Portafogli e Strategie (investimento) Dall'High Yield al Flight to Quality ... (Vol. IV): Cash is King (1 Viewer)

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Imark

Forumer storico
Un'altra notizia che volevo segnalarvi e che è sintomatica di come la ripresa del settore immobiliare USA tarderà ad arrivare (le stime formulate nel pre-Lehman, per una ripresa in tarda primavera 2009, andranno probabilmente riviste in chiave peggiorativa) riguarda la messa sotto osservazione con implicazioni negative del rating di 173 mld $ di RMBS (residential mortgage backed securities) aventi come collaterale i cd. jumbo loans da parte di Moody's.

Si tratta mutui residenziali "prime" (ossia di qualità elevata) che, eccedendo la soglia quantitativa fissata per le agenzie Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac a 417.000 $, non potevano essere da queste acquistati o cartolarizzati.

Sono peraltro i mutui accordati per chi acquista abitazioni di qualità alta o medio alta in molte zone degli USA.

Negli ultimi 6 mesi c'è stata una crescita dei livelli di tardività o problematicità nel fare fronte al pagamento delle rate da parte dei debitori senza precedenti per questa tipologia di mutui, il che induce Moody's a rivedere al rialzo le stime di insolvenza, ma anche, in forza di previsioni per un ulteriore calo dei prezzi delle case USA dell'11%, ad innalzare al 40% la stima media di perdite sui default sui jumbo loans.

Altre importanti info di dettagli nel pezzo del WSJ online, ripreso dal DJ Newswire.

MARCH 19, 2009, 6:36 A.M. ET

Moody's Puts $173.3B Of Jumbo RMBS On Watch For Downgrade


....

The RMBS are from 4,988 tranches issued from 2005 to 2008, and had an original balance of $240.7 billion.

....



In origine sì ... ma credo facciano riferimento ai valori correnti e/o alla circostanza per cui una parte delle trance juniores originarie potrebbero essere già marcite... probabilmente più alla prima circostanza che alla seconda... ;)
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Torna a salire il distress ratio sui bond HY, che da quota 60% di febbraio si porta al 65% di marzo. Il valore è cmq inferiore all'85% che si raggiunse a dicembre, in conseguenza del meltdown obbligazionario del post-Lehman.

Distress Ratio Is On The Rise Again, Article Says

NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) March 25, 2009--After falling to 60% this past month from a record high of 85% in December, Standard & Poor's distress ratio rose to 65% as of March 16, said an article published today by Standard & Poor's.

Standard & Poor's distress ratio is defined as the number of
speculative-grade issues with option-adjusted spreads above 1,000 basis points (bps) divided by the total number of speculative-grade issues.

The distress ratio is at one of its highest levels since the series began
in October 2002 and is considerably higher than the 22.2% in March 2008, according to the article, titled "U.S. Distressed Debt Monitor: Distress Ratio Rises In March—The First Monthly Increase This Year (Premium)." This runs alongside the recent increase in the speculative-grade spread, which finished at 1,483 bps on March 17, up from 1,383 bps a month earlier.

Among distressed bonds, the total number of rated companies with issues trading with spreads of 1,000 bps and higher is currently 438, up from 416 in the past month.

"Alongside an increase in the distress ratio, the amount of affected debt rose to $290.7 billion, up from $260.8 billion in February," said Diane Vazza, head of Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research Group. "Based on debt volume, the finance companies, media and entertainment, and telecommunications sectors together accounted for 45% of the total debt outstanding."
 

Imark

Forumer storico
La lunga marcia del default rate verso il picco di periodo segna ancora un passo avanti. La strada da percorrere resta lunga e tutta in salita. Di pari passo procede l'allineamento dei prezzi al recovery rate atteso per i bond HY delle fasce più basse.

In USA il default rate passa a marzo al 5,5% dal 4,9% di febbraio. IL dato è preliminare, soggetto a revisione. Le aspettative a 12 mesi sono per S&P (sempre per gli USA) per un d.r. a quota 13,9%, con possibilità di raggiungere il 18,5% nello scenario più pessimistico.

Default Rate At 5.5% Is No April Fool's Joke, Article Says

NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) April 2, 2009--Amid persisting economic and financial distress, the number of defaults in the U.S. continued to increase through March, said an article published today by Standard & Poor's. Relevant credit metrics in the U.S. show continued deterioration of credit quality and adverse lending conditions, contrasted with the first signs of life among new issuance.

