fabriziof
Forumer storico
Io vedo cinque e più punti di perdita rispetto a inizio mese per i coco banco do brasil
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (6 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
Io vedo cinque e più punti di perdita rispetto a inizio mese per i coco banco do brasil
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Qui dicono 26%:chiedo un piccolo aiuto O.T. agli amici più esperti:
il 10 febbraio ha pagato cedola AU0000KFWHV4 (kfw 3,75% ago17) ed è stata assoggettata al 26% ....è corretto? ...io mi aspettavo equiparata ai sovrannazionali al 12,50%
Grazie
[..]
La BEI è la banca europea degli investimenti, quindi è come se fosse uno stato (tassazione 12.5%). LA KFW è la banca tedesca della ricostruzione post guerra, di fatto è la Germania, tanto è vero che l'azionista maggioritario è proprio il tesoro tedesco, ma proprio perché banca ha sempre una tassazione del 26%.
Spero di esserti stato utile...
Ah, dimenticavo, per quanto riguarda il ratink: AAA per entrambe
giapo27
Forumer attivo
infinite grazie!!!ho sempre avuto sovrannazionali, titoli di stato ...e corporate, è l'unica che ho di questo tipo...e proprio il rating contribuiva a portarmi fuori strada... in fututo starò più attento!
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
ho sempre avuto sovrannazionali, titoli di stato ...e corporate, è l'unica che ho di questo tipo...e proprio il rating contribuiva a portarmi fuori strada... in fututo starò più attento!
giapo27
Forumer attivo
nn uso i cocobond, possiedo qst due:
XS0883956970EBRD 16 GMTN 6.25%
XS0824386378EBRD 5,5% 16/10/2015 BRL
probabilmente perchè cortissime nn hanno particolari escursioni di prezzo...
qualcuno ne conosce (di questi emittenti) con scadenza 18 - 2022?
Novo Banco’s 2014 Results Reveal Persistent Asset Quality and
Profitability Weaknesses
Last Monday, Novo Banco, S.A. (B2 review for downgrade, E/ca review for upgrade6
) published its 2014
financial statements, which included sizable losses and showed that the bank’s asset quality metrics had
weakened. The results are credit negative for the bank because they call into question the bank’s ability to
generate capital from internal sources.
On 3 August 2014, the Portuguese authorities approved the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo (BES,
unrated) and the immediate creation and capitalisation of a temporary bridge bank called Novo Banco.
Portuguese authorities expect the Portuguese Resolution Fund, which owns 100% of Novo Banco, to divest
the bank before August 2016. Through this sale, the Portuguese government intends to receive the bulk of
the €4.4 billion loan it granted to the Resolution Fund, and which was needed to fund a €4.9 billion capital
injection into Novo Banco.
The publication of Novo Banco’s year-end 2014 financial results sheds some light on the bank’s current
credit quality, the details of which had been limited before last Monday. Persistently weak financial
indicators highlight the challenges the Portuguese government will face in recovering in its entirety the loan
it made to the Resolution Fund via a sale of Novo Banco. Furthermore, if the loan is not entirely reimbursed
through the proceeds of Novo Banco’s sale, it could have negative implications for Portuguese banks given
that the Resolution Fund is financed through bank contributions and banks could be required to bear a
portion of any sale shortfall.
From its creation on 4 August 2014 through 31 December 2014, Novo Banco’s stock of nonperforming
loans (NPLs) climbed 17.3%, which when combined with a 3.8% decline in gross loans resulted in an NPL
ratio of 16.5% at the end of 2014. By comparison, the Portuguese banking system’s average was 11.4% at
the end of September, the latest data available. This negative performance reflects Novo Banco’s persistent
asset quality challenges despite the fact that when Banco Novo was created the most problematic
exposures remained at BES.
Novo Banco’s rapid increase in NPLs has resulted in a still-high burden of credit provisions, which when
combined with impairments related to its securities portfolio, led the bank to report a loss of €467.9 million
for 2014 because pre-provision profit was insufficient to offset such charges.
Novo Banco’s deteriorating asset quality and profitability jeopardize the bank’s ability to preserve its capital
base. Because of Novo Banco’s ongoing balance sheet deleveraging, its capital ratios remained broadly
stable despite having recorded large losses, with the bank reporting a phased-in common equity Tier 1 (CET
1) ratio of 9.6%7 at the end of December 2014. This ratio exceeds Bank of Portugal’s minimum regulatory
threshold of 7%, but it compares unfavourably to the system’s average of 12.6% phased-in CET1 at the end
of September 2014.
