Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1 (6 lettori)

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tommy271

Forumer storico
Econométrica‏ @Econometrica

#Venezuela #Divisas #Petróleo #Bonos El $ paralelo cerró, la semana pasada, con un incremento de 82,71%, el más destacado del dashboard:

DGu7Pi2XkAEmrTW.jpg
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Ricardo Hausmann‏ @ricardo_hausman

A truly important article. Today's Lima declaration makes it clear that whoever finances this government will possess odious debt.


Miguel Angel Santos‏ @miguelsantos12

"A judge could find that holders of Maduro bonds must have known they were transacting with an illegitimate agent"

***

Maduro bonds


By Mitu Gulati

Showing an admirable love of alliteration, President Trump announced on July 17 that retaliation would be “strong and swift” if President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela conducted an election for a new Constituent Assembly. The reason for creating this new legislative body was to replace the existing National Assembly, which was refusing to do the bidding of the Maduro administration.

President Maduro went ahead with the election and the US response was swift but not particularly strong. The day after the election, US officials issued a number of statements condemning President Maduro’s actions, but the sanctions that followed – personal sanctions on President Maduro – were wimpy.


A question on the table is whether the Maduro administration now has carte blanche to push through deals, with the approval of its new Constituent Assembly, that the National Assembly would not have approved. Already, there are rumors of a deal where holders of Venezuelan bonds will be offered a swap; in exchange for granting the Maduro administration short-term debt relief, investors will get a new set of bonds (Maduro bonds), with more favorable terms for later payment.

Why would any investor would want to do such a deal, when it knows that a successor administration will probably want to repudiate the deal? The answer lies in international law: the rule of governmental succession. Successor governments are bound by the agreements of their predecessors, differences in political philosophies notwithstanding.

Yet legal rules have exceptions. Below are two lines of attack that a holder of Maduro bonds might face in the future.

1. Misbehaving Agent

Imagine you made a loan to a company. Would a court help you get repaid if you made the loan through an agent who you knew was not authorized to conduct such transactions for the company? Or if you transacted with a company representative who you knew planned to steal the funds? Agency law says no.

Along those lines, a post-Maduro government could argue that the Maduro bonds were not properly authorized by a representative body, claiming that authorization by the pro-Maduro Constituent Assembly was obviously inadequate, and that investors would have known that.

Relevant to the judge might be the statements made by US officials in response to the election of the Constituent Assembly. President Trump said: “Maduro is not just a bad leader, he is a dictator.” Treasury Secretary Mnuchin called the election of the Constituent Assembly “illegitimate” and in “disregard [of the] will of the people”. UN Ambassador Haley, tweeted “Maduro’s sham election is another step toward dictatorship” and “we won’t accept an illegit govt”. Similar pronouncements are readily available from senior officials for the EU, the Vatican, the UK, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and so on.

Put all that together and a judge could find that the holders of Maduro bonds must have known that they were transacting with an unrepresentative or illegitimate agent of the people.

And things could get worse. Agency law goes beyond merely voiding the contract between the principal and the third party; a third party who suborns a betrayal of trust by the agent may be answerable in tort to the principal.

The negotiations between Spain and the US after the Spanish-American war of 1898 provide an analogy. Spain, having lost and ceded Cuba to the US, argued that Spanish debts backed by Cuban revenue streams were now those of the US – citing the rule that along with a transfer of sovereignty came the transfer of sovereign obligations. The Americans rejected this claim on three grounds:

First, the loans had not been contracted for the benefit of Cuba; indeed, a portion of the proceeds had been spent to suppress rebellions in the island. Second, the Cuban people had not consented to the debts; they had been imposed by Spain. Finally, the creditors knew that the pledges of Cuban revenues had been given in the context of efforts to suppress freedom struggle. Creditors therefore, to quote a leading treatise of the time, “took the obvious chances of their investment on so precarious a security”.

The foregoing argument is strong on the facts – the agents here are obviously misbehaving and everyone knows it. The weakness is in the law. While courts readily accept the argument that a CEO is an agent of the company, with legal obligations that third parties should know about, it is less clear that they will be willing to view the relationship between a government and its people in that fashion. That said, international law in the post World War II era has been moving more and more in this direction.

2. Unauthorized Transaction

A related, but different approach might argue that the Maduro bonds are void because they were issued in violation of Venezuelan law; specifically, the need for National Assembly approval that is specified in current law. Unlike the agency argument that has good facts, but could use stronger law, this second argument is strong on the law but might need better facts.

US law dating back to the 19th century says that municipal obligations issued in violation of law are void. The courts will not even allow investors to collect based on equitable principles.

