Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3

[solovaloreaggiunto]

non si parla più dei bond di Generali, Intesa, Unicredit.... ma avete visto dove sono arrivati i prezzi ?

intesa ytc al 2021 3,14%
unicredit ytc al 2021 3,70%
generali ytd al 2025 3,16%

gli spazi di ulteriore recupero si stanno assottigliando, è arrivato il momento di vendere tutto e andare in ferie ?

È quello che ho fatto oggi fermo restando che con lo scenario tassi per altri 6/8 mesi si poteva fare ancora carry. Ma un anno cosi tra coco e floater cms non era immaginabile a inizio anno.. è stato un 2017 stellare .. chi si accontenta gode

 

[Ventodivino]

JPM su HSH
Disseminato il 25/10 , non so, non avendo seguito, se sia ancora attuale.


HSH Nordbank Underweight A Titanic Challenge Ticker HSHN European Credit - Financials Axel J Finsterbusch, CFA AC (44-20) 7134-4711 [email protected] Roberto Henriques, CFA (44-20) 7134-1733 [email protected] Vishal Iyer (44-20) 7134-0928 [email protected] J.P. Morgan Securities plc See page 11 for analyst certification and important disclosures. J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.  With binding offers expected by the end of October and after the Tier 1 bonds have rallied roughly 15pts in the last month alone, we felt compelled to update our view on HSHN. Following recent headlines in the press regarding prospective buyers we don’t discard a binding offer for the whole bank at the end of the month. However, the inherent volatility of the capital ratios – thanks to the risk shield – along with limited time to privatize the shipping lender implies the buyer has a very strong hand. In our opinion, a sale to a strategic buyer would likely involve a prolonged period of coupon deferral with incremental losses likely to further erode the carrying value of the instruments. We highlight that almost all HSHN Tier 1 bonds (with the exception being HSHN 7 1/4) are callable at the carrying value (i.e. the write-down amount). Under these circumstances we maintain our Underweight recommendation on HSHN.  We draw on the recent tender for IKB Tier 1 (IKB 7 1/2 and IKB 6 5/8) to gain a better understanding of potential outcomes for HSHN Tier 1 bonds. IKB tendered for these two instruments at 20c last April, with acceptance being close to 90%. At face value the offer was not that bad considering that both bonds were written down to almost zero more than five years ago. However, we think the 20c offer is mainly a reflection of the specific provisions of these instruments; selling IKB without the Tier 1 bonds is easier and the bonds are only callable at par. In a scenario where IKB Tier 1 instruments were callable at the carrying value (like all HSHN Tier 1 with the exception of HSHN 7 1/4) we think these bonds would have been redeemed at zero. In essence, we think a prospective buyer of HSHN will have enough leverage to extract value from bondholders by making its binding offer contingent on creditors' participation.  Furthermore, irrespective of the sale process, we think investors’ expectations of a quick and positive outcome may be hard to meet. Under normal circumstances we would expect an issuer to manage its stock of legacy Tier 1 bonds with the aim of optimizing its capital structure. We have to acknowledge that HSHN Tier 1 instruments are still eligible as (zero cost) regulatory capital with the ultimate risk being that nothing really happens in the sense that HSHN Tier 1 bonds are simply left outstanding without paying a coupon over the next few years, thus dashing creditors’ expectation to cash-out sooner rather than later.  We don’t discard that the bondholder group may ultimately be allowed to take full ownership with the resulting recovery rate being a direct function of the equity value of HSHN. However, the regulator may show a greater preference for a strategic buyer or, alternatively, a trade buyer, perhaps a German Landesbank, where the chances of a partial sale increase, with the obvious consequence being that Tier 1 bonds may be left behind. A partial sale scenario was explicitly acknowledged in the H1'17 report.

 

[Joe Silver]

Ok,
ma arriverà un momento in cui la Groupamaglia andrà venduta o attendiamo i 153 ?

Finchè sale o salicchia, non vendo.

 

[Joe Silver]

....ma, secondo voi, srlev9% che target potenziale può avere?

Se migliora la percezione di Anbang, potrebbe arrivare sui 125 (e oltre?)

 

[waltermasoni]

JPM su HSH
Disseminato il 25/10 , non so, non avendo seguito, se sia ancora attuale.


