Near
Forumer storico
Il soberano va al ribasso perchè più aafidabile?
Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1
- Creatore Discussione troppidebiti
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
tommy271
Forumer storico
I bond PDVSA sono vicini a quota recovery, molti soberanos sono ancora troppo cari.
Resta poi la questione se un'ipotetico default possa coinvolgere entrambe gli emittenti ... oppure solo uno dei due.
Near
Forumer storico
Lo short
lo dimentico sempre.
Quindi il bottom sarà presumibilmente il prezzo di recovery valutato ad oggi.
vedo comunque che restano esclusi i bond 2017/18 che continuano a quotare a prezzi non da default (anche se la curva dei rendimenti non è cambiata).
riky2013
Forumer attivo
I bond PDVSA sono vicini a quota recovery, molti soberanos sono ancora troppo cari.
Resta poi la questione se un'ipotetico default possa coinvolgere entrambe gli emittenti ... oppure solo uno dei due.
e secondo per quali opterebbero tenendo conto che pdvsa e sempre stato il loro forziere
Resta poi la questione se un'ipotetico default possa coinvolgere entrambe gli emittenti ... oppure solo uno dei due.
e secondo per quali opterebbero tenendo conto che pdvsa e sempre stato il loro forziere
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
8 Giugno :
No sign that the constitution is the solution
Maduro pivoted in the face of pressure to offer a Constituent Assembly as an “electoral” solution Neither the opposition nor the international community has viewed this favorably US sanctions loom, but only in the medium term if Maduro successfully avoids future elections A new hope or a phantom menace? Venezuela’s ongoing political crisis took an unexpected turn when President Maduro in early May announced a “popular and communal” Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. The move appears to have been aimed at defusing pressure from opposition street protests and international diplomatic scrutiny on the one hand, while on the other paving the way through a quasi-constitutional/quasi-electoral process for Maduro to indefinitely remain in power—notwithstanding minority status in public opinion. Anything but “normal” elections… Recall that there have been no elections in Venezuela since the opposition MUD coalition won a strong majority in the legislature (the National Assembly, or AN) in December 2015. In 2016, governmentfriendly courts and institutions eventually thwarted an opposition drive to hold a recall referendum on Maduro’s mandate (see Venezuela: Holy momentum stopper, November 2016 for background), while state gubernatorial elections due to take place by last December have been indefinitely postponed. While the government had successfully used the Supreme Court (TSJ) to effectively neuter the AN last year, the TSJ appeared to overreach on March 29, when it moved to explicitly assume the powers of the AN. That move elicited strong international criticism and was rejected by Venezuela’s Attorney General, Luisa Ortega Diaz, who labeled it a break in the constitutional order. The TSJ hastily and partially reversed its ruling, but what the opposition calls an “ongoing coup” nonetheless sparked strong street protests that have lasted more than two months now. For Maduro, it seems the Constituent Assembly is both a mechanism to buy time now and maybe to stay in power over the long term. Indeed, if successful it features the “elegant” end-game solution to the existential problem of the end of Maduro’s presidential term in January 2019, which presumably would unavoidably necessitate elections. There remains significant risk to Maduro, however, that this power play could backfire. The Assembly initiative has done little to calm street protests, and has not led the opposition to participate in and legitimate a process that seems stacked to favor pro-Maduro forces. Moreover, and perhaps a bigger risk to the government, the Assembly has deepened the fissures in Chavismo. Attorney General Ortega Diaz has again taken the lead, formally challenging the proposal to tear up the 1999 constitution—seen as President Chavez’s “lasting legacy”. Her position has been publicly supported by a smattering of “institutionalist” Chavistas, mainly ex-officials, but presumably representing the opinion of larger segments of the movement. As it stands, the Constituent Assembly will be constituted in a July 30 election that will elect 543 delegates. Twothirds would be elected in direct elections, but with strong overrepresentation of sparsely populated, more Chavista, municipalities. The remainder would represent corporatist sectors defined and weighted to apparently favor progovernment groups. Beyond the criticism that the body would significantly