto]

Wienerberger 98... dai susus 100 e via...

 

[innocentiproject]

no
coco sarebbe dovuto uscire molto piu' alto di un 7%

ok grazie ancora per le info.
vediamo cosa ne esce fuori...

 

[marc]

BOOKRUNNERS: BofAML, Citigroup, Espirito
Santo Investment Bank, Morgan Stanley

TIMING: Today's business

7%

anche in questo caso la nuova emissione ha "spinto" quelle su mercato
senior stepeener inclusa

Ciao, ma la stepeener 721 finale quota tel quel...?

a quanto la vedete lettera...
la tassazione titoli del portogallo a quanto ammonta..
Grazie

 

[solovaloreaggiunto]

prese Aegon in fiorini otc a 86 ... oggi rabobank le offre a questo prezzo... con Yield del 8,30% attuale, ci vado avanti per un anno.. o per 2 mesi...magari va su a 95 vedremo.. ma la reputo interessante anche se poi nel 2018 cambiera' struttura

 

[cumulate]

BOOKRUNNERS: BofAML, Citigroup, Espirito
Santo Investment Bank, Morgan Stanley

TIMING: Today's business

7%

anche in questo caso la nuova emissione ha "spinto" quelle su mercato
senior stepeener inclusa

Un t2 cedola 7 emesso a 100 significa che il senior steep dovrebbe quotare almeno 90

 

[Topgun1976]

Intanto sulla BnpFortis 2021 cè un 100k a 91...troppo poco