Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3

OT
scusate se posto qui, ma ho un sasso nelle scarpe........quando lo spread Ita vs Bund era a 500+ ogni giorni fiumi di parole sull´insostenibilita´ e fine del mondo in arrivo....ora che e´ circa a 180 e sopratutto in valore assoluto un Btp 30a rende ca. il 4% (!) non ho trovato uno straccio di analisi che spieghi questo quanto vale rispetto alle proiezioni fatte nel 2ß12-3 sul 2014 per il Ns debito pubblico.
Nel 2011-2012 Banca Italia elaboro´ proiezioni con spread a 400 e 250.....siamo a 180.....quanto vale questo in termini di sostenibilita´ del debito.......?

C´e´ qualche studio recente in materia?
Grazie, fine OT.
 
Scusate se posto solo ora operativita´ scorsa settimana:

1. switchato Wind 883 pik € (sell @ 99) con Wind pik US AA36 (@99,5). Cambio 1,4 ca.

2. switchato Petrobras 2040 (sell @ 97) con Petrobras 2044 (@100).

3. Ricevuto rimborso delle storiche (in pf da secoli) UBI 564......


Prego Tutti, anche i lurkers (!!!!), postare quotazioni richieste ed operativita´.
Cosi` ci aiutiamo a vicenda.

Grazie.
 
Wind-down Plan for Hypo Alpe Adria Is Credit Positive for the Bank and Carinthia,
Credit Negative for Austria
On 14 March, Austria’s Finance Minister Michael Spindelegger announced that the government would not
pursue a previously contemplated insolvency of nationalized Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG
(HAA, unrated) and instead will put HAA into wind-down via a bad-bank structure under public
ownership. Assuming the Austrian government implements the scheme in a timely fashion and on a solid
legal and financial footing to smoothly wind down HAA’s remaining assets over time, the plan would be
credit positive for bank creditors, including bondholders benefitting from statutory deficiency or direct
government guarantees, and for the Austrian state of Carinthia (A2 review for downgrade). Our estimate of
€3.6-€4.0 billion (1.1%-1.2% of forecast 2014 GDP) cost to the government of Austria (Aaa stable) is
credit negative, but not significant enough to change the country’s rating or outlook.
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank International. Winding down HAA reduces the risks that unsecured creditors
would have faced in an insolvency, in which they would sustain significant losses owing to the bank’s poor
asset quality (nonperforming loans were 28.6% as of 30 June 2013) and which point to a low recovery value
for unsecured claims. The government’s plan also shields bondholders benefitting from a statutory
deficiency guarantee from Carinthia5
from not receiving full and timely payment of interest and principal.
The vast majority of the group’s senior bonds and subordinated debt benefit from such deficiency
guarantees, which account for major parts of the bank’s liabilities (Exhibit 1).
 
ECB Requirement to Mark to Market Loan Collateral Will Reveal Italian Bank
Exposures and Require More Capital
Last Tuesday, the European Central Bank published a technical manual on its asset quality review, which
among its provisions included a requirement to mark to market loan collateral. This requirement affects
Italian banks, because secured collateralised loans, particularly real estate loans, constitute about 45% of
banks’ lending book and real estate market prices have declined in Italy owing to a lack of demand amid the
country’s weak economy. We expect marking loan collateral to market will require that the Italian banks
raise more capital.
The Bank of Italy in a 2012 review of the accounts of the country’s 20 largest banks and in subsequent
inspections urged banks to write down collateral values associated with problem loans in determining
proper problem loan provisioning. The Bank of Italy urged what we believe was up to a 40% write-down of
commercial real estate values. However, we conclude that the gap between the book value and market value
of the banks’ collateral persists.
The effect of valuing collateral at its market value and the resulting need to increase problem-loan coverage
with loan-loss reserves will likely be significant for many banks. There are some banks, such as UniCredit
SpA (Baa2 stable, D+/baa3 negative6
) and Banco Popolare Società Cooperativa (Ba3 positive, E+/b3
positive), that have already made significant loan-loss provisions in their 2013 results, partly as a result of
strengthening coverage, writing down collateral and, more generally, preparing for the asset quality review.
Other banks with weak asset quality, such as Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (B2 negative, E/caa3
no outlook) and Credito Valtellinese (Ba3 negative, E+/b1 stable), or those with low coverage of problem
loans, such as Unione di Banche Italiane S.c.p.A. (Baa3 negative, D+/ba1 negative) and Banca Popolare di
Milano S.C.a.r.l. (B1 negative, E+/b2 stable), have not yet fully made loan-loss provisions related to
collateral valuation and asset quality review in their 2013 results.7
In anticipation of likely significant capital
effects from the collateral revaluation and the asset quality review, these and other Italian banks are
planning share issues that currently total around €8 billion to avoid any further corrective measures imposed
on them by the European Central Bank.
 
non so per quale motivo ma nell'acquisto di bpm 623 dell'altro giorno mi hanno conteggiato il rateo ma il prezzo di acquisto è notevolmente basso (92,46). A conti fatti mi risulta un prezzo di acquisto cmq più basso del prezzo indicato in fase di ordine (93,35 anzichè 93,5). Come è possibile?
 

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