The number of corporate defaults in 2009 continued the expansion seen at the end of 2008, with 13 more U.S. defaults in March, bringing the
year-to-date total to 38, according to the article, titled "U.S. Credit
Metrics Monthly: Default Rate Expands To 5.5% In March (Premium)."

All but two of the defaults in March hail from nonfinancial sectors, with
two failed credit unions representing the financial company defaults.

The preliminary estimate for the U.S. 12-month-trailing speculative-grade
default rate in March is 5.5% (subject to revision), higher than the 4.9% in February and much higher than the 1.48% reported in March 2008.

"We expect the speculative-grade default rate to escalate to a mean
forecast of 13.9% by February 2010, but it could reach as high as 18.5% if
economic conditions are worse than expected," said Diane Vazza, head of
Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research Group
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Un altro capito al quale intendevo dedicare un po' di attenzione, anche recuperando un articolo del Sole 24h, è quello riguardante il debito in scadenza da rifinanziare per emittenti corporate. Esso si attesta su valori molto significativi, ancor più se si considera che siamo in tempi di credit crunch, nel 2009 e nel 2010.

Se guardiamo all'Europa, ci soccorre con qualche indicazione questo bollettino di S&P che riguarda le esigenze di rifinanziamento del corporate europeo nel 2009 (329,9 mld euro) e nel 2010 (235,3 mld euro).

Sono valori molto significativi, e occorre considerare come ad essi si aggiungono le accresciute esigenze per gli stati nazionali di emettere debito, a sostegno del sistema bancario e di politiche di bilancio espansive, nonché il procedere degli sforzi degli emittenti corporate nel ridurre la propria esposizione al mercato della commercial paper, incrementando il ricorso al mercato obbligazionario nell'intento di aumentare la lunghezza del debito.

Se ne traggono una serie di considerazioni.

Gli emittenti HY europei - specie quelli nella fascia di rating più bassa o quelli operanti nei settori più ciclici - avranno notevolissime difficoltà a rifinanziarsi sul mercato obbligazionario nel biennio a venire.

Gli emittenti IG europei dovranno cmq continuare ad offrire spread allettanti rispetto al midswap se vorranno rifinanziarsi: per qualche tempo ancora, è difficile postulare un ritorno a rendimenti molto bassi, specie sulle scadenze medio-lunghe, anche da parte di emittenti attive in comparti merceologici difensivi ed ancor più di quelle in comparti ciclici (S&P menziona le costruzioni, l'automotive, il customer retail).

Le società a rating BBB appartenenti ai comparti con le esigenze di rifinanziamento più consistenti o a carattere più ciclico saranno quelle più penalizzate (auto, oil&gas, telecomunicazioni e utilities sono la categorie menzionate da S&P con riferimento alle dimensioni del debito, le prime due sono anche cicliche).

IMHO, resto convinto che la prima sia più esposta delle altre, dato che la seconda ha maggiori possibilità di preservare il margine attraverso riduzioni del capex, seppure scontando un minore livello di sostituzione delle riserve nel breve periodo e le altre due, oltre ad avere anch'esse tale opzione come più facilmente esercitabile, sono in più grandi generatrici di cassa, con un modello di business connnotato da minore ciclicità.

Sulle utilities, l'opinione di S&P è che esse continueranno comunque a beneficiare senza troppe difficoltà di un buon livello di accesso ai mercati del credito.

In ogni caso, l'agenzia segnala come fra le società a rating inferiore a BBB+ cresca in futuro (anche in virtù dei maggiori costi di rifinanziamento) la possibilità di violazioni dei covenants sul debito bancario e che l'approccio delle banche a queste situazioni dipenderà dalla sostenibilità del modello di business dell'emittente, ossia dai flussi di cassa che si attende l'emittente sarà in grado di generare in futuro.

Corporate Issuers In Europe Need To Refinance €329.9 Billion Of Debt In 2009, Says Report

LONDON (Standard & Poor's) March 31, 2009--Refinancings among rated European corporates are set to total €329.9 billion in 2009 and €235.3 billion in 2010, says a report published today by Standard & Poor's Ratings Services titled "European Corporates Face Significant Refinancing Risk In Extremely Difficult Market Conditions."

