Joe Silver
Forumer storico
E' così, aihmè, a meno di andare a prendere delle ciofeche impresentabili: cosa che non ho certo intenzione di fare essendo ansioso di natura.
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
E' così, aihmè, a meno di andare a prendere delle ciofeche impresentabili: cosa che non ho certo intenzione di fare essendo ansioso di natura.
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Se ci mettiamo a parlare delle esperienze personali allora qui non finiamo più...io sono andato in causa ad esempio con BNP Paribas. Vuol dire che BNPP e' una pessima banca? Non direi. Anzi il contrario.
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Piccoli bignamini (beato chi non sa a cosa mi riferisco) di JPM (29/03/2017) su Groupama , Unipol, ASR, Ageas, Takko :
We are OW mutual French insurer Groupama, considering attractive trading levels, a conservative investment portfolio and
mostly stable operating performance. The company is well established in France and has a reasonable presence in Italy, but
lacks scale/presence elsewhere. While small in size, the company has good market positions in its chosen niches including
agricultural insurance (no. 1), individual health (no. 1) and local authority insurance (no. 1). We note the company is now able
to issue ‘Certificats Mutualistes' (qualifying as tier I instruments), directly to policyholders which we believe the company will do
iteratively over the next few years to improve the capital position. We are modestly cautious on the lower Solvency II ratio ex.
transitional factors, which stands at c. 149% (286% including transitionals) although this is up significantly from 113% as of H1
16, supported by the issuance of €190m Certificats Mutualistes (N.B. the current transitional rules on technical provisions give a
16yr period for exemption although the exemption reduces linearly over this period, which the company aims to partly offset
with organic capital generation). We also note CCAMA conducted a successful liability management exercise in Jan-17, issuing
€650m of new 10yr sub bullets in exchange for partial redemption of the 6.298% perps and 7.875% 2039s. For FY16, premium
income was flat (€13.58bn), while operating income fell -10% (€153m), although this was reasonable in the context of higher
weather-related events (100.3% combined ratio). Despite Groupama's smaller profile vs. French peera, the CCAMA 6.375%
sub perps are trading at an attractive 6.35% yield (Z-spread of 586bps) which is a significant pickup vs. larger French peers
(e.g. AXASA 3.941% perp: Z+286bps, SCOR 3 ⅞ perp: Z+260bps).
We maintain a Neutral rating on Unipol Gruppo Finanziario (and UnipolSai). We view positively the group’s strong Italian
market position in non-life (no.1), as well as the company’s focus on the more conservative retail market. However, we note the
banking business has been weak (steadily increasing NPLs over last few years), while the legacy real estate business warrants
monitoring, and the Solvency II ratios for UFG/UnipolSai (140%/209% as of FY16) are relatively low. Also, Unipol is exposed
purely to Italy, meaning it holds a large amount of Italian debt on its balance sheet as a result (c. 56%). The group’s ratings
(Ba2, senior) are low due to being tied to the Italian sovereign’s ratings (Baa2/BBB-), with Moody’s downgrading their outlook to
negative from stable in Dec-16, along with other Italian insurers, reflecting concerns around Italian sovereign risk. While we are
comfortable with the fundamental business of Unipol, we acknowledge the ‘peripheral effect’ and that historic concerns around
the Italian banking sector/macro position have driven wide spread levels. In May-16, UFG/UnipolSai announced 2016-18
targets including cumulative net profits of; €1.5-1.7bn/€1.4-1.6bn, combined ratios of; 95.5%/96.0% and Solvency II ratios of;
120-160%/150-200%. These targets look achievable but we note the target Solvency II ratio range is lower than many
European peers. For FY16, UFG total revenues fell -11% (€17.2bn), while PBT fell -26% (€706m). Similarly for UnipolSai,
revenue fell -13.4% (€14.3bn), while PBT dipped -35% (€681m). Declines were driven mainly by the non-life business where
combined ratios were higher and realised investment gains were lower. Downside risks include any deterioration in the Italian
banking/macro environment driving negative sentiment, and any softening in Solvency II ratios. Upside risks include the
potential sale of Unipol's banking operations, any lessening of the competitive non-life environment in Italy and any signs of
exceeding Solvency II targets.