stray from the constitutional enshrinement of “universal vote,” the 2017 constitution goes against the procedural precedent of Chavez 1999 Constituent Assembly—namely a referendum to sanction the process at the outset, and another referendum to approve the new constitution at the end. Maduro finally recognized on June 1 that a consultative referendum would in fact take place before the new Constitution could be approved, but opponents reacted with skepticism. It seems that the Assembly is likely to be constituted amid very low participation and highly questionable legitimacy. Subsequently it will likely take its time to write the new constitution, which would buy time for Maduro’s popularity to sufficiently recover before his 2018 term expires in order to try to force through the new magna carta. Again, the main risk to this already uncertain scenario seems to be a rejection from within Chavismo, especially if it gains traction from the armed forces. In the meantime, the United States appears to be studying more and harsher sanctions. Since 2014, direct sanctions have been on individuals in the Venezuelan government, either related to alleged human rights abuses or alleged narcotics trafficking and/or money laundering. A June 4 report by Reuters revealed US officials are at least studying options to sanction Venezuela’s energy sector, potentially impacting 755kbd of Venezuelan exports to the US and 84kbd imports from the US, not to mention activity of US service providers and upstream JV partners inside Venezuela. The same article says officials recognize the potential such a measure could have to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, as well as to upset regional diplomacy. In our view, drastic sanctions are not imminent, and are only likely if and when the Maduro administration finally abandons all democratic pretext, avoiding the possibility of regime change via free and fair elections in 2018. Completed 08 Jun 2017 12:44 PM EDT Disseminated 08 Jun 2017 10:56 PM EDT T
No sign that the constitution is the solution
Maduro pivoted in the face of pressure to offer a Constituent Assembly as an “electoral” solution Neither the opposition nor the international community has viewed this favorably US sanctions loom, but only in the medium term if Maduro successfully avoids future elections A new hope or a phantom menace? Venezuela’s ongoing political crisis took an unexpected turn when President Maduro in early May announced a “popular and communal” Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. The move appears to have been aimed at defusing pressure from opposition street protests and international diplomatic scrutiny on the one hand, while on the other paving the way through a quasi-constitutional/quasi-electoral process for Maduro to indefinitely remain in power—notwithstanding minority status in public opinion. Anything but “normal” elections… Recall that there have been no elections in Venezuela since the opposition MUD coalition won a strong majority in the legislature (the National Assembly, or AN) in December 2015. In 2016, governmentfriendly courts and institutions eventually thwarted an opposition drive to hold a recall referendum on Maduro’s mandate (see Venezuela: Holy momentum stopper, November 2016 for background), while state gubernatorial elections due to take place by last December have been indefinitely postponed. While the government had successfully used the Supreme Court (TSJ) to effectively neuter the AN last year, the TSJ appeared to overreach on March 29, when it moved to explicitly assume the powers of the AN. That move elicited strong international criticism and was rejected by Venezuela’s Attorney General, Luisa Ortega Diaz, who labeled it a break in the constitutional order. The TSJ hastily and partially reversed its ruling, but what the opposition calls an “ongoing coup” nonetheless sparked strong street protests that have lasted more than two months now. For Maduro, it seems the Constituent Assembly is both a mechanism to buy time now and maybe to stay in power over the long term. Indeed, if successful it features the “elegant” end-game solution to the existential problem of the end of Maduro’s presidential term in January 2019, which presumably would unavoidably necessitate elections. There remains significant risk to Maduro, however, that this power play could backfire. The Assembly initiative has done little to calm street protests, and has not led the opposition to participate in and legitimate a process that seems stacked to favor pro-Maduro forces. Moreover, and perhaps a bigger risk to the government, the Assembly has deepened the fissures in Chavismo. Attorney General Ortega Diaz has again taken the