The facts, however, may be weak. The Maduro bonds will presumably be issued in compliance with future Venezuelan law as such law shall have been promulgated by the Constituent Assembly. It is the Constituent Assembly itself and all of its works that the post-Maduro government must argue are unauthorized, invalid and illegitimate. And the longer that the Constituent Assembly stays in power, and makes the laws of the country, the more it begins to look like the real legislature.

Bottom line: While neither of the foregoing arguments is a slam dunk, Maduro bonds will come with a real risk of repudiation. How many investors will be willing to take it? And if there are none, maybe, just maybe, Mr Maduro will have to rethink getting rid of the National Assembly.

Mitu Gulati is a law professor at Duke University and has written recently on the question of How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
¿Qué está pasando con el precio de los bonos venezolanos?; por Víctor Silva // #EconomíaEnGráficos


Por Víctor Silva | 8 de agosto, 2017




La tensión política y económica vivida en Venezuela en los últimos meses ha intensificado la percepción de riesgo sobre los bonos de Venezuela y PDVSA. Así lo refleja la caída en las cotizaciones de los bonos de Venezuela y PDVSA durante el último mes.

El descenso en el precio de un bono señala un aumento en el riesgo y se traduce en un incremento en su rendimiento. La curva de rendimientos de los bonos de Venezuela y PDVSA se ha presenciado un importante aumento. Esto es una consecuencia de la caída registrada en los precios de los bonos. El mayor incremento en rendimiento se observa en la parte corta de la curva (menos tiempo para su vencimiento), reflejando el aumento de la posibilidad de impago en el corto plazo.

En el siguiente gráfico se presenta la comparación, hace un mes y hoy, de la curva de rendimiento de dichos bonos. En la misma se evidencia el fuerte incremento en el nivel de rendimiento exigido por los inversionistas en el corto plazo (3 meses). En el caso del bono PDVSA 8,5% 02/11/2017, el rendimiento al vencimiento (YTM) ha pasando de 87% (hace un mes) a 137% (hoy).

A pesar de la caída en precios observada en el último mes, aún no se ha alcanzado el mínimo histórico que se registró en febrero de 2016, cuando la caída en los precios del petróleo afectó de forma significativa la cotización de los bonos de Venezuela y PDVSA. A modo de referencia, presentamos la cotización histórica del bono Venezuela 9,25% 2027.

Sin embargo, a pesar de esta fuerte corrección, es importante destacar que en las últimas dos jornadas (2 y 3 de agosto de 2017) se ha registrado una recuperación acumulada de 7% en promedio en la cotización de los bonos, posiblemente explicado por la demanda de algunos fondos de cobertura (hedge funds) en medio de una escasa oferta. Otro factor que no podemos dejar de mencionar y que puede afectar la valoración de los bonos es la posibilidad de que se apliquen sanciones económicas a Venezuela, como fue advertido por el presidente de los Estados Unidos Donald Trump. Es una variable que, sin duda, afecta también a la valoración de los bonos debido a que se considera que sanciones económicas incrementarían sustancialmente la probabilidad dedefault.

All'interno del link i grafici: ¿Qué está pasando con el precio de los bonos venezolanos?; por Víctor Silva // #EconomíaEnGráficos
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
An Inconvenient Fact: Not all debt requires National Assembly approval
By
Claudio Rodríguez
-
May 8, 2017






You’ve heard it a dozen times by now. Members of the National Assembly keep repeating it. Hell, this blog does too: the government needs approval from the National Assembly to incur in any type of debt.

The government can kick and scream all it wants, but foreign creditors know the score: the regime’s debt deals that are being struck without Assembly approval, from the Fintech repo and all those PDVSA credit transactions, are wide open to legal challenge if the regime falls. I mean, article 312 of the Constitution is pretty clear, right?

The Assembly is already warning honchos in Wall Street not to borrow Venezuela any more money or else. It’s become holy word in the opposition’s political sphere.

It’s strictly politics: bluster from players who know they’re holding a weak hand and are trying to do the best they can with it.


The only problem is, if you have any kind of legal training, you can quickly spot big problems with this argument.


Article 312 in Detail


Let’s take a look at article 312 of the Constitution. At all of it, I mean:

“The law will set the limit of public indebtedness in accordance with a prudent level in relation with the size of the economy, reproductive investment and the capacity to generate income to cover public debt service. Public credit transactions will require, for its validity, a special law authorizing them, except the cases established by framework law (leyes orgánicas). The special law will indicate the types of transactions and will authorize the corresponding budgetary credits in the respective budget law. The annual special indebtedness law will be submitted to the National Assembly jointly with the Budget Law. The State will not recognize any other obligations than those incurred by legitimate bodies of the National Power, pursuant to the law.”

The highlighted bit is the bit that always gets left out of opposition talking points. There are explicit exceptions to Article 312’s principle that all debt must be authorized by law.