Although the latest news is credit negative, Novo Banco’s standalone rating remains on review for upgrade
and could be raised if it is clear that the bank is fully and effectively protected from problematic exposures
and contingent liabilities related to BES’ insolvency, and if the high degree of uncertainty around the bank’s
credit profile is resolved. Novo Banco’s deposit and debt ratings remain on review for downgrade and could
be lowered if we think there is a lower probability of government support once our review is complete.
Profitability Weaknesses
Last Monday, Novo Banco, S.A. (B2 review for downgrade, E/ca review for upgrade6
) published its 2014
financial statements, which included sizable losses and showed that the bank’s asset quality metrics had
weakened. The results are credit negative for the bank because they call into question the bank’s ability to
generate capital from internal sources.
On 3 August 2014, the Portuguese authorities approved the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo (BES,
unrated) and the immediate creation and capitalisation of a temporary bridge bank called Novo Banco.
Portuguese authorities expect the Portuguese Resolution Fund, which owns 100% of Novo Banco, to divest
the bank before August 2016. Through this sale, the Portuguese government intends to receive the bulk of
the €4.4 billion loan it granted to the Resolution Fund, and which was needed to fund a €4.9 billion capital
injection into Novo Banco.
The publication of Novo Banco’s year-end 2014 financial results sheds some light on the bank’s current
credit quality, the details of which had been limited before last Monday. Persistently weak financial
indicators highlight the challenges the Portuguese government will face in recovering in its entirety the loan
it made to the Resolution Fund via a sale of Novo Banco. Furthermore, if the loan is not entirely reimbursed
through the proceeds of Novo Banco’s sale, it could have negative implications for Portuguese banks given
that the Resolution Fund is financed through bank contributions and banks could be required to bear a
portion of any sale shortfall.
From its creation on 4 August 2014 through 31 December 2014, Novo Banco’s stock of nonperforming
loans (NPLs) climbed 17.3%, which when combined with a 3.8% decline in gross loans resulted in an NPL
ratio of 16.5% at the end of 2014. By comparison, the Portuguese banking system’s average was 11.4% at
the end of September, the latest data available. This negative performance reflects Novo Banco’s persistent
asset quality challenges despite the fact that when Banco Novo was created the most problematic
exposures remained at BES.
Novo Banco’s rapid increase in NPLs has resulted in a still-high burden of credit provisions, which when
combined with impairments related to its securities portfolio, led the bank to report a loss of €467.9 million
for 2014 because pre-provision profit was insufficient to offset such charges.
Novo Banco’s deteriorating asset quality and profitability jeopardize the bank’s ability to preserve its capital
base. Because of Novo Banco’s ongoing balance sheet deleveraging, its capital ratios remained broadly
stable despite having recorded large losses, with the bank reporting a phased-in common equity Tier 1 (CET
1) ratio of 9.6%7 at the end of December 2014. This ratio exceeds Bank of Portugal’s minimum regulatory
threshold of 7%, but it compares unfavourably to the system’s average of 12.6% phased-in CET1 at the end
of September 2014.
Although the latest news is credit negative, Novo Banco’s standalone rating remains on review for upgrade
and could be raised if it is clear that the bank is fully and effectively protected from problematic exposures
and contingent liabilities related to BES’ insolvency, and if the high degree of uncertainty around the bank’s
credit profile is resolved. Novo Banco’s deposit and debt ratings remain on review for downgrade and could
be lowered if we think there is a lower probability of government support once our review is complete.
TheLondoner
Forumer storico
Per chi seguisse DeltaLloyd ieri hanno chiuso aumento di capitale di 340 mln per rafforzare il solvency ratio.
lagonzaga
Forumer attivo
Questi che indichi sono delle sovrannazionali in Brl, sul mercato ce ne sono diverse
una è questa quotata sul tlx - XS1144002620 al 2017
ma otc ce ne sono delle altre.
La segnalazione riguardava i coco di Banco do Brasil in usd che sono calati in seguito al momento non proprio ottimo dell'economia del paese.
Gli investitori stanno in parte uscendo dal real e dal Brasile in seguito anche al crescente clima di sfiducia sulla politica del paese, vedere anche la vicenda Petrobas con i rendimenti da junk che hanno raggiunto queste obbligazioni.
Il real che aveva addirittura toccato 2,90, siamo adesso a oltre 3,4
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Mediato a 73
no perpetual no party
Forumer storico
Quando escono i risultati di Raiffeisen?