We recently initiated coverage of ASR Nederland with an OW rating. Our view is based on attractive valuations, a history of
good earnings and a strong balance sheet as exemplified by a strong Solvency II capital ratio (189% as of Dec-16). ASR is a
domestically focussed Dutch insurer, active in both the life (72% of operating result) and non-life segments (28% of operating
result), with leading market positions in various market categories. Credit positives include an exceptionally prudent approach
to risk management both in terms of its portfolio and underwriting standards, as well as adopting the more conservative
standard model for Solvency II calculations, which we view positively. We also think ASR is well positioned to continue
consolidating the Dutch domestic insurance market, specifically targetting smaller, niche elements of the sector as opposed to
large acquisitions, which has recently supported strong performance. We caveat that ASR lacks the broad geographic
diversification of several of its Dutch-based peers such as Achmea and Aegon being solely exposed to the Netherlands. Risks
to our OW rating include any large debt-funded acquisitions or any significant catastrophe losses in the Netherlands. ASRNED
5.00% perps currently yield 3.59% (Z+304bps).
Despite strong underlying performance in 9M 16 and major strides made in the Fortis settlement efforts, Ageas pre-announced
in Feb-17 that €137m of exceptionals would impact FY16 results (affecting UK and Asia segments). Accordingly, the Q4 16 net
result was €18m vs. €142m y/y, while gross inflows were effectively stable (-1%, €6.96bn) and the group combined ratio
worsened to 103.7%. The company finally reached an agreement with claimants in the long-running legal claims made against
the legacy Fortis business in Q1 16 (legal charge of €899m taken), which also resulted in an upwards ratings outlook revision at
Moody’s (now Baa3, Positive). While this is a material step, approval by the Dutch courts and final approval of 95% of claimants
is still required. While Ageas has no immediate refinancing needs, we see new issuance as possible if Ageas decides to make
a material acquisition. Accordingly, we note there has been increased media chatter (Le Soir) around a potential acquisition of
domestic peer Ethias, with certain shareholders reportedly in favour of consolidation. Any announcements around BNP Paribas’
exercise of the put on the 25% stake in AG Insurance could also result in issuance or drawdown of cash. Elsewhere, Ageas
continues to adjust is geographic exposure, selling its Hong Kong business, and acquiring AXA’s Portuguese unit over the
course of 2016. Over the mid/long term, we expect a continuation of generally strong performance with stable results in mature
markets, while Asia continues to be the group’s growth engine, although we are watchful for potential excess shareholder
returns considering the large cash pile. We rate Ageas N overall, as despite the positive litigation developments and reasonable
earnings in 2016, the legacy capital structure remains complex and spreads look to be trading at fair value in our view (AGSBB
$ 6 ¾ perps currently yield 3.54% mid (Z+190bps)). Downside risks to our rating include a failure to successfully conclude the
Fortis settlement and any material increase in shareholder returns. Upside risks include any further efforts to simplify the
complex capital structure and any sensible consolidation of business exposures e.g. fairly priced acquisitions in Belgium or
reacquiring the 25% stake in AG Insurance from BNP
We remain Overweight on Takko (9.875% Sen Sec 2019 85.25pt 18.9% YTW). We expect profit to be under pressure in FY18
and as a result expect volatility in trading levels over the coming months. However, we think these bonds are still attractive at
mid-80s with c.4x net leverage (rising towards 5x in the year prior to bond maturity) and a coupon of close to 10%. We highlight
that despite the businesses’ challenges, Takko’s EBITDA has remained in the €103-137m range and net leverage in the 3.9-
5.5x range since bond issuance. Key risk is operating underperformance driving leverage above 5x.