"We consider the assessment of refinancing risk to be an important component in evaluating credit risk," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Chris Dinwoodie. "For this study, we have collated data from over 550 rated European corporates to build a picture of the possible refinancing difficulties these companies may face in 2009 and 2010.

"In 2009, our data indicate that companies in the 'A' and 'BBB' rating categories have the largest absolute amount of debt to be refinanced--€130.5 billion and €115.4 billion, respectively. A similar trend is reflected in companies' debt maturing in 2010.

"However, refinancing risk in coming quarters is in our opinion greatest for speculative-grade credits. Among this group, companies in the consumer-facing sectors such as retail, auto, and construction that are most exposed to declining macroeconomic conditions will likely experience the greatest difficulty in refinancing their debt.

"For investment-grade companies, we believe that in coming quarters refinancing risk looms largest for those in the 'BBB' rating category. Again, this is in our view particularly true of sectors glaringly exposed to the downturn and having the largest absolute amount of debt to refinance, namely auto, oil and gas, telecommunications, and utilities."

As the report points out, when amounts that need to be refinanced are split by sector, it's the utilities sector that presents the largest absolute amount of debt maturing in 2009, with an aggregate figure of €62.3 billion. Telecoms, oil and gas, and autos and trucks also have large absolute refinancing needs, with totals ranging from €28.8 billion to €40.0 billion. Again, a similar pattern emerges by sector for debt maturing in 2010, albeit on a smaller scale.

While some utilities do require sizeable refinancing in 2009--mainly those with acquisition loans that need to be repaid or refinanced soon--we expect that the typically defensive, investment-grade characteristics of the sector would support our view that utilities rated 'A' and 'AA' should retain good access to banks and the bond markets.

Overall, the companies best positioned to manage refinancing risk and retain the confidence of lenders and investors are in our opinion those rated 'A' and higher, and those with relatively strong balance sheet cash positions, positive free operating cash flow, and discretionary cash flow that can alleviate refinancing pressure.

In our opinion, there are mitigating factors for companies with high levels of refinancing risk. Many issuers have strong cash balances and have prefunded future debt maturities or operational funding needs.

Access to the capital markets is another factor. Although market conditions in the bond and bank markets have deteriorated compared with 2007 and early 2008, and the perception is that market access has dried up in general, there is evidence to suggest that (sometimes substantial) pockets of liquidity exist.

In recent months, a number of companies in the 'AA', 'A', and to a lesser extent, 'BBB' categories have been able to successfully tap the bond markets, albeit for a cost. For companies rated 'BB+' or lower, we have observed that the availability of debt financing has declined sharply since the beginning of the market dislocation in mid-2007.

Based on the information we have today, we expect corporate lending growth from European banks to slow in 2009 compared with 2008, reflecting balance sheet constraints and the harsher economic environment. That said, we don't expect aggregate corporate lending to contract, although this may vary by subsector.

However, we observe that covenant breaches and default levels for companies rated lower than 'BBB+' are beginning to accelerate rapidly.

We expect that banks' approaches to customers' covenant breaches will depend on the outlook for the borrowers' cash flows. In our opinion, banks would continue to be supportive if the borrower has a sustainable business model, but they might otherwise move quickly to minimize their exposures
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Come si può vedere, il primo trimestre dell'anno ha segnato un robusto incremento delle emissioni corporate... in parte dovuto al rallentamento verificatosi lo scorso anno nel post Lehman, in parte allo sforzo di ridurre l'esposizione al mercato della commercial paper, in parte all'esigenza di rifinanziare debito in scadenza o di irrobustire la dotazione di liquidità disponibile.

I dati di fonte Thomson Reuters riportati nell'articolo (risalente, se non erro, al sabato scorso) riguardano però la totalità delle emissioni, e preciso che circa il 40% di esse sono di emittenti USA.

Corporate bonds fine mar 2009 sole 24h.jpg
 
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Imark

Forumer storico
Moody's e il default rate... come sapete, ogni agenzia lo calcola sugli emittenti da essa rateati... per Moody's, siamo al 7,4% negli USA a fine marzo, al 4,8% in Europa e al 10,2% Worldwide.

