Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
nuvola nera
Forumer storico
Gli auguro la tripla c ...cogl....i
Ventodivino
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The UK decision to leave the EU represents a meaningful economic and political shock to the rest of the region.
Growth in the Euro area will be weaker and the ECB will ease further.
Other central banks in the region will respond to currency pressure.
The UK decision will energise other EU-sceptic parties across Europe, but we do not expect any other referenda.
Euro area: A meaningful but manageable shock
Growth: The impact on growth will come from the direct spillovers from the uncertainty effect in the UK, and the hit to Euro area confidence and financial markets. In our view, Euro area growth will be around 0.4%-pt lower than it otherwise would have been over the coming year, which will put average GDP gains at around 1.5% ar compared to the prior 1.9% projection based on the assumption that the UK remained in the EU. Unemployment will still likely decline, although at a much reduced pace. Inflation is likely to be slightly lower, perhaps by around 0.1%-pt. A key uncertainty is the extent to which financial markets amplify the fundamental shock from greater uncertainty.
Policy: We expect the ECB to quickly express its commitment to ensure price stability in the region, which necessitates a commitment to the integrity of the region. The ECB’s actual policy response to this shock will depend on the extent of the impact on growth and inflation, and on the extent to which financial market stress looks likely to weigh further on spending and increase sovereign and bank funding costs.
We now expect more easing on rates and the balance sheet. Our forecast already anticipated further easing in September, in the form of an extension of the current asset purchase program through end-2017 (an increase in asset purchases worth €720bn). We now expect additional easing involving a 10bp cut in the deposit rate (to -50bp) and a further extension of asset purchases into 2018 (adding a further €480bn of asset purchases). We do not expect these additional moves to come quickly, unless financial markets put the ECB under a lot of pressure. If peripheral financial market pressure is intense enough to threaten the integrity of the region, the ECB could introduce a new instrument to limit contagion. This could involve country-specific bond market intervention (like the OMT) but without conditionality. In our view, the ECB would rather introduce a new instrument to limit peripheral stress than divert purchases from the existing asset purchase program. Regarding potential bank funding pressure, banks already have access to unlimited liquidity in the weekly and three-monthly operations. If needed, the ECB could adjust the timing of these operations.
Politics: The rest of the EU is torn between fear and fantasy: Fear that a UK exit will lead the region to unravel, and fantasy that without the UK the Euro area can take a leap forward in terms of integration. Neither of these extremes seems very likely. Non-mainstream political parties that are hostile to the EU will be energized by a UK vote to leave, but no other country in the EU looks likely to call a referendum on EU or Euro area membership. And, in our view, it is not the UK that has held back the Euro area from further integration: it is domestic politics in the member states. We expect EU politicians to express strong commitments to the integrity of the EU, but we do not expect any concrete action to integrate further. Such steps likely need to wait at least until after the German and French elections next year.
There will be other political consequences of the UK’s departure. The EU will lose a large member state inclined to an economically-liberal, market-friendly, free-trade approach. Without the UK, the EU risks emphasizing solutions that involve greater centralization, protectionism and harmonization. The UK’s departure is also likely to change the balance of power between the Euro-ins and Euro-outs. The Euro-outs will lose a sizable ally.
We note the UK’s referendum has provided a vivid demonstration to politicians in the EU of something they already knew – that the legitimacy and popularity of the EU project is not at all secure in the eyes of voters. Although the intensity of the UK debate is not shared universally, many of its themes echo around the region. To date, the reaction to this challenge has been for European leaders to (a) avoid referenda on EU related issues, (b) recognize the political limits to further steps of integration, and (c) lean toward institution building on an intergovernmental basis where possible, rather than passing more powers to the Commission and Parliament. The result is that designs for further institutional change (such as the “5 Presidents Report”) lack detail and do not pursue an ambitious timetable. The UK’s vote may generate more reflection on these issues, but it is difficult to visualize a different approach emerging.
Spillovers elsewhere
A UK decision to exit the EU would also be a meaningful shock to the rest of Western Europe—Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Norway. These countries are very sensitive to upward pressure on their currencies, and they would respond either to sustain the current peg in Denmark or to limit appreciation in Sweden and Switzerland. Depending on the extent of the pressure, these countries could see some combination of rate cuts, asset purchases, and FX intervention. Limits on rate cuts or asset purchases due to concern about pressure on bank profitability or market liquidity are not as relevant as elsewhere. In Norway, the central bank could act to counteract a tightening of financial conditions.
Growth in the Euro area will be weaker and the ECB will ease further.
Other central banks in the region will respond to currency pressure.
The UK decision will energise other EU-sceptic parties across Europe, but we do not expect any other referenda.