We are OW mutual French insurer Groupama, considering attractive trading levels, a conservative investment portfolio and
mostly stable operating performance. The company is well established in France and has a reasonable presence in Italy, but
lacks scale/presence elsewhere. While small in size, the company has good market positions in its chosen niches including
agricultural insurance (no. 1), individual health (no. 1) and local authority insurance (no. 1). We note the company is now able
to issue ‘Certificats Mutualistes' (qualifying as tier I instruments), directly to policyholders which we believe the company will do
iteratively over the next few years to improve the capital position. We are modestly cautious on the lower Solvency II ratio ex.
transitional factors, which stands at c. 149% (286% including transitionals) although this is up significantly from 113% as of H1
16, supported by the issuance of €190m Certificats Mutualistes (N.B. the current transitional rules on technical provisions give a
16yr period for exemption although the exemption reduces linearly over this period, which the company aims to partly offset
with organic capital generation). We also note CCAMA conducted a successful liability management exercise in Jan-17, issuing
€650m of new 10yr sub bullets in exchange for partial redemption of the 6.298% perps and 7.875% 2039s. For FY16, premium
income was flat (€13.58bn), while operating income fell -10% (€153m), although this was reasonable in the context of higher
weather-related events (100.3% combined ratio). Despite Groupama's smaller profile vs. French peera, the CCAMA 6.375%
sub perps are trading at an attractive 6.35% yield (Z-spread of 586bps) which is a significant pickup vs. larger French peers
(e.g. AXASA 3.941% perp: Z+286bps, SCOR 3 ⅞ perp: Z+260bps).
We maintain a Neutral rating on Unipol Gruppo Finanziario (and UnipolSai). We view positively the group’s strong Italian
market position in non-life (no.1), as well as the company’s focus on the more conservative retail market. However, we note the
banking business has been weak (steadily increasing NPLs over last few years), while the legacy real estate business warrants
monitoring, and the Solvency II ratios for UFG/UnipolSai (140%/209% as of FY16) are relatively low. Also, Unipol is exposed
purely to Italy, meaning it holds a large amount of Italian debt on its balance sheet as a result (c. 56%). The group’s ratings
(Ba2, senior) are low due to being tied to the Italian sovereign’s ratings (Baa2/BBB-), with Moody’s downgrading their outlook to
negative from stable in Dec-16, along with other Italian insurers, reflecting concerns around Italian sovereign risk. While we are
comfortable with the fundamental business of Unipol, we acknowledge the ‘peripheral effect’ and that historic concerns around
the Italian banking sector/macro position have driven wide spread levels. In May-16, UFG/UnipolSai announced 2016-18
targets including cumulative net profits of; €1.5-1.7bn/€1.4-1.6bn, combined ratios of; 95.5%/96.0% and Solvency II ratios of;
120-160%/150-200%. These targets look achievable but we note the target Solvency II ratio range is lower than many
European peers. For FY16, UFG total revenues fell -11% (€17.2bn), while PBT fell -26% (€706m). Similarly for UnipolSai,
revenue fell -13.4% (€14.3bn), while PBT dipped -35% (€681m). Declines were driven mainly by the non-life business where
combined ratios were higher and realised investment gains were lower. Downside risks include any deterioration in the Italian
banking/macro environment driving negative sentiment, and any softening in Solvency II ratios. Upside risks include the
potential sale of Unipol's banking operations, any lessening of the competitive non-life environment in Italy and any signs of
exceeding Solvency II targets.
We recently initiated coverage of ASR Nederland with an OW rating. Our view is based on attractive valuations, a history of
good earnings and a strong balance sheet as exemplified by a strong Solvency II capital ratio (189% as of Dec-16). ASR is a
domestically focussed Dutch insurer, active in both the life (72% of operating result) and non-life segments (28% of operating
result), with leading market positions in various market categories. Credit positives include an exceptionally prudent approach
to risk management both in terms of its portfolio and underwriting standards, as well as adopting the more conservative
standard model for Solvency II calculations, which we view positively. We also think ASR is well positioned to continue
consolidating the Dutch domestic insurance market, specifically targetting smaller, niche elements of the sector as opposed to
large acquisitions, which has recently supported strong performance. We caveat that ASR lacks the broad geographic
diversification of several of its Dutch-based peers such as Achmea and Aegon being solely exposed to the Netherlands. Risks
to our OW rating include any large debt-funded acquisitions or any significant catastrophe losses in the Netherlands. ASRNED
5.00% perps currently yield 3.59% (Z+304bps).