Il forecast sul default rate atteso per fine anno, è al 21,2% per l'Europa, al 13,5% in USA ed il 14,2% Worldwide. I picchi, leggermente più alti di questi valori, saranno realizzati verso fine anno.

Se l'ultima previsione dovesse rivelarsi esatta, il momento per realizzare un graduale rientro nel comparto sarà stato nella estate 2009.

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's: Steep Rise in Europe Q1 Spec-Grade Defaults; Continued Rise By End 2009[/FONT]
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[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]New York, April 07, 2009 -- The European speculative-grade corporate default rate over the prior year more than doubled to 4.8% in the first quarter of 2009 from 2.0% in Q4 2008. In the U.S., the speculative-grade default rate ended Q1'09 at 7.4%, up from 4.5% in Q4'08, reports Moody's Investors Service in its monthly default report. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]By comparison, the Q1'08 U.S. and European default rates stood at 1.8% and 0.7%, respectively. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's trailing 12-month global speculative-grade default rate finished Q1'09 at 7.0%, up from 4.1% at the end of Q4'08 and 1.5% at the end of Q1'08. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]"Overall, a total of 79 Moody's-rated corporate debt issuers have defaulted so far this year, of which 35 were recorded in March alone. By contrast, only 16 companies defaulted in Q1'08," said Kenneth Emery, Moody's Director of Default Research. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Most of the Q1'09 defaults affected North American issuers (58), while European companies accounted for most of the remainder (11). The majority of the defaults were by issuers in the Media, Chemical, High Tech, and Beverage, Food, & Tobacco sectors. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]"Measured on a dollar volume basis, the European dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default rate rose from 1.1% in Q4'08 to 4.0% Q1'09, compared with only 0.2% this time last year," says Mr. Emery. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]By comparison, the U.S. dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default rate ended Q1'09 at 11.3%, up from 6.6% in Q4'08 and 1.0% a year ago.[/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Globally, the speculative-grade bond default rate closed at 10.2% in Q1'09, almost doubling from 5.8% recorded in Q4'08. A year ago, the global dollar-weighted default rate was much lower at 0.9%. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's distressed index recorded 50.9% at the end of Q1'09, down from 54.6% in Q4'08. A year ago, the index was much lower at 23.4%. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]In the leveraged loan market, a total of 24 Moody's-rated loan defaulters were recorded in Q1, all by North American issuers, compared with only 11 loan defaults in Q1'08. The trailing 12-month U.S. leveraged loan default rate ended Q1'09 at 4.5%, up from 3.5% from Q4'08 and 1.5% in Q1'08. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]"Looking ahead, Moody's default rate forecasting model now predicts that the European speculative-grade default rate will rise to 21.2% at the end of this year, while the U.S. rate is due to rise to 13.5%," says Mr. Emery. Globally, Moody's forecasting model foresees a rise in the speculative-grade default rate to 14.2% by year end, with a peak of 14.6% in Q4'09. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's expects default rates to be highest in the Durable Consumer Goods sector in Europe and the Consumer Transportation sector in the U.S[/FONT]
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Deutsche Analyst: High Yield Defaults to Reach 53% Over Next Five Years

http://www.bearmarketinvestments.co...eld-defaults-to-reach-53-over-next-five-years

Occhio, l'articolo contiene un errore molto grossolano, accreditando Moody's di una stima di default rate pari al 29%, mentre gli analisti di Deutsche ipotizzerebbero un 53% nei 5 anni.

In realtà quel 29% è la stima di default rate Moodys massimo nel worst case scenario in un singolo anno, mentre la stima di Deutsche riguarda 5 anni.

Sui 5 anni la stima di Deutsche e quella di Moody's non differiscono più di tanto, atteso che Moody's stima il default rate sui leveraged loan (spesso più garantiti dei bond HY) nei 5 anni pari a circa il 40%.

Non ho visto il report menzionato in questo pezzo per il quale si postulerebbe un default rate a 5 anni del 29%, ma credo ci sia un errore nel riportare i dati, essendo inverosimile che il tasso di default dei leveraged loans risulti supeiore a quello dei bond HY...
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Se a questo giro i corporate bond HY (almeno quelli dei settori più aciclici e/o a rating di fascia relativamentente più alta) mostrano un andamento asimmetrico rispetto a quello dell'equity, può darsi che la fase più acuta del flight to quality sia effettivamente dietro le spalle... e sarebbero passati quasi 2 anni da quella estate 2007 che segnò il tracollo del comparto.