HSH Nordbank Underweight A Titanic Challenge Ticker HSHN European Credit - Financials Axel J Finsterbusch, CFA AC (44-20) 7134-4711 [email protected] Roberto Henriques, CFA (44-20) 7134-1733 [email protected] Vishal Iyer (44-20) 7134-0928 [email protected] J.P. Morgan Securities plc See page 11 for analyst certification and important disclosures. J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.  With binding offers expected by the end of October and after the Tier 1 bonds have rallied roughly 15pts in the last month alone, we felt compelled to update our view on HSHN. Following recent headlines in the press regarding prospective buyers we don’t discard a binding offer for the whole bank at the end of the month. However, the inherent volatility of the capital ratios – thanks to the risk shield – along with limited time to privatize the shipping lender implies the buyer has a very strong hand. In our opinion, a sale to a strategic buyer would likely involve a prolonged period of coupon deferral with incremental losses likely to further erode the carrying value of the instruments. We highlight that almost all HSHN Tier 1 bonds (with the exception being HSHN 7 1/4) are callable at the carrying value (i.e. the write-down amount). Under these circumstances we maintain our Underweight recommendation on HSHN.  We draw on the recent tender for IKB Tier 1 (IKB 7 1/2 and IKB 6 5/8) to gain a better understanding of potential outcomes for HSHN Tier 1 bonds. IKB tendered for these two instruments at 20c last April, with acceptance being close to 90%. At face value the offer was not that bad considering that both bonds were written down to almost zero more than five years ago. However, we think the 20c offer is mainly a reflection of the specific provisions of these instruments; selling IKB without the Tier 1 bonds is easier and the bonds are only callable at par. In a scenario where IKB Tier 1 instruments were callable at the carrying value (like all HSHN Tier 1 with the exception of HSHN 7 1/4) we think these bonds would have been redeemed at zero. In essence, we think a prospective buyer of HSHN will have enough leverage to extract value from bondholders by making its binding offer contingent on creditors' participation.  Furthermore, irrespective of the sale process, we think investors’ expectations of a quick and positive outcome may be hard to meet. Under normal circumstances we would expect an issuer to manage its stock of legacy Tier 1 bonds with the aim of optimizing its capital structure. We have to acknowledge that HSHN Tier 1 instruments are still eligible as (zero cost) regulatory capital with the ultimate risk being that nothing really happens in the sense that HSHN Tier 1 bonds are simply left outstanding without paying a coupon over the next few years, thus dashing creditors’ expectation to cash-out sooner rather than later.  We don’t discard that the bondholder group may ultimately be allowed to take full ownership with the resulting recovery rate being a direct function of the equity value of HSHN. However, the regulator may show a greater preference for a strategic buyer or, alternatively, a trade buyer, perhaps a German Landesbank, where the chances of a partial sale increase, with the obvious consequence being that Tier 1 bonds may be left behind. A partial sale scenario was explicitly acknowledged in the H1'17 report.

Oggi uscito completamente sulla forte salita a 43,96
In bocca al lupo a chi rimane

 

[Ventodivino]

E stiamo arrivando a 117.
Caixa Geral de Depósitos S.A. EO-FLR Notes 2017(22/Und.) | A19FGA | PTCGDJOM0022 | Übersicht | boerse-stuttgart.de

 

[Joe Silver]

E stiamo arrivando a 117.
Caixa Geral de Depósitos S.A. EO-FLR Notes 2017(22/Und.) | A19FGA | PTCGDJOM0022 | Übersicht | boerse-stuttgart.de

Purtroppo sono considerato dalle banche con cui opero come figlio di un dio minore (anche se professionale) e quindi mi è precluso l'universo dei coco

 

[fidw99]

è stato quotato su Borsa Italiana l'etf che investe nelle preferred Usd

PRFD IM

 

[fol-low IO]

è stato quotato su Borsa Italiana l'etf che investe nelle preferred Usd

PRFD IM

quindi niente doppia tassazione?

 

[Joe Silver]

quindi niente doppia tassazione?

Se operi con Binck anche sulle preferred hai la tassazione al 26%. Ti suggerisco di dare un'occhiata al thread dedicato dove potrai leggere un giudizio del forumer Peco, che è un grande esperto del settore, sul nuovo ETF.