Article 150 is an obscure and hardly ever-cited constitutional provision that has been carried over in our constitutions again and again since the 19th century

Constitutions are usually declarations of principles from which it’s hard to extract definitive guidance to help you solve particular cases. That’s why there are laws and regulations. In Venezuela, most dispositions governing public credit are contained in the Ley Orgánica de la Administración Financiera del Sector Público (the Framework Law on the Financial Administration of the Public Sector). Title III of the Law establishes the procedures for public credit transactions, all the approvals and the procedures that must be followed when the Republic directly enters into public credit transactions.

Now, let’s take a look at article 101 of the Law:

“Title III…

…..Article 101. The following are exempted from this Title:

  1. The Venezuelan Central Bank El Banco Central de Venezuela.
  2. The Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Venezuela (BANDES).
  3. State-owned corporations dedicated to financial and insurance intermediation, governed by the Banking Sector Institutions Law and those governed by the Insurance and Reinsurance Companies Law.
  4. The corporations created or to be created pursuant to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law or those created or to be created pursuant to article 10 of the Decree N° 580 dated November 26. 1974, by which it was reserved to the State the industry of the production of the iron mineral…”
In other words, Article 101 fleshes out the exception established in the constitution’s article 312. Entities excluded from the authorization requirement include BCV, companies created under the Hydrocarbons Law, BANDES, public banks, public insurance companies and iron and steel companies. None of these entities need authorization from the Assembly to incur debt. And their credit transactions don’t need to be included in the annual indebtedness law (ley paraguas).

But you are probably thinking now that this article was rammed through theunconstitutional enabling law of 2015? It wasn’t, it has existed even before chavismowas a thing.

Find any PDVSA or BCV financing deal that was approved as a public interest contract by the National Assembly at any point between 1830 and 2017.

Neither PDVSA nor Banco Central have everrequested or gotten authorization from the National Assembly to incur debt. Try to look up any approval from the Assembly for the issuance of Venny bonds, you won’t find them, they don’t exist because they’ve never been required.

My guess is that this exception was carved out to protect what was seen as technically sound, smooth-functioning institutions during the cuartafrom political meddling by Congress in their operations.


Article 150 is no Better


The Assembly also cites article 150 of the Constitution to say that because these contracts amount to public interest contracts, the financings need AN approval:

“Article 150. The entering into of national public interest contracts will require the approval of the National Assembly in the cases determined by law.

No municipal, state, or national public interest contract can be entered into with States or foreign official entities or with companies not domiciled in Venezuela, not being assigned to them without the approval of the National Assembly.

The law may require in public interest contracts certain conditions of nationality, domicile or any other kind, or require special guarantees.”

Article 150 is an obscure and hardly ever-cited constitutional provision that has been carried over in our constitutions again and again since the 19th century, even though there’s little case law developing it. I don’t mean to get into a legal history lesson, but I challenge you to find any PDVSA or BCV financing deal that was approved as a public interest contract by the National Assembly at any point between 1830 and 2017. You won’t find them either.


The Correa Gambit


OK, so maybe under Venezuelan law it was all legal in some narrow, technical sense. It still shouldn’t count. After all, it was contracted by a dictatorial government, the very definition of “odious debt” any new government is entitled to disregard, right?

Well, odious debt is a dubious legal theory that originated during the peace negotiations after the Spanish-American War which is not recognized under international law. It has been used recently by lefties such as Rafael Correa as an argument to get out of paying foreign debt contracted by previous governments.

Do you really think the wisest thing we can do know is try to ñángara our way out of the mess chavismo left by quoting non-sense from freaking Rafael Correa before the foreign court that hears any dispute about the financings? This is just not what a seriousgovernment trying to solve the external debt mess left by irresponsible populistdoes.

Neither PDVSA nor Banco Central have everrequested or gotten authorization from the National Assembly to incur debt.

Look, I understand where the Assembly is coming from and I commend them for doing all they can to make life hell for the government. But it’s strictly politics: bluster from players who know they’re holding a weak hand and are trying to do the best they can with it.

The truth is that Venezuela right now is a devastated economy that produces almost nothing and spends a big portion of the cash it receives on servicing debts that never should have been taken on. The solution to this is assistance from multilateral institutions and attracting foreign investment by protecting property rights, economic liberties and reestablishing the rule of law. This will be carried out by a serious, market-friendly, well-advised, technically-sound new government that knows better than to misread the Constitution or to rely on flimsy legal theories to weasel out of paying our debts.