lead, formally challenging the proposal to tear up the 1999 constitution—seen as President Chavez’s “lasting legacy”. Her position has been publicly supported by a smattering of “institutionalist” Chavistas, mainly ex-officials, but presumably representing the opinion of larger segments of the movement. As it stands, the Constituent Assembly will be constituted in a July 30 election that will elect 543 delegates. Twothirds would be elected in direct elections, but with strong overrepresentation of sparsely populated, more Chavista, municipalities. The remainder would represent corporatist sectors defined and weighted to apparently favor progovernment groups. Beyond the criticism that the body would significantly stray from the constitutional enshrinement of “universal vote,” the 2017 constitution goes against the procedural precedent of Chavez 1999 Constituent Assembly—namely a referendum to sanction the process at the outset, and another referendum to approve the new constitution at the end. Maduro finally recognized on June 1 that a consultative referendum would in fact take place before the new Constitution could be approved, but opponents reacted with skepticism. It seems that the Assembly is likely to be constituted amid very low participation and highly questionable legitimacy. Subsequently it will likely take its time to write the new constitution, which would buy time for Maduro’s popularity to sufficiently recover before his 2018 term expires in order to try to force through the new magna carta. Again, the main risk to this already uncertain scenario seems to be a rejection from within Chavismo, especially if it gains traction from the armed forces. In the meantime, the United States appears to be studying more and harsher sanctions. Since 2014, direct sanctions have been on individuals in the Venezuelan government, either related to alleged human rights abuses or alleged narcotics trafficking and/or money laundering. A June 4 report by Reuters revealed US officials are at least studying options to sanction Venezuela’s energy sector, potentially impacting 755kbd of Venezuelan exports to the US and 84kbd imports from the US, not to mention activity of US service providers and upstream JV partners inside Venezuela. The same article says officials recognize the potential such a measure could have to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, as well as to upset regional diplomacy. In our view, drastic sanctions are not imminent, and are only likely if and when the Maduro administration finally abandons all democratic pretext, avoiding the possibility of regime change via free and fair elections in 2018. Completed 08 Jun 2017 12:44 PM EDT Disseminated 08 Jun 2017 10:56 PM EDT T
tommy271
Forumer storico
GNB reprime manifestación opositora en al menos cuatro de los 11 puntos de concentración en Caracas (Fotos)
Jun 10, 2017 2:40 pm
La GNB reprime a opositores en al menos cuatro de los once puntos de concentración en Caracas. Foto: Luis Gonzalo Pérez
La Guardia Nacional Bolivariana (GNB) reprimió este sábado la manifestación opositora convocada por la Unidad Democrática en Caracas, en al menos cuatro de los once puntos de concentración.
LaPatilla.com
El primer punto donde comenzaron las acciones violentas por parte de los cuerpos de seguridad fue La Candelaria. Le siguió Montalbá, luego la parroquia La Vega y se le sumó Bello Monte.
Desde más temprano, la oposición se moviliza en la ciudad capital desde 11 puntos de concentración en rechazo a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente que pretende imponer el presidente, Nicolás Maduro.
Desde las 10:00 am, cientos de venezolanos comenzaron a concentrarse en: Santa Mónica (Crema Paraíso), El Valle (Longaray), Coche, El Paraíso (Multiplaza), Montalbán (La Villa), Maternidad, El Cementerio, La Candelaria (Parque Caracas), Bello Monte, Plaza Altamira y el Distribuidor Santa Fe. Esto para luego movilizarse hacia la avenida Victoria del centro de la ciudad.
La actividad de retrasó unas horas debido al mal tiempo. Sin embargo, cerca de la 01:00 de la tarde ya se comenzaba a acercar más gente a la plaza Altamira. Finalmente cerca de las 02:00 de la tarde, la movilización comenzó desde los distintos puntos.
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Punto de concentración Bello Monte. Foto: Eduardo Ríos / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
Jun 10, 2017 2:40 pm
La GNB reprime a opositores en al menos cuatro de los once puntos de concentración en Caracas. Foto: Luis Gonzalo Pérez
La Guardia Nacional Bolivariana (GNB) reprimió este sábado la manifestación opositora convocada por la Unidad Democrática en Caracas, en al menos cuatro de los once puntos de concentración.