A me continua a sembrare presto, ma meglio distinguere i fatti (o meglio la lettura dell'andamento del mercato) dalle opinioni...
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Intanto in Europa il settore dei leveraged loans, parallelo a quello dei bond HY, ma di norma munito di maggiori garanzie a tutela del creditore, mostra anch'esso la corda.

1/3 dei leveraged loans monitorati da Fitch ha rating B- o inferiore e di questi ben pochi si salveranno nel prossimo biennio da un distressed exchange che garantirà un recovery molto più basso che in precedenti cicli di flight to quality.

E il ciclo delle ristrutturazioni del debito rischia di protrarsi ben oltre il 2010.

Entrambi interessanti i due report allegati, dovendo sacrificarne uno, leggete il secondo.

Fitch: Potential Heavy Losses Build for European Leveraged Investors

22 Apr 2009 4:52 AM (EDT)

Fitch Ratings-London-22 April 2009: Fitch Ratings says in a special report published today that the rapid deterioration in credit performance in Q408 and Q109 across many sectors as a result of worsening economic conditions, has exposed European leveraged investors to potentially heavy losses in the form of higher default rates and especially diminished recovery rates in 2009/2010 than in previous cycles.

"Default rates for European leveraged loan borrowers have increased substantially to 6% in Q109 including the effect of the latest distressed debt restructurings, compared with 1.8% at year end 2008" says Pablo Mazzini, Senior Director at Fitch's Leveraged Finance team in London. "As credit performance has continued to deteriorate in recent months, resulting in an increase of 'CCC'-rated credits, Fitch expects strong negative momentum on default rates to persist in the near term."

As of March 2009, 12% of Fitch's 288 privately-rated outstanding European shadow ratings are rated 'CCC' or below, compared with just 2% in June 2007 at the onset of the credit crisis, reflecting non-performing credits for which default is a real possibility as capital structures are unsustainable or due to near-term liquidity issues. Overall, the proportion of leveraged loans 'at risk', including credits rated 'B-*' (B minus) and with a Negative Outlook or Rating Watch Negative, has increased to 29% by March 2009. These are clear candidates for potential distressed debt exchange in the foreseeable future in the event they need further capital to survive. By end-2010, Fitch expects European leveraged loan cumulative 2008-2010 default rates to climb to, or even exceed, 20%.

Current credit performance illustrates that business plans for leveraged loans, especially for recycled deals that were structured in 2006/2007, were not designed to withstand a deep and potentially long and global recession.

The extent of underperformance against the original base case assumptions, of -5%/-11% on average relative to sales/ EBITDA respectively, based on the latest financial information analysed by Fitch generally through to Q408, and sometimes up to Q109, is not surprising as, as previously noted by Fitch, many business plans did not factor in any cyclicality.(evidentemente, gli faceva fatica... :-o)

Some financial headroom still exists under Fitch's more conservative and revised case assumptions.

However, for the distressed sectors, such as building/materials, autos and certain chemicals, the deterioration in credit performance has been so fast and severe that even the revised Fitch cases have often not been met in the most recent reviews.

This along with tighter free cash flow and liquidity headroom has driven rating downgrades for almost one third of Fitch's shadow rating actions taken in Q109, taking the average portfolio shadow IDR to 'B-*' (B minus) and increasingly into 'CCC' by March 2009, away from the 'B*'/'B-*' average in June 2007. Even so, the high proportion of credits on Negative Outlook or Rating Watch Negative, 37% by March 2009, continues to reflect the limited ratings headroom available across borrowers.

Fitch does not rule out the possibility of witnessing widespread forced debt restructurings in coming years, especially after 2010, as financial underperformance brings forward the refinancing risk that would otherwise arise after 2012 when bullet debt maturities are due.

As the evidence of low senior recoveries suggests from recent restructurings, as in Autodistribution and British Vita, the recreation of private risk capital will be key in the longer term to underpin valuations and allow a less painful roll over of leveraged loan exposures.

A copy of the report, entitled "European Leveraged Credit Review - Negative Momentum Accelerating in 2009", along with another report entitled "The Long March - The Outlook for European Leveraged Credit" also published today, is available on Fitch's public website, www.fitchratings.com
 

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