Euro area: A meaningful but manageable shock
Growth: The impact on growth will come from the direct spillovers from the uncertainty effect in the UK, and the hit to Euro area confidence and financial markets. In our view, Euro area growth will be around 0.4%-pt lower than it otherwise would have been over the coming year, which will put average GDP gains at around 1.5% ar compared to the prior 1.9% projection based on the assumption that the UK remained in the EU. Unemployment will still likely decline, although at a much reduced pace. Inflation is likely to be slightly lower, perhaps by around 0.1%-pt. A key uncertainty is the extent to which financial markets amplify the fundamental shock from greater uncertainty.
Policy: We expect the ECB to quickly express its commitment to ensure price stability in the region, which necessitates a commitment to the integrity of the region. The ECB’s actual policy response to this shock will depend on the extent of the impact on growth and inflation, and on the extent to which financial market stress looks likely to weigh further on spending and increase sovereign and bank funding costs.
We now expect more easing on rates and the balance sheet. Our forecast already anticipated further easing in September, in the form of an extension of the current asset purchase program through end-2017 (an increase in asset purchases worth €720bn). We now expect additional easing involving a 10bp cut in the deposit rate (to -50bp) and a further extension of asset purchases into 2018 (adding a further €480bn of asset purchases). We do not expect these additional moves to come quickly, unless financial markets put the ECB under a lot of pressure. If peripheral financial market pressure is intense enough to threaten the integrity of the region, the ECB could introduce a new instrument to limit contagion. This could involve country-specific bond market intervention (like the OMT) but without conditionality. In our view, the ECB would rather introduce a new instrument to limit peripheral stress than divert purchases from the existing asset purchase program. Regarding potential bank funding pressure, banks already have access to unlimited liquidity in the weekly and three-monthly operations. If needed, the ECB could adjust the timing of these operations.
Politics: The rest of the EU is torn between fear and fantasy: Fear that a UK exit will lead the region to unravel, and fantasy that without the UK the Euro area can take a leap forward in terms of integration. Neither of these extremes seems very likely. Non-mainstream political parties that are hostile to the EU will be energized by a UK vote to leave, but no other country in the EU looks likely to call a referendum on EU or Euro area membership. And, in our view, it is not the UK that has held back the Euro area from further integration: it is domestic politics in the member states. We expect EU politicians to express strong commitments to the integrity of the EU, but we do not expect any concrete action to integrate further. Such steps likely need to wait at least until after the German and French elections next year.
There will be other political consequences of the UK’s departure. The EU will lose a large member state inclined to an economically-liberal, market-friendly, free-trade approach. Without the UK, the EU risks emphasizing solutions that involve greater centralization, protectionism and harmonization. The UK’s departure is also likely to change the balance of power between the Euro-ins and Euro-outs. The Euro-outs will lose a sizable ally.
We note the UK’s referendum has provided a vivid demonstration to politicians in the EU of something they already knew – that the legitimacy and popularity of the EU project is not at all secure in the eyes of voters. Although the intensity of the UK debate is not shared universally, many of its themes echo around the region. To date, the reaction to this challenge has been for European leaders to (a) avoid referenda on EU related issues, (b) recognize the political limits to further steps of integration, and (c) lean toward institution building on an intergovernmental basis where possible, rather than passing more powers to the Commission and Parliament. The result is that designs for further institutional change (such as the “5 Presidents Report”) lack detail and do not pursue an ambitious timetable. The UK’s vote may generate more reflection on these issues, but it is difficult to visualize a different approach emerging.
Spillovers elsewhere
A UK decision to exit the EU would also be a meaningful shock to the rest of Western Europe—Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Norway. These countries are very sensitive to upward pressure on their currencies, and they would respond either to sustain the current peg in Denmark or to limit appreciation in Sweden and Switzerland. Depending on the extent of the pressure, these countries could see some combination of rate cuts, asset purchases, and FX intervention. Limits on rate cuts or asset purchases due to concern about pressure on bank profitability or market liquidity are not as relevant as elsewhere. In Norway, the central bank could act to counteract a tightening of financial conditions.
Joe Silver
Forumer storico
Dato che non resisto alle tentazioni, ho comprato qualcosa: Santander 5,75% a 99,75, Achmea 6% a 99,7, Srlev 9% 102. Naturalmente adesso crolleranno...
russiabond
Il mito, la leggenda.
...al 100%
Omero
Forumer storico
Peccato.
Comunque seguo questi
XS0181161380 Friends Provident Group 6,875% Perpetual £ call 21/11/2019
XS0215556142 Old Mutual Plc. 6,376% FRN 2005-49 perp call 24/03/2020 post call libor £ 6m + 2,23% cum
Omero
Forumer storico
compreremo titoli di stato del regno unito vendendo quelli greci
non credo ce l faremo a fare tale swap
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Tra Parigi-Francoforte-Madrid-Milano-Londra qual'è la piazza azionaria che perde meno ?
Un aiutino ?
Inizia con la L.
Un aiutino ?
Inizia con la L.
Ultima modifica:
no perpetual no party
Forumer storico
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