Despite strong underlying performance in 9M 16 and major strides made in the Fortis settlement efforts, Ageas pre-announced
in Feb-17 that €137m of exceptionals would impact FY16 results (affecting UK and Asia segments). Accordingly, the Q4 16 net
result was €18m vs. €142m y/y, while gross inflows were effectively stable (-1%, €6.96bn) and the group combined ratio
worsened to 103.7%. The company finally reached an agreement with claimants in the long-running legal claims made against
the legacy Fortis business in Q1 16 (legal charge of €899m taken), which also resulted in an upwards ratings outlook revision at
Moody’s (now Baa3, Positive). While this is a material step, approval by the Dutch courts and final approval of 95% of claimants
is still required. While Ageas has no immediate refinancing needs, we see new issuance as possible if Ageas decides to make
a material acquisition. Accordingly, we note there has been increased media chatter (Le Soir) around a potential acquisition of
domestic peer Ethias, with certain shareholders reportedly in favour of consolidation. Any announcements around BNP Paribas’
exercise of the put on the 25% stake in AG Insurance could also result in issuance or drawdown of cash. Elsewhere, Ageas
continues to adjust is geographic exposure, selling its Hong Kong business, and acquiring AXA’s Portuguese unit over the
course of 2016. Over the mid/long term, we expect a continuation of generally strong performance with stable results in mature
markets, while Asia continues to be the group’s growth engine, although we are watchful for potential excess shareholder
returns considering the large cash pile. We rate Ageas N overall, as despite the positive litigation developments and reasonable
earnings in 2016, the legacy capital structure remains complex and spreads look to be trading at fair value in our view (AGSBB
$ 6 ¾ perps currently yield 3.54% mid (Z+190bps)). Downside risks to our rating include a failure to successfully conclude the
Fortis settlement and any material increase in shareholder returns. Upside risks include any further efforts to simplify the
complex capital structure and any sensible consolidation of business exposures e.g. fairly priced acquisitions in Belgium or
reacquiring the 25% stake in AG Insurance from BNP
We remain Overweight on Takko (9.875% Sen Sec 2019 85.25pt 18.9% YTW). We expect profit to be under pressure in FY18
and as a result expect volatility in trading levels over the coming months. However, we think these bonds are still attractive at
mid-80s with c.4x net leverage (rising towards 5x in the year prior to bond maturity) and a coupon of close to 10%. We highlight
that despite the businesses’ challenges, Takko’s EBITDA has remained in the €103-137m range and net leverage in the 3.9-
5.5x range since bond issuance. Key risk is operating underperformance driving leverage above 5x.
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Puoi querelarmi tranquillamente, come Zonin , ripeto, sono nullatenente.
Takko, non lo dico a te, è da maneggiare con cura.
Nessuno regala niente.
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Conosco molto bene Takko. Interessante e' che JPM copra un simile "junk' bond.
PS
Anche tu come Zonin ti sei trasferito fuori dall'Italia?
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Rispetto a te partiamo con l'handicap ,nel valutare le performances annuali ti toglieremo almeno 5 punti causa possesso report
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Rispetto a te partiamo con l'handicap ,nel valutare le performances annuali ti toglieremo almeno 5 punti causa possesso report
Questi report non dicono molto. Sono di una ovvietà' disarmante condita con un po di z-spread per comparare i bond. Pero' se li scrive JPM e non un forumista hanno un loro peso. Comunque sempre interessante leggerli.
darkog
In Hoc Signo Vince..
Takko pensavo fosse già fallita. Come fa a stare in piedi?
Ma hanno già ristrutturato?
Ho visto ora il grafico della 2019 (non l'ho più seguita). Dai livelli a cui ero rimasto si é fatta una salita incredibile.
Io la davo per spacciata..
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