An Inconvenient Fact: Not all debt requires National Assembly approval

***
Articolo di un paio di mesi fa, sempre intorno ai temi di Gulati.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Cancilleres de América condenan ruptura democrática en Venezuela

Ago 8, 2017 11:30 pm


Cancilleres y representantes de 12 países de América condenaron el martes el quiebre de la democracia en Venezuela y desconocieron a la Asamblea Constituyente impulsada por Nicolás Maduro, al tiempo que favorecieron una salida pacífica a la crisis que atraviesa ese país.

AFP






En la reunión participaron delegados de 17 países pero, según informaron fuentes diplomáticas a la AFP, de ese grupo, el embajador de Uruguay en Perú, Carlos Barros, se retiró temprano y, los representantes de Jamaica, Santa Lucía, Guyana y Grenada, dejaron la decisión en manos de sus gobiernos.

Finalmente, suscribieron el documento Argentina, Brasil, Canadá, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Panamá, Paraguay y Perú, tal como consta en la Declaración de Lima, de 16 puntos.

En ella, diplomáticos expresaron “su condena a la ruptura del orden democrático en Venezuela” y “su decisión de no reconocer a la Asamblea Constituyente” electa el 30 de julio, ni los actos que emanen de ella por su “carácter ilegítimo”.

También resaltaron “su pleno respaldo y solidaridad con la Asamblea Nacional” (Parlamento), de mayoría opositora, “democráticamente electa”.

En el documento, suscrito tras siete horas de reunión en la capital peruana, expresaron también “su condena a la violencia sistemática a los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, a la violencia, la represión y la persecución política, a la existencia de presos políticos y la falta de elecciones libres”.

En el encuentro, que agrupó a representantes de países como Brasil, Chile, Argentina, México, Colombia y Canadá, los diplomáticos aseguran actuar “con pleno respeto a las normas del derecho internacional y el principio de no intervención, el cual no atenta contra los derechos humanos y la democracia”.

En su declaración, precisaron su “convicción de que la negociación es la única herramienta que asegura una solución duradera a las diferencias” y se ofrecen a apoyarla.

La Asamblea Constituyente, un “suprapoder”, legislará hasta por dos años –más allá de la culminación del mandato de Nicolás Maduro– para reescribir la Carta Magna de 1999 y al mismo tiempo tomar decisiones de efecto inmediato.

Para la oposición, que no participó en la conformación y elección de los miembros de la Constituyente, esta entidad permitirá que Maduro se perpetúe en el gobierno.


“Una dictadura”


La reunión se concretó luego de la decisión del Mercosur de suspender a Caracas por la “ruptura del orden democrático”, tras la elección y reciente instalación de la Constituyente, que es rechazada por parte de la comunidad internacional, entre ellas la Unión Europea, y considerada “un fraude” por la oposición.

Para el canciller peruano, Ricardo Luna, anfitrión del encuentro realizado en la cancillería, “lo que tenemos en Venezuela es una dictadura (…). En Venezuela se ha roto el orden democrático y se tiene una situación de facto”.

La ola de manifestaciones, impulsadas por la oposición para exigir la realización inmediata de comicios generales y la salida del gobierno, ha dejado 125 muertos en los últimos cuatro meses.

Los cancilleres americanos se solidarizaron también con la recientemente destituida Fiscal General, Luisa Ortega, quien mostró abiertas discrepancias con el gobierno de Maduro.

“No podemos admitir un régimen dictatorial entre nosotros ni permitir la continuidad del horror que vive el pueblo venezolano”, dijo el canciller brasileño, Aloysio Nunes.


Grupo de seguimiento


Otro punto de la agenda expresa su compromiso de “mantener un seguimiento de la situación en Venezuela, a nivel de cancilleres, hasta el pleno restablecimiento de la democracia en ese país”.

De acuerdo con el grupo de cancilleres, “Venezuela no cumple con los requisitos ni obligaciones de los miembros del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas”.

De la misma forma, resolvieron no apoyar ninguna candidatura venezolana en mecanismos y organizaciones regionales e internacionales y llamaron a detener “la transferencia de armas hacia Venezuela a la luz de los artículos 6 y 7 del Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas”.

“Chile no acepta golpes militares, autogolpes o levantamientos militares. Queremos que se restablezca el orden democrático quebrantado a través de una negociación creíble, sincera, con efectos reales”, dijo a su turno el canciller chileno Heraldo Muñoz.

Las cancilleres esperan volver a reunirse “a más tardar en la próxima sesión de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, oportunidad en la que podrán sumarse otros países”. Dicha Asamblea está prevista en septiembre.

Bajo las condiciones actuales, los participantes solicitaron a la Presidencia Pro Témpore de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) y a la Unión Europea, la postergación de la Cumbre CELAC-UE prevista para octubre de 2017.

Estados Unidos –severo crítico del gobierno de Maduro– no fue convocado a la reunión, previo acuerdo, para evitar que su presencia fuera malinterpretada.
 
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