LaPatilla.com
El primer punto donde comenzaron las acciones violentas por parte de los cuerpos de seguridad fue La Candelaria. Le siguió Montalbá, luego la parroquia La Vega y se le sumó Bello Monte.
Desde más temprano, la oposición se moviliza en la ciudad capital desde 11 puntos de concentración en rechazo a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente que pretende imponer el presidente, Nicolás Maduro.
Desde las 10:00 am, cientos de venezolanos comenzaron a concentrarse en: Santa Mónica (Crema Paraíso), El Valle (Longaray), Coche, El Paraíso (Multiplaza), Montalbán (La Villa), Maternidad, El Cementerio, La Candelaria (Parque Caracas), Bello Monte, Plaza Altamira y el Distribuidor Santa Fe. Esto para luego movilizarse hacia la avenida Victoria del centro de la ciudad.
La actividad de retrasó unas horas debido al mal tiempo. Sin embargo, cerca de la 01:00 de la tarde ya se comenzaba a acercar más gente a la plaza Altamira. Finalmente cerca de las 02:00 de la tarde, la movilización comenzó desde los distintos puntos.
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Oposición se moviliza en Caracas desde 11 puntos. Foto: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Punto de concentración Bello Monte. Foto: Eduardo Ríos / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
Así estuvo Bello Monte antes de la represión. Fotos: Régulo Gómez / LaPatilla.com
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
GNB reprimió a opositores en Bello Monte. Foto: esteninf Olivares / @esteninf
tommy271
Forumer storico
¡CRIMINAL!: Cerca de 50 afectados tras bombardeo PNB con gases tóxicos en edificio en Las Mercedes (FOTOS + VIDEOS)
Jun 10, 2017 5:35 pm
La Policía Nacional Bolivariana bombardeó con gases lacrimógenos el edificio Ítaca de Las Mercedes, ubicado al lado del Centro Comercial Tolón, reportan para LaPatilla.com.
“Muchos heridos y asfixiados”, reportó Régulo Gómez para LaPatilla.com. En otro contacto se pudo conocer que serían alrededor de 90 personas afectadas, de los cuales 70 serían por asfixia.
No obstante, versiones periodísticas han bajado la lamentable cifra a 46 afectados.
Jun 10, 2017 5:35 pm
La Policía Nacional Bolivariana bombardeó con gases lacrimógenos el edificio Ítaca de Las Mercedes, ubicado al lado del Centro Comercial Tolón, reportan para LaPatilla.com.
“Muchos heridos y asfixiados”, reportó Régulo Gómez para LaPatilla.com. En otro contacto se pudo conocer que serían alrededor de 90 personas afectadas, de los cuales 70 serían por asfixia.
No obstante, versiones periodísticas han bajado la lamentable cifra a 46 afectados.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs 2 (Fotos)
Jun 10, 2017 1:14 pm
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Este sábado, los petareños quisieron mostrar al mundo a través de una protesta pacífica, el nivel inflacionario que hay en el país.
Al menos tres mil billetes de esta denominación se requirieron para construir la gran pancarta.
A continuación le presentamos lo que simboliza un dólar en billetes de Bs. 2:
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
(La Patilla)
Lea también:
¡Esto es UN dólar! Explicación de la inflación en Venezuela nivel… billetes de Bs. 2 (Video)
Jun 10, 2017 1:14 pm
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Este sábado, los petareños quisieron mostrar al mundo a través de una protesta pacífica, el nivel inflacionario que hay en el país.
Al menos tres mil billetes de esta denominación se requirieron para construir la gran pancarta.
A continuación le presentamos lo que simboliza un dólar en billetes de Bs. 2:
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2 REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado
Esto es UN dólar en billetes de Bs. 2. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
(La Patilla)
Lea también:
¡Esto es UN dólar! Explicación de la inflación en Venezuela nivel… billetes de Bs. 2 (Video)
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